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CULTURE

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

BY
A. L. KROEBER
AND
CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF
WAYNE UNTEREINER

AND

APPENDICES BY
ALFRED G. MEYER

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.
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CULTURE

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTION

The "culture concept of the anthropologists and sociologists is coming to be regarded as the foundation stone of the social sciences." This recent statement by Stuart Chase [1] will not be agreed to, at least not without reservation, by all social scientists,[2] but few intellectuals will challenge the statement that the idea of culture, in the technical anthropological sense, is one of the key notions of contemporary American thought. In explanatory importance and in generality of application it is comparable to such categories as gravity in physics, disease in medicine, evolution in biology. Psychiatrists and psychologists, and, more recently, even some economists and lawyers, have come to tack on the qualifying phrase "in our culture" to their generalizations, even though one suspects it is often done mechanically in the same way that mediæval men added a precautionary "God Willing" to their utterances. Philosophers are increasingly concerned with the cultural dimension to their studies of logic, values, and æsthetics, and indeed with the ontology and epistemology of the concept itself. The notion has become part of the stock in trade of social workers and of all those occupied with the practical problems of minority groups and dependent peoples. Important research in medicine and in nutrition is oriented in cultural terms. Literary men are writing essays and little books about culture.

The broad underlying idea is not new, of course. The Bible, Homer, Hippocrates, Herodotus, Chinese scholars of the Han dynasty — to take only some of the more obvious examples — showed an interest in the distinctive life-ways of different peoples. Boethius' Consolations of Philosophy contains a crude statement of the principle of cultural relativity: "The customs and laws of diverse nations do so much differ that the same thing which some commend as laudable, others condemn as deserving punishment." We find the notion in more refined form in Descartes' *Discourse on Method*:

> . . . While traveling, having realized that all those who have attitudes very different from our own are not for that reason barbarians or savages but are as rational or more so than ourselves, and having considered how greatly the self-same person with the self-same mind who had grown up from infancy among the French or Germans would become different from what he would have been if he had always lived among the Chinese or the cannibals . . . I found myself forced to try myself to see things from their point of view.

In Pico della Mirandola, Pascal, and Montesquieu one can point to some nice approximations of modern anthropological thinking. Pascal, for example, wrote:

> I am very much afraid that this so-called nature may itself be no more than an early custom, just as custom is second nature . . . Undoubtedly nature is not altogether uniform. It is custom that produces this, for it constrains nature. But sometimes nature overcomes it, and confines man to his instinct, despite every custom, good, or bad.

Voltaire's [3] "Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations" is also to the point. To press these adumbrations too far, however, is like insisting that Plato anticipated Freud's crucial concept of the unconscious because he made an insightful remark about the relation between dreams and suppressed desire.

By the nineteenth century the basic notion was ready to crystallize in an explicit, generalized form. The emergence of the German word, Kultur, is reviewed in the next section, Part I. In developing the notion of the "superorganic," Spencer presaged one of the primary anthropological conceptions of culture, although he himself used the word "culture" only occasionally and casually.[4] The publication dates of E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture* and of Walter Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* are 1871 and 1872. Bagehot's "cake of custom" is, in essence, very similar to Tylor's "culture." The latter slowly became established as the technical term because of the historical associations of the word and because Tylor defined its generic implications both more sharply and more abstractly.

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[1] Chase, 1948, 59.

[2] Malinowski has referred to culture as "the most central problem of all social science" (1939, 588). Curiously enough, this claim has also been made by a number of sociologists — in fact, by more sociologists than anthropologists, so far as our evidence goes.

[3] Cf. Honigsheim, 1945.

[4] In a secondary source we have seen the following definition of culture attributed to Spencer: "Culture is the sum total of human achievement." No citation of book or page is made, and we have been unable to locate this definition in Spencer's writings. Usually, certainly, he treats culture in roughly the sense employed by Matthew Arnold and other English human-

Even in this century after "culture" was fairly well established in intellectual circles as a technical term, certain well-known thinkers have not used the word though employing highly similar concepts. Graham Wallas, while familiar with anthropological literature, avoids the term "culture" (he occasionally uses "civilization" — without definition) in his books, *The Great Society* (1914) and *Our Social Heritage* (1921). However, his concept of "social heritage" is equivalent to certain definitions of culture:

> Our social heritage consists of that part of our "nurture" which we acquire by the social process of teaching and learning. (1921, 7)

The anthropologist, M. F. Ashley-Montagu, has recently asserted that Alfred Korzybski's concept of time-binding (in *Manhood of Humanity*, 1921) "is virtually identical with the anthropologist's concept of culture." (1951, 251)

The editorial staff of the Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences (vol. I, p. 202) in their article on "War and Reorientation" correctly describes the position reached by the anthropological profession at about 1930:

> The principal positive theoretical position of the early decades of the 20th century was the glorification of culture. The word loomed more important than any other in the literature and in the consciousness of anthropologists. Culture traits, culture complexes, culture types, culture centers, culture areas, culture circles, culture patterns, culture migrations, cultural convergences, cultural diffusion — these segments and variants point to an attempt to grapple rigorously with an elusive and fluid concept and suggest incidentally the richness of such a concept. Concern was rife over the birth of culture, its growth and wanderings and contacts, its matings and fertilizations, its maturity and decay. In direct proportion to their impatience with the classical tradition anthropologists became the anatomists and biographers of culture.

To follow the history of a concept, its diffusion between countries and academic disciplines, its modifications under the impact of broader intellectual movements, is a characteristically anthropological undertaking. Our purpose is several-fold. First, we wish to make available in one place for purposes of reference a collection of definitions by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, philosophers, and others. The collection is not exhaustive, but it perhaps approaches exhaustiveness for English and American social scientists of the past generation. We present, thus, some sources for a case study in one aspect of recent intellectual history. Second, we are documenting the gradual emergence and refinement of a concept we believe to be of great actual and still greater potential significance. Third, we hope to assist other investigators in reaching agreement and greater precision in definition by pointing out and commenting upon agreements and disagreements in the definitions thus far propounded. Considering that the concept has had a name for less than eighty years and that until very recently only a handful of scholars were interested in the idea, it is not surprising that full agreement and precision has not yet been attained. Possibly it is inevitable and even desirable that representatives of different disciplines should emphasize different criteria and utilize varying shades of meaning. But one thing is clear to us from our survey: it is time for a stock-taking, for a comparing of notes, for conscious awareness of the range of variation. Otherwise the notion that is conveyed to the wider company of educated men will be so loose, so diffuse as to promote confusion rather than clarity.[5] More-

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ists. For example, "taken in its widest sense culture means preparation for complete living" (1895, 514). Cf. George Eliot's *Silas Marner*, Chapter I: ". . . Silas was both sane and honest, though, as with many honest fervent men, culture had not defined any channels for his sense of mystery, and it [*sic*] spread itself over the proper pathway of inquiry and knowledge."

[5] One sometimes feels that A. Lawrence Lowell's remarks about the humanistic concept of culture is almost equally applicable to the anthropological: ". . . I have been entrusted with the difficult task of speaking about culture. But there is nothing in the

over, as Opler has pointed out, the sense given the concept is a matter of considerable practical importance now that culture theory underlies much psychiatric therapy as well as the handling of minority problems, dependent peoples, and even some approaches in the field of international relations:

> The discovery and popularization of the concept of culture has led to a many-sided analysis of it and to the elaboration of a number of diverse theories. Since aberrants and the psychologically disturbed are often at loggerheads with their cultures, the attitude toward them and toward their treatment is bound to be influenced by the view of culture which is accepted . . . it is obvious that the reactions which stem from different conceptions of culture may range all the way from condemnation of the unhappy individual and confidence in the righteousness of the cultural dictate, to sharp criticism of the demanding society and great compassion for the person who has not been able to come to terms with it. (1947, 14)

Indeed a few sociologists and even anthropologists have already, either implicitly or explictly, rejected the concept of culture as so broad as to be useless in scientific discourse or too tinged with valuations. The German sociologist, Leopold von Wiese, says ". . . the word should be avoided entirely in descriptive sociology . . ." (1939, pp. 593–94). Lundberg characterizes the concept as "vague" (1939, p. 179). In the glossary of technical terms in Chapple and Coon's *Principles of Anthropology* the word "culture" is conspicuous by its deliberate absence.[6] Radcliffe-Brown and certain British social anthropologists influenced by him tend to avoid the word.

We begin in Part I with a semantic history of the word "culture" and some remarks on the related concept "civilization." In Part II we then list definitions, grouped according to principal conceptual emphasis, though this arrangement tends to have a rough chronological order as well. Comments follow each category of definitions, and Part II concludes with various analytical indices. Part III contains statements about culture longer or more discursive than definitions. These are classified, and each class is followed by comment by ourselves. Part IV consists of our general conclusions.

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world more elusive. One cannot analyze it, for its components are infinite. One cannot describe it, for it is a Protean in shape. An attempt to encompass its meaning in words is like trying to seize the air in the hand, when one finds that it is everywhere except within one's grasp." (1934, 115)

[6] Except that on p. 695 two possible deletions were overlooked, and on p. 580 the adjective cultural survived editing.

Part I

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE WORD CULTURE

GENERAL HISTORY OF THE WORD CULTURE

1. BRIEF SURVEY

As a preliminary to our review of the various definitions which have been given f culture as a basic concept in modern an- ropology, sociology, and psychology, we ıbmit some facts on the general semantic istory of the word culture — and its near- ynonym civilization — in the period when ıey were gradually acquiring their present- ay, technical social-science meaning.

Briefly, the word culture with its modern chnical or anthropological meaning was stablished in English by Tylor in 1871, ıough it seems not to have penetrated to any eneral or "complete" British or American dic- onary until more than fifty years later — a iece of cultural lag that may help to keep nthropologists humble in estimating the tempo of their influence on even the avowedly literate segment of their society. Tylor, after some hesitation as against "civilization," borrowed the word culture from German, where by his time it had become well recognized with the meaning here under discussion, by a growth out of the older meaning of cultivation. In French the modern anthropological meaning of culture [1] has not yet been generally accepted as standard, or is admitted only with reluctance, in scientific and scholarly circles, though the adjective cultural is sometimes so used.[2] Most other Western languages, including Spanish, as well as Russian, follow the usage of German and of American English in employing culture.[3]

Jan Huizinga says: [4]

> What do we mean by Culture? The word has emanated from Germany. It has long since been accepted by the Dutch, the Scandinavian and the Slavonic languages, while in Spain, Italy, and America it has also achieved full standing. Only in French and English does it still meet with a certain resistance in spite of its currency in some well-defined and traditional meanings. At least it is not unconditionally interchangeable with civilization in these two languages. This is no accident. Because of the old and abundant development of their scientific vocabulary, French and English had far less need to rely on the German example for their modern scientific nomenclature than most other European languages, which throughout the nineteenth century fed in increasing degree on the rich table of German phraseology.

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[1] Tonnelat (*Civilisation: Le Mot et l'Idée*, p. 61. ee Addendum, pp. 37–8, of this monograph) says f the development of the more general sense of ılture in French: ". . . il faudrait distinguer entre emploi du xvii^{e} siècle et celui du xviii^{e}: au xvii^{e} ècle, le mot 'culture' — pris dans son sense abstrait -aurait toujours été accompagne d'un complément rammatical désignant la matière cultivée: de même ue l'on disait 'la culture du blé,' on disait 'la culture es lettres, la culture des sciences.' Au contraire, des crivains du xviii^{e} siècle, comme Vauvenargues et 'oltaire, auraient été les premiers à employer le mot 'une façon en quelque sorte absolue, en lui donnant sense de 'formation de l'esprit.' Voltaire, par exmple, écrit dans la *Henriade*, en parlant de Charles K:

Des premiers ans du roi la funeste culture
N'avait que trop en lui combattu la nature."

ebvre (1930, discussion on Tonnelat, p. 74) remarks: La notion allemande de *Kultur* enrichit et complète notion française de *civilisation.*" In the same disussion Saen adds: "Le mot *culture*, dans l'acception e Herder, a passé en France par l'intermédiaire 'Edgar Quinet. Cependant Condorcet a déjà propagé n France des idées analogues à celles de Herder."

[2] The French Academy's Eighth or 1932 edition of s Dictionary gives "l'application qu'on met à perctionner. . . ."; then: "*culture générale, ensemble e connaissances.* . . ."; and finally: "par extension de es deux dernier sens, *Culture* est quelquefois mainenant synonyme de Civilisation. *Culture* grécotine. . . ." Today many of the younger French nthropologists use the word as freely as do English nd American.

[3] Tonnelat (*Civilisation: Le Mot et l'Idée*, p. 61. ee Addendum to our Part I) says that Kultur is "certainement un calque direct du français *culture.*" Febvre (1930, pp. 38–39) takes a similar view, citing especially the parallels between the 1762 definition of the Academy's dictionary and that in Adelung's (1793 edition). The present authors agree that both civilization and culture were probably used in French before they were used in either English or German. Our main point here is that for the generalized concept — sometimes called the ethnographic or anthropological sense, which did not emerge until the nineteenth century — the French came to use the word Civilization, the Germans Cultur and later Kultur, and that English usage divided, the British unanimously employing Civilization until Tylor, and in part thereafter to Toynbee, but Americans accepting Culture without reluctance.

[4] Huizinga, 1936, pp. 39–40. Huizinga does not proceed to a systematic definition of his own.

According to Germán Arciniegas, Paul Hazard observes that the German word Kultur does not occur in 1774 in the first edition of the German dictionary, but appears only in the 1793 one.[5] For some reason, Grimm's Deutsches Wörterbuch[6] does not give the word either under "C" or "K" in the volumes that appeared respectively in 1860 and 1873, although such obvious loan words as Creatur and cujoniren are included, and although the word had been in wide use by classic German authors for nearly a century before. Kant, for instance, like most of his contemporaries, still spells the word *Cultur*, but uses it repeatedly, always with the meaning of cultivating or becoming cultured — which, as we shall see, was also the older meaning of civilization.

The earlier usages of the word culture in German are examined in detail below.

The ethnographic and modern scientific sense of the word culture, which no longer refers primarily to the process of cultivation or the degree to which it has been carried, but to a state or condition, sometimes described as extraorganic or superorganic, in which all human societies share even though their particular cultures may show very great qualitative differences — this modern sense we have been able to trace back to Klemm in 1843, from whom Tylor appears to have introduced the meaning into English.

Gustav E. Klemm, 1802–67, published in 1843 the first volume of his *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit*, which was completed in ten volumes in 1852. In 1854 and 1855 he published *Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft* in two volumes. The first of these
works is a history of Culture, the latter
science of it. The first sentence of the 184
work says that his purpose is to represent th
gradual development of mankind as an entit
— "die allmähliche Entwickelung der Mensc
heit als eines Individuums." On page 18 of th
same volume Klemm says that "it was Voltai
who first put aside dynasties, king lists, an
battles, and sought what is essential in histor
namely culture, as it is manifest in customs,
beliefs, and in forms of government." Klemm
understanding and use of the word "cultur
are examined in detail in § 9 of Part I.

That Klemm[7] influenced Tylor is u
questionable. In his *Researches*, 1865, at th
end of Chapter I on page 13, Tylor's refe
ences include "the invaluable collection
facts bearing on the history of civilization
the 'Allgemeine Cultur-geschichte d
Menschheit,' and 'Allgemeine Culturwisse
schaft,' of the late Dr. Gustav Klemm,
Dresden." In his *Researches* Tylor uses th
word culture at least twice (on pages 4 an
369) as if trying it out, or feeling his wa
though his usual term still is civilization (p
1, 2, 3, 4, etc. . . . 361).

The tenth volume (1920) of Wund
Völkerpsychologie[8] is entitled "Kultur u
Geschichte," and pages 3–36 are devoted
The Concept of Culture. Wundt gives
formal definition, but discusses the origin
the term and the development of the concep
The word is from colere, whence cultus,
in cultus deorum and cultus agri, which latt
became also cultura agri. From this there d
veloped the mediæval cultura mentis;[9] fro
which grew the dual concepts of geistige a

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[5] Arciniegas, 1947, p. 146. "Le mot 'Kultur' — qui, en allemand, correspond en principe a 'civilisation' . . ." The 1774 and 1793 dictionaries are presumably Adelung's. He spells Cultur, not Kultur. His definition is given below.

[6] Grimm, 1860, contains *curios* as well as *Creatur*. In the lengthy introduction by J. Grimm there is nothing said about deliberate omission of words of foreign origin (as indeed all with initial "C" are foreign). There is some condemnation of former unnecessary borrowings, but equal condemnation of attempts at indiscriminate throwing out of the language of well-established and useful words of foreign origin.

[7] An evaluation of Klemm's work is given by R. H. Lowie, 1937, pp. 11–16.

[8] Not to be confused, of course, with his one-vo
ume *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie*, 1912, which
account of its briefer compass and translation in
English is often mis-cited for the larger work. Th
latter is described in its subtitle as: An Inquiry in
Laws of Development; the shorter work as: Outli
of a Psychological History of the Development
Mankind. The one-volume work is actually an evol
tionistic quasi-history in the frame of four stages
the ages of primitiveness, totemism, heroes and go
and development to humanity.

[9] Actually, Cicero (Tusculan Disputations, 2, 5, 1
wrote "cultura animi philosophia est." Cultus mea
"care directed to the refinement of life" and was al
used for "style of dress," "external appearance a
the like."

aterielle Kultur. Wundt also discusses the ighteenth-century nature-culture polarity l'homme naturel, Naturmensch); and he finds hat the historian and the culture historian iffer in evaluating men's deeds respectively ccording to their power or might and according to their intellectual performance — which last seems a bit crudely stated for 1920; however, it is clear that in actually dealing with cultural phenomena in his ten volumes, Wundt conceived of culture in the modern way.[10]

2. *CIVILIZATION*

Civilization is an older word than culture both French and English, and for that atter in German. Thus, Wundt[11] has Latin *ivis*, citizen, giving rise to *civitas*, city-state, nd *civilitas*, citizenship; whence Mediæval *ivitabilis* [in the sense of entitled to citizenhip, urbanizable], and Romance language vords based on *civilisatio*.[12] According to Vundt, Jean Bodin, 1530–96, first used civilizaon in its modern sense. In English, civilizaon was associated with the notion of the sk of civilizing others. In eighteenth-century erman,[13] the word civilization still emphazed relation to the state, somewhat as in the nglish verb to civilize, viz., to spread political *sic*][14] development to other peoples. So far Vundt.

Grimm's *Wörterbuch* gives: civilisieren: rudire, ad humanitatem informare, and cites ant (4:304): "Wir sind . . . durch Kunst und Vissenschaft cultiviert, wir sind civilisiert . . . u allerlei gesellschaftlicher Artigkeit und nständigkeit . . . " (We become cultivated rough art and science, we become civilized by attaining] to a variety of social graces and efinements [or decencies]).

If Kant stuck by this distinction, his *cultivated* refers to intrinsic improvement of the person, his *civilized* to improvements of social interrelations (interpersonal relations). He is perhaps here remaining close to the original sense of French *civiliser* with its emphasis on pleasant manners (cf. poli, politesse) and the English core of meaning which made Samuel Johnson prefer "civility" to civilization.

The French verb *civiliser* was in use by 1694, according to Havelock Ellis,[15] with the sense of polishing manners, rendering sociable, or becoming urbane as a result of city life.

According to Arciniegas, the Encyclopédie Française says: "Civiliser une nation, c'est la faire passer de l'état primitif, naturel, à un état plus évolué de culture[16] morale, intellectuelle, sociale . . . [car] le mot civiliser s'oppose à barbarie."[17] As to the noun *civilisation*, Arciniegas says that the dictionary of the French Academy first admitted it in the 1835 edition. C. Funck-Brentano makes the date 1838 for French "dictionaries," but adds that there is one pre-nineteenth-century use known, Turgot's: "Au commencement de la civilisation."[18]

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[10] In the remainder of the section on The Con- ept of Culture, Wundt discusses nationality, human- y, and civilization. Here he makes one distinction hich is sometimes implicit as a nuance in the English s well as the German usage of the words. Culture, Vundt says, tends to isolate or segregate itself on ational lines, civilization to spread its content to ther nations; hence cultures which have developed ut of civilizations, which derive from them, remain ependent on other cultures. Wundt means that, for istance, Polish culture which in the main is derivative om European civilization, thereby is also more ecifically derivative from ("dependent on") the rench, Italian, and German cultures.

[11] Wundt, 1910–20, vol. 10, ch. 1, § 1.

[12] To which Huizinga, 1945, p. 20, adds that the rench verb civiliser preceded the noun civilisation -that is, a word for the act of *becoming* civilized receded one for the condition of *being* civilized.

[13] However, we find that the 1733 *Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, Halle und Leipzig, has no articles on either civilization or culture.

[14] Governmental control as a means to Christianity, morality, trade?

[15] Ellis, 1923, p. 288.

[16] In the sense of cultivation, cultivating.

[17] Arciniegas, 1947, pp. 145–46. He does not state under what head this quotation is to be found, and we have not found it — see next paragraph.

[18] Funck-Brentano, 1947, p. 64. Both Arciniegas and Funck-Brentano are in error as to the date — it was the 1798 edition; Turgot did not use the word; and there was not only one instance but many of pre-nineteenth century French usage of *civilisation.* The history of the French word has been most exhaustively reviewed by Lucien Febvre in his essay "Civilisation: Evolution d'un Mot et d'un Groupe

We find in the Encyclopédie [19] only a juristic meaning for *Civiliser*, namely to change a criminal legal action into a civil one. The following article is on CIVILITÉ, POLITESSE, AFFABILITÉ. Incidentally, culture appears as a heading only in CULTURE DES TERRES, 20 pages long. In the French of the nineteenth century, *civilisation* is ordinarily used where German would use *Kultur*. One can point to a few examples of the use of *culture* like Lavisse's: "leur culture était toute livresque et scolaire;" [20] but it is evident that the meaning here is education, German Bildung, not culture in the anthropological sense.

The English language lagged a bit behind French. In 1773, Samuel Johnson still excluded *civilization* from his dictionary. Boswell had urged its inclusion, but Johnson preferred *civility*. Boswell [21] notes for Monday, March 23, 1772:

> I found him busy, preparing a fourth edition of his folio Dictionary. He would not admit "civilization," but only "civility." With great deference to him, I thought "civilization" from "to civilize," better in the sense opposed to "barbarity," than "civility."

This seems indicative of where the center of gravity of meaning of the word then lay. John Ash, in his 1775 dictionary, defines civilization as "the state of being civilized, the act of civilizing." Buckle's use of the noun in the title of his *History of Civilization in England*, 1857, might still be somewhat ambiguous in implication, but Lubbock's (Avebury's) *The Origin of Civilization*, 1870 which dealt with savages and not with refinement, means approximately what a modern anthropologist would mean by the phrase.[2 Neither of these titles is referred to by th Oxford Dictionary, though phrases from botl Buckle and Lubbock are cited — with contex of Egypt and ants! It must be remembere that Tylor's *Researches into the Early History and Development of Mankind* was five year old when Lubbock published. The Oxfor Dictionary's own effort — in 1933! — come to no more than this: "A developed or advanced state of human society; a particula stage or type of this."

Huizinga [23] gives a learned and illuminatin discussion of the Dutch term, *beschaving* literally *shaving* or *polishing*, and of its relations to *civilization* and *culture*. *Beschavin* came up in the late eighteenth century witl the sense of *cultivation*, came to denote als the condition of being cultivated, blocked th spread of *civilisatie* by acquiring the sense o culture, but in the twentieth century was increasingly displaced by *cultuur*.

Huizinga also points out that Dante, in a early work, "Il Convivio," introduced int Italian *civiltà* from the Latin *civilitas*, addin a new connotation to the Latin original whicl made it, in Huizinga's opinion, a "specific an clear" term for the concept of culture.

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d'Idées," forming pages 1–55 of the volume *Civilisation: Le Mot et l'Idée*, 1930, which constitutes the Deuxième Fascicule of the Première Semaine of Centre International de Synthèse, and which presents the best-documented discussion we have seen. We summarize this in an Addendum to the present Part I. On pages 3–7 Febvre concludes that Turgot himself did not use the word, that it was introduced into the published text by Turgot's pupil, Dupont de Nemours. The first publication of the word *civilisation* in French, according to Febvre, was in Amsterdam in 1766 in a volume entitled *L'Antiquité Dévoilée par ses Usages*. Febvre also establishes by a number of citations that by 1798 the word was fairly well established in French scholarly literature. Finally (pp. 8–9), he makes a case for the view that the English word was borrowed from the French.

[19] We had available the 1780–82 edition publishe in Lausanne and Berne. *Civiliser* is in vol. 8. According to Berr's discussion on Febvre, 1930 (as just cited i full in our note 18), p. 59, the participle from this verl is used already by Descartes (Discourse on Method Part II).

[20] Lavisse, 1900–11, vol. VII, I, p. 30, cited b Huizinga, 1945, p. 24. The reference is to the seventeenth-century "noblesse de robe."

[21] Quoted in Huizinga, 1945, p. 21; also in Nev English (Oxford) Dictionary, vol. 2, 1893, "Civiliza tion," under "1772 — Boswell, Johnson, XXV."

[22] For instance, Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* 1922.

[23] Huizinga, 1945, pp. 18–33. Dante's *Civiltà*, p. 2

3. RELATION OF CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

The usage of "culture" and "civilization" n various languages has been confusing.[24] Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines both 'culture" and "civilization" in terms of the other. "Culture" is said to be a particular state or stage of advancement in civilization. 'Civilization" is called an advancement or a tate of social culture. In both popular and iterary English the tendency has been to treat hem as near synonyms,[25] though "civiliza-ion" has sometimes been restricted to "advanced" or "high" cultures. On the whole, his tendency is also reflected in the literature of social science. Goldenweiser's 1922 introluction to anthropology is called *Early Civilzation* and all index references to "culture" re subsumed under "civilization." Some writers repeatedly use the locutions "culture, or civilization," "civilization, or culture." Sumner and Keller follow this practice, but in at least one place make it plain that there is still a shade of difference in their conception:

> The adjustments of society which we call civilization form a much more complex aggregation than does the culture that went before . . . (1927, 2189)

Occasional writers incline to regard civilization as the culture of societies characterized by cities — that is, they attempt or imply an operational definition based upon etymology. Sometimes there is a tendency to use the term civilization chiefly for literate cultures: Chinese civilization but Eskimo culture — yet without rigor or insistence of demarcation.

4. THE DISTINCTION OF CIVILIZATION FROM CULTURE IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

Certain sociologists have attempted a sharp opposition between the two terms. These eem to have derived from German thought. Lester Ward writes:

> We have not in the English language the same disinction between civilization and culture that exists n the German language. Certain ethnologists affect o make this distinction, but they are not understood by the public. The German expression *Kulturgechichte* is nearly equivalent to the English expression history of civilization. Yet they are not synonymous, ince the German term is confined to the material conditions [*sic*!], while the English expression may nd usually does include psychic, moral, and spiritual phenomena. To translate the German *Kultur* we are obliged to say material civilization [*sic*!]. Culture in English has come to mean something entirely different, corresponding to the humanities [*sic*]. But *Kultur* also relates to the arts of savages and barbaric peoples, which are not included in any use of civilization ince that term in itself denotes a stage of advancement higher than savagery or barbarism. These tages are even popularly known as stages of culture, where the word culture becomes clearly synonymous with the German *Kultur*.
>
> To repeat again the definition that I formulated wenty years ago: *material civilization consists in the utilization of the materials and forces of nature.* (1903, 18)

In a book published two years later, Albion Small expresses himself along not dissimilar lines:

> What, then, is "culture" (Kultur) in the German sense? To be sure, the Germans themselves are not wholly consistent in their use of the term, but it has a technical sense which it is necessary to define. In the first place, "culture" is a condition or achievement possessed by *society*. It is not individual. Our phrase "a cultured person" does not employ the term in the German sense. For that, German usage has another word, *gebildet*, and the peculiar possession of the *gebildeter Mann* is not "culture," but *Bildung*. If we should accept the German term "culture" in its technical sense, we should have no better equivalent for *Bildung*, etc., than "education" and "educated," which convey too much of the association of school discipline to render the German conception in its entire scope. At all events, whatever names we adopt, there is such social possession, different from the individual state, which consists of adaptation in thought and action to the conditions of life.
>
> Again, the Germans distinguish between "culture" and "civilization." Thus "civilization is the ennobling,

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[24] For a thoughtful discussion, see Dennes, 1942.

[25] This statement, of course, does not apply to one popular usage, namely that which identifies "culture" with "refinement," "sophistication," "learning" in some individuals as opposed to others.

> the increased control of the elementary *human* impulses by society. Culture, on the other hand, is the control of *nature* by science and art." That is, civilization is one side of what we call politics; culture is our whole body of technical equipment, in the way of knowledge, process, and skill for subduing and employing natural resources, and it does not necessarily imply a high degree of socialization. (1905, 59–60)

Another American sociologist, writing some twenty-five years later, seizes upon an almost opposite German conception, that developed primarily by Alfred Weber in his *Prinzipielles zur Kultursoziologie*. MacIver thus equates "civilization" with means, and "culture" with ends:

> . . . The contrast between means and ends, between the apparatus of living and the expressions of our life. The former we call civilization, the latter culture. By civilization, then, we mean the whole mechanism and organization which man has devised in his endeavor to control the conditions of life . . . Culture on the other hand is the expression of our nature in our modes of living and thinking, in our everyday intercourse, in art, in literature, in religion, in recreation and enjoyment . . . The realm of culture . . . is the realm of values, of styles, of emotional attachments, of intellectual adventures. Culture then is the antithesis of civilization. (1931, 226) [26]

Merton has criticized MacIver's position, provided a restatement of Weber, and supplied some refinements of his own:

> . . . The essential difficulty with such a distinction [as MacIver's] is that it is ultimately based upon differences in motivation. But different motives may be basic to the same social activity or cultural activity . . . Obviously, a set of categories as flexible as this is inadequate, for social products tend to have the same social significance whatever the motivation of those responsible for them.
>
> Weber avoids this difficulty. Civilization is simply a body of practical and intellectual knowledge and a collection of technical means for controlling nature. Culture comprises configurations of values, of normative principles and ideals, which are historically unique . . .
>
> Both these authors [MacIver and A. Weber] agree in ascribing a series of sociologically relevant attributes to civilization and culture. The civilizational aspects tend to be more accumulative, more readily diffused, more susceptible of agreement in evaluation and more continuous in development than the cultural aspect . . . Again, both avoid a narrow determinism and indicate that substantial interaction occurs between the two realms.
>
> This last point is especially significant. For insofar as he ignores the full significance of the *concrete* effects of such interdependence, Weber virtually reverts to a theory of progress. The fact which must be borne in mind is that accumulation is but an *abstractly* immanent characteristic of civilization Hence, concrete movements which always involve the interaction with other spheres need not embody such a development. The *rate* of accumulation is influenced by social and cultural elements so that in societies where cultural values are inimical to the cultivation of civilization, the rate of development may be negligible . . .
>
> The basis for the accumulative nature of civilization is readily apparent. Once given a cultural animus which positively evaluates civilizational activity, accumulation is inevitable. This tendency is rooted deep in the very nature of civilization as contrasted with culture. It is a peculiarity of civilizational activities that a set of operations can be so specifically defined that the criteria of the attainment of the various ends are clearly evident. Moreover, and this is a further consideration which Weber overlooks entirely, the "ends" which civilization serves are empirically attainable[27]. . .
>
> Thus civilization is "impersonal" and "objective." A scientific law can be verified by determining whether the specified relations uniformly exist. The same operations will occasion the same results, no matter who performs them . . .
>
> Culture, on the other hand, is thoroughly personal and subjective, simply because no fixed and clearly defined set of operations is available for determining the desired result . . . It is this basic difference between the two fields which accounts for the cumulative nature of civilization and the unique (noncumulative) character of culture. (1936, 109–12)

Among others, Howard Odum, the well-known regional sociologist, makes much the same distinction as Merton (cf. e.g., Odum, 1947, esp. pp. 123, 281, 285). To him also civilization is impersonal, artificial, often destructive of the values of the folk. Odum was heavily influenced by Toennies.

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[26] This conception is followed also in *The Modern State* and in articles by MacIver, and is modified and developed in his *Social Causation* 1942, which we have discussed in Part III, Group *b*.

[27] [Merton's footnote] This fundamental point is implied by MacIver but is not discussed by him within the same context.

However, the anthropological conception, temming back to Tylor, has prevailed with he vast majority of American sociologists as pposed to such special contrasts between culture" and "civilization." Talcott Parsons – also under the influence of Alfred and Max Veber — still employs the concept of "culure" is a sense far more restricted than the nthropological usage, but, as will be seen in 'art II, almost all of the numerous definitions ı recent writings by sociologists clearly reolve about the anthropological concept of ulture. This trend dates only to the nineteen-wenties. Previously, culture was little used as systematic concept by American socilogists.[28] If it appeared in their books at all, was as a casual synonym for "civilization" or ı contradistinction to this term.

Ogburn's *Social Change: With Respect to 'ulture and Original Nature* (1922) seems to ave been the first major work by an American ociologist in which the anthropological conept of culture was prominently employed.)gburn studied with Boas and was influenced y him. He appears also to have been cogizant of Kroeber's *The Superorganic*, 1917. Ie cites Kroeber's *The Possibility of a Social sychology* (1918). The appearance of Lowie's little book, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917), and Wissler's *Man and Culture* (1923), seems to have made a good deal of difference. At any rate, the numerous articles [29] on culture and "cultural sociology" which make their appearance in sociological journals in the next ten years cite these books more frequently than other anthropological sources, although there is also evidence of interest in Boas and in Wissler's culture area concept.

To summarize the history of the relations of the concepts of culture and civilization in American sociology, there was first a phase in which the two were contrasted, with culture referring to material products and technology; then a phase in which the contrast was maintained but the meanings reversed, technology and science being now called civilization; and, beginning more or less concurrently with this second phase, there was also a swing to the now prevalent non-differentiation of the two terms, as in most anthropological writing, culture being the more usual term, and civilization a synonym or near-synonym of it. In anthropology, whether in the United States or in Europe, there has apparently never existed any serious impulse to use culture and civilization as contrastive terms.

5. *THE ATTEMPTED DISTINCTION IN GERMANY*

This American sociological history is a eflection of what went on in Germany, with ne difference that there the equation of culture nd civilization had been made before their istinction was attempted, and that the equatg usage went on as a separate current even hile the distinction was being fought over. 'he evidence for this history will now be resented. We shall begin with the contrast f the two concepts, as being a relatively minor cident which it will be expedient to dispose of before we examine the main theme and development of usage in Germany.

The last significant representative known to us of the usage of the noun culture to denote the material or technological component is Barth.[30] He credits Wilhelm von Humboldt, in his *Kawisprache*, 1836,[31] with being the first to delimit the "excessive breadth" which the concept of culture had assumed. Humboldt, he says, construed culture as the control of nature by science and by "Kunst" (evidently in the sense of useful arts, viz., technology); whereas civilization is a qualitative improvement, a "Veredelung," the increased control of elementary human impulses (Triebe) by society. As a distinction, this is not too sharp; and Humboldt's own words obscure it further. He speaks of civilization as "die Vermenschlichung der Völker in ihren äusseren Einrichtungen und Gebräuchen und der darauf Bezug habenden Gesinnung." This might be Englished as "the humanization of peoples in their outer [manifest, visible, tangible, overt?] arrangements [institutions] and customs and in their [*sc.* inner, spiritual] disposition relating to these [institutions]."

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[28] Chugerman (1939) in his biography of Lester /ard states that *Pure Sociology* (1903) marks Ward's ansition from a naturalistic to a cultural approach. . A. Ellwood and H. E. Jensen in their introduction this volume also comment "In effect, Ward holds in *ure Sociology* that sociology is a science of civilizaon or 'culture' which is built up at first accidentally ıd unconsciously by the desires and purposes of en, but is capable of being transformed by intellint social purposes" (p. 4). But the anthropologist ho reads *Pure Sociology* will hardly recognize the concept of culture as he knows it.

[29] See Bernard (1926, 1930, 1931); Case (1924b, 1927); Chapin (1925); Ellwood (1927a, 1927b); Frank (1931); Krout (1932); Price (1930); Smith (1929); Stern (1929); Wallis (1929); Willey (1927a, 1927b, 1931). Abel (1930) views this trend with alarm as does Gary in her chapter in the 1929 volume *Trends in American Sociology*. Gary cites Tylor's definition and one of Wissler's.

[30] Barth, 1922.

[31] Barth, 1922, vol. I, p. xxxvii.

Next, Barth cites A. Schaeffle, 1875–78,[32] who gives the name of "Gesittung" to what eventuates from human social development. There is more connotation than denotation in this German word, so that we find it impossible to translate it exactly. However, a "gesitteter" man is one who conducts himself according to Sitte, custom (or mores), and is therefore thoroughly human, non-brutish. The word Gesittung thus seems essentially an endeavored substitution for the older one of culture. Schaeffle then divides Gesittung into culture and civilization, culture being, in his own words, the "sachliche Gehalt aller Gesittung." "Sachlich" varies in English sense from material to factual to relevant; "sachliche Gehalt" probably means something close to the "concrete content" of "Gesittung." Schaeffle's "civilization," according to Barth, refers to the interior of man, "das Innere des Menschen"; it is the "attainment and preservation of the [cultural] sachliche Gehalt in the nobler forms of the struggle for existence." This is as nebulous as Humboldt; and if we cite passages of such indefiniteness from forgotten German authors, it is because it seems worthwhile to show that the culture-civilization distinction is essentially a hang-over, on both sides of the argument, of the spirit-nature dichotomy — Geist und Natur — which so deeply penetrated German thought from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Hence the ennoblements, the inwardnesses, the humanizations as opposed to the factual, the cor
crete, and the mechanical arts.

Barth also reckons on the same side Lippe
— whose *Kulturgeschichte der Menschhei*
1886, influenced Sumner and Keller — on th
ground that he postulates "Lebensfürsorge"
"Grundantrieb" (subsistence provision co
stituting the basal drive), and then deriv
from this primary impulse tools, skills, ide
[*sic*], and social institutions.[33]

Barth's own résumé of the situation is th
"most often" culture refers to the sway
man over nature, civilization to his sway ove
himself; though he admits that there is co
trary usage as well as the non-differentiatin
inclusive meaning given to culture. It is cle
that in the sway-over-nature antithesis wit
sway-over-himself, the spirit of man is st
being preserved as something intact and ind
pendent of nature.

It was into this current of nomenclature th
Ward and Small dipped.

Now for the contrary stream, which, a
though overlapping in time, began and pe
haps continued somewhat later, and to whic
MacIver and Merton are related. Here it
civilization that is technological, culture th
contains the spiritualities like religion and ar

Toennies, in his *Gemeinschaft und Gesel*
schaft, first published in 1887,[34] makes h
primary dichotomy between community an
society, to which there corresponds a progre
from what is socially "organic" to what
"mechanical," a transition from the cultu
of folk society (Volkstum) to the civilizatio
of state organization (Staatstum). Cultu
comprises custom (Sitte), religion, and ar
civilization comprises law and science. Just
psychological development is seen as the ste
from Gemüt to Verstand and political d
velopment that from Gemeinschaft to Gesel
schaft, so Kultur is what precedes and bege
Zivilisation. There is some similarity
Irwing's distinction between Kultur des Wi
lens and Kultur des Verstandes. Whi
Toennies' culture-civilization contrast is fo
mally secondary to the Gemeinschaft-Gesel
schaft polarity in Toennies' thought, it

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[32] *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers.*

[33] Bernheim's *Lehrbuch* (6th edition, 1914, p. 60) also has culture and civilization refer to man's mastery respectively over nature and over himself.

[34] Later editions in 1912, 1920 — Barth's summa
in 1922, pp. 441–44.

implicit in this from the beginning. His frame of distinction is social in terms, but the loading of the frame is largely cultural (in the anthropological sense of the word).

Alfred Weber's address "Der Soziologische Kulturbegriff," first read at the second German "Soziologentag" in 1912,[35] views the process of civilization as a developmental continuation of biological processes in that it meets necessities and serves the utilitarian objective of man's control over nature. It is intellectual and rational; it can be delayed, but not permanently prevented from unfolding. By contrast, culture is superstructural, produced from feeling; it works toward no immanent end; its products are unique, plural, non-additive.

Eight years later Weber reworked this thesis in *Prinzipielles zur Kultursoziologie* [36] in language that is equally difficult, but in a form that is clearer than his first attempt, perhaps both because of more thorough thinking through and because of a less cramping limitation of space. In this philosophical essay Weber distinguishes *three* components: social process, civilizational process, and cultural movement (or flow: Bewegung). It is this work to which MacIver and Merton refer in the passages already cited.[37] It should be added that Weber's 1920 essay contains evident reactions — generally negative — to Spengler's *Untergang* that had appeared two years before.

Spengler in 1918 [38] made civilization merely a stage of culture — the final phase of sterile crystallization and repetition of what earlier was creative. Spengler's basic view of culture s discussed below (in § 10).

Oppenheimer in 1922,[39] reverting to Schaeffle's "Gesittung," makes civilization to be the material, culture the spiritual content (geistige Gehalt) of "Gesittung." To art and religion, as expressions of culture, Oppenheimer adds science.[40]

Meanwhile, the Alfred Weber distinction, with civilization viewed as the technological, subsistential, and material facies, and culture as the spiritual, emotional, and idealistic one, maintained itself in Germany. See Menghin, 1931, and Tessmann in 1930, as cited and discussed in Part III, *b*. Thurnwald, who always believed in progress in the sense of accumulation on physically predetermined stages, determined the locus of this as being situate in technology and allied activities, and set this off as civilization. In his most recent work (1950) the contrast between this sphere of "civilization" and the contrasting one of residual "culture" is the main theme, as the subtitle of the booklet shows: man's "ascent between reason and illusion." See especially our tabulation at the end of Part III, *b*.[41]

Nevertheless, it is evident that the contrasting of culture and civilization, within the scope of a larger entity, was mainly an episode in German thought. Basically it reflects, as we have said, the old spirit-nature or spirit-matter dualism carried over into the field of the growing recognition of culture. That it was essentially an incident is shown by the fact that the number of writers who made culture the material or technological aspect is about as great as the number of those who called that same aspect civilization. More significant yet is the fact that probably a still greater number of Germans than both the foregoing together used culture in the inclusive sense in which we are using it in this book.

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[35] Published, he says in "Verhandlungen 1 Serie I." It is reprinted in his *Ideen zur Staats- und Kultursoziologie*, 1927, pp. 31–47.

[36] Weber, 1920, vol. 47, pp. 1–49. Primarily historical in treatment is Weber's book *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie*, 1935.

[37] A comment by Kroeber is being published under the title *Reality Culture and Value Culture*, No. 18 of *The Nature of Culture*, University of Chicago Press, 1952.

[38] Untergang des Abendlandes. The standard translation by C. F. Atkinson as *The Decline of the West* was published in 1926 (vol. 1), 1928 (vol. 2), 1939 (2 vols. in 1).

[39] Oppenheimer, 1922, vol. 1.

[40] For Wundt's distinction, see § 1, especially its footnote 8.

[41] Thurnwald, 1950, p. 38: "The sequence of civilizational horizons represents progress." Page 107: "Civilization is to be construed as the equipment of dexterities and skills through which the accumulation of technology and knowledge takes place. Culture operates with civilization as a means." Legend facing plate 11: "Civilization is to be understood as the variation, elaboration, and perfection of devices, tools, utensils, skills, knowledge, and information. Civilization thus refers to an essentially temporal chain of variable but accumulative progress — an irreversible process . . . The same [civilizational] object, when viewed as component of an associational unity at a given time, that is, in synchronic section of a consociation of particular human beings, appears as a component in a culture."

We therefore return to consideration of this major current, especially as this is the one that ultimately prevailed in North America and Latin America, in Russia and Italy, in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, partially so in England, and is beginning to be felt in long-resistive France.

6. *PHASES IN THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN GERMANY*

At least three stages may be recognized in the main stream of use of the term culture in Germany.

First, it appears toward the end of the eighteenth century in a group of universal histories of which Herder's is most famous. In these, the idea of progress is well tempered by an intrinsic interest in the variety of forms that culture has assumed. The slant is therefore comparative, sometimes even ethnographic, and inclined toward relativism. Culture still means progress in cultivation, toward enlightenment; but the context is one from which it was only a step to the climate of opinion in which Klemm wrote and the word culture began to take on its modern meaning.

Second, beginning contemporaneously with the first stage but persisting somewhat longer, is a formal philosophic current, from Kant to Hegel, in which culture was of *decreasing* interest. This was part of the last florescence of the concept of spirit.

The third phase, since about 1850, is that in which culture came increasingly to have its modern meaning, in general intellectual as well as technical circles. Among its initiators were Klemm the ethnographer and Burckhardt the culture historian; and in its development there participated figures as distinct as the neo-Kantian Rickert and Spengler.

M. Heyne's *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 1890–95, illustrates the lag of dictionary makers in all languages in seizing the modern broad meaning of culture as compared with its specific technical senses. After mentioning "pure cultures of bacilli," the Dictionary says that the original meaning was easily transferred to the evocation or finishing (Ausbildung) and the refining of the capabilities (Kräfte) of man's spirit and body — in other words, the sense attained by the word by 1780. No later meaning is mentioned, although the compound "culture history" is mentioned.

H. Schulz, *Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch*, 1913, says that the word Kultur was taken into German toward the end of the seventeenth century to denote spiritual culture, on the model of Cicero's cultura animi, or the development or evocation (Ausbildung) of man's intellectual and moral capacities. In the eighteenth century, he says, this concept was broadened by transfer from individuals to peoples or mankind. Thus it attained its modern sense of the totality (as E. Bernheim, 1889, *Lehrbuch*, p. 47, puts it) "of the forms and processes of social life, of the means and results of work, spiritual as well as material."

This seems a fair summary of the history of the meanings of the word in German; as Bernheim's definition is the fair equivalent, for a German and a historian, of Tylor's of eighteen years earlier.

The earliest appearance of the term "culture history," according to Schultz, is in Adelung's *Geschichte der Cultur*, 1782 and, (discussed in § 7 and note 49), in the reversed order of words, in D. H. Hegewisch, *Allgemeine Uebersicht der teutschen Culturgeschichte*, 1788.

7. *CULTURE AS A CONCEPT OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY GENERAL HISTORY*

In its later course, the activity of eighteenth-century enlightenment found expression in attempts at universal histories of the development of mankind of which Herder's is the best-known. This movement was particularly strong in Germany and tended to make considerable use of the term culture. It was allied to thinking about the "philosophy of history," ut not quite the same. The latter term was stablished in 1765 by Voltaire when he used : as the title of on essay that in 1769 became he introduction of the definitive edition of is *Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Vations*.[42] Voltaire and the Encyclopædists vere incisive, reflective, inclined to comment hilosophically. Their German counterparts r successors tended rather to write systematic nd sometimes lengthy histories detailing how ian developed through time in all the conti-ents, and generally with more emphasis on his tages of development than on particular or ersonal events. Such stages of development vould be traceable through subsistence, arts, eliefs, religion of various successive peoples: short, through their customs, what we today vould call their culture. The word culture vas in fact used by most of this group of vriters of universal history. To be sure, a lose reading reveals that its precise meaning vas that of "degree to which cultivation has rogressed." But that meaning in turn grades ery easily and almost imperceptibly into the iodern sense of culture. In any event, these istories undoubtedly helped establish the word wide German usage; the shift in meaning ien followed, until by the time of Klemm, in 843, the present-day sense had been mainly ttained and was ready-made for Tylor, for ie Russians, and others.

In the present connection, the significant eature of these histories of mankind is that ney were actual histories. They were per-neated by, or aimed at, large ideas; but they lso contained masses of concrete fact, pre-ented in historical organization. It was a ifferent stream of thought from that which esulted in true "philosophies of history," that , philosophizings about history, of which Iegel became the most eminent representative. y comparison, this latter was a deductive, anscendental movement; and it is significant nat Hegel seems never to have used the word culture in his *Philosophy of History*, and civilization only once and incidentally.[43] This fact is the more remarkable in that Hegel died only twelve years[44] before Klemm began to publish. He could not have been ignorant of the word culture, after Herder and Kant had used it: it was his thinking and interests that were oriented away from it.

It must accordingly be concluded that the course of "philosophy of history" forked in Germany. One branch, the earlier, was interested in the actual story of what appeared to have happened to mankind. It therefore bore heavily on customs and institutions, became what we today should call culture-conscious, and finally resulted in a somewhat diffuse ethnographic interest. From the very beginning, however, mankind was viewed as an array or series of particular peoples. The other branch of philosophy of history became less interested in history and more in its supreme principle. It dealt increasingly with mankind instead of peoples, it aimed at clarifying basic schemes, and it operated with the concept of "spirit" instead of that of culture.

This second movement is of little further concern to us here. But it will be profitable to examine the first current, in which comparative, cultural, and ethnographic slants are visible from the beginning.

The principal figures to be reviewed are Irwing, Adelung, Herder, Meiners, and Jenisch; their work falls into the period from 1779 to 1801. First, however, let us note briefly a somewhat earlier figure.

Isaac Iselin, a Swiss, published in Zurich in 1768 a *History of Mankind*,[45] which seems not to contain the words culture or civilization. The first of eight "books" is given over to a Psychological ("psychologische") Consideration of Man, the second to the Condition (Stand) of Nature (of Man — in Rousseau's sense, but not in agreement with him), the third to the Condition of Savagery, the fourth to the Beginnings of Good Breeding (Gesittung, i.e., civilization). Books five to eight deal with the Progress of Society (Geselligkeit — sociability, association?) toward Civil (bürgerlich, civilized?) Condition, the Oriental peoples, the Greeks and Romans, the Nations of Europe. The implicit idea of progress is evident. The polar catchwords are Wildheit and Barbarey (Savagery and Barbarism), on the one hand; on the other, Milderung der Sitten, Policirung, Erleuchtung, Verbesserung, that is, Amelioration of Manners, Polishing (rather than Policing), Illumination (i.e., Enlightenment), Improvement. The vocabulary is typical mid-eighteenth-century French or English Enlightenment language put into German — quite different from the vocabulary of Adelung and Herder only twenty-five to thirty years later: Cultur, Humanität, Tradition are all lacking. While Europe was everywhere groping toward concepts like those of progress and culture, these efforts were already segregating into fairly diverse streams, largely along national speech lines.

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[42] As usually stated; e.g., in E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch*, h edition, 1914. But dates and titles are given vari-usly, due no doubt in part to alterations, inclusions, d reissues by Voltaire himself. Febvre, 1930, sum-arized in Addendum to our Part I, credits the *hilosophie de l'Histoire* to 1736.

[43] "Es ist ferner ein Faktum, dass mit fortschreiten-er Zivilisation der Gesellschaft und des Staats diese systematische Ausführung des Verstandes [in gebildeter Sprache] sich abschleift und die Sprache hieran ärmer und ungebildeter wird." (1920, 147; Allgem. Einleitung, III, 2.)

[44] His *Philosophy of History* is a posthumous work, based on his lecture notes and those of his students. It was first published in 1837.

[45] Iselin, 1768 (Preface dated 1764, in Basel).

K. F. von Irwing, 1725–1801, an Oberconsistorialrat in Berlin, who introduces the main German series, attempted, strictly speaking, not so much a history of mankind as an inquiry into man,[46] especially his individual and social springs or impulses ("Triebfedern" or "Triebwerke"). He is of interest in the present connection on account of a long section, his fourteenth, devoted to an essay on the culture of mankind.[47] Culture is cultivation, improvement, to Irwing. Thus: The improvements and increases of human capacities and energies, or the sum of the perfectings (Volkkommenheiten) to which man can be raised from his original rudest condition — these constitute "den allgemeinen Begriff der ganzen Kultur ueberhaupt" — a very Kantian-sounding phrase. Again: The more the capacitie of man are worked upon ("bearbeitet wer den") by culture ("durch die Kultur") th more does man depart from the neutral con dition ("Sinnesart") of animals. Here th near-reification of culture into a seemingl autonomous instrument is of interest. Cultur is a matter and degree of human perfectio (Vollkommenheit) that is properly attribut able only to the human race or entire peoples individuals are given only an educatio (Erziehung), and it is through this that the are brought to the degree (Grade) of cultur of their nation.[48]

Johann Christoph Adelung, 1732–1806, al ready mentioned as the author of the diction aries of 1774 and 1793, published anonymousl in 1782 an *Essay on the History of Cultur of the Human Species*.[49] This is genuine i highly summarized history, and it is con cerned primarily with culture, though politica events are not wholly disregarded. The presen tation is in eight periods, each of which i designated by a stage of individual human age so that the idea of growth progress is no only fundamental but explicit. The compari son of stages of culture with stages of individ ual development was of course revived b Spengler, though Spengler also used the meta phor of the seasons.[50] Adelung's periods wit their metaphorical designations are the follow ing:

1. From origins to the flood. Mankind an embry
2. From the flood to Moses. The human race child in its culture.
3. From Moses to 683 B.C. The human race a boy.
4. 683 B.C. to A.D. 1. Rapid blooming of youth of th human race.
5. A.D. 1 to 400 (Migrations). Mankind an enlightene man (aufgeklaerter Mann).
6. 400–1096 (Crusades). A man's heavy bodily labor
7. 1096–1520 (1520, full enlightenment reached).

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[46] Irwing, 1777–85.

[47] Vol. 3, § 184–207, pp. 88–372 (1779). This Abtheilung is entitled: "Von der allgemeinen Veranlassung zu Begriffen, oder von den Triebwerken, wodurch die Menschen zum richtigen Gebrauch ihrer Geisteskraefte gebracht werden. Ein Versuch ueber die Kultur der Menschheit ueberhaupt." The word is spelt with K — Kultur.

[48] The three passages rendered are from pp. 122–23, 127 of § 188, "Von der Kultur ueberhaupt."

[49] Adelung, 1782. Sickel, 1933, contains on pp. 145 209 a well-considered analysis of "Adelungs Kultu theorie." Sickel credits Adelung with being the fir inquirer to attribute cultural advance to increase population density (pp. 151–55).

[50] A fundamental difference is that Spengler applie the metaphor only to stages *within* particular culture never to human culture as a whole; but Adelun applies it to the *totality* seen as one grand unit.

man occupied in installation and improvement of his economy (Hausweşen).
. 1520–(1782). A man in enlightened enjoyment (im aufgeklaerten Genusse).[51]

Adelung is completely enlightened re-
igiously. In § 1 he does not treat of the crea-
ion of man but of the origins of the human
ace ("Ursprung seines Geschlechts"). Moses
ssures us, he says, that all humanity is des-
ended from a single pair, which is reasonable;
ut the question of how this pair originated
annot be answered satisfactorily, unless one
ccepts, along with Moses, their immediate
reation by God. But man was created merely
vith the disposition and capacity ("Anlage")
f what he was to become (§ 3). Language
vas invented by man; it is the first step toward
ulture (§ 5 foll.). The fall of man is evaded
§ 13); but as early as Cain a simultaneous re-
inement and corruption of customs ("Ver-
lerben der Sitten") began (§ 24). The Flood
nd the Tower of Babel are minimized (Ch. 2,
 1–4), not because the author is anticlerical
ut because he is seeking a natural explanation
or the growth of culture. Throughout, he sees
opulation increase as a primary cause of
ultural progress.[52]

While there are innumerable passages in
delung in which his "Cultur" could be read
vith its modern meaning, it is evident that he
lid not intend this meaning — though he was
nconsciously on the way to it. This is clear
rom his formal definitions in his Preface.
hese are worth quoting.

> Cultur ist mir der Uebergang aus dem mehr
> innlichen und thierischen Zustande in enger ver-
> chlungene Verbindungen des gesellschaftlichen Le-
> ens. (Culture is the transition from a more sensual
> nd animal condition to the more closely knit in-
> errelations of social life.)
>
> Die Cultur bestehet . . . in der Summe deutlicher
> egriffe, und . . . in der . . . Milderung und Ver-
> einerung des Koerpers und der Sitten. (Culture
> onsists of the sum of defined concepts and of the
> melioration and refinement of the body and of
> anners.)

The word "sum" here brings this definition close to modern ones as discussed in our Part II; it suggests that Adelung now and then was slipping into the way of thinking of culture as the *product* of cultivation as well as the *act* of cultivating.

> Die Cultur des Geistes bestehet in einer immer zunehmenden Summe von Erkenntnissen, welche nothwendig wachsen muss . . . .(Spiritual culture consists in an ever increasing and necessarily growing sum of understandings.)

And finally:

> Gerne haette ich für das Wort *Cultur* einen deutschen Ausdruck gewählet; allein ich weiss keinen, der dessen Begriff erschoepfte. *Verfeinerung, Aufklaerung, Entwickelung der Faehigkeiten*, sagen alle etwas, aber nicht alles. (I should have liked to choose a German expression instead of the word *culture;* but I know none that exhausts its meaning. *Refinement, enlightenment, development of capacities* all convey something, but not the whole sense.)

Again we seem on the verge of the present-day meaning of culture.

Adelung's definition of Cultur in his 1793 German dictionary confirms that to him and his contemporaries the word meant improvement, rather than a state or condition of human social behavior, as it does now. It reads:

> Cultur — die Veredlung oder Verfeinerung der gesammten Geistes- and Leibeskraefte eines Menschen oder eines Volkes, so dass dieses Wort so wohl die Aufklaerung, die Veredlung des Verstandes durch Befreyung von Vorurtheilen, aber auch die *Politur*, die Veredlung und Verfeinerung der Sitten unter sich begreift. (Culture: the improvement [ennoblement] or refining of the total mental and bodily forces of a person or a people; so that the word includes not only the enlightening or improving of understanding through liberation from prejudices, but also polishing, namely [increased] improvement and refinement, of customs and manners.)

Veredlung, literally ennoblement, seems to be a metaphor taken from the improvement of breeds of domesticated plants and animals.

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[51] The metaphorical subtitles appear in the Table
f Contents, but not in the chapter headings. For the
rst five periods, reference is to "mankind" (der
lensch) or to "the human race" (das menschliche
eschlecht); for the last three, directly to "a man"
der Mann), which is awkward in English where "man" denotes both "Mensch" and "Mann."

[52] Preface: "Die Cultur wird durch Volksmenge . . . bewirkt"; "Volksmenge im eingeshraenkten Raume erzeuget Cultur"; and *passim* to Chapter 8, § 2, p. 413.

It is significant that the application of the term culture still is individual as well as social.

Adelung's definition is of interest as being perhaps the first formal one made that includes, however dimly, the modern scientific concept of culture. However, basically it is still late eighteenth century, revolving around polish, refining, enlightenment, individual improvement, and social progress.

Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744–1803) *Ideas on the Philosophy of History of Mankind* [53] is the best-known and most influential of these early histories of culture. The title reverts to the "Philosophy of History" which Voltaire had introduced twenty years before; but the work itself deals as consistently as Adelung's with the development of culture. The setting, to be sure, is broader. The first section of Book I has the heading: "Our Earth is a Star Among Stars." Books II and III deal with plants and animals; and when man is reached in Book IV, it is to describe his structure, what functions he is organized and shaped to exercise. Book V deals with energies, organs, progress, and prospects. In Books VI and VII racial physiques and geographical influences are discussed. A sort of theory of culture, variously called Cultur, Humanität, Tradition, is developed in VIII and IX; X is devoted to the historic origin of man in Asia, as evidenced by "the course of culture and history" in its § 3. Books XI to XX then settle down to an actual universal history of peoples — of their cultures, as we would say, rather than of their politics or events. These final ten books deal successively [54] with East Asia, West Asia, the Greeks, Rome, humanization as the purpose of human nature, marginal peoples of Europe, origin and early development of Christianity, Germanic peoples, Catholicism and Islam, modern Europe since Amalfi and the Crusades.

Herder's scope, his curiosity and knowledge, his sympathy, imagination, and verve, his enthusiasm for the most foreign and remote of human achievements, his extraordinary freedom from bias and ethnocentricity, endow his work with an indubitable quality of greatness. He sought to discover the peculiar values of all peoples and cultures, where his great contemporary Gibbon amused himself by castigating with mordant polish the moral defects of the personages and the corruption and superstition of the ages which he portrayed.

Basically, Herder construes Cultur as a progressive cultivation or development of faculties. Not infrequently he uses Humanität in about the same sense. Enlightenment, Aufklärung, he employs less often; but Tradition frequently, both in its strict sense and coupled with Cultur. This approach to the concepts of culture and tradition has a modern ring: compare our Part II.

> Wollen wir diese zweite Genesis des Menschen die sein ganzes Leben durchgeht, von der Bearbeitung des Ackers *Cultur*, oder vom Bilde des Lichtes *Aufklärung* nennen: so stehet uns der Name frei; die Kette der Cultur und Aufklärung reicht aber sodann ans Ende der Erde. (13: 348; IX, 1)
>
> Setzen wir gar noch willkührliche Unterschiede zwischen Cultur und Aufklärung fest, deren keine doch, wenn sie rechter Art ist, ohne die andere sein kann . . . (13: 348; IX, 1)
>
> Die Philosophie der Geschichte also, die die Kette der Tradition verfolgt, ist eigentlich die wahre Menschengeschichte. (13: 352; IX, 1)
>
> Die ganze Geschichte der Menschheit . . . mit allen Schätzen ihrer Tradition und Cultur . . . (13: 355; IX, 2)
>
> Zum gesunden Gebrauch unsres Lebens, kurz zur Bildung der Humanität in uns . . . (13: 361; IX, 2)
>
> Die Tradition der Traditionen, die Schrift. (13: 366; IX, 2)
>
> Tradition ist [also auch hier] die fortplanzende Mutter, wie ihrer Sprache und wenigen Cultur, so auch ihrer Religion und heiligen Gebräuche (13: 388; IX 3)
>
> Der religiösen Tradition in Schrift und Sprache ist die Erde ihre Samenkörner aller höheren Cultur schuldig. (13: 391; IX, 5)
>
> Das gewisseste Zeichen der Cultur einer Sprache ist ihre Schrift. (13: 408; X, 3)
>
> Wenn . . . die Regierungsformen die schwerste Kunst der Cultur sind . . . (13: 411; X, 3)
>
> Auch hüte man sich, allen diesen Völkern gleiche

---

[53] Herder, 1744–1803, 4 vols., 1784, 1785, 1787, 1791. These constitute vols. 13 and 14 of Herder's *Sämmtliche Werke* edited by Bernhard Suphan, 1887, reprinted 1909, pagination double to preserve that of the original work. We cite the Suphan paging.

[54] The books are without titles as such; we are roughly summarizing their contents.

> Sitten oder gleiche Cultur zuzueignen. (14: 275; XVI, 3)
>
> Von selbst hat sich kein Volk in Europa zur Cultur erhoben. (14: 289; XVI, 6)
>
> Die Städte sind in Europe gleichsam stehende Heerlager der Cultur. (14: 486; XX, 5)
>
> Kein Thier hat Sprache, wie der Mensch sie hat, noch weniger Schrift, Tradition, Religion, willkührliche Gesetze und Rechte. Kein Tier endlich hat auch nur die Bildung, die Kleidung, die Wohnung, die Künste, die unbestimmte Lebensart, die ungebundenen Triebe, die flatterhaften Meinungen, womit sich beinahe jedes Individuum der Menschheit auszeichnet. (13: 109; III, 6)

The enumeration in this last citation is a good enough description of culture as we use the word. If it had had the modern meaning in his day, Herder would probably have clinched his point by adding "culture" to sum up the passage.

C. Meiners, 1747–1810, published in 1785 a *Grundriss der Geschichte der Menschheit.* We have not seen this work and know of it through Stoltenberg,[55] Muehlmann, and Lowie.[56] It aims to present the bodily formation, the "Anlagen" of the "spirit and heart," the various grades of culture of all peoples, especially of the unenlightened and half-cultivated ones. This comes, as Meiners himself admits, close to being a "Völkerkunde" [57] or ethnography.[58] Like most of his contemporaries, Meiners saw culture as graded in completeness, but since he rejected the prevalent three-stage theory (hunting, herding, farming) he was at least not a unilinear developmentalist.

D. Jenisch, 1762–1804, published in 1801 a work called *Universal-historical Review of the Development of Mankind viewed as a Progressing Whole.*[59] This book also we have not seen, and know of it through Stoltenberg's summary.[60] It appears to bear a subtitle "Philosophie der Kulturgeschichte." [61] Stoltenberg quotes Jenisch's recognition of the immeasurable gap between the actual history of culture and a rationally ideal history of human culture marked by progressive perfection. He also cites Jenisch's discussion of the "developmental history of political and civilizing culture." It would seem that Jenisch, like his German contemporaries, was concerned with culture as a development which could be traced historically, but still weighted on the side of the act of rational refining or cultivation rather than being viewed as a product or condition which itself serves as a basic influence on men.

8. *KANT [62] TO HEGEL*

The great German philosophy of the decades before and after 1800 began with some recognition of enlightenment culture and improvement culture, as part of its rooting in the eighteenth century; but its general course was away from Cultur to Geist. This is evident in the passage from Kant to Hegel.

Kant says in his *Anthropologie*: [63]

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[55] As cited, 1937, vol. 1, 199–201.

[56] Mühlmann, 1948, pp. 63–66; Lowie, 1937, pp. 5, 10–11.

[57] The word Völkerkunde had been previously used by J. R. Forster, *Beiträge zur Völker- und Länderkunde*, 1781 (according to Stoltenberg, vol. 1, 200).

[58] According to Muehlmann, just cited, p. 46, the word ethnography was first used in Latin by Johann Olorinus in his "Ethnographia Mundi," Magdeburg, 1608.

[59] *Universalhistorischer Ueberlick der Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts, als eines sich fortbildenden Ganzen*, 2 vols., 1801.

[60] Stoltenberg, 1937, vol. 1, pp. 289–92.

[61] The original may have been "Cultur;" Stoltenberg modernizes spellings except in titles of works.

[62] Kant's position as an "anthropologist" is relevant to consideration of his treatment of "Cultur." Bidney (1949, pp. 484, 485, 486) remarks: "It is most significant, as Cassirer observes, that Kant was 'the man who introduced anthropology as a branch of study in German universities and who lectured on it regularly for decades.' . . . It should be noted, however, that by anthropology Kant meant something different from the study of human culture or comparative anatomy of peoples. For him the term comprised empirical ethics (folkways), introspective psychology, and 'physiology.' Empirical ethics, as distinct from rational ethics, was called 'practical anthropology.' . . . Kant reduced natural philosophy or theoretical science to anthropology. Just as Kant began his critique of scientific knowledge by accepting the fact of mathematical science, so he began his ethics and his *Anthropologie* by accepting the fact of civilization." Kant's view, as defined by Bidney, seems very similar to the contemporary "philosophical anthropology" of Wein (1948) and the "phenomenological anthropology" of Binswanger (1947).

[63] References are to Kant's *Werke*, Reimer 1907 edition: the Anthropologie of 1798 is in vol. 7.

> Alle Fortschritte in der Cultur . . . haben das Ziel diese erworbenen Kentnisse und Geschicklichkeiten zum Gebrauch für die Welt anzuwenden.
>
> Die pragmatische Anlage der Civilisirung durch Cultur. (p. 323)

"Künste der Cultur" are contrasted with the "Rohigkeit" of man's "Natur." (p. 324)

With reference to Rousseau, Kant mentions the "Ausgang aus der Natur in die Cultur," "die Civilisirung," "die vermeinte Moralisirung." (p. 326)

The national peculiarities of the French and English are derivable largely "aus der Art ihrer verschiedenen Cultur," those of other nations "vielmehr aus der Anlage ihrer Natur durch Vermischung ihrer ursprünglich verschiedenen Stämme." (p. 315)

In this last passage Cultur might possibly seem to have been used in its modern sense, except that on page 311 Kant calls the French and English "die zwei civilisirtesten Völker auf Erden," which brings the word back to the sense of cultivation.

In *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1781, Kant says, "metaphysics is the completion of the whole culture of reason."[64] Here again, culture must mean simply cultivation.

Fichte deals with Cultur and "Vernunftcultur" largely from the angle of its purpose freedom. Cultur is "die Uebung aller Kraeft auf den Zweck der voelligen Freiheit, de voelligen Unabhaengigkeit von allem, wa nicht wir selbst, unser reines Selbst ist."[65]

Hegel's transcendental philosophy of history, viewed with reference only to "spirit," a generation after a group of his fellow countrymen had written general histories which were de facto histories of culture,[66] has already been mentioned.

Schiller also saw culture unhistorically added to a certain disappointment in the enlightenment of reason.[67] "Culture, far from freeing us, only develops a new need with every power it develops in us. . . . It was culture itself which inflicted on modern humanity the wound [of lessened individual perfection compared with ancient times]" (1883, 4: 566 568). He takes refuge in "the culture of beauty," or "fine [schoene] culture," evidently on the analogy of fine arts or belles lettres Lessing does not appear to use the word Goethe uses it loosely in opposition to "Barbarei."

9. *ANALYSIS OF KLEMM'S USE OF THE WORD "CULTUR"*

It seems worth citing examples of Klemm's use of the word Cultur, because of his period being intermediate between the late eighteenth-century usage by Herder, Adelung, etc., in the sense of "cultivation," and the modern or post-Tylorian usage. We have therefore gone over the first volume, 1843, of his *Cultur-geschichte*, and selected from the hundreds of occurrences of the word some that seem fairly to represent its range of meaning.

Very common are references to stages (Stufen) of culture. These can generally be read as referring to conditions of culture, as we still speak of stages; but they may refer only to steps in the act of becoming cultivated. We have: very low stage of culture, up to the stage of European culture, middle stages, higher stages, an early stage, our stage, a certain degree of culture (1: 2, 184, 185, 186, 199, 207, 209, 211, 220, 227, etc.).

Similar are combinations which include step or progress of culture: erste Schritt, fortschreitende, zuschreitet, Fortschritt zur Cultur (1: 185, 206, 209, 210). These are also ambiguous.

Also not certain are true culture (1: 204), purpose of culture (1: 205), yardstick of culture (1: 214), spiritual culture (1: 221), sittliche Cultur (1: 221), resting places (Anhaltepuncte) of culture (1: 224).

The following are typical passages in which culture is used as if in the modern sense:

> My effort is to investigate and determine the gradual development of mankind from its rudest . .

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[64] Muller's translation, New York, 1896, p. 730. The original (Kritik, 2nd ed., Riga, 1787, p. 879) reads: "Eben deswegen ist Metaphysik auch die Vollendung aller Cultur der Menschlichen Vernunft."

[65] Cited from Eucken, 1878, p. 186.

[66] We have found one use of Zivilisation in Hegel as cited in footnote 43 above.

[67] *Briefe ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 1795. Citations are from *Saemmtliche Werke*, vol. 4.

beginnings to their organization into organic onalities (Volkskörper) in all respects, that is ay with reference to customs, arts (Kentnisse) and ls (Fertigkeiten), domestic and public life in ce or war, religion, science (Wissen) and art . . . 21) [While the passage begins with mention of elopment, the list of activities with which it cludes is very similar to that in which Tylor's ous definition ends.]

Ve regard chronology as part of culture itself. (1:

he means (or mechanisms, Mittel) of culture ted first in private life and originally in the ily. (1: 205)

Ve shall show . . . that possessions are the beiing of all human culture. (1: 206)

With reference to colonies and spread of the ive race,"] the emigrants brought with them to r new homes the sum (Summe) of the culture ch they had hitherto achieved (erstrebt) and l it as foundation of their newly florescent life. 210)

mong nations of the "passive race," custom te) is the tyrant of culture. (1: 220)

outh American Indians . . . readily assume a iish (Firniss) of culture. . . . But nations of the ve race grow (bilden sich) from inside outward . Their culture consequently takes a slower rse but is surer and more effective. (1: 288)

blueprint (Fantasie) of a Museum of the culture ory of mankind. (1: 352)

he last section of the natural history collection the Museum] would be constituted by [physical] ropology . . . [and] . . . [materials illustrating] rudest cultural beginnings of the passive race. 356–57)

he next section comprises the savage hunting fishing tribes of South and North America. . . . ystem could now be put into effect which would retained in all the following sections . . . about as ows: 1) Bodily constitution . . . 2) Dress . . . Ornament . . . 4) Hunting gear . . . 5) Vehicles land and water . . . 6) Dwellings . . . 7) Household sils . . . 8) Receptacles . . . 9) Tools . . . 10) ects relating to disposal of the dead . . . 11) Insig- of public life . . . batons of command, crowns, wampum, peace pipes, models of assemblies . . . 12) War . . . 13) Religious objects . . . 14) Culture [*sic*]. Musical instruments, decorative ornament, petroglyphs, maps, drawings; illustrations (Sammlungen) of speech, poetical and oratorical products of the various nations. (1: 357–58)

Most of these ten cited passages read as if culture were being used in its modern anthropological sense — as indeed Klemm is de facto doing an ethnography, even though with reminiscences of Herder and Adelung as regards general plan. Whenever he adds or lists or summates, as in the first, fifth, and last of these citations, the ring is quite contemporary. Moreover, the "enlightenment," "tradition," "humanity" of Herder and his contemporaries have pretty well dropped out.[68] It is difficult to be sure that Klemm's concept of culture was ever fully the same as that of modern anthropologists. On the other hand, it would be hard to believe that he is never to be so construed. Most likely he was in an in-between stage, sometimes using the term with its connotations of 1780, sometimes with those of 1920 — and perhaps never fully conscious of its range, and, so far as we know, never formally defining it.[69]

In that case, the more credit goes to Tylor for his sharp and successful conceptualization of culture, and for beginning his greatest book with a definition of culture. He found Klemm doing ethnography much as it is being presented today, and using for his data a general term that was free of the implication of advancement that clung to English civilization. So Tylor substituted Klemm's "cultur" for the "civilization" he had himself used before, gave it formal definition, and nailed the idea to his masthead by putting the word into the title of his book. By his conscious explicitness, Tylor set a landmark, which Klemm with all his ten volumes had not done.

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[68] We do not find civilization, and only one passing of "civilisirt": "in the rest of civilized Europe" 221)

[69] What Klemm does make clear is that he pro-es to treat of the "gradual development of mankind as an individual" (1: 1): "I consider mankind as an individual . . . which . . . has its childhood, youth, maturity." (1: 21) But he does very little to follow out this Adelung idea.

10. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN GERMANY SINCE 1850

By mid-nineteenth century, the Hegelian active preference for dealing with Geist in preference to Cultur was essentially over, and the latter concept became increasingly, almost universally, dominant in its own field. The term Zivilisation languished in Germany, much as Culture did in England, as denotation of the inclusive concept. It had some vogue, as we have seen, in two attempts — diametrically opposite ones, characteristically — to set it up as a rival to Culture by splitting off one or the other part of this as contrastive. But the prevailing trend was toward an inclusive term; and this became Cultur, later generally written Kultur. In this movement, philosophers,[70] historians, and literary men were more active and influential than anthropologists.

The following list of book titles suggests the course of the trend.

1843, Klemm, *Allgemeine Cultur-geschichte*
1854, Klemm, *Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft*
1860, Burckhardt, *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien*
1875, Hellwald, *Kultur in ihrer Natürlichen Entwickelung bis zur Gegenwart*
1878, Jodl, *Die Kulturgeschichtschreibung*
1886, Lippert, *Kultur der Menschheit*
1898, Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*
1899, Frobenius, *Probleme der Kultur*
1900, Lamprecht, *Die Kulturhistorische Methode*
1908, Vierkandt, *Stetigkeit im Kulturwandel*
1908, Mueller-Lyer, *Phasen der Kultur*
1910, Frobenius, *Kulturtypen aus dem Westsudan*
1914, Preuss, *Die Geistige Kultur der Naturvölker*
1923, Lederer, *Aufgaben einer Kultursoziologie*
1923, *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*: Part III, Section 5, "Anthropologie," Eds., Schwalbe and Fischer
1923, Simmel, *Zur Philosophie der Kultur*
1924, Schmidt and Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen*, vol. 1
1930, Bonn, *Die Kultur der Vereinigten Staaten*
1931, Buehler, *Die Kultur des Mittelalters*
1933, Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*
1935, Thurnwald, *Werden, Wandel, und Gestaltung von Staat und Kultur*

Rickert's basic thesis, to the effect that what has been called Geisteswissenschaft really is Kulturwissenschaft and that it is the latter an not Geisteswissenschaft that should be co trasted with Naturwissenschaft — this thes proves that Rickert's concept of kultur is broad as the most inclusive anthropologist "culturologist" might make claim for. Ricl ert's Wissenschaft of culture takes in the who of the social sciences plus the humanities, contemporary American educational parlanc

Spengler's somewhat special position in th culture-civilization dichotomy has alread been touched on. For Spengler, civilization the stage to which culture attains when it h become unproductive, torpid, frozen, crysta lized. A culture as such is organismic an creative; it becomes. Civilization merely *i* it is finished. Spengler's distinction won wid though not universal acceptance in German at least for a time, and is included in the 193 edition of Brockhaus' *Konversationlexicon.*

In spite of the formal dichotomy of th words, Spengler's basic concept, the one wit which his philosophy consistently operates, that of culture. The monadal entities whic he is forever trying to characterize and con pare are the Chinese, Indian, Egyptian, Arabi Magian, Classic, and Occidental cultures, an anthropologist would conceive and ca them. Civilization is to him merely a stag which every culture reaches: its final pha of spent creativity and wintry senescence, wit fellaheen-type population. Cultures are deepl different, all civilization is fundamentally alik it is the death of the culture on which settles. Spengler's theory concerns cultur culture in at once the most inclusive and e clusive sense, and nothing else. He sees cultu manifesting itself in a series almost of thec phanies, of wholly distinct, uncaused, u explainable realizations, each with an immane quality and predestined career and destin (Schicksal). Spengler's view is certainl mystic, but it is so because in trying to sei the peculiar nature of culture he helps h sharpness of grasp by not only differentiatin but insulating culture from the remainder the cosmos: in each of its occasional realizations, it is self-sufficient, self-determining and uncaused, hardly even apperceivable. In fact, no culture really is wholly intelligible to members of other cultures. Culture in short is something wholly irreducible and unrelatable, for Spengler. This is an extreme view, unquestionably. But it can also be construed as an exaggeration of the view of some modern anthropologists that culture constitutes a distinctive aspect, dimension, or level with which for certain purposes it is most profitable to operate in terms of inter-cultural relations, even though ultimately the relations of cultural to non-cultural phenomena can never be disregarded. Pushed to the limit, this concept of the operational distinctiveness of culture, which is still relative, becomes the concept of ts absolute distinctness and complete self-sufficiency. Spengler does not feel this distinctness and self-sufficiency as merely marking the limit of the concept of culture but as constituting the ultimate essence of its quality.

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[70] There is an extensive literature in this century on Kulturphilosophie. See, for example, Kroner (1928) and the critique of Kroner's system by Marc (1929).

[71] Huizinga, 1945, p. 28.

Spengler acknowledges his indebtedness to Nietzsche who wrote, "Kultur ist Einheit des künstlerischen Stils in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes." [72] This accent on style recurs n Spengler.

We have already dealt (§ 4) with Alfred Weber's attempted distinction between "culture" and "civilization." A few words must e said here of Weber's "cultural sociology," articularly as set forth in his article in the 931 "Sociological Dictionary." [73] Sociology, Weber writes, can be the science of social *tructures*. But, he continues, as soon as you ry to write sociology of religion, art, or nowledge, structural sociology must be ranscended. And the Wesengehalt (reality ontent), of which social structure is only one Ausdrucksform (expression), is Kultur. In its intent, therefore, Kultursoziologie is much the same as cultural anthropology. The irrationalist trend inherent in German Kultur ideas is perhaps perpetuated in the sharp stand Weber takes against all materialist conceptions of history which make cultural phenomena into mere superstructure.[74]

We close this section by commenting on the core of a definition by a philosopher in a German philosophical dictionary: [75]

> Kultur ist die Daseinsweise der Menschheit (wie Leben die Daseinsweise des Protoplasmas und Kraft die Daseinsweise der Materie) sowie das Resultat dieser Daseinsweise, der Kulturbesitz oder die Kulturerrungenschaften. (Culture is the mode of being of mankind — as life is the mode of being of protoplasm and energy the mode of being of matter — as well as the result of this mode of being, namely, the stock of culture possessed or cultural attainments.)

With culture construed as the characteristic mode of human existence or manifestation, as life is of organisms and energy of matter, we are close to the recent theory of integrative levels of organization, each level, in the words of Novikoff,[76] "possessing unique properties of structure and behavior, which, though dependent on the properties of the constituent elements, appear only when these elements are combined in the new system. . . . The laws describing the unique properties of each level are qualitatively distinct, and their discovery requires methods of research and analysis appropriate to the particular level." This view, sometimes spoken of as a theory of emergent levels, seems to have been developed largely by biologists, first Lloyd Morgan, then Needham, Emerson, Novikoff, Herrick, etc., for the phenomena of life; though it was explicitly extended to the phenomena of society by W. M. Wheeler, also a biologist, but specially interested in social insects. For culture as a distinct level of organization, the most avowed proponents in American anthropology have probably been Kroeber and White. In Germany, culture as a level has been explicitly recognized chiefly by non-anthropologists such as Rickert and Spengler — by the latter with the unnecessary exaggerations mentioned.

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[72] *Geburt der Tragödie* (Band I, Gesammelte Verke, Grossoktav-Ausgabe: Leipzig, 1924, p. 183. The identical sentence is repeated on p. 314 of the ame work. Nietzsche (1844–1900) falls in the period vhen culture had acquired its modern meaning. At ny rate, it is clear that Nietzsche is wholly out of he Kant-to-Hegel swing away from cognizance of ulture. The *Nietzsche-Register* by Richard Oehler Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1926) lists hundreds f references to Kultur (pp. 182–87). Cf. also N. von ubnoff, *Friedrich Nietzsches Kulturphilosophie und mwertungslehre*, 1924, pp. 38–82.

[73] *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, Stuttgart, 1931, pp. 284–94. Article "Kultursoziologie."

[74] Hans Freyer in his article (pp. 294–308) of the same *Handwörterbuch* offers a sociological concept of culture as opposed to Alfred Weber's cultural concept of sociology. He says, for example, "Das Problem Typen und Stufen der Kultur verwandelt sich . . . in die Frage nach den Struktur- und Entwicklungsgesetzen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens." (p. 307)

[75] Schmidt, 1922, p. 170.

[76] Novikoff, 1945, pp. 209–15. Compare also, Herrick, 1949, pp. 222–42.

Just when, by what German, and in what context Cultur was first unequivocally used in this fundamental and inclusive sense, as distinct from the previous meanings in which nurture or cultivation or progressive enlightenment are dominant, is interesting, but can be most securely worked out by a German well read in the generic intellectual literature of his people.[77]

Why it was the Germans who first attained, however implicitly, to this fundamental and inclusive concept and attached it to the vocable Cultur, is equally interesting and perhaps even more important. Almost certainl their priority is connected with the fact tha in the decades following 1770 Germans fo the first time began to contribute creativel to general European civilization abreast o France and England, and in certain fields eve more productively; but at the same time the remained a nationality instead of an organize or unified nation. Being politically in arrear their nationalism not only took solace in German cultural achievement, but was led t appraise culture as a whole above politics as portion thereof; whence there would deriv an interest in what constituted culture.

Some further suggestions are made by u below (§ 11, and by Dr. Meyer in Appendi A). But to follow out our hints fully, or tr to discover other possible factors, woul require a more intimate and pervasive acquaintance with the whole of German thought between about 1770 and 1870 than we posses We therefore relinquish the problem at thi point.

11. "KULTUR" AND "SCHRECKLICHKEIT"

Just before, during, and after World War I, the Germans became notorious among the Allied nations for alleged insistence on their having discovered something superior and uniquely original which they called Kultur. Thirty years later it is clear what underlay this passionate and propagandist quarrel. The Germans, having come to their modern civilization belatedly and self-consciously, believed that this civilization was more "advanced," of greater value, than that of other Western nations. French, British, and Americans believed the same for their national versions of the common Western civilization; but the French and British having had an integrated, standardized, and effective civilization longer than the Germans, took their position more for granted, were more secure in it, had spread much more of their civilization to other societies, and on the whole were enough in a status of superiority to have to do no ill-mannered boasting about it. The other difference was that in both the French and Englis languages the ordinary word referring to th totality of social attainments, achievement and values was civilization, whereas in Germa it had come to be Kultur. Here accordingl was a fine chance, in war time, to believe tha the enemy claimed to have invented something wholly new and original which however was only a crude barbarism. Had th customary German word been civilizatio we Allies would no doubt have argued bac that our brand of it was superior, but w could hardly have got as indignant as we di become over the bogey meanings whic seemed to us to crystallize around the wholl strange term Kultur.

This episode is touched on here because i confirms that in the Germany of 1914 the wor culture had a popular meaning essentiall identical to that with which anthropologist se it, whereas in spite of Tylor, the British, merican, and French people, including even nost of their upper educated level, were ignorant of this sense of the word, for which they then generally used civilization instead.[78]

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[77] Barth, after discussing cultura animi in Cicero, Thomas More, Bacon, gives it up too: "Aber wo Cultura absolut, ohne Genitiv, zuerst gebraucht wird, nicht als Ackerbau wie bei den Alten, sondern i heutigen Sinne, habe ich nicht finden können." (192 1, 599, fn. 1)

12. DANILEVSKY

The Russians apparently took over the word nd the concept of culture from the Germans see Appendix A). This was pre-Marxian, bout mid-nineteenth century. In the late ighteen-sixties N. I. Danilevsky published irst a series of articles and then a book, *Russia nd Europe*,[79] which was frankly Slavophile ut has also attracted attention as a forerunner f Spengler.[80] He deals with the greater ivilizations much in the manner of Spengler r Toynbee, but calls them culture-historical types[81] instead of cultures or civilizations. They are supernational, and while ethnically limited, they differ culturally in their quality.

We are not certain whether Danilevsky was the first Russian to employ culture in the sense which it had acquired in German, but it has come into general usage since his day. The noun is kul'tura;[82] the adjective kul'turnyi seems to mean cultural as well as cultured or cultivated. Kul'turnost' is used for level or stage of culture as well as for high level.

13. "CULTURE" IN THE HUMANITIES IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE

Curiously enough, "culture" became poplarized as a literary word in England[83] in a ook which appeared just two years before ylor's. Matthew Arnold's familiar remarks 1 *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) were an answer o John Bright who had said in one of his peeches, "People who talk about culture . . . y which they mean a smattering of the two ead languages of Greek and Latin . . ." rnold's own definition is primarily in terms f an activity on the part of an individual:

> . . . a pursuit of total perfection by means of getting o know, on all the matters which most concern us, ie best which has been thought and said in the vorld. . . . I have been trying to show that culture is, r ought to be, the study and pursuit of perfection; and that of perfection as pursued by culture, beauty and intelligence, or, in other words, sweetness and light, are the main characters. . . . [culture consists in] . . . an inward condition of mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances . . .

Arnold's words were not unknown to social scientists. Sumner, in an essay probably written in the eighties, makes these acid comments:

> Culture is a word which offers us an illustration of the degeneracy of language. If I may define culture, I have no objection to produce it; but since the word came into fashion, it has been stolen by the dilettanti and made to stand for their own favorite forms and amounts of attainments. Mr. Arnold, the great apostle, if not the discoverer, of culture, tried to

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[78] That this was the situation is shown also by the act that the 1917 paper of Kroeber, *The Super-rganic*, uses this term, superorganic, synonymously vith "the social," when it is obvious that it is essenally culture that is being referred to throughout. : is not that Kroeber was ignorant of culture in 917 but that he feared to be misunderstood outside f anthropology if he used the word.

[79] Rossiia i Evropa, 1869 in the journal Zaria; 1871 1 book form. Sorokin, 1950, pp. 49–71, summarizes anilevsky's work, and on pp. 205–43 he critically xamines the theory along with those of Spengler nd Toynbee.

[80] Danilevsky acknowledges a debt to Heinrich ückert's *Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte in organischer arstellung* (Leipzig, 1857). Rückert defines Cultur s "die Totalität der Erscheinungen . . . in welcher ch die Selbständigkeit und Eigenthümlichkeit der höheren menschlichen Anlage ausspricht. . . . " p. iii. Rueckert also uses the terms "Culturkreis," "Culturreihe," "Culturindividuum" (a particular culture), and "Culturtypus," pp. 92–97 and elsewhere. The last appears to be the origin of Danilevsky's "culturhistorical types."

[81] Kul'turno-istoricheskie tipy.

[82] This is the standard method of transcription adopted by the Library of Congress. In it, the apostrophe following a consonant indicates the palatalization of that consonant. It is hence a direct transcription of the *miagkii znak* (soft sign) in the Russian alphabet.

[83] So deeply entrenched is this usage that as late as 1946 a distinguished anthropologist, Sir Arthur Keith, used "culture" in this humanistic sense (1946, 117–18).

> analyze it and he found it to consist of sweetness and light. To my mind, that is like saying that coffee is milk and sugar. The stuff of culture is all left out of it. So, in the practice of those who accept this notion, culture comes to represent only an external smoothness and roundness of outline without regard to intrinsic qualities. (Sumner, 1934, 22–23.)

Since Arnold's day a considerable literature on culture as humanistically conceived has accumulated. John Cowper Powys[84] in *The Meaning of Culture* lays less stress on formal education and more on spontaeity, play — in brief, on the expression of individual personality rather than the supine following of custom:

> Culture and self-control are synonymous terms. . . . What culture ought to do for us is to enable us to find somehow or other a mental substitute for the traditional restraints of morality and religion. . . . It is the application of intelligence to the difficult imbroglio of not being able to live alone upon the earth. (1929, 235)
>
> What has been suggested in this book is a view of culture, by no means the only possible one, wherein education plays a much smaller part than does a certain secret, mental and imaginative effort of one's own, continued . . . until it becomes a permanent habit belonging to that psyche of inner nucleus of personality which used to be called the soul. (1929, 275)

Robert Bierstedt sums up as follows:

> John Cowper Powys understands by culture that ineffable quality which makes a man at ease with his environment, that which is left over after he has forgotten everything he deliberately set out to learn, and by a cultured person one with a sort of intellectual finesse, who has the aesthete's deep feeling for beauty, who can find quiet joy in a rock-banked stream, a peewee's call, a tenuous wisp of smoke, the warmth of a book format, or the serene felicity of friendship. (Bierstedt, 1936, 93)

The humanistic or philosophical meanings of culture tended to be the only ones treated in standard reference works for a long period. For example, John Dewey's article, "Culture," in the Cyclopædia of Education (1911) does not cite Tylor or any other anthropologist, though he had been in contact with Boas at Columbia and later evidenced considerable familiarity with anthropological literature. Here Dewey says (239): "From the broader point of view culture may be defined as the habit of mind which perceives and estimates all matters with reference to their bearing on social values and aims." The Hastings Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics (1912) contains articles by anthropologists and a good deal of material on primitive religion, but C. G. Shaw, a philosopher who wrote the article, "Culture," makes no reference to the anthropological concept and comes only as close as Wundt to citing an anthropologist. Shaw, incidentally, attributes the introduction of the term "culture" into England to Bacon, citing his *Advancement of Learning*, 1605, II, xix 2F.[85]

The Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, operates within the humanistic tradition (in its German form) but gives a vitalistic twist:

> We can now give the word, culture, its exact significance. There are vital functions which obey objective laws, though they are, inasmuch as they are vital, subjective facts, within the organism; they exist, too, on condition of complying with the dictates of a *régime* independent of life itself. These are culture. The term should not, therefore, be allowed to retain any vagueness of content. Culture consists of certain biological activities, neither more nor less biological than digestion or locomotion. . . . Culture is merely a special direction which we give to the cultivation of our animal potencies. (1933, 41, 76)

He tends to oppose culture to spontaeity:

> . . . culture cannot be exclusively directed by its objective laws, or laws independent of life, but is at the same time subject to the laws of life. We are governed by two contrasted imperatives. Man as a living being must be good, orders the one, the cultural imperative: what is good must be human, must be lived and so compatible with and necessary to life, says the other imperative, the vital one. Giving a more generic expression to both, we shall reach the

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[84] For other representative recent treatments from the point of view of the humanities, see Burns (1929), Patten (1916), Lowell (1934).

[85] Siebert (1905, p. 579) cites Bacon "cultura sive georgica animi" and gives the reference as De Augm. Scient., VII, 1. Neither citation conforms to the editions available to us.

> onception of the double mandate, life must be ultured, but culture is bound to be vital. . . . Un-ultured life is barbarism, devitalized culture is yzantinism. (1933, 45–46)
>
> To oppose life to culture and demand for the former e full exercise of its rights in the face of the latter not to make a profession of anticultural faith. . . . he values of culture remain intact; all that is denied their exclusive character. For centuries we have one on talking exclusively of the need that life has f culture. Without in the slightest degree depriving is need of any of its cogency, I wish to maintain ere and now that culture has no less need of life . . . Modern tradition presents us with a choice etween two opposed methods of dealing with the tinomy between life and culture. One of them — tionalism — in its design to preserve culture denies l significance to life. The other — relativism — at-mpts the inverse operation: it gets rid of the jective value of culture altogether in order to ave room for life. (1933, 86)

other passages he makes points which are ssential aspects of the anthropological con-eption of culture:

> . . . the generations are born one of another in ch a way that the new generation is immediately ced with the forms which the previous generation ve to existence. Life, then, for each generation is task in two dimensions, one of which consists in the ception, through the agency of the previous gen-ation, of what has had life already, e.g., ideas, lues, institutions, and so on . . . (1933, 16)
>
> The selection of a point of view is the initial action culture. (1933, 60)
>
> . . . Culture is the system of vital ideas which each e possesses; better yet, it is the system of ideas *by* ich each age lives. (1944, 81)

F. Znaniecki's *Cultural Reality* (1919), ough written in English by a Polish sociolo-st, is essentially a philosophical treatise. The sic point of view and argument can be indi-ted by brief quotations:

> For a general view of the world the fundamental ints are that the concrete empirical world is a world evolution in which nothing absolutely permanent n be found, and that as a world in evolution it is st of all a world of culture, not of nature, a his-ical, not a physical reality. Idealism and naturalism th deal, not with the concrete empirical world, but th abstractly isolated aspects of it. (1919, 21)
>
> We shall use the term "culturalism" for the view the world which should be constructed on the und of the implicit or explicit presuppositions involved in reflection about cultural phenomena . . .
>
> The progress of knowledge about culture demonstrates more and more concretely the *historical relativity* of all human values, including science itself. The image of the world which we construct is a historical value, relative like all others, and a different one will take its place in the future, even as it has itself taken the place of another image . . . . The theories of the old type of idealism are in disaccordance with experience, for they conceive mind, individual consciousness or super-individual reason, as absolute and changeless, whereas history shows it relative and changing. (1919, 15–16)

The German philosopher, Ernst Cassirer, states (p. 52) that the objective of his *Essay on Man* is a "*phenomenology of human culture*." But, though he was familiar with modern anthropology, particularly the writings of Malinowski, his conception remains more philosophical than anthropological:

> Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science are various phases in this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power — the power to build up a world of his own, an "ideal" world. (1944, 228)

At the moment many of the younger American philosophers are accepting one of the various anthropological definitions of culture. For example, the anthropologist finds himself completely at home reading Richard McKeon's treatment of culture in two recent articles in the "Journal of Philosophy" and "Ethics." One may instance a passage from *Philosophy and the Diversity of Cultures*:

> If political problems have cultural and ideological dimensions, philosophies must treat not only ethical and esthetic judgments but must also examine the form which those judgments must take in terms of the operation of political power and relevant to actions accessible to the rule of law and their possible influence on the social expectations which make conventional morality. The study of cultures must present not merely the historically derived systems of designs for living in their dynamic interactions and interrelations in which political and ideological characteristics are given their place, but must also provide a translation of those designs of living into the conditions and conventional understandings which are the necessities and material bases of political action relative to common ends and an abstraction from them of the values of art, science, religion and

> philosophy which are the ends of human life and the explanations of cultures. (1950b, 239–40)

Werner Jaeger, the classicist, reflects both the dissatisfaction of most Western humanists with the anthropological habit of extending "culture" to encompass the material, humble, and even trivial, and also the tendency of one strain of German scholarship to restrict culture to the realm of ideals and values. He equates culture with the classical Greek concept of *paideia* and is quick to contrast the anthropological notion unfavorably:

> We are accustomed to use the word culture not to describe the ideal which only the Hellenocentric world possesses, but in a much more trivial and general sense, to denote something inherent in every nation of the world, even the most primitive. We use it for the entire complex of all the ways and expressions of life which characterize any one nation. Thus the word has sunk to mean a simple anthropological concept, not a concept of value, a consciously pursued ideal. (1945, xviii)
>
> . . . the distinction . . . between culture in the sense of a merely anthropological concept, which means the way of life or character of a particular nation, and culture as the conscious ideal of human perfection. It is in this latter, humanistic sense that the word is used in the following passage. The "ideal of culture" (in Greek areté and paideia) is a specific creation of the Greek mind. The anthropological concept of culture is a modern extension of this original concept; but it has made out of a concept of value a mere descriptive category which can be applied to any nation, even to "the culture of the primitive" because it has entirely lost its true obligatory sense. Even in Matthew Arnold's definition of culture . . . the original paideutic sense of the word (as the ideal of man's perfection) is obscured. It tends to make culture a kind of museum, i.e., paideia in the sense of the Alexandrian period when it came to designate *learning* (1945, 416)

The Arnold-Powys-Jaeger concept of culture is not only ethnocentric, often avowedly Hellenocentric; it is absolutistic. It knows perfection, or at least what is most perfect in human achievement, and resolutely directs its "obligatory" gaze thereto, disdainful of what is "lower." The anthropological attitu
is relativistic, in that in place of beginning wi
an inherited hierarchy of values, it assun
that every society through its culture see
and in some measure finds values, and that t
business of anthropology includes the dete
mination of the range, variety, constancy, a
interrelations of these innumerable values.

Incidentally, we believe that when the ultr
montane among the humanists renounce t
claim that their subject matter is superior
privileged, and adopt the more catholic a
humble human attitude — that from that d
the humanities will cease being on the defe
sive in the modern world.

The most recent humanistic statement
culture is that of T. S. Eliot [86] who attempts
bridge the gap between the conception of t
social sciences and that of literary men and pl
losophers. He quotes Tylor on the one ha
and Matthew Arnold on the other. In rather
schoolmasterish way he reviews the meanin
of "culture": (1) the conscious self-cultiv
tion of the individual, his attempt to ra
himself out of the average mass to the level
the élite; (2) the ways of believing, thinkin
and feeling [87] of the particular group with
society to which an individual belongs; a
(3) the still less conscious ways of life of
total society. At times Eliot speaks of cultu
in the quite concrete denotation of certa
anthropologists:

> It includes all the characteristic activities and i
> terests of a people: Derby Day, Henley Regat
> Cowes, the twelfth of August, a cup final, the d
> races, the pin table, the dart board, Wensleyd
> cheese, boiled cabbage cut into sections, beetroot
> vinegar, nineteenth-century Gothic churches and t
> music of Elgar. (1948, 31)

He also accepts the contemporary anthr
pological notion that culture has organizati
as well as content: " . . . culture is not mere
the sum of several activities, but a way
life." (p. 40) On the other hand, he sa
"Culture may even be described as that whi

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[86] Eliot, 1948. Vogt (1951) has linked both the personal and "societal" conceptions of culture to the cult or cultus idea.

[87] Cf. ". . . culture — a peculiar way of thinking, feeling, and behaving." (p. 56) "Now it is obvious that one unity of culture is that of the people w
live together and speak the same language: becau
speaking the same language means thinking, a
feeling, and having emotions rather differently fr
people who use a different language." (pp. 120–2

makes life worth living." (p. 26) Finally, he seems to be saying that, viewed concretely, religion is the way of life of a people and in this sense is identical with the people's culture. Anthropologists are not likely to be very happy with Eliot's emphasis on an élite and his reconciliation of the humanistic and social science views, and the literary reviews[88] have tended to criticize the looseness and lack of rigor of his argument.

14. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS

The anthropological meaning of "culture" had more difficulty breaking through into wider public consciousness than did the word "civilization." This is attested by the history of "culture" in standard dictionaries of English. We summarize here what the Oxford dictionary has to say about the history of the word.[89]

Culture is derived from Latin *cultura*, from the verb *colere*, with the meaning of tending or cultivation. [It may also mean an honoring or flattering; husbandry — Short's Latin dictionary.] In Christian authors, *cultura* has the meaning of worship. The Old French form was *couture*, later replaced by *culture*. In English, the following uses are established: 1420, husbandry, tilling; 1483, worship;[90] 1510, training of the mind, faculties, manners, More (also, 1651, Hobbs; 1752, Johnson; 1848, Macaulay); 1628 training of the human body, Hobbes. Meaning 5 is: "The training, development, and refinement of mind, tastes, and manners; the condition of being thus trained and refined; the intellectual side of civilization." This is illustrated by citations from Wordsworth, 1805, and Matthew Arnold.[91] "A particular form of intellectual development," evidently referring to a pairing of language and culture, is illustrated from Freeman, 1867. Then there are the applications to special industries or technologies, with culture meaning simply "the growing of." Such are silk culture, 1796; oyster culture, 1862; bee culture, 1886; bacterial cultures, 1884.

There is no reference in the original Oxford Dictionary of 1893 to the meaning of culture which Tylor had deliberately established in 1871 with the title of his most famous book, *Primitive Culture*, and had defined in the first paragraph thereof. This meaning finally was accorded recognition sixty-two years after the fact, in the supplement[92] of 1933. The entry reads:

> 5b. *spec.* The civilization of a people (especially at a certain stage of its development in history).
> 1871, E. B. Tylor (title), *Primitive Culture.*
> [1903, C. Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico* is also cited.]

Webster's New International Dictionary in 1929 seems the first to recognize the anthropological and scientific meaning which the word had acquired:

> 7. A particular state or stage of advancement in civilization; the characteristic attainments of a people or social order: as, Greek culture; primitive culture [Examples from Tylor and Ripley follow; but that from Tylor is not his famous fundamental definition.][93]

In the 1936 Webster, there appear three separate attempts to give the scientific meaning of the word culture, numbered 5a, 5b, 6. Of these, 5a is the 7 of 1929, with minor revisions of phrasing. The two others follow:

> 5b. The complex of distinctive attainments, beliefs, traditions, etc., constituting the background of a racial, religious, or social group; as, a nation with many *cultures.* Phrases in this sense are culture area, culture center, culture complex, culture mixing, culture pattern, culture phenomenon, culture sequence, culture stage, culture trait.
>
> 6. *Anthropol.* The trait complex manifested by a tribe or a separate unit of mankind.

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[88] Irwin Edman in *New York Times Book Review*, March 6, 1949; W. H. Auden in *The New Yorker*, April 23, 1949; John L. Myers in *Man*, July, 1949; William Barrett in *Kenyon Review*, summer, 1949.

[89] *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, ed. by J. A. H. Murray, vol. II, 1893.

[90] Eliot (1948) cites from the Oxford Dictionary another (rare) meaning of 1483: "The setting of bounds; limitation."

[91] Culture is "the study and pursuit of perfection;" and, of perfection, "sweetness and light" are the main characters.

[92] "Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography."

[93] Which we cite as A1 in Part II.

These statements certainly at last recognize the fact that the word culture long since acquired a meaning which is of fundamental import in the more generalizing segments of the social sciences. Yet as definitions they are surely fumbling. "Particular state or *stage* of advancement"; "characteristic *attainments* of a . . . *social order*"; "distinctive attainments . . . *constituting the background* of a . . . group"; "the *trait complex manifested* by a tribe" — what have these to do with one another? What do they really mean or refer to — especially the vague terms here italicized? And what do they all build up to that a groping reader could carry away? — compared for instance with Tylor's old dictum that culture *is* civilization, especially if supplemented by a statement of the implications or nuances by which the two differ in import in some of their usages. It is true that anthropologists and sociologists also have differed widely in their definitions: if they had not, our Part II would have been much briefer than it is. But these professionals were generally trying to find definitions that would be both full and exclusive, not merely adumbrative; and they often differ deliberately in their distribution of emphasis of meaning, where the dictionary makers seem to be trying to avoid distinctive commitment.[94]

Yet the main moral is the half-century of lag between the common-language meanings of words and the meanings which the same words acquire when they begin to be used in specific senses in profesisonal disciplines like the social sciences. Dictionary makers of course are acute, and when it is a matter of something technical or technological, like a culture in a test tube or an oyster culture, or probably ergs or mesons, they are both prompt and accurate in recognizing the term or meaning. When it comes to broader concepts, especially of "intangibles," they appear to become disconcerted by the seeming differences in professional opinion, and hence either leave out altogether, as long as they can, the professional meaning which a word has acquired, or they hedge between its differences in meaning even at the risk of conveying very little that makes useful sense. Yet, primarily, the lag is perhaps due to students in social fields, who have gradually pumped new wine into skins still not empty of the old, in their habit of trying to operate without jargon in common-language terminology even while their concepts become increasingly refined. However, each side could undoubtedly profit from the other by more cooperation.

It will be of comparative interest to cite a definition of culture in a work which is both a dictionary and yet professionally oriented. This is the Dictionary of Sociology edited by H. P. Fairchild, 1944. The definition of culture was written by Charles A. Ellwood.

> Culture: a collective name for all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted by means of symbols; hence a name for all the distinctive achievements of human groups, including not only such items as language, tool making, industry, art, science, law, government, morals, and religion, but also the material instruments or artifacts in which cultural archievements are embodied and by which intellectual cultural features are given practical effect, such as buildings, tools, machines, communication devices, art objects, etc.
>
> . . . The essential part of culture is to be found in the patterns embodied in the social traditions of the group, that is, in knowledge, ideas, beliefs, values, standards, and sentiments prevalent in the group. The overt part of culture is to be found in the actual behavior of the group, usually in its usages, customs, and institutions . . . . The essential part of culture seems to be an appreciation of values with reference to life conditions. The purely behavioristic definition of culture is therefore inadequate. Complete definition must include the subjective and objective aspects of culture. Practically, the culture of the human group is summed up in its traditions and customs; but tradition, as the subjective side of culture, is the essential core.

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[94] For instance, Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary, 1947, under Culture: "3. The training, development, or strengthening of the powers, mental or physical or the condition thus produced; improvement or refinement of mind, morals, or taste; enlightenment or civilization." By contrast, the Random House American College Dictionary of the same year does give a specific and modern definition: "7. *Sociol.*, the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings, which is transmitted from one generation to another . . . " There are also definitions of culture area, change, complex, diffusion, factor, lag, pattern, trait.

While this is somewhat prolix, it is enumeratively specific. In condensation, it might distill to something like this:

> Culture consists of patterns of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional [= historically derived and selected] ideas and especially their attached values.

It will be shown that this is close to the approximate consensus with which we emerge from our review that follows in Part II.

15. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The most generic sense of the word "culture" — in Latin and in all the languages which have borrowed the Latin root — retains the primary notion of cultivation[95] or becoming cultured. This was also the older meaning of "civilization." The basic idea was first applied to individuals, and this usage still strongly persists in popular and literary English to the present time.[96] A second concept to emerge was that of German *Kultur*, roughly the distinctive "higher" values or enlightenment of a society.[97]

The specifically anthropological concept crystallized first around the idea of "custom." Then — to anticipate a little — custom was given a time backbone in the form of "tradition" or "social heritage." However, the English anthropologists were very slow to substitute the word "culture" for "custom." On March 10th, 1885, Sir James G. Frazer presented his first anthropological research to a meeting of the Royal Anthropological Society. In the discussion following the paper, he stated that he owed his interest in anthropology to Tylor and had been much influenced by Tylor's ideas. Nevertheless, he[98] speaks only of "custom" and "customs" and indeed to the end of his professional life avoided the concept of culture in his writings. R. R. Marett's Home University Library *Anthropology* also uses only the word custom. Radcliffe-Brown writing in 1923 does not use "custom" but is careful to say rather consistently "culture or civilization." In 1940 he no longer bothers to add "or civilization." The implication is that by roughly 1940 "culture" in its anthropological sense had become fairly familiar to educated Englishmen.

The contemporary influence of learning theory and personality psychology has perhaps brought the anthropological idea back closer to the Kantian usage of the individual's becoming cultured, with expressions like "enculturation" and "the culturalization of the person." Perhaps instead of "brought back" we should say that psychological interest, in trying better to fund the idea of culture, and to understand and explain its basic process, has reintroduced the individual into culture.

The history of the word "culture" presents many interesting problems in the application of culture theory itself. Why did the concept "Kultur" evolve and play such an important part in the German intellectual setting? Why has the concept of "culture" had such difficulty in breaking through into public consciousness in France and England? Why has it rather suddenly become popular in the United States, to the point that such phrases as "Eskimo culture" appear even in the comic strips?

We venture some tentative hypotheses, in addition to the suggestion already made as to the imbalance in Germany of 1800 of cultural advancement and political retardation. In the German case, there was first — for whatever reasons — a penchant for large abstractions in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought. Second, German culture was less internally homogeneous — at least less centralized in a dominant capital city — than the French and English cultures during the comparable period. France and England, as colonial powers, were aware, of course, of other ways of life, but

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[95] A philosophy of history published in 1949 by an agriculturalist (H. B. Stevens) bears the title *The Recovery of Culture.*

[96] One may instance the little book by Herbert Read (1941) *To Hell with Culture: Democratic Values are New Values.*

[97] This is reflected even in anthropological literature of the first quarter of this century in the distinction (e.g., by Vierkandt and by Schmidt and Koppers) between "Naturvölker" and "Kulturvölker."

[98] Frazer, 1885.

— perhaps precisely because of imperialism — the English and French were characteristically indifferent to the intellectual significance of cultural differences — perhaps resistant to them. Similarly, the heterogeneous cultural backgrounds of Americans — plus the fact that the new speed of communication and political events forced a recognition of the variety of social traditions in the world generally — quite possibly have helped create a climate of opinion in the United States unusually congenial to the cultural idea.

Not that a precise anthropological concept of culture is now a firm part of the thinking of educated citizens.[99] If it were, there would be no need for this monograph. No, even in intellectual and semi-intellectual circles the distinction between the general idea of culture and a specific culture is seldom made. "Culture" is loosely used as a synonym for "society." In social science literature itself the penetration of the concept is far from complete, though rapidly increasing. Mr. Untereiner surveyed the tables of contents and indices in about six hundrd volumes in the libraries of the Department of Social Relations and the Peabody Museum of Harvard University. Anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and clinical psychology were represented in about that order, and dates of publication ranged back as far as 1900 but with heavy concentration on the past two decades. In more than half of these books "culture" was not even mentioned. In the remainder surprisingly few explicit definitions were given. Usage was rather consistently vague, and denotation varied from very narrow to very broad. Mr. Untereiner's impression (and ours) is that the neighboring social science disciplines have assimilated, on the whole, little more than the notion of variation of customs. There are important individual exceptions, of course, and there does seem to be a much greater effort
at explicitness and rigor in some recent socic
logical and psychological works.

The lack of clarity and precision is largel
the responsibility of anthropology. Anthrc
pologists have been preoccupied with gathei
ing, ordering, and classifying data. Apart fror
some nineteenth- and early twentieth-centur
"armchair" speculations which were largel
of the order of pseudo-historical reconstruc
tions, anthropology has only very recentl
become conscious of problems of theory an
of the logic of science. A fully systemati
scientific theory of man, society, and cultur
has yet to be created. While there has bee
greater readiness to theorize in psychology an
sociology than in anthropology, the results a
yet show neither any marked agreement nc
outstanding applicability to the solution c
problems. The lack of mooring of the cor
cept of culture in a body of systematic theor
is doubtless one of the reasons for the shynes
of the dictionary makers. They have not onl
been puzzled by the factoring out of variou
sub-notions and exclusive emphasis upon on
of these, but they have probably sensed tha
the concept has been approached fror
different methodological assumptions — whic
were seldom made explicit.

We have made our taxonomy of definitior
in the next section as lengthy as it is becaus
culture is the central concept of anthropolog
and inevitably a major concept in a possibl
eventual unified science of human behavio
We think it is important to discuss the pas
the present, and the prospects of this cruci
concept. Its status in terms of refinements c
the basic idea, and the organization of suc
refinements into a corpus of theory, may serv
as a gauge of the development of explicit cor
ceptual instruments in cultural anthropolog
Definitions of culture can be conceived as
"telescoping" or "focussing" upon these cor
ceptual instruments.

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[99] An example of confusion is the interpretation of "Ethical Culture" as stemming from anthropology. The Ethical Culture movement has nothing to do with culture in the anthropological sense. It refers to cultivation of ethics: the meaning being the older one that gave rise to terms like horticulture, pearl culture, bee culture, test-tube culture. The movement was founded and long led by Felix Adler as a sort of deistic or agnostic religion, with emphasis on ethics in place of the deity. The parent society was,
and is still, flourishing in New York. Other societi
were established in several American cities, and
Germany; until Hitler abolished them there. Tl
term "Ethische Kultur" was so out of step with tl
by then general use of Kultur in Germany that tl
movement was sometimes misunderstood there
having reference to a special kind of propose
civilization-culture, instead of the mere fostering
ethical behavior.

ADDENDUM: FEBVRE ON CIVILISATION

A work published as far back as 1930 which
tempts for civilization much the sort of
quiry, though somewhat more briefly, which
e are instituting as regards culture, eluded
s (as it did certain writers in French — see
2, notes 15, 16, 17) until after our text was in
ress — partly because few copies of the work
eem to have reached American libraries and
artly because of certain bibliographical am-
iguities of its title. It has a pretitle: *Civilisa-*
on: le Mot et l'Idée, without mention of
ithor or editor; and then a long full title:
Fondation Pour la Science: Centre Inter-
ational de Synthèse. Première Semaine Inter-
ational de Synthèse. Deuxième Fascicule.
ivilisation: Le Mot et l'Idée. Exposés par
ucien Febvre, Émile Tonnelat, Marcel Mauss,
lfredo Niceforo, Louis Weber. Discussions.
Publ. by] La Renaissance du Livre. Paris.
930." The Director of the Centre, active par-
cipant in the discussions, and editor of the
olume of 144 pages was Henri Berr. The
ontained article of special relevance to our
quiry is the first one by Lucien Febvre, en-
tled "Civilisation: Évolution d'un Mot et
'un groupe d'Idées," covering pages 1–55,
cluding full documentation in 124 notes.
n the following paragraphs we summarize
is important and definitive study, which has
lready been referred to several times.[100]

Febvre, after distinguishing the "ethno-
raphic" concept of civilization from the idea
f higher civilization loaded with values of
restige and eminence, searches for historic
vidences of first use of the word as a noun —
o civilize and civilized are earlier in both
rench and English. A 1752 occurrence attri-
uted to Turgot is spurious, being due to the
sertion by an editor, probably Dupont de
Nemours (Ed. 1884, II, p. 674). The earliest
rinted occurrence discovered by Febvre is
y Boulanger, who died in 1759, in his
'Antiquité Devoilée par ses Usages, printed
n Amsterdam in 1766 (vol. III, pp. 404–05), in
sentence which contains the phrases "mettre
n à l'acte de civilisation" and "une civilisation
ontinuée." In both cases the reference is to a becoming, not to a state of being civilized. The second recorded usage is by Baudeau, 1767, *Ephémérides du Citoyen*, p. 82. After that, occurrences are, 1770, Raynal, *L'Histoire Philosophique . . . dans les deux Indes;* 1773, d'Holbach, *Système Social;* 1773–74, Diderot, *Réfutation*; 1793, Billaud-Varennes; June 30, 1798, Bonaparte ("une conquête dont les effets sur la civilisation et les commerces du monde sont incalculable," where the meaning seems to have passed from that of "becoming" to "a condition of activity in," as in the coupled "commerces"). Finally, in 1798, the work also "forces the gates" of the Academy's Dictionary, Littré being in error when he says that this was not until 1835.

Voltaire, Rousseau, Turgot, Helvetius, de Chastellux in 1772, Buffon in *Epoques de la Nature* in 1774–79, do not use the noun, although the verb or participle occurs in Voltaire in 1740 and Rousseau in 1762 — in fact long before them in Montaigne and Descartes. A near-synoym in the mid-eighteenth century was policé, policed, favored by Rousseau, and used by Voltaire in 1736 in his *Philosophie de l'Histoire*,[101] though in his Chapters 9 and 19 "civilisé" occasionally replaces it. Allied qualities, since at least the seventeenth century, were expressed by "civilité" — sometimes as being arbitrary or a mere varnish, while Montesquieu rates it above "politesse." All three words, however, were ultimately displaced by "civilisation" as regards the broadest meaning.

The first use of the plural "civilisations" — a significant step — which Febvre has been able to find is in 1819, by Ballanche in *Le Veillard et le Jeune Homme* (p. 102 of 1868 edition). The idea of a plurality of civilizations is already implicit when Volney in his *Eclaircissements sur les États-Unis* (before 1814, p. 718 of the 1868 edition) speaks almost ethnographically of "la civilisation des sauvages."

While Febvre leaves the question open, British use seems to follow on French. Murray traces the English verb and participle back only to 1631–41, as against sixteenth-century use by Montaigne. The Boswell reference of 1772 about Johnson excluding civilization in favor of civility (our § 2, fn. 21) is cited. Two apparent occurrences in the 1771 French translation of Robertson's *History of Charles V* have "refinement" in the English original of 1769. The first use of the noun, in English as in French, is in its legal procedural sense of turning a criminal into a civil suit, as we too have noted in § 2.

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[100] In footnotes 1, 3, 18, 42 above.

[101] As to the date see footnote 42 in § 7, above.

So far, Febvre's precise and illuminating account of the word civilization. This extends our comments in § 2, which were incidental to the history of the word culture and its meanings.

The second essay in the volume, by E. Tonnelat, on *Kultur*: *Histoire du Mot, Évolution du Sens*, is much briefer (pp. 61–73) and somewhat sketchy. He regards the German usage as a direct *calque* or copy of the French. In the seventeenth century, in French, the noun "culture" is always acco plished by the object of action — culture wheat or letters or what not. In the eighteen it is used by itself, to denote "formation l'esprit." In German, Tonnelat cites the 17 dictionary definition by Adelung which have discussed, and the 1807–13 one by Cam who equates Cultur with Bildung, geisti Entwickelung, and proposes Anbau, Geistesa bau as a German equivalent. Tonnelat th briefly discusses usage in Herder, Ka Schiller, Goethe, and the growing empha on relation of Cultur to Staat in the romanti Novalis, Fichte, and Schlegel.

The remaining essays in the volume, Mauss on elements and forms of civilizatio by Niceforo on cultural values and the pos bility of an objective scale for measuri these, by Weber on technology, discuss aspec of civilization itself rather than the history the concept and word as such.

PART II

DEFINITIONS

GROUPS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE[1] DEFINITIONS IN ENGLISH[2]

Group A. Enumeratively descriptive

Group B. Historical

Group C. Normative
  - C-I. Emphasis on Rule or Way
  - C-II. Emphasis on Ideals or Values Plus Behavior

Group D. Psychological
  - D-I. Emphasis on Adjustment, on Culture as a Problem-Solving Device
  - D-II. Emphasis on Learning
  - D-III. Emphasis on Habit
  - D-IV. Purely Psychological Definitions

Group E. Structural

Group F. Genetic
  - F-I. Emphasis on Culture as a Product or Artifact
  - F-II. Emphasis on Ideas
  - F-III. Emphasis on Symbols
  - F-IV. Residual Category Definitions

Group G. Incomplete Definitions

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[1] The definers (in addition to anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, one chemist, one biologist, one economist, one geographer, and one political scientist) include several philosophers. The latter, however, are operating within the social-science area of the concept.

[2] Only four definitions not in the English language are included.

INTRODUCTION

T IS impossible, without an enormous number of categories and great artificiality, to group finitions of culture with complete con- tency. We think, however, that some order- g both reflects meaningful historical fact d makes for a measure of conceptual en- htenment. As the physiologist, L. J. enderson, used to say to his students, "In ence any classification is better than no ssification — provided you don't take it too iously." We recognize that an element of bitrariness has entered into many of our ignments, and we are quite aware that an cellent case could be made for a radical fting of some mixed or borderline defini- ns. In certain (but not all) cases we have licated possible alternative assignments.

We have tried to categorize on the basis of incipal emphasis rather than by, as it were, eraging the total content of the definition. is emphasis, in some instances, we have lged in a broader context than that supplied the quotation given. Yet this does not an that a given emphasis is constant for a rticular author throughout his professional e. Indeed we present examples of definitions m the same publication which differ im- rtantly in emphasis. The fact of the matter hat many of the definitions we cite are only y crudely comparable. Some were con- ucted for the purpose of making one kind legitimate point or for dealing with highly cialized materials; others for very different nts and materials. Some definitions are from oks, some from articles in professional jour- s, a few from monographs or popular ays or literary pieces. Some were hardly ended as formal definitions at all but rather convenient encapsulations of what was en as generally agreed upon. Nevertheless, eemed important to us to document fully range and variety of nuclear ideas and their sible combinations. We hope the reader l remember that we do not take our classi- ation at all insistently in its details, and that consider it useful for heuristic purposes y.

The objective of our taxonomy is to illus- e developments of the concept and to bring out the convergences and divergences in various definitions. In our classification and our critical comments we realize that we are taking brief statements out of the larger context of the authors' thinking. But our purpose is not to make an over-all critique of certain writers. It is rather to point up the important and useful angles from which the central idea has been approached. This can, in part, be achieved by grouping together those statements which seem to stress one or more of the same fundamental criteria.

In the operation of definition one may see in microcosm the essence of the cultural process: the imposition of a conventional form upon the flux of experience. And, as I. A. Richards has remarked, some words must bear a much heavier weight of meaning than others. It is the basic concepts like "value," "idea," and "culture" that are the hardest to circumscribe. There is a scattering of denotations and connotations that might be compared to the clustering of steel filings around a magnet. This analogy might be pursued further: as a magnet is a point of reference, so are the key concepts centers of symbolic crystallization in each culture. Charged with affect, almost impossible to delimit and hence susceptible to considerable projection, these fundamental concepts are the ultimate conscious and unconscious references in a culture. Accepted as a currency for explanation, they may be viewed as the boundary lines of symbolic development in a culture. Scientific definition represents a sharpening of the same process that occurs more slowly and less rationally in culture generally.

We do not think it profitable in this study to haggle over the logical and metaphysical aspects of a "definition of definition."[7] The (1941) statement of the Committee on Conceptual Integration does not seem very helpful for our purposes:

> A definition is a statement of a definiendum (the thing defined) which indicates its genus (next most inclusive class), indicates its species (the class in which the definiendum lies), differentiates it (the definiendum) from all other phenomena in the same species and which indicates no more than these

things about the definiendum — the choice of genus, species, and intra-species differentiae being determined by and adequate to fulfill the purposes for which the statement was devised.

We prefer the view expressed by Freud:

> The fundamental concepts or most general ideas in any of the disciplines of science are always left indeterminate at first and are only explained to begin with by reference to the realm of phenomena from which they were derived; it is only by means of a progressive analysis of the material of observation that they can be made clear and can find a significant and consistent meaning. It is plain that a science based upon observation has no alternative but to work out its findings piecemeal and to solve its problems step by step. . . . " (1946, 106–07)

Indeed scientists reject more and more the old recipe "define your terms" in favor of the prescription "state explicitly and clearly your undefined terms." For, as Woodger has remarked:

> It is clear that we cannot define all our terms. If we start to define all our terms, we must by necessity soon come to a set of terms which we cannot define any more because we will have no terms with which to define them. (1937, 159)

Moreover, all "definitions" are constructed from a point of view — which is all too often left unstated. Not all definitions are substantive or descriptive. Nor is explanatory th only other alternative. Some of the definitio of culture which we shall present have bee "functional" in intent. Others may be cha acterized as epistemological — that is, the have been intended to point to the phenomen and process by which we gain our knowledg of culture. Some definitions look towar the actions of the individual as the startin point of all generalizations, whereas other while perhaps admitting individual acts ultimate referents, depart from abstractio posited for groups.

Our own procedure may be stated simpl One of the reasons "culture" has been so har to delimit is that its abstractness makes an single concrete referent out of the questio and, up to this time, the notions that ha accreted around the concept have not bee well enough organized to cross-relate ther Our hope is that by grouping and dissecti the varying notions that have been subsum under this label we can show the interconne tions of the related abstractions. As L. Bernard (1941a, p. 501, *Definition of Defin tion*) has remarked: "Definition becomes at one and the same time a process of conde sation and simplification on the one hand a of precision and formulation on the oth hand."

GROUP A: DESCRIPTIVE

ROAD DEFINITIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON ENUMERATION OF CONTENT: USUALLY INFLUENCED BY TYLOR

1. *Tylor, 1871: 1.*

Culture, or civilization, . . . is that com- lex whole which includes knowledge, belief, rt, law, morals, custom, and any other capa- ilities and habits acquired by man as a member f society.

. *Wissler, 1920: 3.*

. . . all social activities in the broadest sense, uch as language, marriage, property system, tiquette, industries, art, etc. . . .

3. *Dixon, 1928: 3.*

(a) The sum of all [a people's] activities, ustoms, and beliefs.

(b) That totality of a people's products and ctivities, social and religious order, customs nd beliefs which . . . we have been accustomed o call their civilization.

. *Benedict, (1929)*[3] *1931: 806.*

. . . that complex whole which includes all e habits acquired by man as a member of ociety.

. *Burkitt, 1929: 237.*

. . . the sum of the activities of a people as nown by their industries and other discover- le characteristics.

. *Bose, 1929: 23.*

We can now define Culture as the rystallized phase of man's life activities. It cludes certain forms of action closely as- ociated with particular objects and institu- ons; habitual attitudes of mind transferable om one person to another with the aid of ental images conveyed by speech-symbols . . Culture also includes certain material ojects and techniques . . .

7. *Boas, 1930: 79.*

Culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by these habits.[4]

8. *Hiller, 1933: 3.*

The beliefs, systems of thought, practical arts, manner of living, customs, traditions, and all socially regularized ways of acting are also called culture. So defined, culture includes all the activities which develop in the association between persons or which are learned from a social group, but excludes those specific forms of behavior which are predetermined by inherited nature.

9. *Winston, 1933: 25.*

Culture may be considered as the totality of material and non-material traits, together with their associated behavior patterns, plus the language uses which a society possesses.

10. *Linton, 1936: 288.*

. . . the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior which the members of that society have acquired through instruction or imitation and which they share to a greater or less degree.

10a. *Lowie, 1937: 3.*

By culture we understand the sum total of what an individual acquires from his society — those beliefs, customs, artistic norms, food-habits, and crafts which come to him not by his own creative activity but as a legacy from the past, conveyed by formal or informal education.

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[3] The year in parentheses represents date of first ublication, the second year the date of source cited.

[4] An expansion of this definition by Boas in 1938 is cited by us in a footnote to his quoted statement on culture in Part III, *b*–4.

11. *Panunzio, 1939: 106.* (could also justifiably be assigned to D-I)

It [culture] is the complex whole of the system of concepts and usages, organizations, skills, and instruments by means of which mankind deals with physical, biological, and human nature in satisfaction of its needs.

12. *Murray, 1943: 346.*

The various industries of a people, as well as art, burial customs, etc., which throw light upon their life and thought.

13. *Malinowski, 1944: 36.*

It [culture] obviously is the integral whole consisting of implements and consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, beliefs and customs.

14. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 82.*

Culture is that complex whole which includes artifacts, beliefs, art, all the other habits acquired by man as a member of society, and all products of human activity as determined by these habits.

15. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 96.*

. . . culture in general as a descriptive concept means the accumulated treasury of human creation: books, paintings, buildings, and the like; the knowledge of ways of adjusting to our surroundings, both human and physical; language, customs, and systems of etiquette, ethics, religion, and morals that have been built up through the ages.

16. *Bidney, 1947: 376.*

. . . functionally and secondarily, culture refers to the acquired forms of technique, behavior, feeling and thought of individuals within society and to the social institutions in which they cooperate for the attainment of common ends.

17 *Kroeber, 1948a: 8–9.*

. . . the mass of learned and transmitt
motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, a
values — and the behavior they induce —
what constitutes *culture*. Culture is the spec
and exclusive product of men, and is the
distinctive quality in the cosmos . . . . Cultu
. . . is at one and the same time the totality
products of social men, and a tremendo
force affecting all human beings, socially a
individually.

18. *Herskovits, 1948: 154.*

Culture [5] . . . refers to that part of the to
setting [of human existence] which includ
the material objects of human manufactu
techniques, social orientations, points of vie
and sanctioned ends that are the immedia
conditioning factors underlying behavior.

19. *Herskovits, 1948: 625.*

. . . culture is essentially a construct th
describes the total body of belief, behavi
knowledge, sanctions, values, and goals th
mark the way of life of any people. That
though a culture may be treated by the stude
as capable of objective description, in the fi
analysis it comprises the things that peo
have, the things they do, and what they thi

20. *Thurnwald, 1950: 104.*

[Culture:] The totality of usages and a
justments which relate to family, politi
formation, economy, labor, morality, custo
law, and ways of thought. These are bou
to the life of the social entities in which th
are practiced and perish with these; wher
civilizational horizons are not lost.

COMMENT

The distinctive criteria of this group are (
culture as a comprehensive totality,[6] (
enumeration of aspects of culture conte
All of these definitions, save two, use one
more of the following words explicitly: co

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[5] When a single word or words in a definition are italicized by the author, this is reproduced, but where the whole definition is italicized we present it in ordinary type.

[6] This is now almost universal. Odum (194
though distinguishing culture from civilization so
what as Merton does, nevertheless says ". . . cultur
the sum total of the characteristics of a society .
(p. 13)

ex whole, totality, sum, sum total, all. A-12
eaks merely of "various." The phrase "ac-
mulated treasury" in A-15 clearly implies
otality." Every definition except A-4 is
umerative.

Tylor's definition appears at the very be-
nning of his *Primitive Culture*. It has been,
d continues to be, quoted numberless times
and not only by anthropologists and sociolo-
sts. Klineberg uses it in his *Social Psychology*
940, p. 62). Another important recent text-
ok in psychology (Gardner Murphy's *Per-*
nality, 1948) gives Tylor's as the sole defini-
n in the glossary under "culture" (p. 983).

Boas expanded and refined Tylor's defini-
n, but without breaking away from it. He
d met Tylor and was evidently impressed
him; and if direct influencing is not trace-
le, that tends to be true of Boas generally.
issler, Benedict, Dixon, Linton, and Kroeber
re all students of Boas. The influence of
lor — often through Boas — appears also in
phrasing of definitions not included in this
oup (cf. B-1, B-7, B-8, B-10, B-11, C-I-1,
I-4, C-I-5, C-II-2, C-II-4, D-II-8, etc.).

Customs (group referent), habits (individual
erent), customs and habits, or habitual
havior enter into the majority of the
finitions in this group. This was probably
vitable for a conception emanating from
nologists, for customs are the obvious
enomena presented by historyless and non-
rate peoples. Learning and tradition were
doubt implicit in the idea of custom, but
rning is made explicit in only one definition
an anthropologist prior to 1930 (Wissler,
6; D-II-1). Linton (1936, A-10) says
quired through instruction or imitation."
ter the formal "learning theory" of psy-
ologists began to reach anthropologists,
arning" as consciously distinct from "tradi-
n" begins to enter into an increasing num-
of definitions (Mead, 1937, B-10; Miller
Dollard, 1941, D-II-3; Linton, 1945a,
I-8; Opler, 1947, D-II-8; Ford, 1942, D-I-
Benedict, 1947, D-II-6; Davis, 1948,
I-9; etc. Symbolism was formally injected
sociologists, though one anthropologist,
lie White, has emphasized it in his defini-
s. Behavior as such enters the scene long
r behaviorism was launched in psychology:
h the sociologists Hiller and Winston (both
1933), with Linton (1936), Mead (1937, B-10), and Thomas (1937, C-II-2). Activity is mentioned by Wissler (1920) and Dixon (1928). It is certainly contained in Boas' "reactions of the individual" and implied in Benedict's (and of course Tylor's) "habits acquired by man." Tylor's term "capabilities" is perhaps to be construed in the sense of "capabilities *as realized* in achievements." But the enumeration — "knowledge, belief, art, morals, customs" — seems today curiously ambiguous as between products of activity and activities as such. It is probable that Tylor would have said that the products implied activities, and the activities resulted in products. This is the position implicit in the two definitions in this group by archæologists (A-5, A-12).

Boas' definition, which is careful, is also unusually comprehensive and explicit. He takes in, separately: (1) customs and their manifestations; (2) individual behavior ("reactions") as determined by customs; (3) the products of activity as so determined. We have not been able to find an earlier explicit definition by Boas, nor in his long teaching at Columbia does he seem to have entered into a systematic discussion of the concept. In the first edition of *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911) he uses the word frequently, sometimes as interchangeable with "civilization." Occasionally he slips into popular terminology as in "highly cultured families," "most cultured class." On the whole, his usage reveals a conception substantially identical with the formal definition quoted above, though his quasi-definition on page 139 is archaic or at least incomplete.

Linton's definition, which is only one of several by him, does not use "customs;" "habits" have become "habitual behavior;" and "conditioned responses" enter as further indication of influencing by social psychology. There may be a remnant of Tylor-Boas type of definition, but the orientation is away from it.

Malinowski (A-13) takes Tylor's notions of comprehensive totality and enumeration of content and adds a dash of economic jargon and his own favorite locution "constitutional charters" which implies "rule or way" (see C-I). Kluckhohn and Kelly (A-15) link enumeration with social heritage (B) and adjustment (D–I). Kroeber (A–17) is enumerative but theoretically his is one of the more inclusive of the statements in this group, for learning, transmission, behavior, and the significance for human life are all included.

Thurnwald's recent definition (20) is still enumerative. It differs from the others in this group in that Thurnwald restricts culture by *excluding* civilization, which he sees as an irreversible, human-wide accumulation of technology and knowledge which proceeds (in the Alfred Weberian not the Spenglerian sense of civilization — Part I, § 5, Part III, *b*), independently of the more transient and perishable cultures and their societies.

The principal logical objection to the definitions in this group is that definitions by enumeration can never be exhaustive and what is not explicitly mentioned tends to get left ou of consideration. Culture is an abstraction an the listing of any relatively concrete phenomena confuses this issue. As Bernard (1941a *Definition of Definition*, p. 501) says:

> The precision of a definition does not usually consist in the accuracy of a detailed description, bu rather in that of a representative conceptualized inclusive formula which serves as a base for contro operations. That is, the precision resides in a syntheti conceptualized norm which is always in some degre artificial and projective and may be and frequentl is in large measure hypothetical and ideal formatio

Certain abstract and (today) generally agreed upon properties of culture — e.g., the fac that it has organization as well as content — do not enter into any of the definitions in th group.

GROUP B: HISTORICAL

EMPHASIS ON SOCIAL HERITAGE OR TRADITION

. *Park and Burgess, 1921: 72.*

The culture of a group is the sum total and rganization of the social heritages which have cquired a social meaning because of racial emperament and of the historical life of the roup.

. *Sapir, 1921: 221.*

. . . culture, that is, . . . the socially inherited ssemblage of practices and beliefs that deternines the texture of our lives . . . .

. *Sapir, 1924a: 402.* (*1949: 308–09.*)

[Culture is technically used by the ethnoloist and culture historian to embody] any ocially inherited element in the life of man, naterial and spiritual.

. *Tozzer, 1925: 6.*

. . . the cultural, that which we inherit by ocial contact. . . .

a. *Myres, 1927: 16.*

. . . "culture" is not a state or condition nly, but a process; as in *agriculture* or *horticulture* we mean not the condition of the land ut the whole round of the farmer's year, and ll that he does in it; "culture," then, is what emains of men's past, working on their resent, to shape their future.

5. *Bose, 1929: 14.*

. . . we may describe culture as including uch behaviour as is common among a group of men and which is capable of transmission from generation to generation or from one country to another.

6. *Malinowski, 1931: 621.*

This social heritage is the key concept of cultural anthropology. It is usually called culture. . . . Culture comprises inherited artifacts, goods, technical processes, ideas, habits, and values.

7. *Winston, 1933: 4.*

. . . we may regard culture as the sum total of the possessions and the patterned ways of behavior which have become part of the heritage of a group.

8. *Lowie, 1934: 3.*

The whole of social tradition. It includes, as . . . Tylor put it, "capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society". . .

9. *Linton, 1936: 78.*

. . . the social heredity is called *culture.* As a general term, *culture* means the total social heredity of mankind, while as a specific term *a culture* means a particular strain of social heredity.

10. *Mead, 1937: 17.*

Culture means the whole complex of traditional behavior which has been developed by the human race and is successively learned by each generation. *A culture* is less precise. It can mean the forms of traditional behavior which are characteristic of a given society, or of a group of societies, or of a certain race, or of a certain area, or of a certain period of time.

11. *Sutherland and Woodward, 1940: 19.*

Culture includes everything that can be *communicated* from one generation to another. The culture of a people is their *social heritage*, a "complex whole" which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, techniques of tool fabrication and use, and method of communication.

12. *Davis and Dollard, 1940: 4.*

. . . the difference between groups is in their cultures, their social heritage. Men behave differently as adults because their cultures are different; they are born into different habitual ways of life, and these they must follow because they have no choice.

13. *Groves and Moore, 1940: 14.*

Culture is thus the *social heritage*, the fund of accumulated knowledge and customs through which the person "inherits" most of his behavior and ideas.

14. *Angyal, 1941: 187.*

Culture can be defined as an organized body of behavior patterns which is transmitted by social inheritance, that is, by tradition, and which is characteristic of a given area or group of people.

15. *Kluckhohn, 1942: 2.*

Culture consists in those abstracted elements of action and reaction which may be traced to the influence of one or more strains of social heredity.

16. *Jacobs and Stern, 1947: 2.*

Humans, as distinct from other animals have a culture — that is, a social heritage — transmitted not biologically through the germ cells but independently of genetic inheritance.

17. *Dietschy, 1947: 121.*

C'est cette perpétuation des données de l'histoire qui nous sont transmises d'abord par la génération qui nous précède que nous nommons civilisation.

18. *Kroeber, 1948a: 253.*

. . . culture might be defined as all the activities and non-physiological products of human personalities that are not automatically reflex or instinctive. That in turn means, in biological and physiological parlance, that culture consists of conditioned or learned activities (plus the manufactured results of these); and the idea of learning brings us back again to what is socially transmitted, what is received from tradition, what "is acquired by man as a member of societies." So perhaps *how it comes to be* is really more distinctive of culture than what it *is*.

19. *Parsons, 1949: 8.*

Culture . . . consists in those patterns relative to behavior and the products of human action which may be inherited, that is, passed on from generation to generation independently of the biological genes.

20. *Kluckhohn, 1949a: 17.*

By "culture" anthropology means the to life way of a people, the social legacy t individual acquires from his group.

21. *Henry, 1949: 218.*

I would define culture as *the individual's* *group's acquired response systems*. . . . t conception of culture as *response systems a* *quired through the process of domestic* *tion* . . .

22. *Radcliffe-Brown, 1949: 510–11.*

As a sociologist the reality to which I rega the word "culture" as applying is the proce of cultural tradition, the process by which a given social group or social class languag beliefs, ideas, aesthetic tastes, knowledge, skil and usages of many kinds are handed on ("tr dition" means "handing on") from person person and from one generation to another.

COMMENT

These definitions select one feature culture, social heritage or social traditio rather than trying to define culture substan tively. Linton's "social heredity" obviousl means the same and is etymologically equall valid, but is open to the tactical objection th "heredity" has acquired in biology the tech nical denotation of an organic process whic is distinctly *not* involved in culture trans mission. "Heritage" connotes rather what received, the product; "tradition" refers pri marily to the process by which receipt take place, but also to what is given and accepted Both terms view culture statically, or at leas as more or less fixed, though the word "tra dition" denotes dynamic activity as well as en product.

Several of the statements deviate somewhat Sapir speaks of culture *embodying element* that are socially inherited: elements "in th life of man, material and spiritual" — phrase that have a curiously old-fashioned or Ger manic ring uncharacteristic of the later Sapir Margaret Mead's statement looks both forwar and back. Its "complex whole" is a reminiscence from Tylor, perhaps via Benedict "Traditional" is what connects the definitio with the others in the group; "behavior" and arned," which differentiate it from the ners, represent formal or conscious psycho-ical influencing.

There are six definitions from sociologists this group (1, 7, 11, 12, 13, 19). The first perhaps the neatest and most interesting. istorical life of the group" is a component ich anthropologists long implied rather n formulated. "Racial temperament" is a tor that anthropologists have tended to shy ay from since they became conscious of ture. "*Social* meaning" and "*social* heritage" understandable emphases. This definition Park and Burgess is one of the first to state t culture has organization as well as content. is note is also struck by Winston's *tterned* ways of behavior" (7), Parsons' tterns" (19), and by the psychiatrist gyal's "*organized* body" (14).

inton's and Mead's definitions (9 and 10) appear to be the first to make an explicit distinction between "culture" and "a culture." This point is simple but of great theoretical importance.

The definitions in this group have been of utility in drawing attention to the fact that human beings have a social as well as a biological heritage, an increment or inheritance that springs from membership in a group with a history of its own. The principal drawbacks to this conception of culture are that it implies too great stability and too passive a role on the part of man. It tends to make us think of the human being as what Dollard (1939) has called "the passive porter of a cultural tradition." Men are, as Simmons (1942) has reminded us, not only the carriers and creatures of culture — they are also creators and manipulators of culture. "Social heredity" suggests too much of the dead weight of tradition.

GROUP C: NORMATIVE

C–I. EMPHASIS ON RULE OR WAY

1. *Wissler, 1929: 15, 341.*

The mode of life followed by the community or the tribe is regarded as a culture . . . [It] includes all standardized social procedures . . . a tribal culture is . . . the aggregate of standardized beliefs and procedures followed by the tribe.

2. *Bogardus, 1930: 336* (second sentence would justify assignment to B).

Culture is the sum total of the ways of doing and thinking, past and present, of a social group. It is the sum of the traditions, or handed-down beliefs, and of customs, or handed-down procedures.

3. *Young, 1934:xiii* (or F–1, second sentence; B, third sentence).

The general term for these common and accepted ways of thinking and acting is culture. This term covers all the folkways which men have developed from living together in groups. Furthermore, culture comes down to us from the past.

4. *Klineberg, 1935: 255* (or A, second sentence).

[culture] applies to that whole "way of life" which is determined by the social environment. To paraphrase Tylor it includes all the capabilities and habits acquired by an individual as a member of a particular society.

5. *Firth, 1939: 18.*

They [anthropologists] consider the acts of individuals not in isolation but as members of society and call the sum total of these modes of behavior "culture."

5a. *Lynd, 1940: 19.*

. . . all the things that a group of people inhabiting a common geographical area do, th ways they do things and the ways they thin and feel about things, their material tools an their values and symbols.

6. *Gillin and Gillin, 1942: 20.*

The customs, traditions, attitudes, ideas, an symbols which govern social behavior sho a wide variety. Each group, each society h a set of behavior patterns (overt and cover which are more or less common to the men bers, which are passed down from generatio to generation, and taught to the children, an which are constantly liable to change. The common patterns we call the *culture* . . .

7. *Simmons, 1942: 387.*

. . . the culture or the commonly recogniz mores . . .

8. *Linton, 1945b: 203.*

The culture of a society is the way of li of its members; the collection of ideas a habits which they learn, share, and transm from generation to generation.

9. *Linton, 1945a: 30.*

[Culture] refers to the total way of life any society . . .

10. *Kluckhohn and Kelly,[7] 1945a: 84.*

. . . those historically created selective pr cesses which channel men's reactions both internal and to external stimuli.

11. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 97.*

By culture we mean all those historical created designs for living, explicit and implic rational, irrational, and nonrational, whi exist at any given time as potential guides f the behavior of men.

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[7] The multiplicity of definitions from the Kluckhohn and Kelly article is due to the fact that this was also, in part, a survey of current thinking about the concept of culture. In addition to the explanatory (10) and descriptive (11) definitions proposed by the authors, there is an attempt to state various positio reflecting different types of anthropological empha Of these (12) is an example, and others will foll in later sections.

2. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 91.*

Culture is . . . a set of ready-made definiions of the situation which each participant nly slightly retailors in his own idiomatic way.

3. *Kluckhohn and Leighton, 1946: xviii.*

A culture is any given people's way of life, s distinct from the life-ways of other peoples.

4. *Herskovits, 1948: 29.*

A culture is the way of life of a people; vhile a society is the organized aggregate of ndividuals who follow a given way of life. n still simpler terms a society is composed of eople; the way they behave is their culture.

5. *Lasswell, 1948: 203.*

"Culture" is the term used to refer to the vay that the members of a group act in relaion to one another and to other groups.

6. *Bennett and Tumin, 1949: 209.*

Culture: the behavior patterns of all groups, alled the "way of life": an observable feature f all human groups; the fact of "culture" is ommon to all; the *particular pattern* of ulture differs among all. "A culture": the pecific pattern of behavior which distinuishes any society from all others.

7. *Frank, 1948: 171.*

. . . a term or concept for the totality of hese patterned ways of thinking and acting vhich are specific modes and acts of conduct f discrete individuals who, under the guidnce of parents and teachers and the associaions of their fellows, have developed a way f life expressing those beliefs and those ctions.

8. *Titiev, 1949: 45.*

. . . the term includes those objects or tools, ttitudes, and forms of behavior whose use is anctioned under given conditions by the nembers of a particular society.

8a. *Maquet, 1949: 324.*

La culture, c'est la manière de vivre du roupe.

19. *Kluckhohn, 1951a: 86.*

"A culture" refers to the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their complete "design for living."

Addendum: When this monograph was already in press — and hence too late for inclusion in tabulations — we encountered the following definition belonging to this group, by the biologist, Paul Sears:

> The way in which the people in any group do things, make and use tools, get along with one another and with other groups, the words they use and the way they use them to express thoughts, and the thoughts they think — all of these we call the group's culture. (1939, 78–79)

COMMENT

Wissler's 1929 statement, "the mode of life followed by the community," sets the pattern. It is the old "customs" concept (cf. Group A), raised from its pluralistic connotations into a totalizing generalization. The word "mode" or "way" can imply (a) common or shared patterns; (b) sanctions for failure to follow the rules; (c) a manner, a "how" of behaving; (d) social "blueprints" for action. One or more of these implications is made perfectly explicit in many of these definitions.

There are probably few contemporary anthropologists who would reject completely the proposition "A culture is the distinctive way of life of a people," though many would regard it as incomplete. Radcliffe-Brown has only recently committed himself to a definition of culture (B-22). Earlier in his professional career he appeared to accept the Tylorian conception but increasingly he has belittled "culture" as opposed to "social structure" (see p. 132). Even Radcliffe-Brown, however, in conversation and in his final seminar at Chicago in 1937 spoke of culture as a set of rules for behavior. If there is a difference with Wissler's position it is in Radcliffe-Brown's implication that there is something artificial in rules. This is an understandable enough attitude for an anti-culturalist of his day and generation. Wissler's "mode of life followed" is more neutral; or if it has a connotation, it is rather that of a natural phenomenon.

The idea of artificiality or arbitrariness becomes explicit in Redfield's "conventional understandings manifest in act and artifact" (E-4). This emphasis seems to pull the definition well off to one side — almost as if it were an echo of the *Contrat Social.* The "arbitrariness" of a cultural phenomenon is a function of its particular historical determination. "Artificiality" is related to a different set of problems hinging on the role of culture in human life. Is it a thwarting or fulfilling or both? Is man's "culturalness" just a thin film, an epiphenomenon, capping his naturalness? Or are cultural features in man's life so important that culture becomes the capstone to human personality? Perhaps, however, there is no influence of either Rousseau or Radcliffe-Brown involved in Redfield's definition; it may be only a degree of stylization of phrase.

In any case there tends to be a close relationship between the definitions in this group and the group (E) to which Redfield's definition is assigned — those which emphasize the organization of culture. From Tylor's "complex whole" to Wissler's "mode of life" is one step. It is a next natural step to a "system" or "organization" (Redfield's word) of the common patterns, for the notion of stylization suggested by "mode" or "way" is easily extended to the totality of a culture.

There is also some linkage to the definitions in the D groups, particularly D–I, "Emphasis Upon Culture as a Problem-Solving Device." Ford (D-I–8) speaks of "regulations governing human behavior" (the "blueprints" idea) but emphasizes the fact that these rules constitute a set of solutions for perennial human problems. Morris (D-I–14) starts from "a scheme for living" but stresses the role of this in the adjustment process. Miller and Dollard (D-II–3) use the phrase "design of the human maze" but emphasize primarily the learning theory angle and secondarily the conception of adjustment. It is clear, however, that t "design for living" theme is, to greater lesser extent, a feature common to Grou C–I, D–I, D–II, and E.

A few more specific comments are now order.

Bogardus' definition (2) combines an ech of Tylor with the social heritage notion b stresses "the ways." Young (3) likewise i cludes the theme of tradition with a stress upo "ways" but combines these with Sumne term "folkways." The Gillin and Gillin defin tion (6) seems to be the first to speak of t overt and covert aspects of culture, thoug it is probable that the younger Gillin dre this distinction from the lectures of his teache Linton.

Linton, in two books in 1945, drifts int three or four definitions or subdefinitions culture. Most in accord with Wissler "the total way of life of any society," thoug he says only that this is what culture "refe to." An amplified version (8) adds the "ide and habits" which the members of the societ "learn, share, and transmit." Two other stat ments in 1945 (E-5) completely leave out t way of living, and emphasize the psychologic factors or organized repetitive responses an configurations of learned behavior — as natural enough in a book professedly dealin with personality.

Herskovits (A-19) includes the phrase "wa of life" in his definition, but we have place this in the Tylor group rather than here because it is specifically enumerative. An alte native definition from the same book Herskovits belongs in F-I.

In general, the definitions in this grou imply an "organicism" which becomes explic in the "structural" definitions of Group Here is foreshadowed the notion of a networ of rules, the totality rather than the parts (th discrete rules) being stressed.

C–II. EMPHASIS ON IDEALS OR VALUES PLUS BEHAVIOR

1. *Carver, 1935: 283.*

Culture is the dissipation of surplus human energy in the exuberant exercise of the higher human faculties.

2. *Thomas, 1937: 8.*

[Culture is] the material and social values of any group of people, whether savage o civilized (their institutions, customs, attitude behavior reactions) . . .

3. *Bidney, 1942: 452.*

A culture consists of the acquired or cult vated behavior and thought of individua

ithin a society, as well as of the intellectual,
tistic, and social ideals which the members
f the society profess and to which they strive
conform.

Bidney, 1946: 535.

An integral or holistic concept of culture
omprises the acquired or cultivated behavior,
eling, and thought of individuals within a
ociety as well as the patterns or forms of in-
llectual, social, and artistic ideals which
man societies have professed historically.

Bidney, 1947: 376.

. . . genetically, integral culture refers to the
lucation or cultivation of the whole man con-
dered as an organism and not merely to the
ental aspect of his nature or behavior.

Sorokin, 1947: 313.

[The social aspect of the superorganic uni-
erse is made up of the interacting individuals,
the forms of interaction, of unorganized and
rganized groups, and of the interindividual
d intergroup relationships . . .] The cultural
pect of the superorganic universe consists
meanings, values, norms, their interaction
d relationships, their integrated and uninte-
ated groups (systems and congeries) as they
e objectified through overt actions and
her vehicles in the empirical sociocultural
iverse.

COMMENT

These definitions come from an economist,
o sociologists, and a philosopher concerned
ith the concept of culture. The definition
the economist (Carver) is probably of the
Geist" or "Kultur" type ("higher faculties");
e have included it only because of some slight
storical interest. It may also be argued that
dney's 1947 definition (5) has no genuine
ace in this group.

The remaining four definitions all name
ehavior" or "overt actions" together with
deals" or "values." However, the relation
behavior to ideals or values in these defi-
tions appears to be not conceptually intrinsic,
t to be historical — a function of the period
hen the definitions were framed (1937–1947).

Thomas is notable among sociologists perhaps most of all for his contribution of the "definition of the situation;" but this does not enter into his definition of culture. Basically this is: "material and social values" of a group; further elaborated by specification of "institutions, customs, attitudes, behavior reactions." As artifacts are not mentioned in the enumeration, the word "material" in the core of the definition perhaps refers to expression in physical form, whether in terms of tangible objects or of bodily actions. This core of the definition, as usual with Thomas, is trenchant: the essence of culture is values.

Sorokin's 1947 statement is elaborate because it is really part of a philosophical system. Thus he begins by separating the social aspect from the cultural aspect of the superorganic or sociocultural empirical universe. Within this universe, culture, or "the cultural aspect," consists first of all of "meanings, values, norms." The three together obviously equate more or less with Thomas's "values." However, that is only the beginning. With the meanings, values, and norms there are also included by Sorokin: (1) their interactions and relationships; (2) their respectively more or less integrated grouping into systems versus congeries; and (3) these systems and congeries "as they are objectified through overt actions and other vehicles." This lands us in the midst of a systematic terminology that Sorokin has coined but which it would be beyond the scope of this comparative review to examine or appraise in detail. It is however clear that "overt actions" means behavior; that "other vehicles" are or include artifacts or objects of material culture; and that "objectified through" means that both behavior and artifacts are expressions of the primary meanings, values, and norms in their variably integrated groupings. Values, in short, are primary. Sorokin's thought system is therefore idealistic. Nevertheless, both behavior and artifacts have room made for them as "objectifications" — that is, expressions or derivations — just as it is recognized that values may occur either integrated into systems or merely collocated in congeries. That is, the world of phenomena is fully recognized, though the thinking is idealistic. This is how we construe Sorokin's definition. It aims at being broader than most, and is more avowedly idealistic, but otherwise is less off-center in meaning than in the terminology chosen.

Of Bidney's three definitions, the 1946 one is an expansion of that of 1942 by the addition of "feelings" to "behavior and thought"; of "patterns or forms of" to the "ideals" of various kinds; of "historically" to "profess": and by the omission of "to which they strive to conform," which presumably is already implied in the profession of ideals. We need therefore consider only the later definition. Bidney avows himself as in the humanist tradition. This fact no doubt accounts for his "acquired or cultivated" where most other definitions stress only acquisition itself, or its empirical method by social inheritance, learning, symbolism. To Bidney culture retains an element of its older sense of "cultivation"[8] — especially self-cultivation; culture is something sought.[9] It is no doubt this inclination that makes him specify "individuals within a society," where most other writers merely refer to the society or group. Seemingly also it is this same orientation that allows Bidney to couple behavior and values. The behavior, feelings, and thought being acquired or cultivated, in other words, being purposive or sought, relate to the patterns or forms of th social and other ideals — presumably partl shaping the ideals, partly being again in fluenced by them. Sorokin connects the sam two elements by having behavior "objectify ideals — express it or derive from it. Perhap one may compare the expression of th "themes" of a personality in TAT storie Thomas apparently was not conscious of problem of relation: he simply redefines hi values as *being* customs, attitudes, and be havior.

Such unity as exists in this group consis in the premise of the dynamic force of certai normative ideas on behavior in the cultur process. This conception is one to which a thropologists have openly given their allegianc only quite recently. In definitions of cultur by anthropologists one must wait until Kroe ber's 1948 definition (A-17) before the wor "values" appears. On the other hand, th treatment given to religious and other ide constitutes an implicit admission of the sig nificance of such norms. And anthropologis have long recognized such concepts as Sum ner's "mores" which clearly contain valu implications.

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[8] This is clear from his 1947 definition of "integral culture."

[9] Ortega y Gasset has somewhere said, "culture that which is sought" (quoted by Frank, 1948).

GROUP D: PSYCHOLOGICAL

D-I. EMPHASIS ON ADJUSTMENT, ON CULTURE AS A PROBLEM-SOLVING DEVICE

. *Small, 1905: 344–45.*

“Culture” . . . is the total equipment of tech-ique, mechanical, mental, and moral, by use f which the people of a given period try to ttain their ends . . . “culture” consists of the neans by which men promote their individual r social ends.

. *Sumner*[10] *and Keller, 1927: 46–47.*

The sum of men’s adjustments to their life-onditions is their culture, or civilization. hese adjustments . . . are attained only hrough the combined action of variation, se-ection, and transmission.

. *Dawson, 1928: xiii–xiv* (could also be as-igned to C-I).

A culture is a common way of life — a par-icular adjustment of man to his natural sur-oundings and his economic needs.

. *Keller, 1931: 26.*

No civilization (sum or synthesis of mental djustments) of any importance can be de-eloped by the individual or by the limited roup in isolation. . . . Culture[11] is developed hen the pressure of numbers on land reaches degree at which life exerts stress on man.

. *Young, 1934: 18–19.*

These folkways, these continuous methods f handling problems and social situations, we all *culture*. Culture consists of the whole ass of learned behavior or patterns of any roup as they are received from a previous roup or generation and as they are added to y this group, and then passed on to other roups or to the next generation.

. *Lundberg, 1939: 179.*

Through this process of inventing and ansmitting symbols and symbolic systems and technologies as well as their non-symbolic counterparts in concrete tools and instruments, man’s experience and his adjustment technique become cumulative. This societal behavior, together with its man-made products, in their interaction with other aspects of human environment, creates a constantly changing series of phenomena and situations to which man must continually adjust through the development of further habits achieved by the same process. The concrete manifestations of these processes are usually described by the vague word culture.

7. *Panunzio, 1939: 106.*

. . . culture is a man-made or superorganic order, self-generating and dynamic in its operation, a pattern-creating order, objective, humanly useful, cumulative, and self-perpetuating. It is the complex whole of the systems of concepts and usages, organizations, skills, and instruments by means of which mankind deals with physical, biological, and human nature in the satisfaction of its needs.

8. *Ford, 1939: 137* (could justifiably be assigned to C-I).

Culture, in the form of regulations governing human behavior, provides solutions to societal problems.

9. *Blumenthal, 1941: 9.*

Culture consists of all results (products) of human learned effort at adjustment.

10. *Ford, 1942: 555, 557.*

Culture consists of traditional ways of solving problems. . . . Culture . . . is composed of responses which have been accepted because they have met with success; in brief, culture consists of learned problem-solutions.

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[10] Sumner’s *Folkways* (1906) uses the term “civiliza-on” but not “culture.”

[11] The 1915 edition of this same book defines culture as “the sum or synthesis of mental adaptations.” (21)

11. *Young, 1942: 35.*
Culture consists of common and more or less standardized ideas, attitudes, and habits which have developed with respect to man's recurrent and continuous needs.

12. *Kluckhohn and Leighton, 1946: xviii–xix.*
There are certain recurrent and inevitable human problems, and the ways in which man can meet them are limited by his biological equipment and by certain facts of the external world. But to most problems there are a variety of possible solutions. Any culture consists of the set of habitual and traditional ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting that are characteristic of the ways a particular society meets its problems at a particular point in time.

13. *Morris, 1946: 205.*
The culture of a society may be said to consist of the characteristic ways in which basic needs of individuals are satisfied in that society (that is, to consist of the particular response sequences of various behavior-families which occur in the society). . .

14. *Morris, 1948: 43.*
A culture is a scheme for living by which a number of interacting persons favor certain motivations more than others and favor certain ways rather than others for satisfying these motivations. The word to be underlined is "favor." For preference is an essential of living things. . . . To live at all is to act preferentially — to prefer some goals rather than others and some ways of reaching preferred goals rather than other ways. A culture is such a pattern of preferences held by a group of persons and transmitted in time.

15. *Turney-High, 1949: 5.*
In its broadest sense, culture is coterminous with everything that is artificial, useful, and social employed by man to maintain his equilibrium as a biopsychological organism.

16. *Gorer, 1949: 2.*
. . . a culture, in the anthropological sens of the word: that is to say, shared patterns o learned behaviour by means of which thei fundamental biological drives are transforme into social needs and gratified through the appropriate institutions, which also define th permitted and the forbidden.

17. *Piddington, 1950: 3–4.*
The *culture* of a people may be defined a the sum total of the material and intellectua equipment whereby they satisfy their biological and social needs and adapt themselves t their environment.

COMMENT

Although only four of the definitions in thi group (2, 4, 8, 10) are directly traceable t William Graham Sumner, it seems likely tha most of them show at least an indirect influenc from him. Young (5), for example, uses Sumner's favorite word "folkways." It is notabl that of the seventeen definitions ten come fro sociologists,[12] two from a philosopher (13 14), two from English general scholars wh are hard to classify in academic terms (3, 16) one from an anthropologist [13] and psychiatris (12), and but two from conventional anthropologists (15, 17).

At any rate, it is a fact that Sumner, onc a dominating figure in American sociology consistently stressed the point of adjustmen In defining his major concept — which very close to anthropological "culture" bu narrower, for "culture" embraces both "folkways" and "mores" — he says:

> . . . folkways are habits of the individual an customs of the society which arise from efforts t satisfy needs; they are intertwined with goblinis and demonism and primitive notions of luck . . . an so they win traditional authority. Then they becom a social force. They arise no one knows whence o how. They grow only to a limited extent by th purposeful efforts of men. In time they lose powe decline, and die, or are transformed. While the

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[12] Although C. S. Ford is considered an anthropologist, his degree was in "The Science of Society" at Yale.

[13] Kluckhohn has been deeply influenced by h contacts with the Yale Institute of Human Relatio group in anthropology and psychology, and the thinking stems, in part, from Sumner.

> in vigor they very largely control individual and
> ial undertakings, and they produce and nourish
> as of world philosophy and life policy. Yet they
> not organic or material. They belong to a super-
> ganic system of relations, conventions, and in-
> utional arrangements. The study of them is called
> by their *social* character, by virtue of which they
> leading factors in the science of society. (1906, iv)

ne number of elements found in earlier, con-
nporary, and later definitions of culture
esent also in the above statement is remark-
le. We have: customs, habits, tradition,
ues ("ideas of world philosophy and life
licy"), the superorganic, the social, the
clical nature of culture.

This group has an evident conceptual rela-
nship to the "rule or way" group (C–I)
the one hand, and to the succeeding "learn-
" group (D–II), on the other. The Yale
nosphere was peculiarly congenial to the
empted synthesis of anthropology, soci-
gy, and learning theory because of the
mner tradition, as Dollard, Neal Miller,
rdock, Ford, Whiting, and others have
tified. This position is also close to Malin-
ski's [14] assumption that culture is solely the
ult of response to physiological drives and
eds as modified by acquired drives. Indeed
linowski apparently found himself intel-
tually at home in Yale during the last years
his life. Gorer was also at Yale for some
e.

Clellan Ford's definitions express the mod-
central tendency of this group without
iation or qualification. His "traditional
ys of solving problems" and "learned
blem solutions" stem from Sumner, from
llard, and from a specific psychological
entation. "Problem solutions" are the ex-
cit way in which one strain of contempor-
academic psychology (and some theo-
ical sociology) would approach the field
design, aim, or business of living. The
rned" also comes from a branch of psy-
logy, learning theory. In fact everything
racteristically cultural has been dissolved
of Ford's definitions, except for the hang-
r of alternative "traditional." The drift is
resolve or reduce culture into psychology.

This is a principal distinction between a number of definitions in this group and some definitions (e.g., Opler, D–II–8; Kluckhohn and Kelly, E–6) which have certain points of similarity.

It is true that any culture is, among other things, a set of techniques for adjusting both to the external environment and to other men. Insofar as these definitions point to this fact, they are helpful; however, they are both incomplete and inaccurate as synoptic definitions. For cultures create problems as well as solving them. If the lore of a people states that frogs are dangerous creatures, or that it is not safe to go about at night because of were-animals or ghosts, threats are posed which do not arise out of the inexorable facts of the external world. This is why all "functional" definitions of culture tend to be unsatisfactory: they disregard the fact that cultures create needs as well as provide means of fulfilling them.

Moreover, we must not continue so glibly to posit "needs" on the basis of observed habits. We must, with Durkheim, take account of the possibility that even some "functional" necessities of societies are referable primarily to the collectivity rather than to the biologically derived needs of the component individuals. We require a way of thinking which takes account of the pull of expectancies as well as the push of tensions, which emphasizes perduring values as well as immediate situation. As Dorothy Lee (1948, *Are Basic Needs Ultimate*?) has noted: "Culture is not . . . 'a response to the total needs of a society' but rather a system which stems from and expresses something had, the basic values of the society." Only in part is culture an adaptive and adjustive instrument.

Another weakness of most of this cluster of propositions is that in concern at why culture exists, and how it is achieved, they forget to tell what culture is. In short, they aim to find an explanatory definition without even troubling to find a descriptive one.

Finally, though these definitions attempt to relate the scientific idea of culture to the individual, culture often tends to disappear in

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[4] Piddington's definition would seem to stem
ctly from Malinowski, though cast more in the "Yale" framework than any actual definition by Malinowski.

the work of the proponents of this "school": culture is "reduced" to psychology. What is actually stressed is the acquisition of habits by individuals and why they retain or cha habits. Then this analysis is projected i culture.

D–II. EMPHASIS ON LEARNING

1. *Wissler, 1916: 195.*

Cultural phenomena are conceived of as including all the activities of man acquired by learning. . . . Cultural phenomena may, therefore, be defined as the acquired activity complexes of human groups.

2. *Hart and Pantzer, 1925: 703, 705.*

Culture consists in behavior patterns transmitted by imitation or tuition. . . . Culture includes all behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted.

3. *Miller and Dollard, 1941: 5* (could justifiably be assigned to C–I).

Culture, as conceived by social scientists, is a statement of the design of the human maze, of the type of reward involved, and of what responses are to be rewarded.

4. *Kluckhohn, 1942: 2.*

Culture consists in all transmitted social learning.

5. *LaPiere, 1946: 68.*

A culture is the embodiment in customs, traditions, institutions, etc., of the learning of a social group over the generations. It is the sum of what the group has learned about living together under the particular circumstances, physical and biological, in which it has found itself.

6. *Benedict, 1947: 13.*

. . . culture is the sociological term for learned behavior, behavior which in man is not given at birth, which is not determined by his germ cells as is the behavior of wasps or the social ants, but must be learned anew from grown people by each new generation.

7. *Young, 1947: 7.*

The term refers to the more or less organized and persistent patterns of habits, ideas, attitudes, and values which are passed on to the newborn child from his elders or by other he grows up.

8. *Opler, 1947: 8* (could justifiably be signed to D-I).

A culture can be thought of as the total of learned techniques, ideas, and activi which a group uses in the business of livin

9. *A. Davis, 1948: 59.*

. . . culture. . . may be defined as *all havior learned by the individual in conform with a group. . . .*

10. *Hoebel, 1949: 3, 4.*

Culture is the sum total of learned behav patterns which are characteristic of the me bers of a society and which are, therefore, the result of biological inheritance.

11. *Haring, 1949: 29.*

Cultural behavior denotes all human fu tioning that conforms to patterns learned fr other persons.

12. *Wilson and Kolb, 1949: 57.*

Culture consists of the patterns and produ of learned behavior — etiquette, langua food habits, religious beliefs, the use of a facts, systems of knowledge, and so on.

13. *Hockett, 1950: 113.*

Culture is those habits which humans h because they have been learned (not necess ly without modification) from other human

14. *Steward, 1950: 98.*

Culture is generally understood to m learned modes of behavior which are socia transmitted from one generation to anot within particular societies and which may diffused from one society to another.

15. *Slotkin, 1950: 76.*

By definition, customs are categories of tions learned from others. . . . A *culture* e body of customs found in a society, and yone who acts according to these customs a participant in the culture. From a biolo- cal viewpoint, its culture is the means by hich a society adjusts to its environment. . . . rtifacts are not included in culture.

. Aberle, et al, 1950: 102.

Culture is socially transmitted behavior con- ived as an abstraction from concrete social oups.

COMMENT

It is interesting that Wissler appears to have oneered both the "rule or way" and the earning" definitions, though it was many ars before the latter caught on among his thropological colleagues. Wissler was ained as a psychologist. The recent fashion emphasizing learning in definitions of cul- re demonstrably comes from psychology, ore especially from "learning theory," most oecially from the Institute of Human Rela- ns brand of learning theory.

LaPiere is of interest because he represents attempt to combine the content of the old ylor-type group A definitions with the re- nt psychological emphasis on learning. Cul- re becomes the sum or embodiment in cus- ms of what a society has learned in its his- ry about how to live. Not everything that ght be mentioned is here; but what there is ems unexceptionable, provided one is ready put its acquisition by learning into the fore- ont of consideration over what culture may .

Opler's definition seems perhaps influenced the substantive one of Kluckhohn and Kel- "Uses in the business of living" is at least ually telic or functional in its emphasis. owever, this is a less selective or purified finition. The "group" is in, "learning" is in, are "ideas," "activities" include behavior. ere is even a new element "techniques," nich may have been meant to refer specifi- ly to technologies, but also slants ahead to se in the business of living."

Slotkin mentions action, learning, and ad- tment, and his psychological accent is thus ear. His basic definition of a culture reduces to the body of actions learned from others in a society. Culture is also the means by which a society "adjusts" (see our preceding subgroup D-I) to its environment; but this is "from the biological viewpoint," that is, in non-sociocultural aspect. While artifacts are specifically excluded from culture by Slotkin, he does not state whether he includes in culture or excludes from it other "products" of human behavior such as ideas and values (our groups F-I and C-II).

Most of these definitions stress the element of inter-human learning, of non-genetic transmission, at the expense of other features of culture. That the learning element is important would not be questioned by contemporary anthropologists; it is mentioned in many other definitions without such preponderant emphasis. In the broad sense, of course, this was realized as long ago as 1871, for Tylor says, "acquired by man as a member of society." All human beings of whatever "races" seem to have about the same nervous systems and biological equipment generally; hence the basic processes of learning are very similar if not identical among all groups. Anthropologists look to the psychologists to discover these general laws of learning. On the other hand, anthropologists can show that that which is learned, from whom learning takes place, and when the learning of certain skills usually occurs, varies according to culture. However, while cultural behavior is always learned behavior, not all learned behavior is cultural; conversely, learning is only one of a number of differentia of culture.

A number of the definitions in the group, while emphasizing learning, do combine this with other features. LaPiere (5), Young (7), and Wilson and Kolb (12) are enumerative in Tylorian fashion. Others (1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11) echo the "rule or way" theme by the use of words like "groups," "social," "conformity," and the like. Opler (8) combines "learning" with a suggestion of adjustment. Slotkin (15) has learning, customs, and adjustment—with an implication of rule or way. Steward (14) joins learning to social transmission with a characteristically anthropological emphasis on diffusion which he mentions explicitly.

D–III. EMPHASIS ON HABIT

1. *Tozzer, n.d. (but pre-1930).*

Culture is the rationalization of habit.

2. *Young, 1934: 592 (Glossary)*

Culture: Forms of habitual behavior common to a group, community, or society. It is made up of material and non-material traits.

3. *Murdock, 1941: 141.*

. . . culture, the traditional patterns of action which constitute a major portion of the established habits with which an individual enters any social situation.

COMMENT

These three definitions belong with the other psychological groups because, whereas "custom" refers to a group, "habit" puts the locus in the individual. Perhaps the definition of Murdock[15] will serve at least as a cor scious reminder that, in the last analysis, th social scientist's description of a culture mu rest upon observation of the behavior of ir dividuals and study of the products of ind vidual behavior. The word "habits," howeve is too neutral; a group is never affectively ir different to its culture. "Socially value habits" would seem minimal and again, lik "learning," this is only part of the pictur Anthropologists would agree, though, that so cial habits and the alterations brought about i the non-human environment through soci habits constitute the raw data of the studer of culture.

It may legitimately be questioned wheth Young's definition (2) belongs here or in C ("rule or way"). The second sentence is als the beginning of an enumerative definition.

D–IV. PURELY PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS

1. *Roheim, 1934: 216.*

By culture we shall understand the sum of all sublimations, all substitutes, or reaction formations, in short, everything in society that inhibits impulses or permits their distorted satisfaction.

2. *Katz and Schanck, 1938: 551.*

Society refers to the common objective relationships (non-attitudinal) between man and man and between men and their material world. It is often confused with culture, the attitudinal relationship between men. . . . Culture is to society what personality is to the organism. Culture sums up the particular institutional content of a society. Culture is what happens to individuals within the context of a particular society, and . . . these happenings are personal changes.

COMMENT

These two definitions not only stress th psychological angle; they are couched in term entirely outside the main stream of anthropo logical and sociological thought. The first psychoanalytic; the second is from social psy chology, as evidenced by the key word "a titudinal."

Roheim appears to be the only psychoana yst who has attempted a formal definition i psychoanalytic terms. Freud occasionally use the word "Kultur" in its non-anthropologic sense. In general, he seems to have had litt sense of the significance of cultural diversit His eye was upon the universal. The "Ne Freudians" (Horney, Kardiner, Alexande and Fromm) use the term "culture" freel enough but with little precision. Horney least uses "cultural" as synonymous with "so cial."

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[15] Roberts, a pupil of Murdock, says (1951, pp. 3, 6): "It [the study] is based on the major hypothesis that every small group, like groups of other sizes, defines an independent and unique culture . . . the description of any culture is a statement of ordered habit relationships. . . .

"The data in the field were collected on the theory that the culture of a group could be defined in term of its shared habits. On analysis, it was found tha although important because it implies common lear ing, understanding, and action, the shared habit rel tionship was not the only one which was significant Roberts also (p. 3) speaks of a habit as "a way of b having." There is thus a link to the C-I group.

GROUP E: STRUCTURAL

EMPHASIS ON THE PATTERNING OR ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE

Willey, 1929: 207.
A culture is a system of interrelated and in-
rdependent habit patterns of response.

Dollard, 1939: 50.
Culture is the name given to [the] abstracted
rom men] inter-correlated customs of a so-
al group.

Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1940: 63.
A culture consists of inventions, or culture
aits, integrated into a system, with varying
egrees of correlation between the parts. . . .
oth material and non-material traits, organized
ound the satisfaction of the basic human
eeds, give us our social institutions, which are
e heart of culture. The institutions of a
lture are interlinked to form a pattern which
unique for each society.

Redfield, 1940: quoted in Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1940: 25.
An organization of conventional under-
andings manifest in act and artifact, which,
ersisting through tradition, characterizes a
uman group.[16]

Linton, 1945a: 5, 32.
a) . . . and cultures are, in the last analysis,
othing more than the organized repetitive
esponses of a society's members.
b) A culture is the configuration of learned
ehavior and results of behavior whose com-
onent elements are shared and transmitted by
e members of a particular society.

Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 98.
A culture is a historically derived system of
xplicit and implicit designs for living, which
nds to be shared by all or specially designa-
d members of a group.

7. *Gillin, 1948: 191.*

Culture consists of patterned and functionally interrelated customs common to specifiable human beings composing specifiable social groups or categories.

8. *Coutu, 1949: 358.*

Culture is one of the most inclusive of all the configurations we call interactional fields — the way of life of a whole people like that of China, western Europe, and the United States. Culture is to a population aggregate what personality is to the individual; and the ethos is to the culture what self is to a personality, the core of most probable behaviors.

9. *Turney-High, 1949: 5.*

Culture is the working and integrated summation of the non-instinctive activities of human beings. It is the functioning, patterned totality of group-accepted and -transmitted inventions, material and non-material.

COMMENT

Five of these nine definitions have been published within the past six years; only one antedates 1939. This may reflect only an intellectual fashion of the past decade or may indicate a deeper level of sophistication. The essential points are two. First, there is the distinction between the enumerative "sum" or "total" of Group A and the organized interrelation of the isolable aspects of culture. Second, most of the definitions in this group make it clear that a culture is inevitably an abstraction. Dollard (2) first explicitly separates "customs" from their concrete carriers or agents. Culture becomes a conceptual model that must be based on and interpret behavior but which is not behavior itself. The definitions in this group tend to be remote from the overt, observable uniformities of behavior. Culture is a design or system of designs for living; it is a plan, not the living itself; it is that which selectively channels men's reactions, it is not the reactions themselves. The importance of this is that it extricates culture as such from behavior, abstracts it from human activity; the concept is itself selective.

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[16] Almost the same definition, but less complete
d, in our opinion, a little less precise, is given in
edfield, 1941, p. 133. This work also amplifies as
llows: "The 'understandings' are the meanings
tached to acts and objects. The meanings are con-
ntional, and therefore cultural, in so far as they
ve become typical for the members of that society
reason of intercommunication among the members.
A culture is then an abstraction . . . . We may as well identify 'culture' with the extent to which the conventionalized behavior of members of the society is for all the same. Still more concretely we speak of culture, as did Tylor, as knowledge, belief, art, law, custom . . . . The quality of organization . . . is probably a universal feature of culture and may be added to the definition."

These concepts may be considered "advanced" also in the sense of inclusiveness and absence of one-sided weighting. While there is always a key word ("system," "organization," "configuration") justifying inclusion in this group, the concept never rests on this sole feature to the extent that some definitions rest on "tradition," "learning," "adjustment," and the like. Each of these definitions includes at least two of the emphases noted for previous groups.

The definition of Ogburn and Nimkoff (3) is tent-like and loose. Redfield (4) is tight and unusually thoughtful. He gets in: (1) the systematic property ("organization"); (2) the selective or arbitrary aspect of culture ("conventional understandings"); (3) the empirical basis ("manifest in act and artifact"); (4) social heritage ("tradition"); (5) distinctive way of life; and (6) *human* group reference ("characterizes a human group"). The whole is tightly bound together. Linton (5) cements organization, habit, group, learning, heritage. But the content or kind of behavior, its idea or way, are not gone into as in Linton's earlier definitions.

Gillin (7) is reminiscent, perhaps accidentally, of Willey (1) 1929, and also suggests influence of Kluckhohn and Kelly (6). Gillin uses "customs" as the noun in the predicate of his definition. The customs are qualified as "patterned" and as "functionally interrelated"; and the larger half of the definition refers to the specifiable individuals and specifiable groups or social categories to whom the customs are common. This quantitative weighting reflects Gillin's psychological and sociological interests. The "specifiable" carriers suggest emphasis on cultural variability due to a viewing of it from the angle of personality rather than collectively. "Customs," though formally the key word, seems residual rather than pivotal in the definition.

The definition by Coutu (8), a social psy chologist, is interesting and original. He link organization to "way of life" and to the cor cepts of the culture and personality field.

Kluckhohn and Kelly (6) mention historic creation or derivation — as a more consciou variant of the older tradition or heritage fac tor. This new variant is less explicit as to pro cess, but is more inclusive in range of connota tion and perhaps more specific as to effect. new element is "system of . . . designs for liv ing." This expresses purpose or end. So fa as we know, this is the first injection of consid eration of aim or end into formal definitions o culture, though of course the concept was no new in considerations of culture. The "ex plicit or implicit" is a modification of Linton "overt and covert culture."

The analysis of a culture must encompas both the explicit and the implicit. The explic culture consists in those regularities in wor and deed which may be generalized straigh from the evidence of the ear or eye. The im plicit culture, however, is an abstraction of th second order. Here the anthropologist infer least common denominators which seem, as were, to underlie a multiplicity of cultural con tents. Only in the most sophisticated and self conscious of cultures will his attention be calle directly to these by carriers of the culture, an then only in part, probably. One may in stance Radcliffe-Brown's well-known pape "The Position of the Mother's Brother i South Africa."

As Ernst Cassirer and Kurt Lewin, amon others, have pointed out, scientific progres frequently depends upon changes in what regarded as real and amenable to objectiv study. The development of the social science has been impeded by a confusion between th "real" and the concrete. Psychologists, typical ly, are reluctant to concede reality in the so cial world to anything but individuals. Th greatest advance in contemporary anthropolo gical theory is probably the increasing recog nition that there is something more to cultur than artifacts, linguistic texts, and lists o atomized traits.

Structural relations are characterized by rela tively fixed relations between parts rather tha by the parts or elements themselves. That re lations are as "real" as things is conceded by ost philosophers. It is also clear from ordi- ry experience that an exhaustive analysis of ality cannot be made within the limitations of atomistic or narrowly positivistic scheme. ake a brick wall. Its "reality" would be anted by all save those who follow an ideal- n of Berkeley's sort — they would deny it en to the bricks. Then let us take each ick out of the wall. A radical, analytic em- ricist would be in all consistency obliged to y that we have destroyed nothing. Yet it clear that while nothing concrete has been nihilated, a form has been eliminated. milarly, the student of culture change is rced to admit that forms may persist while ntent changes or that content remains rela- ely unaltered but is organized into new uctures.

An analogy used by Freud for personality equally applicable to cultural disintegration. we throw a crystal to the ground, it breaks; wever, its dissolution is not haphazard. The gmentation accords with lines of cleavage edetermined by the particular structure of e crystal, invisible though it was to the naked e. So, in culture, the mode in which the rts stand to each other cannot be indifferent om the standpoint of understanding and pre- ction. If a form ceases to exist, the resultant ange is different from that of a purely sub- ctive operation. Each culture is, among her things, a complex of relations, a multi- rse of ordered and interrelated parts. Parts not cause a whole but they comprise a ole, not necessarily in the sense of being rfectly integrated but in the sense of being parable only by abstraction.

All nature consists of materials. But the nner in which matter is organized into tities is as significant as the substance or the nction serviced within a given system. Re- nt organic chemistry has documented this t. The self-same atoms present in exactly e same number may constitute either a dicine or a poison, depending solely upon e fashion in which they are arranged. Con- nporary genetics and biology have come to e same conclusion. A famous geneticist has itten, "All that matters in heredity is its pattern." Positivistic biologists have observed: "These results appear to demonstrate that statistical features of *organization* can be heritable. . . ."[17] The behavioristic psychologist, Clark Hull, finds that behavior sequences are "strictly patterned" and that it is the pattern which is often determinative of adaptive or non-adaptive behavior.

That organization and equilibrium seem to prevail in nature generally is doubtless a matter of balance, economy, or least action of energy. Assuming that those aspects of behavior which we call cultural are part of a natural and not of a supernatural order, it is to be expected that exactness of relationship, irrespective of dimensions, must be discovered and described in the cultural realm. One of the most original of anthropological linguists, B. L. Whorf,[18] has put well the approach most suited to cultural studies:

> . . . In place of apparatus, linguistics uses and develops *techniques*. Experimental does not mean quantitative. Measuring, weighing, and pointer-reading devices are seldom needed in linguistics, for quantity and number play little part in the realm of pattern, where there are no variables but, instead, abrupt alternations from one configuration to another. The mathematical sciences require exact measurement, but what linguistics requires is, rather, exact "patternment" — an exactness of relation irrespective of dimensions. Quantity, dimension, magnitude are metaphors since they do not properly belong in this spaceless, relational world. I might use this simile: Exact measurement of lines and angles will be needed to draw exact squares or other regular polygons, but measurement, however precise, will not help us to draw an exact circle. Yet it is necessary only to discover the principle of the compass to reach by a leap the ability to draw perfect circles. Similarly, linguistics has developed techniques which, like compasses, enable it without any true measurement at all to specify *exactly* the patterns with which it is concerned. Or I might perhaps liken the case to the state of affairs within the atom, where also entities appear to alternate from configuration to configuration rather than to move in terms of measurable positions. As alternants, quantum phenomena must be treated by a method of analysis that substitutes a point in a pattern under a set of conditions for a point in a pattern under another set of conditions — a method similar to that used in analysis of linguistic phenomena.

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[17] Crozier and Wolf, 1939, p. 178.

[18] Whorf, 1949, p. 11.

GROUP F: GENETIC

F-1. EMPHASIS ON CULTURE AS A PRODUCT OR ARTIFACT

1. *Groves, 1928: 23.*

A product of human association.

1a. *Willey, 1927b: 500.*

. . . that part of the environment which man has himself created and to which he must adjust himself.

2. *Folsom, 1928: 15.*

Culture is the sum total of all that is artificial. It is the complete outfit of tools, and habits of living, which are invented by man and then passed on from one generation to another.

3. *Folsom, 1931: 476–77.*

Culture is not any part of man or his inborn equipment. It is the sum total of all that man has produced: tools, symbols, most organizations, common activities, attitudes, and beliefs. It includes both physical products and immaterial products. It is everything of a relatively permanent character[19] that we call artificial, everything which is passed down from one generation to the next rather than acquired by each generation for itself: it is, in short, civilization.

4. *Winston, 1933: 209.*

Culture in a vital sense is the product of social interaction. . . . Human behavior is cultural behavior to the degree that individual habit patterns are built up in adjustment to patterns already existing as an integral part of the culture into which the individual is born.

5. *Menghin, 1934: 68.*

Kultur ist das Ergebnis der geistigen Betätigung des Menschen, objectivierter, stoffgebundener Geist.[20]

6. *Warden, 1936: 22–23.*

Those patterns of group life which exi only by virtue of the operation of the thre fold mechanism — invention, communicatio and social habituation — belong to the cu tural order. . . . The cultural order is supe organic and possesses its own modes of oper tion and its own types of patterning. It ca not be reduced to bodily mechanisms or to t biosocial complex upon which it rests. T conception of culture as a unique type of s cial organization seems to be most readily e plicable in terms of the current doctrine emergent evolution.

7. *Sorokin, 1937: I: 3.*

In the broadest sense [culture] may me the sum total of everything which is creat or modified by the conscious or unconscio activity of two or more individuals intera ing with one another or conditioning one a other's behavior.

8. *Reuter, 1939: 191.*

The term *culture* is used to signify the su total of human creations, the organized res of human experience up to the present tim Culture includes all that man has made in t form of tools, weapons, shelter, and other m terial goods and processes, all that he h elaborated in the way of attitudes and belie ideas and judgments, codes, and institutio arts and sciences, philosophy and social o ganization. Culture also includes the inter lations among these and other aspects of h man as distinct from animal life. Everythi material and immaterial, created by man, the process of living, comes within the co cept of culture.

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[19] Cf. Folsom, 1931, p. 474: ". . . those relatively constant features of social life are called *culture*." P. 475: "*Culture as the more constant features of social life.*"

[20] This definition by the archæologist, Oswald Menghin, has a doubtful place in this group. An thing in terms of "Geist" really belongs at anoth level and does not fit properly within our schem We have put the definition here only because Ergeb means product, result, outcome.

. *Bernard, 1941: 8.*
Culture consists of all products (results) of rganismic nongenetic efforts at adjustment.

o. *Dodd, 1941: 8* (could be assigned to D–II).
Culture consists of all products (results) of tterhuman learning.

1. *Hart, 1941: 6.*
Culture consists of all phenomena that have een directly or indirectly caused (produced) y both nongenetic and nonmechanical comaunication of phenomena from one individual o other.

2. *Bernard, 1942: 699.*
The term *culture* is employed in this book 1 the sociological sense, signifying anything hat is man-made, whether a material object, vert behavior, symbolic behavior, or social rganization.

3. *Young, 1942: 36.*
A precipitate of man's social life.

4. *Huntington, 1945: 7–8.*
By culture we mean every object, habit, idea, istitution, and mode of thought or action vhich man produces or creates and then passes n to others, especially to the next generation.

5. *Carr, 1945: 137.*
The accumulated transmissible results of ast behavior in association.

6. *Bidney, 1947: 387.*
. . . human culture in general may be undertood as the dynamic process and product of he self-cultivation of human nature as well s of the natural environment, and involves the evelopment of selected potentialities of nature or the attainment of individual and social nds of living.

17. *Herskovits, 1948: 17.*
A short and useful definition is: "Culture is the man-made part of the environment."

18. *Kluckhohn, 1949a: 17.*
. . . culture may be regarded as that part of the environment that is the creation of man.

19. *Murdock, 1949a: 378.*
The interaction of learning and society thus produces in every human group a body of socially transmitted adaptive behavior which appears super-individual because it is shared, because it is perpetuated beyond the individual life span, and because its quantity and quality so vastly exceeds the capacity of any single person to achieve by his own unaided effort. The term "culture" is applied to such systems of acquired and transmitted behavior.

20. *Kluckhohn, 1951a: 86.*
Culture designates those aspects of the total human environment, tangible and intangible, that have been created by men.

COMMENT

F–I, F–II, and F–III are lumped together as "genetic" because all focus upon the question: how has culture come to be? what are the factors that have made culture possible or caused it to come into existence? Other properties of culture are often mentioned, but the stress is upon the genetic side.

This group of definitions (F–I) is in effect close to the B group that centers on tradition or heritage, but it emphasizes the result or product instead of the transmitting process. Groves says in 1928, "a product of human association"; Kimball Young fourteen years later: "a precipitate of man's social life." Sorokin — in a definition which he says is the broadest possible — also regards culture as the product of human interaction. This is a distinctively sociological emphasis, and twelve of the twenty definitions in this group come from sociologists.[21] Carr packs a tremendous lot into his nine words. The basing in society is there; the history and the accumulation; the products and their transmissibility.

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[21] Another sociologist, Leopold von Wiese (1932), vhile not defining culture, formally associates himelf with the "product" criterion:

"De la relation interhumaine resulte tout ce que nous appellons culture au sens le plus large possible." (24)

"Dans la structure des cultures, nous reconnaissons une accumulation et une continuité ininterrompus de séries de processus sociaux." (28)

The single definition by a psychologist, Warden (6), is perhaps more concerned to make the point of culture as an emergent than of culture as a product, but both notions are there. The geographer, Huntington (14), has enumerative and heritage aspects to his definition. The philosopher, Bidney (16), recurs to his favorite theme of "self-cultivation," mentions "process" as well as "product," and includes the properties of selection and "ends of living."

The four anthropological definitions in this group all date from the last four years. While agreeing upon culture as "product," the twist they give is quite different from that of the sociologists: while the environment influences the "way of life" which is culture, the most humanly relevant part of this environment is itself the product of cultural groups.

Some of these definitions, while quite vague, point up an important problem: the locus of abstraction. Certain definitions emphasize the effect aspect of culture; others localize the effects in the human mind; still others suggest the possibility of putting the effects out in the environment. This is a recurrent problem in the thinking of our culture; the Ogden and Richards' distinction between reference and referent hinges on it. Another example is the shifting of value from "inside" ("attitude") to outside the person.

F-II. EMPHASIS ON IDEAS

1. *Ward, 1903: 235.*

A culture is a social structure, a social organism, if any one prefers, and ideas are its germs.

2. *Wissler, 1916: 197.*

. . . a culture is a definite association complex of ideas.

3. *Schmidt, 1937: 131.*

Die Kultur besteht ihrem tiefsten Wesen nach in der inneren Formung des menschlichen Geistes; in der äussern Formung des Körpers and der Natur insofern, als diese durch den Geist gelenkt ist. Somit ist Kultur, wie alles Geistige, etwas Immanentes, etwas durchaus Innerliches und als soches der äussern Beobachtung direkt nicht zugänglich.

4. *Blumenthal, 1937: 3, 12.*

a) Culture is the world sum-total of past and present cultural ideas. [*Note*: As cultural ideas are said to be "those whose possessors are able to communicate them by means of symbols," symbolically-communicable should be substituted for cultural above.]

b) Culture consists of the entire stream of inactive and active cultural ideas from the first in the cosmos to the last. [*Note*: This includes ideas *once resident in human minds*, but now no longer held by living minds, though their former existence is ascertainable from surviving material symbols.] [22]

5. *Osgood, 1940: 25.*

Culture consists of all ideas concerning human beings which have been communicated to one's mind and of which one is conscious.

6. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 97.*

. . . a summation of all the ideas for standardized types of behavior.

7. *Feibleman, 1946: 73, 76.*

(a. Tentative definition.) Culture may be said to be the common use and application of complex objective ideas by the members of a social group.

(b. Final definition.) A culture is the actual selection of some part of the whole of human behavior considered in its effect upon materials, made according to the demands of an implicit dominant ontology and modified by the total environment. [Implicit dominant ontology is elsewhere said to be the common sense of a cultural group, or the eidos of a culture.]

Also, contrast his two definitions of 1941 which w cite as D-I-9 and F-IV-3.

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[22] These two definitions are somewhat modified and commented upon in Blumenthal, 1938a and 1938b.

. *Taylor, 1948: 109–10.*

By [holistic] culture as a descriptive con-
ept, I mean all those mental constructs or
leas which have been learned or created after
irth by an individual . . . . The term *idea* in-
ludes such categories as attitudes, meanings,
entiments, feelings, values, goals, purposes,
nterests, knowledge, beliefs, relationships,
ssociations, [but] not . . . Kluckhohn's and
Kelly's factor of "designs."

By [holistic] culture as an explanatory con-
ept, I mean all those mental constructs which
re used to understand, and to react to, the
xperiential world of internal and external
imuli . . . . Culture itself consists of ideas, not
rocesses.

By *a* culture, i.e., by culture as a partitive
oncept, I mean a historically derived system
f culture traits which is a more or less
eparable and cohesive segment of the whole-
hat-is-culture and whose separate traits tend
be shared by all or by specially designated
dividuals of a group or "society."

Ford, 1949: 38.

. . . culture may be briefly defined as a
ream of ideas,[23] that passes from individual
individual by means of symbolic action,
erbal instruction, or imitation.

. *Becker, 1950: 251.*

A culture is the relatively constant non-
aterial *content* transmitted in a society by
eans of processes of sociation.

COMMENT

While this concept seems unnecessarily
stricted, it does aim at what certain authors
ve thought cardinal. The underlying point
often expressed in conversation somewhat
follows: "Strictly speaking, there is no
ch thing as 'material culture.' A pot is not
lture — what is culture is the idea behind
e artifact. A prayer or a ceremony is merely the outward and visible manifestation of a cultural idea."

In this emphasis, as in two others, Wissler was first — or first among anthropologists. However, this appears to be another trial balloon — derived again from his psychological training — which he threw out in passing but did not develop systematically in his later writings.

Schmidt's somewhat cryptic definition has an echo of nineteenth-century German *Geist*. It does tie in with a consistent strain in his writing emphasizing internality and the dependence of culture upon the individual psyche. The note of "immanence" links with Sorokin's thinking.

Blumenthal, in a special and condensed paper on the subject in 1937, gives alternative definitions. Combined into one, these would read: "The entire stream (*or:* world sum-total) of past and present (*or:* inactive and active) symbolically-communicable ideas." The historic weighting is obvious. Ideas alone, in the strict sense, seem a narrow concept for embracing the whole of culture. Yet, if there is to be limitation to a single element or term, ideas is perhaps as good as could be found. Blumenthal's definition further includes the feature of the method of communication or transmission (symbolically communicable) which so characteristically sets off culture from other organically based aspects. What is lacking from the Blumenthal definition is, first, consideration of behavior, activity, or practice; second, that of design or mode or way, whether teleological-functional or empirically descriptive; and third, the element of ideal, norm, or value — unless this was intended to be comprised in "ideas." While the present definition by Blumenthal is perhaps anthropological in its slant, and certainly is historically oriented, his redefinition of four years later (D–I–9) is psycho-sociological (learned efforts at adjustment).

Osgood's statement — "all ideas . . . which have been communicated . . . [or are] conscious" — seems to belong here. But it contains features whose relevance is not evident ("ideas *concerning human beings*"!) or which are unclear (do "one," "one's mind" refer to members of the society having the culture or to the student of culture?). There appear to be elements belonging in the definition which have not been stated.

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[23] [Ford's footnote.] Webster's definition of "idea"
es not quite serve here, yet the writer does not wish
use an obscure word or coin a new one. For the
rposes of this paper, it is understood that individuals
not "create" ideas. The concept of "free will" seems to have no place in science. Individuals receive ideas from other humans, sometimes combine them, less frequently discover them in the natural world about them, and almost always pass them along to others.

Feibleman is a philosopher. Neither his tentative nor his final definition fits well into the classification we have made of the opinions of sociologists and anthropologists. We have put them here because the first one stresses ideas and the second one ontology. How these elements integrate with other elements in the same definitions is not wholly clear. Does "common use and application" refer to behavior? What are "complex objective" ideas? As to "the actual selection of some part of the whole of human behavior" — does this mean that a particular culture is a selection out of the total of possible human culture viewed as behavior, or is it intended merely to exclude non-cultural physiology like scratching an itch or digesting? "Behavior considered in its effects upon materials" would seem to be oriented away from ideas, but is obscure, unless the reference is to artifacts. However, an "implicit dominant ontology" is an integrating ideology, and the "selection," being "made according to [its] demands," would render this ontology formative.

We welcome the participation of philosophers in the problem of what culture is. Better trained in abstract terminology, they will not however be of much help to working social scientists until they either conform to the established terminology of these or reform it by explicit revision or substitution.

By contrast, Taylor comes from archæology, that branch of social studies most directly concerned with tangibles, and presents a set of definitions which are both clear and readily applicable to specific situations. His definitions number three because he makes a point of distinguishing between holistic culture and particular cultures, and then defines the first both descriptively and explanatorily, following Kluckhohn and Kelly. He also states that he essentially follows them in his definition of particular cultures. Nevertheless, Taylor
differs from Kluckhohn and Kelly on th
fundamental point that to him culture co
sists of ideas or mental constructs; to them,
designs or selective channeling processes.
would appear to us that while Taylor h
been influenced by Kluckhohn and Kelly, h
has emerged with something different, an
that his definitions clearly belong in the prese
class where we have put them. This is pr
marily because Taylor restricts himself
cognitive or conscious processes ("ment
constructs"), whereas "design" allows fo
feelings, unconscious processes, "implicit cu
ture."

The distinction between culture holisticall
conceived and partitively conceived is
course not new. Linton explicitly makes th
distinction (in our B-9) in the same boo
(1936: 78) in which Taylor sees him shiftin
from one level to another (1936: 274) on th
point. There is probably little danger of co
fusion between the two aspects, the holist
and the partitive, becoming consequential
concrete situations; but theoretically, failu
to observe the distinction might be seriou
Taylor revolves the distinction largely arou
individual peculiarities, emergent or survivin
These he argues are cultural when culture
conceived holistically, but not cultural wh
it is conceived partitively — in that event on
shared traits are cultural.

Taylor gives to the holistic concept
culture an emergent quality and says that
"hinges . . . against concepts of the same [*si*
level such as the organic" and inorganic.
"same level" he does not of course mean th
the cultural, the organic, and the inorgan
represent phenomena of the same order, b
that they are on the same "first level of a
straction" resulting from "the primary brea
down of data" (p. 99). The other or partiti
concept of "*a*" culture he credits to "a secon
ary level of abstraction." This distinction
Taylor of course holds true only on deducti
procedure, from universals to particulars. H
torically it is obvious that the procedure
been the reverse. Even savages know particu
customs and culture traits, whereas cultu
as a defined holistic concept arose in the nin
teenth century and is still being resisted
spots within the social sciences and ignor

considerable areas without. We would
ther say that the first "level" or step in
straction was represented by the mild com-
on-sense generalization of customs from sen-
rily observed instances of behavior; that then
e customs of particular societies were gen-
alized into the cultures of those societies;
d that culture conceived holistically, as an
der of phenomena and an emergent in evo-
tion, represented the to-date final "level" or
ep of abstraction, the one farthest removed
om the raw data of experience.

In short, Taylor seems to us to have
urred two different meanings of the term
evel" as currently used. One meaning is
vels of abstraction, which are really *steps*
the process of abstracting. The other mean-
g refers to a hierarchy of *orders* of organiza-
on of the phenomenal world (like inorganic,
ganic, superorganic or sociocultural). These
ders are often spoken of as levels, but do *not*
ffer one from the other in their degree of
stractness. And in any empirical context
ey obviously all represent the *last* and highest
vel of abstraction, as compared with more
stricted concepts or categories such as par-
cular cultures, behaviors, organisms, species.

Taylor's summary (p. 110) seems worth
summarizing, in supplement of his definition.
ulture consists of the increments [of mental
onstructs] which have accrued to individual
inds after birth. When the increments of
ough minds are sufficiently alike, we speak
a culture. Culture traits are manifested by
ltural agents through the medium of
hicles, as in Sorokin's terms. These agents
e human beings; the vehicles are "objectifica-
ons of culture" — observable behavior and its
sults. Culture processes are the dynamic factors involving culture traits. They do not constitute culture but comprise the relationship between culture traits. [This would exclude formal and structural relationships and recognize only dynamic relationship.] Culture, consisting of mental constructs, is not directly observable; it can be studied solely through the objectifications in behavior and results of behavior. Culture traits are ascertainable only by inference and only as approximations (p. 111). It is for this reason that context is of such tremendous importance in all culture studies. — Thus Taylor.

Ford's definition (9) suggests influence from both Blumenthal and Taylor, but is original and carefully thought through. Ford, it is worth remarking, is also an archæologist.

These definitions emphasizing ideas form an interesting group, whatever specific defects may be felt to attach to any given definition. Perhaps this group and Group E are farthest out on the frontier of culture theory. Certain issues are raised (for instance Osgood's suggestion that culture must be restricted to phenomena above the level of consciousness) which anthropology must face up to. Many of these definitions deal explicitly with the problem of weighting. An attempt is made to extract what is central from looser conceptions of "custom," "form," "plan," and the like. The important distinction between participant and scientific observer is introduced. There are points of linkage with the analyses of the "premises" and "logics" of cultures recently developed by Dorothy Lee, B. L. Whorf, Laura Thompson, and others. In short, at least some of these definitions make genuine progress toward refinement of some hitherto crude notions.

F-III. EMPHASIS ON SYMBOLS

Bain, 1942: 87.

Culture is all behavior mediated by symbols.

White, 1943: 335.

Culture is an organization of phenomena —
aterial objects, bodily acts, ideas, and senti-
ents — which consists of or is dependent
on the use of symbols.

3. *White, 1949b: 15.*

The cultural category, or order, of phenomena is made up of events that are dependent upon a faculty peculiar to the human species, namely, the ability to use symbols. These events are the ideas, beliefs, languages, tools, utensils, customs, sentiments, and institutions that make up the civilization — or culture, to use the anthropological term — of any people regardless of time, place, or degree of development.

4. *White, 1949a: 363.*

. . . "culture" is the name of a distinct order, or class, of phenomena, namely, those things and events that are dependent upon the exercise of a mental ability, peculiar to the human species, that we have termed "symbolling." To be more specific, culture consists of material objects — tools, utensils, ornaments, amulets, etc. — acts, beliefs, and attitudes that function in contexts characterized by symbolling. It is an elaborate mechanism, an organization of exosomatic ways and means employed by a particular animal species, man, in the struggle for existence or survival.

5. *K. Davis, 1949: 3–4* (could be assigned to D-II).

. . . it [culture] embraces all modes of thought and behavior that are handed down by communicative interaction — i.e., by symbolic transmission — rather than by genetic inheritance.

COMMENT

It has been held by some, including Leslie White, that the true differentium of man is neither that he is a rational animal nor a culture-building animal, but rather that he is a symbol-using animal. If this position be correct, there is much to be said for making reference to symbols in a definition of culture. However, we have found only two sociologists (Bain and Davis) and one anthropologist (White)[24] who have built their definitions around this idea.

Bain's definition is admirably compact. Its "behavior" suggests the adjustment efforts of the definitions in D–I. Its "mediation by symbols" implies inter-human learning and non-genetic communication. But the reader must project even these meanings into the definition That which *is* characteristic of culture and *i* specific to it is not gone into by Bain. The larger class to which culture belongs is said to be behavior, and within this it consists of that part which is "mediated" by symbols — that is, is acquired through them or dependen on them for its existence; but what this part i *like* is not told.

White's statements all include enumerations One (4) includes the words "organization and "function," but the emphasis remains upon symbols.

A good case could be made for assigning Davis' definition to D-II ("learning"), but the explicit use of "symbol" or "symbolic" is s rare that we put it in this group. Ford (F-II–9 does include the word "symbolic" — but very casually.

This group has some affiliation with C–I ("values") because "symbol" implies the at tachment of meaning or value to the externall given. There is also a connection with the group F–II ("ideas"), though "symbol" lik "design" has connotations of the affectiv and the unconscious — in contradistinction t "idea."

F-IV. RESIDUAL CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. *Ostwald, 1907: 510.*

That which distinguishes men from animals we call culture.

2. *Ostwald, 1915: 192.*

These specifically human peculiarities which differentiate the race of the *Homo sapiens* from all other species of animals is comprehended in the name culture . . .

3. *Blumenthal, 1941: 9.*

Culture consists of all nongenetically pro duced means of adjustment.

4. *Roheim, 1943: v.*

Civilization or culture should be under stood here in the sense of a possible minimum definition, that is, it includes whatever is abov the animal level in mankind.

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[24] Three years earlier than his first formal definition we find that White wrote "A culture, or civilization, is but a particular kind of form (symbolic) which the biologic, life-perpetuating activities of a particula animal, man, assume." (1940: 463)

. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 87.*

. . . culture includes all those ways of feeling, hinking, and acting which are not inevitable s a result of human biological equipment and rocess and (or) objective external situations.

COMMENT

This group is "genetic" in the sense that it xplains the origin of culture by stating what ulture is not. Most logicians agree that resi-ual category definitions are unsatisfactory for the purposes of formal definition, though they may be useful as additional expository statements.

Ostwald, the chemist, whose contributions to culture theory have been recently re-discovered by Leslie White, is an odd and interesting figure in the intellectual history of this century.

Roheim's phrase "minimum definition" may be a conscious echo of Tylor's famous minimum definition of religion.

GROUP G: INCOMPLETE DEFINITIONS

1. *Sapir, 1921: 233.*

Culture may be defined as *what* a society does and thinks.

2. *Marett, 1928: 54.*

Culture . . . is communicable intelligence . . . . In its material no less than in its oral form culture is, then, as it were, the language of social life, the sole medium for expressing the consciousness of our common humanity.

3. *Benedict, 1934: 16.*

What really binds men together is their culture — the ideas and the standards they have in common.

4. *Rouse, 1939: 17 (chart).*

Elements of culture or standards of behavior.

5. *Osgood, 1942: 22.*

Culture will be conceived of as comprising the actual artifacts, plus any ideas or behavior of the people who made them which can be inferred from these specimens.

6. *Morris, 1946: 207.*

Culture is largely a sign configuration . . .

7. *Bryson, 1947: 74.*

. . . culture is human energy organized in patterns of repetitive behavior.

COMMENT

These are on-the-side stabs in passing
metaphors. They should not be judged in cor
parison with more systematic definitior
Sapir's phrase, for instance, is most felicitio
in an untechnical way, but never comes to pa
ticulars and hence not to involvements. The
statements are included precisely because
some striking phrase or possible germir
idea.

Osgood's sentence which on its face h
shifted from ideas (cf. F-II–5) to artifac
as central core (in an archæological mon
graph) seems to be incomplete. Perhaps
was not intended as a general definition b
as a picture of the culture remnant availab
to the archæologist. The definition of cultu
obviously presents a problem to the arc
æologist. We have listed six definitions pr
pounded by men who were — or are — p
marily archæologists (or concerned with "m
terial culture"). Two (A–5, A–12) fall in t
Tylorian group. Two (F-II–8, F-II–9) in
the "ideas" bracket; for this Taylor has ma
a good case. Two (4, 5) fall in this incomple
group and were probably not intended
formal definitions.

The intent of Morris' remark (6) clear
places it within E, "structural."

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PART III

SOME STATEMENTS ABOUT CULTURE

GROUPING OF STATEMENTS ABOUT CULTURE

Group *a.* The Nature of Culture
Group *b.* The Components of Culture
Group *c.* Properties of Culture
Group *d.* Culture and Psychology
Group *e.* Culture and Language
Group *f.* Relation of Culture to Society, Individuals, Environment, and Artifacts

INTRODUCTION

THE following excerpts[1] will repeat some of the ideas that have already emerged ı the more formal definitions. However, ome new and important points will also apear, and these quotations are placed, for the ost part, within a fuller context of the riter's thinking. Parts II and III supplement ach other significantly, though the assignent of a statement to one part or the other as in some cases arbitrary. This Part will lso serve the function of a thesaurus of repreentative or significant statements on cultural eory.

In Part II we have made some progress toward factoring out the notions subsumed under the label "culture" and relating them to each other. The word "culture," like the pictures of the Thematic Apperception Test, invites projection. The sheer enthusiasm for such an idea that is "in the air" not only makes projection easier but gives an intensity to the development which makes the process easy to delineate. We shall therefore in Part III present primarily passages where writers have taken "culture" as a cue to, almost, free association and trace the projections of various interpreters upon the concept.

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[1] We have eliminated authors' footnotes except here directly germane to the theoretical issues we are concerned with.

GROUP *a*: THE NATURE OF CULTURE

1. *Ogburn, 1922: 6, 13.*

. . . The terms, the superorganic, social heritage, and culture, have all been used interchangeably . . . .

. . . The factor, social heritage, and the factor, the biological nature of man, make a resultant, behavior in culture. From the point of view of analysis, it is a case of a third variable determined by the two other variables. There may of course be still other variables, as for instance, climate, or natural environment. But for the present, the analysis concerns the two variables, the psychological nature of man and culture.

2. *Ellwood, 1927a: 9.*

[Culture includes] on the one hand, the whole of man's material civilization, tools, weapons, clothing, shelter, machines, and even systems of industry; and, on the other hand all of non-material or spiritual civilization, such as language, literature, art, religion, ritual, morality, law, and government.

3. *Bose, 1929: 7–8, 24.*

But in another branch of the science, emphasis is laid upon the life-activities of man instead of his physical characters. Just as in studying an animal species we might pay more attention to its life and habits instead of anatomical characters, so in that branch of the science named Cultural Anthropology, we consider what the ruling forces of man's life are, in what way he proceeds to meet them, how human behaviour differs from animal behaviour, what are the causes of difference, if they throw any light upon unknown specific characters, how such characters have evolved in relation to environment and so on. Much of the data of Cultural Anthropology is accordingly furnished by human behaviour. We shall presently see that Anthropology cannot use every aspect of human behaviour on account of limiting conditions present in the data. It is concerned more with the crystallised products of human behaviour, which can be passed on from one individual to another. Culture in Anthropology is specially designed to indicate this particula
product of crystallisation . . . .

There are certain modes of behaviour whic
are found to be common among groups o
men. These modes of behaviour are associate
with social and political organization, law
with some object like a material object o
social institution, etc. These objects and th
associated types of behaviour, forming distinc
and isolable units, are called cultural traits
The assemblage of cultural traits is know
as culture. Culture is also to be viewed as a
adaptive measure.

4. *Radcliffe-Brown, 1930: 3, 3–4.*

I shall confine myself, then, in this address
to the science called, somewhat clumsily
Social Anthropology, which has for its tas
to formulate the general laws of the phenomen
that we include under the term culture o
civilization. It deals with man's life in society
with social and political organization, law
morals, religion, technology, art, languag
and in general with all social institutions, cus
toms, and beliefs in exactly the same way tha
chemistry deals with chemical phenomena. .

The readiest way in which to understan
the nature of culture and realize its functio
in human life, its biological function we ma
perhaps say, is to consider it as a mode o
process of social integration. By any cultur
or civilization a certain number, larger o
smaller, of human beings are united togethe
into a more or less complex system of socia
groups by which the social relations of indi
viduals to one another are determined. In an
given culture we denote this system of group
ing as the social structure . . . .

The function of any element of culture,
rule of morality or etiquette, a legal obligatio
a religious belief or ritual can only be dis
covered by considering what part it play
in the social integration of the people in whos
culture it is found.

5. *Wallis, 1930: 9, 13, 32, 11, 33.*

(P. 9): [Culture] may be defined as th
artificial objects, institutions, and modes o
life or of thought which are not peculiarl

ndividual but which characterize a group; t is "that complex whole . . . " [repeating Tylor]. (P. 13): Culture is the life of a people s typified in contacts, institutions, and equipnent. It includes characteristic concepts and ehavior, customs and traditions. (P. 32): Culture, then, means all those things, instituions, material objects, typical reactions to ituations, which characterize a people and listinguish them from other peoples. (P. 11): A culture is a functioning dynamic unit . . . he . . . traits . . . [of which] are interdependent. (P. 33): A culture is more than the sum f the things which compose it.

. *Murdock*, *1932: 213.*

Four factors . . . have been advanced . . . as xplanations of the fact that man alone of all ving creatures possesses culture — namely, abit-forming capacity, social life, intelligence, nd language. These factors may be likened o the four legs of a stool, raising human be-avior from the floor, the organic level or ereditary basis of all behavior, to the super-rganic level, represented by the seat of the tool. No other animal is securely seated on uch a four-legged stool.

. *Forde*, *1934: 463, 469–70.*

Neither the world distributions of the vari-us economies, nor their development and elative importance among particular peoples, an be regarded as simple functions of physical onditions and natural resources. Between the hysical environment and human activity here is always a middle term, a collection of pecific objectives and values, a body of knowl-dge and belief: in other words, a cultural attern. That the culture itself is not static, hat it is adaptable and modifiable in relation o physical conditions, must not be allowed to bscure the fact that adaptation proceeds by iscoveries and inventions which are them-elves in no sense inevitable and which are, in ny individual community, nearly all of them cquisitions or impositions from without. . . .

. . . That complex of activities in any human ociety which we call its culture is a going oncern. It has its own momentum, its dogmas, s habits, its efficiencies and its weaknesses. The elements which go to make it are of very different antiquity; some are old and moribund, but others as old may be vigorous; some borrowings or developments of yesterday are already almost forgotten, others have become strongly entrenched. To appreciate the quality of a particular culture at a particular time; to understand why one new custom or technique is adopted and another rejected, despite persistent external efforts at introduction; to get behind the general and abstract terms which label such somewhat arbitrarily divided categories of activity and interest as arts and crafts, social organization, religion, and so forth; and to see the culture as a living whole — for all these purposes it is necessary to inquire minutely into the relations between the multifarious activities of a community and to discover where and how they buttress or conflict with one another. Nothing that happens, whether it is the mere whittling of a child's toy or the concentration of energy on some major economy, operates in isolation or fails to react in some degree on many other activities. The careful exploration of what have been called "functional," or "dynamic," relations within a society may disclose much that was unexpected in the processes of interaction between one aspect of culture and another.

8. *Schapera*, *1935: 319.*

. . . For culture is not merely a system of formal practices and beliefs. It is made up essentially of individual reactions to and variations from a traditionally standardized pattern; and indeed no culture can ever be understood unless special attention is paid to this range of individual manifestations.

9. *Faris*, *1937: 23.*

Language is communication and is the product of interaction in a society. Grammars are not contrived, vocabularies were not invented, and the semantic changes in language take place without the awareness of those in whose mouths the process is going on. This is a super-individual phenomenon and so also are other characteristic aspects of human life, such as changes in fashions or alterations of the mores.

Herbert Spencer called these collective phenomena superorganic; Durkheim referred to them as *faits sociaux;* Sumner spoke of them as folkways; while anthropologists usually employ the word "culture."

10. *Mumford, 1938: 492.*

Culture in all its forms: culture as the care of the earth: culture as the disciplined seizure and use of energy toward the economic satisfaction of man's wants: culture as the nurture of the body, as the begetting and bearing of children, as the cultivation of each human being's fullest capacities as a sentient, feeling, thinking, acting personality: culture as the transmission of power into polity, of experience into science and philosophy, of life into the unity and significance of art: of the whole into the tissue of values that men are willing to die for rather than forswear — religion . . .

11. *Firth, 1939: 18–19.*

Most modern authors are agreed, whether explicitly or not, upon certain very general assumptions about the nature of the material they study. They consider the acts of individuals not in isolation but as members of society and call the sum total of these modes of behavior "culture." They are impressed also by the dynamic interrelationship of items of a culture, each item tending to vary according to the nature of the others. They recognize too that in every culture there are certain features common to all: groups such as the family, institutions such as marriage, and complex forms of practice and belief which can be aggregated under the name of religion. On the basis of this they argue for the existence of universally comparable factors and processes, the description and explanation of which can be given in sociological laws or general principles of culture.

12. *von Wiese, 1939: 593.*

Culture is above all not "an order of phenomena," and is not to be found in the worlds of perceptible or conceived things. It does not belong to the world of substance; it is a part of the world of values, of which it is a formal category . . . Culture is no more a thing-concept than "plus," "higher" or "better."

12a. *Murdock, 1940: 364–69.*

1. *Culture Is Learned.* Culture is not instinctive, or innate, or transmitted biologically, but is composed of habits, i.e., learned tendencies to react, acquired by each individual through his own life experience after birth. This assumption, of course, is shared by all anthropologists outside of the totalitarian states, but it has a corollary which is not always so clearly recognized. If culture is learned, it must obey the laws of learning, which the psychologists have by now worked out in considerable detail. The principles of learning are known to be essentially the same, not only for all mankind but also for most mammalian species. Hence, we should expect all cultures, being learned, to reveal certain uniformities reflecting this universal common factor.

2. *Culture Is Inculcated.* All animals are capable of learning, but man alone seems able, in any considerable measure, to pass on his acquired habits to his offspring. We can housebreak a dog, teach him tricks, and implant in him other germs of culture, but he will not transmit them to his puppies. They will receive only the biological inheritance of their species, to which they in turn will add habits on the basis of their own experience. The factor of language presumably accounts for man's preeminence in this respect. At any rate, many of the habits learned by human beings are transmitted from parent to child over successive generations, and, through repeated inculcation, acquire that persistency over time, that relative independence of individual bearers, which justifies classifying them collectively as "culture." This assumption, too, is generally accepted by anthropologists, but again there is an underestimated corollary. If culture is inculcated, then all cultures should show certain common effects of the inculcation process. Inculcation involves not only the imparting of techniques and knowledge but also the disciplining of the child's anima impulses to adjust him to social life. That there are regularities in behavior reflecting the ways in which these impulses are thwarted and redirected during the formative years of life seems clear from the evidence of psycho-

alysis, e.g., the apparent universality of intra-
mily incest taboos.

3. *Culture Is Social.* Habits of the cultural
der are not only inculcated and thus trans-
itted over time; they are also social, that is,
ared by human beings living in organized
gregates or societies and kept relatively uni-
rm by social pressure. They are, in short,
oup habits. The habits which the members
a social group share with one another con-
itute the culture of that group. This assump-
on is accepted by most anthropologists, but
ot by all. Lowie, for example, insists that "a
lture is invariably an artificial unit segregated
r purposes of expediency . . . . There is
ly one natural unit for the ethnologist — the
lture of all humanity at all periods and in all
aces . . . ." The author finds it quite im-
ossible to accept this statement. To him,
e collective or shared habits of a social
oup — no matter whether it be a family, a
llage, a class, or a tribe — constitute, not "an
tificial unit" but a natural unit — a culture
subculture. To deny this is, in his opinion,
repudiate the most substantial contribution
hich sociology has made to anthropology.
culture is social, then the fate of a culture
pends on the fate of the society which bears
and all cultures which have survived to be
udied should reveal certain similarities be-
use they have all had to provide for societal
rvival. Among these cultural universals, we
n probably list such things as sentiments of
oup cohesion, mechanisms of social control,
ganization for defense against hostile neigh-
rs, and provision for the perpetuation of the
pulation.

4. *Culture Is Ideational.* To a considerable
tent, the group habits of which culture con-
ts are conceptualized (or verbalized) as
eal norms or patterns of behavior. There
e, of course, exceptions; grammatical rules,
r example, though they represent collective
guistic habits and are thus cultural, are only
small part consciously formulated. Never-
eless, as every field ethnographer knows,
ost people show in marked degree an aware-
ss of their own cultural norms, an ability to
fferentiate them from purely individual
bits, and a facility in conceptualizing and
porting them in detail, including the circumstances where each is considered appropriate and the sanctions to be expected for nonconformity. Within limits, therefore, it is useful to conceive of culture as ideational, and of an element of culture as a traditionally accepted idea, held by the members of a group or subgroup, that a particular kind of behavior (overt, verbal, or implicit) should conform to an established precedent. These ideal norms should not be confused with actual behavior. In any particular instance, an individual behaves in response to the state of his organism (his drives) at the moment, and to his perception of the total situation in which he finds himself. In so doing, he naturally tends to follow his established habits, including his culture, but either his impulses or the nature of the circumstances may lead him to deviate therefrom to a greater or lesser degree. Behavior, therefore, does not automatically follow culture, which is only one of its determinants. There are norms of behavior, of course, as well as of culture, but, unlike the latter, they can be established only by statistical means. Confusion often arises between anthropologists and sociologists on this point. The former, until recently, have been primarily preoccupied with ideal norms or patterns, whereas sociologists, belonging to the same society as both their subjects and their audience, assume general familiarity with the culture and commonly report only the statistical norms of actual behavior. A typical community study like *Middletown* and an ethnographic monograph, though often compared, are thus in reality poles apart. To the extent that culture is ideational, we may conclude, all cultures should reveal certain similarities, flowing from the universal laws governing the symbolic mental processes, e.g., the world-wide parallels in the principles of magic.

5. *Culture Is Gratifying.* Culture always, and necessarily, satisfies basic biological needs and secondary needs derived therefrom. Its elements are tested habitual techniques for gratifying human impulses in man's interaction with the external world of nature and fellow man. This assumption is an inescapable conclusion from modern stimulus-response psychology. Culture consists of habits, and psychology has demonstrated that habits persist only so long

as they bring satisfaction. Gratification reinforces habits, strengthens and perpetuates them, while lack of gratification inevitably results in their extinction or disappearance. Elements of culture, therefore, can continue to exist only when they yield to the individuals of a society a margin of satisfaction, a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. Malinowski has been insisting on this point for years, but the majority of anthropologists have either rejected the assumption or have paid it but inadequate lip service. To them, the fact that culture persists has seemed to raise no problem; it has been blithely taken for granted. Psychologists, however, have seen the problem, and have given it a definitive answer, which anthropologists can ignore at their peril. If culture is gratifying, widespread similarities should exist in all cultures, owing to the fact that basic human impulses, which are universally the same, demand similar forms of satisfaction. The "universal culture pattern" propounded by Wissler would seem to rest on this foundation.

6. *Culture Is Adaptive.* Culture changes; and the process of change appears to be an adaptive one, comparable to evolution in the organic realm but of a different order. Cultures tend, through periods of time, to become adjusted to the geographic environment, as the anthropogeographers have shown, although environmental influences are no longer conceived as determinative of cultural development. Cultures also adapt, through borrowing and organization, to the social environment of neighboring peoples. Finally, cultures unquestionably tend to become adjusted to the biological and psychological demands of the human organism. As life conditions change, traditional forms cease to provide a margin of satisfaction and are eliminated; new needs arise or are perceived, and new cultural adjustments are made to them. The assumption that culture is adaptive by no means commits one to an idea of progress, or to a theory of evolutionary stages of development, or to a rigid determinism of any sort. On the contrary, one can agree with Opler, who has pointed out on the basis of his Apache material, that different cultural forms may represent adjustments to like problems, and similar cultural forms to different problems. It is probable, nevertheles that a certain proportion of the parallels in different cultures represent independent adjustments to comparable conditions.

The conception of cultural change as a adaptive process seems to many anthropologists inconsistent with, and contradictory to the conception of cultural change as an historical process. To the author, there seem nothing inconsistent or antagonistic in the tw positions — the "functional" and the "historical," as they are commonly labeled. On th contrary, he believes that both are correc that they supplement one another, and that th best anthropological work emerges when th two are used in conjunction. Culture histor is a succession of unique events, in which late events are conditioned by earlier ones. Fron the point of view of culture, the events whic affect later ones in the same historical sequence are often, if not usually, accidental, since the have their origin outside the continuum of culture. They include natural events, like flood and droughts; biological events, like epidemic and deaths; and psychological events, like emotional outbursts and inventive intuitions. Suc changes alter a society's life conditions. The create new needs and render old cultural form unsatisfactory, stimulating trial and error behavior and cultural innovations. Perhaps th most significant events, however, are historica contacts with peoples of differing cultures, fo men tend first to ransack the cultural resource of their neighbors for solutions to their problems of living, and rely only secondarily upo their own inventive ingenuity. Full recognition of the historical character of culture, an especially of the role of diffusion, is thus prime prerequisite if a search for cross-cultural generalizations is to have any prospect o success. It is necessary to insist, however, tha historical events, like geographic factors, exer only a conditioning rather than a determinin influence as the course of culture. Man adjust to them, and draws selectively upon them t solve his problems and satisfy his needs.

7. *Culture Is Integrative.* As one produc of the adaptive process, the elements of a give culture tend to form a consistent and integrated whole. We use the word "tend" advisedly, for we do not accept the position of ce

in extreme functionalists that cultures actual- are integrated systems, with their several rts in perfect equilibrium. We adhere, ther, to the position of Sumner that the folk- ays are "subject to a strain of consistency to ch other," but that actual integration is never hieved for the obvious reason that historical ents are constantly exerting a disturbing in- ence. Integration takes time — there is al- ays what Ogburn has called a "cultural lag" -and long before one process has been com- eted, many others have been initiated. In our vn culture, for example, the changes wrought habits of work, recreation, sex, and religion rough the introduction of the automobile e probably still incomplete. If culture is in- grative, then correspondences or correlations tween similar traits should repeatedly occur unrelated cultures. Lowie, for example, has inted out a number of such correlations.

. *Dennes, 1942: 164–65.*

Following the lead of eminent historians, thropologists, psychologists, and philoso- ers, I have now directed your attention to ght phases or characteristics of group living hich have been taken by them as definitive of e term culture, or of the term civilization, hen those terms are used descriptively. Some holars, as we have seen, use the name culture r the "simpler" phases, civilization for the ore complex; others exactly reverse this prac- e; and still others use the two terms virtually synonyms. We may observe at this point at none of these eight descriptive notions stricts culture or civilization to any particu- pattern of organization. For example, a ghly aristocratic or a highly democratic pat- rn of social living might, either of them, con- icuously exemplify — or fail to exemplify what is meant by culture or civilization in y of the eight senses. We must note, also, at there are *indefinitely many* other types, ases, and products of social living which n be distinguished and studied, and taken as iteria of civilization; — how many (and hich) a man will deal with will be deter- ined by his interests and capacities and by e problems that are felt as pressing at the ne. The eight descriptive notions I have ected and brought to your attention are, to sume:

1. Material culture.
2. Culture, that is, material culture conjoined with art, ritual, laws.
3. "Genuine culture" (in Sapir's phrase) — a firm integration and mutually reinforcing development of all the factors specified as constituting culture in sense 2.
4. Civilization as culture (or "genuine culture") *mediated by history and science.*
5. Civilization as tribal or national culture so mediated by history and science as to lead to the recognition of the equal humanity of other nations.
6. Civilization as that special development of sense 5 which is essentially characterized by the employment of intelligence to discern the dominant tendencies of change in men's ways of living together, to predict future changes in these respects, and to accommodate men to (and even facilitate) such change.
7. Civilization as values realized, and particular civilizations as the patterns of social living more or less conducive to, or adequate to, the enactment and experience of values.
8. Civilization as an active process of growth in communication and appreciation.

14. *Roheim, 1943: 81–82.*

. . . When looking at the situation from a remote, biological point of view I wrote of culture as a neurosis, my critics objected. Attempting to reply to this criticism I now defined culture with greater precision as a psychic defense system. Since this view has also been questioned, I have taken up the question again in the present book and tried to analyze culture in some of its aspects which are most ego-syntonic, most useful and therefore appear to be remote from defense mechanisms. The result of this investigation is to confirm me in the view that *defence systems against anxiety are the stuff that culture is made of* and that therefore specific cultures are structurally similar to specific neuroses. This view of psychoanalytical anthropology was really the starting point of the whole problem. However other processes must follow the formation of these neurosis-systems to produce sublimations and culture. The psyche as we know it, is formed by the introjection of primary objects (super-ego) and the first contact with environment (ego). Society itself is knitted together by projection of these primarily introjected objects or concepts followed by a series of subsequent introjections and projections.

15. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945a: 93–94.*

The philosopher: . . . where is the locus of culture — in society or in the individual?

Third anthropologist: Asking the question that way poses a false dilemma. Remember that "culture" is an abstraction. Hence culture as a concrete, observable entity does not exist anywhere — unless you wish to say that it exists in the "minds" of the men who make the abstractions, and this is hardly a problem which need trouble us as scientists. The objects and events from which we make our abstractions do have an observable existence. But culture is like a map. Just as a map isn't the territory but an abstract representation of the territory so also a culture is an abstract description of trends toward uniformity in the words, acts, and artifacts of human groups. The data, then, from which we come to know culture are not derived from an abstraction such as "society" but from directly observable behavior and behavioral products. Note, however, that "culture" may be said to be "supra-individual" in at least two non-mystical, perfectly empirical senses:

1. Objects as well as individuals show the influence of culture.
2. The continuity of culture seldom depends upon the continued existence of any particular individuals.

16. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945b: 33–35.*

. . . there are four variables in the determination of human action: man's biological equipment, his social environment, his physical environment, and his culture. Let us designate those as a, b, c, and d. But a given system of designs for living is clearly the product of a, b, c, *and* d. In other words, it is quite clearly different from "d" alone, so let us call it "x." It would seem, then, that anthropologists have used the same term "culture" to cover both "d" and "x." This is enough to make a logician's hair stand on end.

Third anthropologist: Perhaps, in practice, the confusion has been mitigated by the tendency to use "culture" for the analytical abstraction "d" and "a culture" for the generalizing abstraction "x." But it is all too true that anthropologists and other scholars have frequently treated "d" (the explanatory concept) and "x" (the descriptive concept) as synonyms or equivalents. Having given sound abstract description of "group habits, the anthropologist then unthinkingly employ this ("x") as an explanatory concept, for getting that "x" must be regarded as the join product of "d" and three other determiners.

"X" is much closer to observable "reality than "d." "D" is, if you will, only an hypoth esis — though a highly useful hypothesis. "X, however, is an abstract representation of cen tral tendencies in observed facts. Let me giv you an example. Some peoples call thei mothers and their mothers' sisters by the sam kin term, and they tend to make few dis tinctions in the ways in which they behav toward their mothers and toward thei mothers' sisters. Other peoples apply differen terms of address and of reference to these tw classes of relatives and perhaps also differen tiate between the younger and the older sister of the mother. With such usages, in mos instances, go variations in behavior. Rigorou abstract description of all these patterns doe not require the invocation of hypothese But we do not know, and perhaps never ca know, in an ultimate and complete sense, wh these two examples of differing behavior exis The concept "culture" does however hel to understand how it is that at a given poin in time two different peoples, living in th same natural environment, having the sam "economic" system, can nevertheless hav different usages in this respect.

In sum, when a culture is *described*, this merely the conceptualization — highly con venient for certain purposes — of certai trends toward uniformity in the behavior o the people making up a certain group. N pretense is made at a total "explanation" o all this behavior. Just to approach such a understanding would require the collaboratio of a variety of specialists in biology, medicin and many other subjects. The primary utilit of "culture" as an explanatory concept is i illuminating the *differences* between behavior trends as located in space and time.

17. *Bidney, 1947: 395–96.*

According to the polaristic position adopte here, *culture is to be understood primarily a regulative process initiated by man for th* *elopment and organization of his determin- , substantive potentialities.* There is no pre- tural human nature from which the variety cultural forms may be deduced *a priori*, ce the cultural process is a spontaneous ex- ssion of human nature and is coeval with n's existence. Nevertheless, human nature ogically and genetically prior to culture ce we must postulate human agents with chobiological powers and impulses capable initiating the cultural process as a means of usting to their environment and as a form symbolic expression. In other words, the erminate nature of man is manifested ctionally through culture but is not reduci- to culture. Thus one need not say with tega y Gassett, "Man has no nature; he has tory." There is no necessity in fact or logic choosing between nature and history. Man a substantive ontological nature which may investigated by the methods of natural ence as well as a cultural history which may studied by the methods of social science by logical analysis. Adequate self-knowl- e requires a comprehension of both nature history. The theory of the polarity of ure and culture would do justice to both tors by allowing for the ontological con- ons[2] of the historical, cultural process.

Hinshaw and Spuhler, 1948: 17.

n an attempt to resolve certain conflicting losophies of culture, Bidney has suggested t the "idealistic" and "realistic" concep- ns of culture are not in conflict, that they be unified. In discussing this contention he ines five fallacies. He makes commission these fallacies contrary to achievement of ceptual unification. While we feel that definition of such fallacies is an important thodological service, we believe that Bidney not made sufficiently clear what some ht call the purposes or what we have ed the levels of his analysis. We do not h to challenge his substantive contributions; rather we wish to have his methodological remarks clarified.

On the scientific (perceptual) level of inquiry, the subject matter of cultural anthropology is necessarily parcelled by confining attention to a (more or less) definite group of abstractions. We would insist that those anthropologists who have confined attention to a "realist" set of abstractions, and those who have been concerned with an "idealist" set of abstractions, have both made significant and useful contributions to anthropology on the scientific level. The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a parcelled group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the subject matter, one has neglected a remainder of that subject matter. Insofar as the excluded data are important to the subject matter, this particular methodology or mode of thought is not fitted to deal, in an adequate way, with the larger problems in question. Since, in practice, the working anthropologist cannot proceed without making a classification of his subject matter, it is of great importance to pay constant attention to the modes of abstraction.

It is here that the philosophy of anthropology finds its role essential to the progress of the subject. And this task, the authors contend, can be carried out solely within the perceptual or scientific level.

19. *Kroeber, 1948a: 8–9, 253.*

Culture, then, is all those things about man that are more than just biological or organic, and are also more than merely psychological. It presupposes bodies and personalities, as it presupposes men associated in groups, and it rests upon them; but culture is something more than a sum of psychosomatic qualities and actions. It is more than these in that its phenomena cannot be wholly understood in terms of biology and psychology. Neither of these sciences claims to be able to explain why there are axes and property laws and etiquettes

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[Bidney's footnote] There is an important dis- tion to be made between the ontological conditions the cultural process and the ontological pre- positions of given systems of culture. Sorokin, for nple, in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, and throp in his *The Meeting of East and West* have ussed the views of reality inherent in diverse cultural systems. *In this paper, my concern is with the meta-cultural presuppositions of any system of culture whatsoever.* The problem, it seems to me, was soundly appraised by Dilthey, Ortega y Gasset, and Cassirer; my disagreement is solely with their Neo-Kantian epistemology.

and prayers in the world, why they function and perpetuate as they do, and least of all why these cultural things take the particular and highly variable forms or expressions under which they appear. Culture thus is at one and the same time the totality of products of social men, and a tremendous force affecting all human beings, socially and individually. And in this special but broad sense, culture is universal for man. . .

The terms "social inheritance" or "tradition" put the emphasis on how culture is acquired rather than on what it consists of. Yet a naming of all the kinds of things that we receive by tradition — speech, knowledges, activities, rules, and the rest — runs into quite an enumeration. We have already seen . . . that things so diverse as hoeing corn, singing the blues, wearing a shirt, speaking English, and being a Baptist are involved. Perhaps a shorter way of designating the content of culture is the negative way of telling what is excluded from it. Put this way around, culture might be defined as all the activities and non-physical products of human personalities that are not automatically reflex or instinctive. That in turn means, in biological and psychological parlance, that culture consists of conditioned or learned activities (plus the manufactured results of these); and the idea of learning brings us back again to what is socially transmitted, what is received from tradition, what "is acquired by man as a member of societies." So perhaps *how it comes to be* is really more distinctive of culture than what it *is*. It certainly is more easily expressed specifically.

20. *Bidney, 1949: 470.*

Modern ethnology has shown that all historical societies have had cultures or traditional ways of behavior and thought in conformity with which they have patterned their lives. And so valuable have these diverse ways of living appeared to the members of early human society that they have tended to ascribe a divine origin to their accepted traditions and have encouraged their children to conform to their folkways and mores as matters of faith which were above question. With the growth of experience and the development
of critical thought, first individuals and th
groups began to question some elements
the traditional thoughtways and practices a
thereby provided a stimulus for cultu
change and development.

21. *Radcliffe-Brown 1949: 510–11.*

The word "culture" has many differe
meanings. As a psychologist I would defi
culture in accordance with its dictiona
meaning in English, as the process by whicl
human individual acquires, through cont
with other individuals, or from such things
books and works of art, habits, capabiliti
ideas, beliefs, knowledge, skills, tastes, a
sentiments; and, by an extension common
the English language, the products of tl
process in the individual. As an Englishm
I learned Latin and French and therefore so
knowledge of Latin and French are part
my culture. The culture process in this se
can be studied by the psychologist, and
fact the theory of learning is such a study.

. . . The sociologist is obviously obliged
study the cultural traditions of all kinds tl
are found in a society of which he is maki
a study. Cultural tradition is a social proc
of interaction of persons within a soc
structure.

22. *Zipf, 1949: 276.*

Culture is relative to a given social gro
at a given time: that is it consists of *n* differe
social signals that are correlated with *m* diff
ent social responses . . .

COMMENT

Five of this group of statements attempt
list the factors that make culture: Ogbu
(1) 1922; Murdock, (6) 1932; Murdock, (1
1940; Dennes, (13) 1942; Kluckhohn a
Kelly, (16) 1945a. Dennes stands somewl
apart from the others. He thoughtfully li
eight "phases or characteristics" which ha
been taken to be definitive of the terms c
ture or civilization — eight senses in whi
they have been used. This is in a way
essay similar in goal to our present one —
deed, nearer to it in general outcome th
might be anticipated from a philosopher
against a pair of anthropologists.

Of the others, Ogburn is earliest and, no oubt for that reason, simplest. He recognizes vo factors, social heritage and biological ture of man, whose resultant is cultural bevior. Murdock, ten years later, admits four ctors that raise human behavior from the ganic, hereditary level to the super-organic vel. These four are habit-forming capacity, cial life, intelligence, and language. Only e fourth would today be generally accepted one of the pillars on which culture rests. abits, society, and intelligence are now unirsally attributed to sub-human as well as to man beings, in kind at any rate, though often ss in degree. It is only by construing "habits" customs, and "intelligence" as symbol-using agination, that these two factors would today retained as criteria; and as for "social life" how get around the cultureless ants? It ould appear that Murdock started out to ve "explanations" of the factors that make lture a uniquely human attribute, but that part he substituted faculties which are ined associated in man with culture but are t differential criteria of it.[3] In his 1940 statement (12a), however, he is clear on this disnction, and indeed his position as developed re is quite close to our own.

Kluckhohn and Kelly also name four factors variables") determinative of "human tion": biological equipment, physical enronment, social environment, and culture. hey complain, however, or have one of the aracters in their dialogue complain, that thropologists use the same word culture r the product of these four factors and for e fourth factor — a procedure logically hairising.

The one of the present authors not involved the 1945 dialogue is less troubled logically. is a given culture that is the product, antedent culture that always enters into it as a ctor. He sees cultural causality as inevitably rcular; equally so whether culture be viewed personally and historically or as something isting only in, through, or by persons. In e latter case the persons are inevitably inenced by existing and previous culture. he two-term formula is: culture > (persons assumed) > culture; the three term: culture > persons > culture. Each formula has its proper uses, and particular risks. The culture > culture formula eliminates the personalities that in a long-range historical or mass situation can contribute little but may rather clog or distract from understanding. The risk in exclusive use of this formula is that it may lead to assumption of culture as a wholly autonomous system, with immanent, preordained causation. The culture-persons-culture formula obviously is most useful in short-term, close-up, fine-view analyses. Its risk is the temptation to escape from circularity of reasoning by short-circuiting into a simplistic two-term formula of persons > culture or culture > personalities.

Three British social anthropologists, (7) Forde, 1934, (11) Firth, 1939, and (21) Radcliffe-Brown, 1949, stress the dynamic interrelations of activities within a culture. In addition, Radcliffe-Brown as usual narrows the concept of culture as much as possible: culture is the *process* by which language, beliefs, usages, etc., are handed on (similar to statements in [19] Kroeber, 1948!); and, says Radcliffe-Brown, cultural tradition is a *social* process of interaction of *persons* within a *social* structure. This seems to leave culture a mere derivative by-product of society, a position shared with Radcliffe-Brown by some sociologists, but by few if any anthropologists; who, if they insist on deriving culture, nowadays try to derive it out of personality, or at least from the interaction of personalities as opposed to society as such.

Radcliffe-Brown's earlier position in (4), 1930, emphasizes that the nature and function of culture in general are a mode of *social integration*, and he repeats this for the function of elements of culture. The focus of interest here is slightly different from that of 1949, but the subordination of culture to society is about the same.

Firth in (11), 1939, adduces a second property of culture: it contains *universally comparable* factors and processes. These can be described and explained in "social laws or general principles of culture."

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[3] As regards habits this is explicitly recognized by ırdock. Cf. III-b-3, below.

In (12) von Wiese, 1939, and (17, 20) Bidney, 1947, 1949, we feel modern repercussions of the old nature-spirit duality, even though Bidney expressly criticizes the idealistic concept of culture. Von Wiese holds that culture is not in the world of substance but is part of the world of values, of which it is a category. It is not a thing concept, it is not even an order of phenomena. Bidney is less vehement. He sees culture as a *regulative* process *initiated* by man *for* the *development* and organization of his determinate, substantive *potentialities*. We have italicized the words in this statement which seem to us as construable of idealistic if not teleological implications. Again, man is said to have a substantive ontological nature open to investigation by natural science, as well as a culture history open to investigation by social science and logical analysis. To us — subject to correction — this smacks of the Natur-Geist opposition of Kantian, post-Kantian, and perhaps Neo-Kantian idealism. In an important footnote which we have retained, Bidney says that he is speaking of the metacultural presuppositions of any culture; that the problem was soundly appraised by Dilthey, Ortega, and Cassirer; and that his disagreement is only with their Neo-Kantian epistemology.

Hinshaw and Spuhler, (18) 1948, seem to sense something of the same point we are making, when they reply to Bidney that the task of anthropology can be carried out only within the perceptual or scientific level. We too hold that everything about culture, including its values and creativities, is within nature and interpretable by natural science.

A few more isolated statements are worth mentioning.

Schapera (8), 1935, emphasizes the ne for understanding culture, of attending to range of individual variations from the ditionally standardized pattern. There is quarreling with this. It is much like insist that a mean plus variability has more sign cance than the mean alone. At the same ti much depends on the focus. If interest primarily in persons, the standardized patt need only be defined, and examination concern itself with the range of variation. interest is in cultural forms as such and th interrelations, individual variability beco of secondary moment.

Bose (3), 1929, strikes a somewhat new n with his statement that while cultural anth pology draws its data from human behavi it specializes on those *crystallized* products behavior which can be passed on betw individuals. "Crystallized" here appears mean the same as standardized to Schapera.

Roheim (14), 1943, in holding that defe systems against anxiety are the stuff that c ture is made of, and that therefore spec cultures are structurally [why structurall similar to specific neuroses, is virtually adher to Freud's *Totem and Taboo* theory of origin of culture in a slightly new dress.

On the other hand, we agree with the dict of Faris (9), 1937, that Spencer's superorga Durkheim's *faits sociaux*, Sumner's folkwa and the anthropologists' culture refer to ess tially the same collective phenomena.

Wallis (5), 1930, ambles through seve points on culture, all of which are unexc tionable, but which do not add up to a defi tion nor even quite to a condensed theory.

1. *Bose, 1929: 25.*

The stuff of which culture is composed is capable of analysis into the following categories: Speech – Material traits – Art – Mythology – Knowledge – Religion – Family and Social systems – Property – Government and War (Wissler). Any of these components of culture does not by itself, however, form an ndependent unit, but is closely bound up with the rest through many ties of association.

2. *Menghin, 1931: 614.*

Die Kultur lässt sich noch weiter einteilen, natürlich wiederum nur rein begreiflich, denn tatsächlich treten uns, wie schon in der Eineitung gesagt wurde, die verschiedenen Kultursachgebiete konkret so gut wie immer in vermengtem Zustande entgegen. Die Systematik der Kultur, als der verhältnismässig reinsten Objektivation des Geistigen, schliesst ich am besten den Grundsstrebungen an, die n der Menschheit beobachtet werden können. Dies sind nach meiner Auffassung das Streben nach Erhaltung, Geltung und Einsicht. Das erste erfüllt die materielle, das zweite die oziale, das dritte die geistige Kultur. Dabei st aber nicht zu übersehen, dass in der Wurzel edes dieser Sachgebiete geistiger Natur ist, da es ja einer Strebung entspringt. Der Unterschied, der die Bezeichnungen rechtfertigt, beruht lediglich in der Art und Stärke der Stoffgebundenheit. Man kann diese drei Sachgebiete weiter gliedern. Doch soll hier nur die geistige Kultur nähere Behandlung erfahren. Sie zerfällt in Kunst, Wissenschaft, und Sitte.

. *Murdock, 1932: 204–05.*

Habit alone, however, is far from explaining ulture. Many cultureless animals possess a onsiderable habit-forming capacity, and some f the mammals are in this respect not radically nferior to man. Social scientists agree, therefore, that culture depends on life in societies s well as on habit. Individual habits die with heir owners, but it is a characteristic of culture that it persists though its individual bearers are mortal. Culture consists of habits, to be sure, but they differ from individual habits by the fact that they are shared or possessed in common by the various members of a society, thus acquiring a certain independence and a measure of immortality. Habits of the cultural order have been called "group habits." To the average man they are known as "customs," and anthropologists sometimes speak of the "science of custom."

> The process of custom forming (as Chapin . . . correctly states) is similar to that of habit forming, and the same psychological laws are involved. When activities dictated by habit are performed by a large number of individuals in company and simultaneously, the individual habit is converted into mass phenomenon or custom.

To the anthropologist, group habits or customs are commonly known as "culture traits," defined by Willey as "basically, habits carried in the individual nervous systems." The sociologists, on the other hand, almost universally speak of them as "folkways." General agreement prevails, therefore, that the constituent elements of culture, the proper data of the science of culture, are group habits. Only the terms employed are at variance.

Of the several terms, "folkway" possesses certain manifest advantages. "Custom" lacks precision. Moreover, though it represents adequately enough such explicit group habits as words, forms of salutation, and burial practices, it scarcely suffices for implicit common responses, mental habits, or ideas, such as religious and magical concepts, which are equally a part of culture. The term "culture trait," though it covers both of these types of group behavior, is also used to include material objects or artifacts, which are not group habits, indeed not habits at all but facts of a totally different order. Artifacts are not themselves primary data of culture, as is shown by the recognized distinction between their dissemination by trade and the process of cultural diffusion proper.

4. *Boas, 1938: 4–5.*[4]

Aspects of culture: Man and nature. Culture itself is many-sided. It includes the multitude of relations between man and nature; the procuring and preservation of food; the securing of shelter; the ways in which the objects of nature are used as implements and utensils; and all the various ways in which man utilizes or controls, or is controlled by, his natural environment: animals, plants, the inorganic world, the seasons, and wind and weather.

Man and man. A second large group of cultural phenomena relate to the interrelation between members of a single society and between those belonging to different societies. The bonds of family, or tribe, and of a variety of social groups are included in it, as well as the gradation of rank and influence; the relation of sexes and of old and young; and in more complex societies the whole political and religious organization. Here belong also the relations of social groups in war and peace.

Subjective aspects. A third group consists of the subjective reactions of man to all the manifestations of life contained in the first two groups. These are of intellectual and emotional nature and may be expressed in thought and feeling as well as in action. They include all rational attitudes and those valuations which we include under the terms of ethics, esthetics, and religion.

5. *Murdock, 1941: 143.*

The elements of which a culture is composed, though all alike are traditional, habitual and socially shared, may be conveniently divided into techniques, relationships, and ideas. Techniques relate the members of
society to the external world of nature. . .
Relationships . . . are the interpersonal habi
ual responses of the members of a society . .
ideas consist not of habits of overt behavio
but of patterned verbal habits, often subvoc
but capable of expression in speech. Thes
include technological and scientific knowledg
beliefs of all kinds, and a conceptual formul
tion of normal behavior in both techniqu
and relationships and of the sanctions f
deviation therefrom.

6. *Firth, 1944: 20.*

Social anthropology is a scientific study
human culture. Its interest is in the variety
men's rules, conduct, and beliefs in differen
types of society, and in the uniformity (as f
instance in basic family organization) whic
underlies all societies. It is not concerne
only with the different forms of customs a
over the world, but also with the meanin
these customs have for the people who practis
them. Values are part of its material for exam
ination . . .

7. *White, 1947: 165.*

Culture is the name of the means, the equip
ment, employed by man and by man alone i
this struggle. Concretely and specificall
culture is made up of tools, utensils, tradition
habits, customs, sentiments, and ideas. Th
cultural behavior of man is distinguished fro
the non-cultural behavior of the lower anima
and of man himself considered *as an animal* a
distinguished from man *as a human being*—b
the use of *symbols*. A symbol may be define

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[4] Boas in *The Mind of Primitive Man*, revised edition of 1938, opens his Chapter 9 on page 159 with a definition of culture based on his 1930 one (which we have already cited in Part II–A–7) but expanded, and then in a sense effaced by a second paragraph which grants most the components of culture to animals other than man. The two paragraphs read:

"Culture may be defined as the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterise the behavior of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself and of each individual to himself. It also includes the products of these activities and their role in the life of the groups. The mere enumeration of these various aspects of life, however, does not constitute cultur
It is more, for its elements are not independent, the
have a structure.

The activities enumerated here are not by an
means the sole property of man, for the life of anima
is also regulated by their relations to nature, to othe
animals and by the interrelation of the individua
composing the same species or social group."

Apart from its non-limitation to man, this statemen
by Boas is strongly behavioral: culture consists c
psychosomatic reactions and activities. Beyond thes
activities, culture includes their products (presum
ably artifacts, material culture) and possesses structur
Not mentioned are the rational attitudes and ethica
aesthetic, and religious valuations mentioned in stat
ment (4) in the text above.

s a thing whose meaning is determined by
hose who use it. Only man has the ability to
se symbols. The exercise of this faculty has
reated for this species a kind of environment
ot possessed by any other species: a cultural
nvironment. Culture is a traditional organiza-
on of objects (tools, and things made with
ools), ideas (knowledge, lore, belief), senti-
nents (attitude toward milk, homicide,
nothers-in-law, etc.) and use of symbols.
he function of culture is to regulate the ad-
stment of man as an animal species to his
atural habitat.

COMMENT

A few statements as to the components of
ulture are enumerative, somewhat like Tylor's
riginal definition of culture (Part II–A–1),
ithout straining to be absolutely inclusive.
uch is White's 1947 list (7): tools, utensils,
aditional habits, customs, sentiments, ideas.
he context shows that White is concerned
ith the nature and function of culture, and
s enumeration is illustrative rather than ex-
austive. Bose (1), 1929 takes over Wissler's
niversal pattern (with one minor change).
e merely says that culture can be analyzed
to these nine categories, and is express that
ese are not independent units in their own
ght. Wissler's classificatory attempt — with
s sub-classes it is about a page long and
oks much like a Table of Contents — has
ever been seriously used, developed, or
allenged. It is evident that anthropologists
ve been reluctant to classify culture into its
pical parts. They have sensed that the cate-
ories are not logically definite, but are sub-
ctively fluid and serve no end beyond that
convenience, and thus would shift accord-
g to interest and context.

Sorokin (1947, ch. 17, 18) calls the divis-
ns, segments, or categories of culture, such
those of Wissler and Bose, "cultural sys-
ms," which, with cultural congeries, under-
his Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate super-
systems of culture. He recognizes five "pure" cultural systems: (1), language; (2), science, evidently including technology; (3), religion; (4), fine arts; (5), ethics or law and morals.[5] Of "mixed" or derivative systems, there are three most notable ones: philosophy, economics, politics. Philosophy, for instance, is a compound of science, religion, and ethics.

Except for Wissler's one fling at the universal pattern of culture, which was enumerative and which he did not follow up, anthropologists have fought shy of trying to make formal classification of the components of culture.[6] Being mostly preoccupied with dealing with cultures substantively, such classification has evidently seemed to them a matter mainly of pragmatic convenience, and they have dealt with it in an *ad hoc* manner, in contrast with Sorokin, whose logical and systematizing bent is much more developed than theirs — more than that of most sociologists, in fact.

There is however one tripartite classification of culture which appears several times — in substance though not in the same nomenclature — in the foregoing statements: those by Menghin (2), 1931, Boas (4), 1938, Murdock (5), 1941.[7] Under this viewpoint, the major domains of culture are: (1) the relation of man to nature, subsistence concerns, techniques, "material" culture; (2) the more or less fixed interrelations of men due to desire for status and resulting in social culture; (3) subjective aspects, ideas, attitudes and values and actions due to them, insight, "spiritual" culture. We have already touched on one aspect of this ideology in Part I, Section 4, 5, in discussing distinctions attempted, in Germany and the United States, between "civilization" and "culture." The addition of social relations, process, or culture yields the trichotomy now being considered.

As a matter of fact Alfred Weber in 1912 appears to have been the first to make the dichotomy in the present specific sense, and to have expanded it to the trichotomy in 1920.

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[5] In Sorokin, 1950, p. 197, philosophy seems to be
ded as a pure system, "applied technology" to have
ken its place among the derivative ones.

[6] Murdock, 1945, constitutes, in part, a follow-up
Wissler.

[7] Tessman, 1930, in listing culture items of East Peruvian tribes, groups them under the headings of material, social, and spiritual culture, corresponding to Menghin's divisions.

In America, MacIver (1931, 1942) and Merton (1936) seem to have been the first to see its significance. It thus appears that this three-way distinction was first made in Germany and for a while remained a sociological one, anthropologists coming to recognize it later, but again first in Germany and second in the United States. In so far as the trichotomy developed out of one of the several culture-civilization distinctions, it could not well have originated in England or France, where we have seen that use of the word culture w long respectively resisted and refused.

At any rate, this three-fold segmentation culture has now sufficient usage to suggest th it possesses a certain utility. We therefo tabulate the principal instances of its emplo ment as a convenient way of illustrating t substantial uniformity of authors' conce tions, underneath considerable difference terms used, as well as some minor variations what is included in each category.

Menghin (2: 1931)			
Strivings:	Subsistence	Recognition (Geltung)	Insight (Einsicht)
Fulfilled by:	Material Culture	Social Culture	Geistige Kultur
Boas (4: 1938) Aspects of Culture, Relations of:	Man to Nature Food, shelter, implements, control of nature	Man to Man	Subjective Aspects preceding, intellec emotional, includ tions: rational a and valuations
Murdock (5: 1941) Culture composed of:	Techniques Relating society to nature	(Social) Relationships Interpersonal habitual responses	Ideas: patterned ve sub-vocal habits. Knowledge (inclu technology), belie mulations of nor havior
Weber (1920; Part I, § 5, above)	Civilizational Process: Science, technology	Social Process Including economics, government	Cultural Movement: Religion, philosop
MacIver (1942, *Social Causation*)	Technological Order ("Civilization" in 1931): Technology, including economics, government—viz., "Apparatus" of living	Social Order	Cultural Order Religion, philosop traditions, codes, play; viz., "Mo living"
Thurnwald (1950, *passim*)	Civilization Dexterities, skills, technology, knowledge. Accumulative. Its sequence is progress	(Gesellungsleben)	Culture Bound to societies able. Uses civiliz means
Kroeber (1951, in press)	Reality Culture	(Social Culture)	Value culture Includes pure scie

F. Kluckhohn[8] has recently developed a classification of cultural orientations which includes the following categories:

Innate Predispositions
Man's Relation to Nature
Time Dimensions
Personality
Modality of Relationship (Man's Relation
Other Men)

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[8] F. Kluckhohn, 1950, esp. pp. 378–82.

GROUP *c*: DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES OF CULTURE

1. *Case, 1927: 920.*

Culture consists essentially in the external storage, interchange, and transmission of an accumulating fund of personal and social experience by means of tools and symbols . . . Culture is the unique, distinctive, and exclusive possession of man, explainable thus far only in terms of itself.

2. *Ellwood, 1927b: 13.*

The process by which the spiritual element in man is gradually transforming not only the material environment, but man himself . . . [It is] culture which has made and will make our human world.

3. *Bose, 1929: 32–33.*

Beneath the outer framework of culture, there lies a body of beliefs and sentiments which are responsible for the particular manifestation of a culture. They do not form part of any specific trait, but working beneath many traits, they give to each culture a character of its own . . . .

Such a body of ideas and sentiments grows out of life's philosophy and is consequently conditioned by the needs and aspirations of each particular age.

4. *Faris, 1937: 3, 278.*

The following . . . are presented as postulates . . .

The reality of culture. The collective habits have produced uniformities of speech, thought, and conduct which form a body of phenomena with laws of its own.

The priority of culture. With respect to the members of a group, the cultural habits and forms are pre-existing, so that the most important aspects of a given person are to be traced back to influences existing in the culture into which he comes.

The inertia of culture. Slow unnoticed changes in a culture may be noted but these are relatively unimportant. Culture tends to produce itself indefinitely.

Culture is a phenomenon of nature. Language, manners, morals, and social organization grow up within the ongoing activity in the effort of a group to maintain itself, to secure food, and to rear children . . . .

5. *Goldenweiser, 1937: 45–46.*

In summary it might then be said that culture is historical or cumulative, that it is communicated through education, deliberate and nondeliberate, that its content is encased in patterns (that is, standardized procedures or idea systems), that it is dogmatic as to its content and resentful of differences, that its contribution to the individual is absorbed largely unconsciously, leading to a subsequent development of emotional reinforcements, and that the raising of these into consciousness is less likely to lead to insight and objective analysis than to explanations *ad hoc*, either in the light of the established status quo, or of a moral reference more or less subjective, or of an artificial reasonableness or rationality which is read into it; also, finally, that culture in its application and initial absorption is local . . . .

6. *Opler, 1944: 452.*

The capacity for culture is a function of an accent on plasticity, on the development of general adaptability instead of specific structures, on the reduction of the importance of instinct. The inauguration of culture was heralded, we may believe, by the invention of tools and symbols. The tools, crude enough at first, were extra-organic means of doing what man had been forced to accomplish by the power of his own body to that moment. The symbols (generally understood vocal labels for familiar objects and processes) made possible communication (speech, language) and the conservation of whatever gains accumulated from tool-making and experience. Thus tools and symbols (or invention and communication, to phrase it in terms of process) can be considered the building blocks of culture.

7. *Herskovits, 1948: 625.*

Culture (1) is learned; (2) derives from the biological, environmental, psychological, and historical components of human existence; (3)

is structured; (4) is divided into aspects; (5) is dynamic; (6) is variable; (7) exhibits regularities that permit its analysis by the methods of science; (8) is the instrument whereby the individual adjusts to his total setting, and gains the means for creative expression.

8. *White, 1949a: 374.*

. . . articulate speech is the most important and characteristic form of symbolic behavior. Man alone is capable of symbolic behavior by virtue of unique properties of his nervous system, which, however, cannot yet be described except in terms of gross anatomy — exceptionally large forebrain, both relatively and absolutely; an increase in quantity of brain has eventuated in a qualitatively new kind of behavior.

Tradition — the nonbiological transmission of behavior patterns from one generation to the next — is found to a limited extent in some of the lower animal species. But in man, thanks particularly to articulate speech, the transmission of experience in the form of material objects, patterns of behavior, ideas, and sentiments or attitudes becomes easy, varied, and extensive; in short, the culture of one generation and age is passed on to the next. And, in addition to this lineal transmission of culture, it is transmitted laterally, by diffusion, to contemporary neighboring groups. Culture is cumulative as well as continuous; new elements are added through invention and discovery. It is also progressive in that more effective means of adjustment with and control over environment are achieved from time to time.

Culture thus becomes a continuum of extrasomatic elements. It moves in accordance with its own principles, its own laws; it is a thing *sui generis*. Its elements interact with one another, forming new combinations and syntheses. New elements are introduced into the stream from time to time, and old elements drop out.

9. *Osgood, 1951: 206, 207, 210, 211, 213.*

. . . Culture consists of all ideas concerning human beings which have been communicated to one's mind and of which one is conscious.

. . . Culture consists of all ideas of the manufactures, behavior, and ideas of the aggregat of human beings which have been directly observed or communicated to one's mind and o which one is conscious.

. . . Thus we can say that the manufacture and behavior of the aggregate of human being which have been directly observed are th percepta of culture, while the ideas of th aggregate of human beings which have bee communicated are the concepta of culture.

. . . Material culture consists of all ideas o the manufactures of the aggregate of huma beings which have been directly observed an of which one is conscious.

. . . Social culture consists of all ideas of th behavior of the aggregate of human being which have been directly observed and o which one is conscious.

. . . Mental culture consists of all ideas (i.e. an ego's) of the ideas (i.e., concepta) of th aggregate of human beings which have bee communicated to one's mind and of whic one is conscious. By disregarding epistemological considerations, one can greatl simplify this definition to read: Mental cultur consists of the ideas of the aggregate of huma beings.

COMMENT

The statements that seem to fall under this head cover the period 1927–1951. They tend to be enumerative. In this quality they resemble the broad descriptive definitions of II–A, though these attempt to list constituents of culture rather than its properties. The majority of these enumerative descriptions date from before 1934. We can thus probably conclude that as definitions became more cardinal, enumeration tended to become transferred from definition to less concentrated statement about culture.

As might be expected, the properties mentioned run rather miscellaneous, only a few being noted by as many as three or four of the nine authors cited. Now and then an author stands wholly alone in emphasizing a quality, as Ellwood in bringing in spirituality with a hopefully ameliorative tone, or Goldenweiser in dilating on the affect of hidden *a* *prioris* when brought to consciousness. Case's statement contains an allusive metaphor in "external storage." On account of the variety of properties mentioned, a discussion of them would be lengthy. Accordingly we content ourselves with a condensed presentation of the properties, grouped as far as possible, to serve as a summary.

SUMMARY OF PROPERTIES

External (to body), extraorganic, extrasomatic (1, 6, 8)
Symbolism (1, 6, 8)
Communicated (6, 9), by speech (8), transmitted (8), learned (7), by education (5), prior to individual and influencing him (4)
Education deliberate and non-deliberate (5), individual absorption also unconscious (5)
Accumulating, cumulative (1, 5, 8), gains conserved (6)
Aggregate of human beings (9)
Historical (5), continuous (8)

Human only (1), unique property of nervous system (8), *sui generis* (8)
Spiritual (2)
Ideas (9), percepts and concepts (9)
Uniformities with laws (4), regularities promoting scientific analysis (7), own principles and laws (8)
Real (4), phenomenon of nature (4)
Explicable only in terms of self (1)

Inertia, tending to indefinite reproduction (4)
Plastic (6), variable, dynamic (7), new combinations (8)
Localized (5), each culture underlain by particular beliefs and sentiments (3)
General adaptability instead of specific structures and instincts (6)
Means for creative expression (7)
Invention (6, 8), tools (6), manufacture (9)

Instrument of adjustment to environment (7, 8), effort at group maintenance (4)
Transforms natural environment (2)

Patterned, standardized (5), structured (7)

Dogmatic with emotional reenforcement (5), if made conscious, resentful and leading to moral judgments or false rationalizing (5)
Conscious (9)

1. *Marett, 1920: 11–12* (cf. footnote 6).

It is quite legitimate to regard culture, or social tradition, in an abstract way as a tissue of externalities, as a robe of many colours woven on the loom of time by the human spirit for its own shielding or adorning. Moreover, for certain purposes which in their entirety may be termed sociological, it is actually convenient thus to concentrate attention on the outer garb. In this case, indeed, the garb may well at first sight seem to count for everything; for certainly a man naked of all culture would be no better than a forked radish. Nevertheless, folk-lore cannot out of deference to sociological considerations afford to commit the fallacy of identifying the clothes worn with their live wearer . . . Hence I would maintain that in the hierarchy of the sciences psychology is superior to sociology, for the reason that as the study of the soul it brings us more closely into touch with the nature of reality than does the study of the social body . . . .

. . . Tylor called our science the science of culture, and it is a good name. But let us not forget that culture stands at once for a body and a life, and that the body is a function of the life, not the life of the body.

2. *Freud, 1927: 62–63.*

. . . order and cleanliness are essentially cultural demands, although the necessity of them for survival is not particularly apparent, any more than their suitability as sources of pleasure. At this point we must be struck for the first time with the similarity between the process of cultural development and that of the libidinal development in an individual. Other instincts have to be induced to change the conditions of their gratification, to find it along other paths, a process which is usually identical with what we know so well as sublimation (of the aim of an instinct), but which can sometimes be differentiated from this. Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution; this it is that makes it possible for the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, ideological activities, to play such an important part in civilized life. If one were to yield to a first impression, one would be tempted to say that sublimation is a fate which has been forced upon instincts by culture alone. But it is better to reflect over this a while longer. Thirdly and lastly, and this seems most important of all it is impossible to ignore the extent to which civilization is built up on renunciation of instinctual gratifications, the degree to which the existence of civilization presupposes the non-gratification [suppression, repression or something else?] of powerful instinctual urgencies. This "cultural privation" dominates the whole field of social relations between human beings; we know already that it is the cause of the antagonism against which all civilization has to fight.

3. *Redfield, 1928: 292.*

The barrios have, indeed, obviously different cultures, or, what is the same thing, different personalities. . . .

4. *Benedict, 1932: 23, 24.*

Cultural configurations stand to the understanding of group behavior in the relation that personality types stand to the understanding of individual behavior. . . .

. . . It is recognized that the organization of the total personality is crucial in the understanding or even in the mere description of individual behavior. If this is true in individual psychology where individual differentiation must be limited always by the cultural forms and by the short span of a human lifetime, it is even more imperative in social psychology where the limitations of time and of conformity are transcended. The degree of integration that may be attained is of course incomparably greater than can ever be found in individual psychology. Cultures from this point of view are individual psychology thrown large upon the screen, given gigantic proportions and a long time span.

This is a reading of cultural from individual psychology, but it is not open to the objections that always have to be pressed against such sions as Frazer's or Lévy-Bruhl's. The dif- lty with the reading of husband's preroga- es from jealousy, and secret societies from exclusiveness of age- and sex-groups, is that gnores the crucial point, which is not the currence of the trait but the social choice t elected its institutionalization in that cul- e. The formula is always helpless before opposite situation. In the reading of cul- al configurations as I have presented it in s discussion, it is this selective choice of the iety which is the crux of the process. It probable that there is potentially about the ne range of individual temperaments and ts, but from the point of view of the indi- ual on the threshold of that society, each ture has already chosen certain of these its to make its own and certain to ignore. e central fact is that the history of each it is understandable exactly in terms of its ving passed through this needle's eye of so- l acceptance.

Goldenweiser, 1933: 59.

. . If we had the knowledge and patience analyse a culture retrospectively, every ele- nt of it would be found to have had its be- nning in the creative act of an individual nd. There is, of course, no other source culture to come from, for what culture is de of is but the raw stuff of experience, ether material or spiritual, transformed in- culture by the creativeness of man. An an- sis of culture, if fully carried out, leads back the individual mind.

The content of any particular mind, on the ner hand, comes from culture. No individual ever originate his culture — it comes to from without, in the process of education. n its constituent elements culture is psycho- ical and, in the last analysis, comes from the lividual. But as an integral entity culture is nulative, historical, extra-individual. It nes to the individual as part of his objective erience, just as do his experiences with na- e, and, like these, it is absorbed by him, s becoming part of his psychic content.

Roheim, 1934: 216.

Thus we are led logically to assume that in- idual cultures can be derived from typical infantile traumata, and that culture in general (everything which differentiates man from the lower animals) is a consequence of infantile experience.

7. *Roheim, 1934: 169, 171, 235–36.*

I believe that every culture, or at least every primitive culture, can be reduced to a formula like a neurosis or a dream.

If we assume that differences in the treatment of children determine differences in culture, we must also suppose that the origin of culture in general, that is, the emergence of mankind was itself determined by traumata of ontogenesis to be found in the parent–child relation among the anthropoids of pre-human beings from whom we are descended. Analysis teaches us that super-ego and character, the moral attitudes that are independent of reality, of the current situation, result from infantile experience. The possession of these moral attitudes is specifically human; it separates man from his pre-human forbears.

The prolongation of the period of infancy is the cause of a trauma that is common to all mankind. Differentiation in the erotic play activities in different hordes has modified it and so produced the typical traumata and the specific cultures of different groups. . . . Although neurosis is a super-culture, an exaggeration of what is specifically human, analysis adds to the cultural capacity of the patient; for those archaic features of quick discharge which arise as a compensation to the over-culture disappear during its course. But in general we have no cause to deny the hostility of analysis to culture. Culture involves neurosis, which we try to cure. Culture involves super-ego, which we seek to weaken. Culture involves the retention of the infantile situation, from which we endeavour to free our patients.

8. *Sapir (1934) 1949: 591–92.*

What is the genesis of our duality of interest in the facts of behavior? Why is it necessary to discover the contrast, real or fictitious, between culture and personality, or, to speak more accurately, between a segment of behavior seen as cultural pattern and a segment of behavior interpreted as having a person-defining value? Why cannot our interest in be-

havior maintain the undifferentiated character which it possessed in early childhood? The answer, presumably, is that each type of interest is necessary for the psychic preservation of the individual in an environment which experience makes increasingly complex and unassimilable on its own simple terms. The interests connected by the terms culture and personality are necessary for intelligent and helpful growth because each is based on a distinctive kind of imaginative participation by the observer in the life around him. The observer may dramatize such behavior as he takes note of in terms of a set of values, a conscience which is beyond self and to which he must conform, actually or imaginatively, if he is to preserve his place in the world of authority or impersonal social necessity. Or, on the other hand, he may feel the behavior as self-expressive, as defining the reality of individual consciousness against the mass of environing social determinants. Observations coming within the framework of the former of these two kinds of participation constitute our knowledge of culture. Those which come within the framework of the latter constitute our knowledge of personality. One is as subjective or objective as the other, for both are essentially modes of projection of personal experience into the analysis of social phenomena. Culture may be psychoanalytically reinterpreted as the supposedly impersonal aspect of those values and definitions which come to the child with the irresistible authority of the father, mother, or other individuals of their class. The child does not feel itself to be contributing to culture through his personal interaction but is the passive recipient of values which lies completely beyond his control and which have a necessity and excellence that he dare not question. We may therefore venture to surmise that one's earliest configurations of experience have more of the character of what is later to be rationalized as culture than of what the psychologist is likely to abstract as personality. We have all had the disillusioning experience of revising our father and mother images down from the institutional plane to the purely personal one. The discovery of the world of personality is apparently dependent upon the ability of the individual to become
aware of and to attach value to his resistanc
to authority. It could probably be shown th
naturally conservative people find it difficu
to take personality valuations seriously, whi
temperamental radicals tend to be impatie
with a purely cultural analysis of human b
havior.

9. *Opler, 1935: 145, 152–53.*

Now this cultural factor is the chief co
cern and object of study of the anthropologis
and he is adverse, naturally, to seeing it di
qualified at the outset. He is then further di
turbed to see the totality of culture explaine
as a sublimation, as a channelization of the r
pressed element of the Oedipus complex in
more acceptable avenues. As has been pointe
out, in this view totemism is the "first religio
and the ritual extension of the act of parricid
exogamy is also derived from the aftermath
the parricide and is connected with totemis
Art develops as a vehicle of ritualism. T
parricide is the "criminal act with which
many things began, social organization, mor
restrictions and religion." A. L. Kroeber h
pointedly remarked the discouraging implic
tions of such a view for anthropology wh
he comments, ". . . the symbols into which t
'libido' converts itself, are phylogenetical
transmitted and appear socially. . . . Now
the psychoanalysts are right, nearly all et
nology and culture history are waste of effo
except insofar as they contribute new raw m
terials. . . ."

Thus the ego is the expression of the ps
chological sustenance drawn from the to
culture by the individual. There are tho
whose contacts are rich, varied, and balance
There are those whose experiences have prov
poor, stultifying, and unsatisfying. But wha
ever we attain, whatever we become, it is on
a small part of what the total culture has
offer; above the slight shadow any of us cas
looms the greater image of the world of ide
attainments, and ideals from which we dra
our aspirations. This is the measuring sti
by which our individual statures must
evaluated. This is the glass through which o
neighbors watch us. This is the judge befo
whom we must pass before we dare breat
"Well done," of our works. This is the to

ure of the anthropologist and the ego-ideal
reud.

ow we are prepared to understand what
ud means when he says: "The tension be-
en the demands of conscience and the ac-
attainments of the ego is experienced as a
e of guilt. Social feelings rest on the foun-
on of identification with others, on the basis
n ego-ideal in common with them." What
have in common with fellowmen whose
gments mean much to us is culture, a com-
ity of understandings, artifacts, concepts,
ethics. The individual ego approaches, re-
bles, and utilizes this, or failing to do so,
ffers the condemnation of its fellows and
drawn in guilty self-approach.

he difference between the anthropologist
psychoanalyst in respect to the offices of
id, ego, and ego-ideal as thus defined, is
lly more than terminological.

he psychoanalyst says: "Whereas the ego
sentially the representative of the external
ld, of reality, the super-ego stands in con-
t to it as the representative of the internal
ld, of the id."

he anthropologist would phrase the matter
a little differently. He would say: "That
statement demonstrating remarkable in-
t, Dr. Freud. We anthropologists have
much impressed with its truth. We too
noted that culture (ego-ideal) tends to
ess the deep-seated wishes (id). Man's
le world of supernaturalism, for instance,
rgely a response to wishfulfillment. The
h tried individual (ego) is constantly in
position of attempting to accommodate the
l, fictitious world that culture deems should
with the realities of living."

Seligman, 1936: 113.

. A mosaic, as we all know, may be of any
ree of elaboration, and this holds equally
he cultures we study. A mosaic may ex-
t well-defined patterns, or it may be a
e scatter of different coloured *tesserae*;
eover, the *tesserae* are held together by a
rix, and I believe that in studying so-called
erns of culture attention should equally be
to an element comparable to the matrix
mosaic. If I may be allowed to develop my metaphor, this matrix or cementing substance will in the first place consist of some of the deeper or fundamental attitudes of the human psyche, including, perhaps, ethnic elements and possibly fixations resulting from infantile experiences, if these are sufficiently general to affect the majority of children of a social group.

11. *Faris, 1937: 278.*

It is assumed that culture and personality are correlative terms; that to know the culture of a people is to know the types of personalities to be found within it; and that to know the personalities is to understand the culture. These two products of human life are twin-born. Culture is the collective side of personality; personality, the subjective aspect of culture. Society with its usages and personalities with their variations are but two ways of looking at human life.

It is further assumed that these two concepts are not to be thought of as arranged in a causal sequence. Personalities do not cause culture, nor does culture produce personality. Interaction, interstimulation, interlearning are continuous, and personalities are always affecting culture, and culture is always modifying personality. It would appear that society does not mold the individual, for molding is too passive a term. Individuals do not produce a culture, for collective life has its own laws and its own procedure. Society and the individual, culture and personality: both are useful and necessary abstractions made sometimes at will, forced sometimes upon the student as he tried to understand the phenomena before him.

And yet a sequence is assumed, if not causal, at least temporal. All culture can be assumed to arise out of a former culture or some blend or combination of more than one. Similarly, all personal ties are organized from the contact with other personalities and cultural forms. But in any particular instance, in the consideration of any one individual personality, it is here assumed that a personality arises subsequently to a specific cultural system. The priority of culture seems to be not only a demonstrable fact; it is a heuristic principle of great utility.

12. *Nadel, 1937a: 280–81.*

. . . The present discussion attempts to demonstrate that we have to reverse the argument; that we must define (at least in the first instance) the observable psychological trends in culture as an expression of dominating "contents," rational interests, and concrete purpose-directed activity. . . .

The "pattern" of a culture thus appears as a co-ordination of social activity of primarily sociological, i. e., rational ("purposive-rational," as Max Weber would say) nature. The rational interdependence of culture facts reveals the agency of certain obtaining social conditions and concrete dominant interests. In certain cases we may be able to trace these determining conditions and interests still further, down to objective "absolute" needs and necessities: to physical facts and psycho-physical or biological factors. In other cases there may be no such solution, and functional interpretation will then be definitely relieved by the descriptive statement of history (in the narrow sense), by the "uniqueness of events" of which we spoke in the beginning, and by the arbitrariness of the "illogical" phenomena of culture (Pareto). It is implied in the nature of this purpose-directed integration of society that it tends to penetrate into every detail of culture: religion, education, recreation, and art will reflect the dominating interests of a culture as much as the institutions which serve these interests more directly. Here, for the complex wheels-within-wheels-mechanism of culture in which each element is conditioned as well as conditioning, directed as well as directing, Dr. Benedict's formulation of the "consolidations" of culture in "obedience to (dominating) purposes," holds true in a new and, I believe, logically more correct sense. Evidently, this consolidation can only work and become effective through concrete mental processes. Expressed in terms of mental organization, functional integration of culture means logical connection and relation (of which purposive relation is only one category), working with "assumption," "premises," and syllogistic schemata. In its collectivity it coincides with Mr. Bateson's logical *structure* or *eidos* (or rather with one side of this slightly ambiguous concept).

13. *Nadel, 1937b: 421–23, 433.*

As this article is to describe an attempt include psychology in anthropological fie work a few words must be said first in justi cation of this attempt to examine, over a above the concrete realities of culture, the ps chological factors "behind" culture. . . .

The anthropological analysis defines the co stitution and structure of a culture (includi the institutionalized activities which invol psychological factors); the psychological e periment is to define, independently, the ps chological organization of the human substr tum of the culture. . . .

We have been able, by means of the expe ment, to isolate psychological organizati from the body of culture, and we have demo strated that an essential correspondence o tains between the two systems of phenomena

14. *Woodard, 1938: 649.*

From the angle of contained imperativ the culture, like the individual, *must* have integration. A rational, and thereby a co plete, integration is not possible until mu experience has been accumulated. Hence, both cases, the first integration cannot esca being an incomplete, inconsistent, and em tional one. As an emotional integration, it sists the necessary transitional break-ups in dent to achieving a mature and rational inte ration, and, as an incomplete and inconsiste pattern, it achieves general workability of sort by compartmentalization, rationalizatio the development of subintegrations, and t achievement of only accomodative mecha isms *between* these, rather than reaching t full adjustment of a single, all inclusive inte ration. Precisely this same mechanism pr duces the three subintegrations within the pe sonality (Super-ego, Ego, and Id) and t three divisions of culture (Control, Inducti and Aesthetic-expressive culture) and the va ous merely accommodative mechanisms b tween them. Blocking at the hands of t dominant subintegration; exaggerated pressu from the blocked impulse; defensive overpr tection and repression; further exaggerati and consolidation of the repressed elemen still further overprotestation, consolidatio and protective severity: this is the contain rocess which forges the threefold structure oth of personality and of culture. Make it nly a little more severe than usual and it is ne vicious circle of neuroticism and psychotic issociation (social disorganization and revoition at the social level) expressed in its roadest terms.

5. Kardiner, 1939: 84–85.

Cultures have been described by analogies ith the variations found in human character, rawn either from psychopathology, from terary or from mythological sources. Thus ultures have been described as "paranoid," ntroverted," or "extroverted"; cultures have een named after literary figures like "Faust," after Greek deities like "Apollo" or "Dionys." The effort in all these cases is to convey me general impression of the predominant rection of life goals, of moral values, or of psychological technique.

Such designations as these cannot claim any eat accuracy. No culture is exclusively exoverted or introverted. No culture is preominantly "paranoid." These epithets rely n very vague connotations. The term "paraoid" may refer to megalomania, to persecuon, or merely to anxiety, and the reader's section of one of these depends on his concepon of "paranoid." The term "extrovert" likeise can mean any number of things: uninhied, interested in activity, interested in the ter world; "introverted" may mean inhibited, trospective, interested in fantasy, etc. he designation "Faustian" or "Dionysian" is fferent in kind from the preceding ones. ere a culture is described in accordance with characterological type in which the characristic dominant objectives or values or ideolgies are taken as guides to the adaptation of group.

All these focal ideas are open to the same jection, because they destroy the boundaries tween individual and institution. The basic llacy involved is that, according to any conmporary psychology, variations in human aracter are created by habitual methods of acting to external conditions. The character it may be a reaction formation, a compensaon or flight, the nature of which can be deded only from the disciplines or reality situations in the culture. From this point of view, if a group is paranoid, one ought to be able to track down those institutional forces with which all constituents make contact and which terminate in this common trait. However, to regard character as an irreducible racial or cultural idiosyncrasy is at once to use a psychological designation and at the same time to deny the validity of psychological derivation of character.

16. Mandelbaum, 1941: 238.

A graduated weighting of patterns, a hierarchy of values, is characteristic of the phenomena we call cultural as well as of the behavior we term personal. The shape of a culture, when we probe into its essential nature, begins to look more and more like the structure of a personality. . . .

17. Roheim, 1941: 3–4, 23.

The theory of a collective unconscious would be an assumption we might be compelled to make if we had no other way to explain the phenomenon of human culture. I believe, however, that psychoanalysis has another contribution to offer and that this second suggestion is safer and easier to prove. The second suggestion is that the specific features of mankind were developed in the same way as they are acquired to-day in every human individual as a sublimation or reaction-formation to infantile conflicts. This is what I have called the ontogenetic theory of cultures. I found a society in which the infant was exposed to libidinal trauma on the part of the mother and have shown that this predominantly male society was based on the repression of that trauma. In the same way I have shown that in a matrilineal society the libidinal trauma consisted in the father playing at devouring the child's genital and that this society was based on the fiction that there are no fathers.

If we remember some significant passages in Freud's writings, we notice that Freud also holds this second view of culture. If culture consists in the sum total of efforts which we make to avoid being unhappy, this amounts to an individualistic and therefore, from the psycho-analytic point of view, to the ontogenetic explanation of culture. If culture is based on the renunciation of instinctual gratification, this means that it is based on the super-ego and hence also explained by the fact that we acquire a super-ego.

Of if we take Freud's papers in which he explains not culture as a whole, but certain elements of culture, we find that these interpretations are individualistic and psychological, and not based on a hypothetical phylogenesis. Finally, if we consider especially the interpretations given by Melanie Klein and in general by the English school of psycho-analysts, it is quite evident that all these interpretations of individual evolution also imply an interpretation of human culture as based on the infantile situation. Thus, if Melanie Klein regards symbolism as a necessary consequence of the infant's aggressive trends and the mechanisms mobilized against these trends and also as the basic elements in the subject's relation to the outside world and in sublimation, this implies an explanation of culture in terms of the infantile situation. If demons are explained as projections of the super-ego, if the functions of a medicine man are explained by the assumption that the help of an external object is sought against the introjected object, or if introversion or extraversion in an individual or a group are due to the flight of the internal or external object, these and many others are obviously explanations based on the infantile situation. . . .

1. Culture or sublimations in a group are evolved through the same process as in the individual.

2. Cultural areas are conditioned by the typical infantile situation in each area.

3. Human culture as a whole is the consequence of our prolonged infancy.

4. Typically human forms of adjustment are derived from the infantile situation.

5. Our conquest of nature is due to the synthetic function of the ego.

6. Psycho-analytic interpretations of culture should always be ego plus id interpretations.

7. The interpretation of cultural elements through individual analysis is probably correct, but should be combined with the analysis of anthropological data.

18. *Roheim, 1942: 151.*

Ever since the first attempts were made to apply psychoanalysis to cultural phenomena the structural similarity of culture and neurosis or "psychical system formation" has been tacitly assumed. No psychoanalyst would be likely to contradict Freud's famous threefold comparison of paranoia to philosophy, of compulsion neurosis to religion (ritual) and of hysteria to art. By comparing three of the most important aspects of culture to three types of neurosis Freud has implicitly compared culture itself to neurosis in general. Furthermore if we consider the whole literature on "applied analysis" we see in every case a cultural element of some kind is explained on basis of the same mechanisms that underlie the various kinds of neurosis.

19. *Kluckhohn and Mowrer, 1944: 7–8.*

The cultural facet of the environment of any society is a signally important determinant both of the content and of the structure of the personalities of members of that society. The culture very largely determines what is learned: available skills, standards of value, and basic orientations to such universal problems as death. Culture likewise structures the conditions under which learning takes place: whether from parents or parent surrogates or from siblings or from those in the learner's own age grade, whether learning is gradually and gently acquired or suddenly demanded, whether renunciations are harshly enforced or reassuringly rewarded. To say that "culture determines" is, of course, a highly abstract way of speaking. In the behavioral world what we actually see is parents and other older and more experienced persons *teaching* younger and less experienced persons. We assume that biology sets the basic processes which determine *how* man learns, but culture, as the transmitted experiences of preceding generations (both technological and moral), very largely determines *what* man learns (as a member of a society rather than as an individual who has his own private experiences). Culture even determines to a considerable extent how the teaching that is essential to this learning shall be carried out.

, *Beaglehole and Beaglehole, 1946: 15.*

. . . The culture of each individual overlaps
a greater or less degree with the culture of
ch and every other individual making up the
oup in question. This overlapping makes up
world of generally understood feelings,
oughts, actions, and values. In other words,
makes up the culture of the people. One of
e jobs of the social scientist is to study this
lture as thus defined. But in doing so, he
ust abstract and generalize from the private
perience of as many informants as he is able
study. The result can only be an abstrac-
on. It can only be a valid abstraction if a
nsitive member of the group feels a fair
nount of familiarity as he reads the words
hich define these abstractions.

Depending both on the skill of the investiga-
rs and on the relative amount of integration
the culture (that is, the preponderance of
mmon symbols over private symbols in the
lture), the informed reader is likely to say,
'es, this *is* so," or "Yes, that *may* be so, but
is outside the context of my own experi-
ce." Because of our feeling that Kowhai
aori culture today suffers from a lack of in-
gration (a feeling that we will try to docu-
ent later on in this report), we expect disa-
eement of the "Yes, but . . ." type with some
our analyses and statements. Such disagree-
ents would not necessarily imply that our
idy was subjective and perhaps prejudiced.
hey would indicate only that in trying to see
owhai Maori culture as a going concern we
ve inevitably neglected to explore all the
ivate worlds of all the Maoris living in Kow-
i. A moment's reflection will doubtless con-
ice the general reader of the impossibility
ever presenting an absolutely true and abso-
tely objective account of Kowhai Maori life.

. *Leighton, 1949: 76.*

There exist psychological uniformities com-
on to all tribes, nations, and "races" of human
ings. Each psychological uniformity has a
nge through which it varies; some variants
characteristic of particular groups of peo-
and as such form a part of their culture.

22. *Merton, 1949: 379.*

Despite her consistent concern with "culture," for example, Horney does not explore differences in the impact of this culture upon farmer, worker and businessman, upon lower-, middle-, and upper-class individuals, upon members of various ethnic and racial groups, etc. As a result, the role of "inconsistencies in culture" is *not* located in its differential impact upon diversely situated groups. Culture becomes a kind of blanket covering all members of the society equally, apart from their idiosyncratic differences in life-history. It is a primary asumption of our typology that these responses occur with different frequency within various sub-groups in our society precisely because members of these groups or strata are differentially subject to cultural stimulation and social restraints. This sociological orientation will be found in the writings of Dollard and, less systematically, in the work of Fromm, Kardiner, and Lasswell.

COMMENT[9]

These excerpts are largely variations upon two themes: the relationship of the abstraction, culture, to concrete individuals and certain similarities between personalities and cultures.

The variations on the first theme consist partly in general discussions of the origins of culture in the individual psyche, partly in attempts to provide a specific theory through psychoanalytic principles.

Marett (1) (cf. also III–f–21) strikes a chord which has been developed by many later writers, perhaps most subtly and effectively by Sapir (cf. also III–f–7). A somewhat crude paraphrase of this position might run as follows: "Let us not be so seduced by captivating abstractions that we lose sight of the experiencing organism in all his complexity and variability. We must not dehumanize the science of man by concentrating exclusively upon 'the outer garb.' What we in fact observe and we ourselves experience is not culture but an intricate flux that is influenced, channeled but never completely contained within cultural forms. Actual living always has an affective tone, and each human being has a uniqueness that is partly the product of his own special biological nature, partly the resultant of his own private life history up to that point. Abstractions may be useful but they must not be confused with 'reality.'" Goldenweiser's (5) main point is an extension of this argument: culture change could not occur were it not for the creative activity of concrete individuals.

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[9] This comment must be linked to that in the
mment on III-f, subsection entitled, "Culture and Individuals."

It is perfectly true, as Nadel (12) insists, that culture not only "conditions" individuals but is also "conditioned" by them. There is certainly a ceaseless interplay between the tendencies toward standardization that inhere in cultural norms and the tendencies toward variation that inhere in the processes of biological heredity and biological development. However, any argument over "primacy" is as bootless as any other question cast in the chicken or the egg formula. To be sure, there were presumably human or at least humanoid organisms before there was culture. But as far as the phenomena with which anthropologists and psychologists can actually deal, the issue of "primacy" resolves itself into a selection between problems and between equally legitimate frames of reference.

Study of what Nadel calls "the psychological factors behind culture" is clearly essential to a satisfactory theory of the cultural phenomenon. For historical accident, environmental pressures, and seemingly immanent causation, though all important, are not adequate to explain fully the observed facts of cultural differentiation. Unless we are to assume that each distinct culture was divinely revealed to its carriers, we must have recourse to psychology as part of the process.

Thus far only the psychoanalysts have proposed somewhat systematic theories. How helpful the suggestions of Freud, Roheim, and Kardiner are is highly arguable. Freud's "Just So Stories" are contradicted, at least in detail, by much anthropological evidence. It also appears to most anthropologists that he has exaggerated "cultural privation" at the expense of the many ways in which cultures reward and gratify those who participate in them. Insofar
as Freud was merely saying that family lif
and social life in general were possible only
the price of surrendering many "instinctu
gratifications" to the control of cultural norm
few anthropologists would gainsay him. Man
would likewise agree that culture is to a larg
degree a "sublimation" — i.e., a redirecting
bodily energies from such immediate satisfac
tions as sex and aggression (Roheim, 18).

Freud developed a putative explanation
culture in general but hardly of the variation
between cultures. Roheim (6, 7, 17), how
ever, has offered such a theory.[10] This briefl
is that the distinctiveness of each culture is
be understood in terms of the infantile trau
mata maximized by the child-training prac
tices of that culture. The institutions of th
adult culture are, as it were, reaction-forma
tions against the specific "instinctual depriva
tions" emphasized in what Herskovits calls th
process of "enculturation." Obviously, thi
cannot serve as an explanation of the *origins*
the special features of each culture. Roheir
(cf. also III–a–14) would have to resort to his
torical accident for that. His theory may b
useful in understanding the perpetuation of
set of culture patterns. At any rate, it is a test
able hypothesis, and unpublished research b
John M. Whiting and others is directed towar
determining what degree of validity this theor
possesses.

On the whole, the last few years have see
considerable improvements in communicatio
between psychoanalysts and anthropologist
and a re-casting of certain central proposition
on both sides in forms more nearly acceptabl
to each of the two groups.[10a] Thus Roheim i
his last book says:

> . . . the theory of cultural conditioning cannot ac
> count for certain parallelisms in widely divergent cul
> tures . . . the psychic unity of mankind is more tha
> a working hypothesis . . . cross-cultural parallels, al
> though *they may have an additional context-deter
> mined meaning*, have an underlying meaning that
> independent of the social system or culture or basi
> institutions and is based on the nature of the primar
> process. There is such a thing as a potentially univers
> symbolism. The latent content is universal, but th
> symbol itself may become verbalized by a certain in
> dividual or many individuals in many parts of th

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[10] Cf. also Seligman (10).

[10a] Cf. Kluckhohn and Morgan, 1951.

> orld and then accepted by others on basis of the
> iversal latent content . . . those who condition are
> bject to the same biological laws as are the others
> hom they are conditioning. (1950, 5, 435, 488,
> 9; italics Roheim's).

the Roheim Festschrift Hartmann, Kris, and
oewenstein observe:

> The comparative study of culture includes the ques-
> on as to variant and invariant traits of "human
> ture. . . ." The "biological" is neither limited
> the innate nor identical with invariant traits in man.
> ere is obviously a vast area in which the same
> tements are part of both biological and sociological
> s of assumptions. . . . The biological approach thus
> dicates a framework within which the fact that man
> the social animal becomes meaningful. Once this
> s become clarified it becomes evident that the study
> human behavior can, and in many cases must, be
> ewed from both sides: we can characterize the rela-
> nship between mother and child as a biological
> ationship or we can characterize it as a social one:
> e fact that both concatenations are overlapping con-
> tutes the human. . . . Both psychoanalysts and
> thropologists are interested in the same processes,
> t they are partly using data of different kinds. . .
> 951, 6, 10).

Everyone will agree that human biology
d those aspects of human psychology which
ise from biological potentialities set limiting
ames for cultures (Leighton, 21; Seligman,
). How the selections that are possible with-
these frames are arrived at by different peo-
es each in a somewhat distinctive way — this
one of the largest questions in culture theory
d one which has hardly gone beyond the
ase of speculation and reasoning by analogy
d the illustrative example. It does seem cer-
in that simplistic "functional" explanations
ill help us only a little.

Neither a society nor an individual will sur-
ve unless behavior makes a certain minimum
sense in terms of environment demands.
it how is one to account thus for the enor-
ously diverse conceptions of time found in
e cultures of the world? The ancient Egyp-
ns were pioneers in astronomical and calen-
ical investigations. This makes good "func-
nal" sense, for Egyptian agriculture was
d to the periodicities in the inundations of
e Nile. Why, however, is the dominant theme in Egyptian thought, as we have recently been assured by Frankfort,[11] the conviction that the universe is static and that only the changeless is ultimately significant? Did the Judaic conception of sin originate in the Near East because this had unusual survival or adjustive value under the circumstances of life in this area?

It seems more likely that conceptions of time and of the good life were largely determined by the accidents of history operating through psychological mechanisms as yet unknown but including the genius and temperament of individuals who happened to be born at a crucial period and born to key positions in the social structure. Societies make what, for want of a more accurate word, we may call "choices." Such decisions are of special importance when a new culture is being created or when an old one has become relatively loose and malleable under extreme stress. But with societies as with individuals any crucial "choice" is to greater or lesser degree a determiner of later ones. Once a group starts down one road, the paths that would have opened up on another route that was "objectively" available will not be traversed; even if they should be, the territory will be reacted to, not freshly, but in a fashion colored and shaped by the experience upon the first road. The principle of "limitation of possibilities" is operative.

The functionalist assumption that culture is solely the result of response to physiological drives and needs as modified by acquired drives reduces culture change to the tautology of "culture begets or determines culture." Undoubtedly the systemic quality of each culture does tend to give cultures the property or at least appearance of immanence or orthogenesis. Some culture change may well be predetermined once the culture has assumed its fundamental organization. Much more, however, culture change seems to be due to the ceaseless feedback between factors of idiosyncratic and universal human motivation, on the one hand, and factors of universal and special situation, on the other. Unfortunately, we lack conceptual instruments for dealing with such systems of organized complexity.[12]

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[11] Frankfort, 1948.

[12] Cf. Weaver, 1948.

Nevertheless we can consistently and explicitly recognize the interdependence of cultural and psychological phenomena. While anthropologists will always resist the tendency of some psychologists to reduce culture to psychology (as in the Katz and Schanck definition, D–IV–2), they increasingly acknowledge that psychologists and anthropologists inevitably start from the same data. More strictly, they start from data of the same order, namely human behavior. They may start from the same particular data, but often do not, because their interests and problems usually differ. More concretely: a psychologist seldom starts with a custom considered as such, anthropologists hardly from acts of learning or remembering as such. To the psychologist a fresco of Giotto is primarily a datum on a certain creative personality. To the anthropologist the fresco is a datum on art style of a certain period in Italy and on culture content (costume, house types, other artifacts, etc.). In Sapir's (8) words, a segment of behavior may be seen either as cultural pattern or as having a person-defining value.

Moreover — and this brings us to the second major theme of this group of extracts — culture and personality are not only abstractions from data of the same order; they have intrinsic similarities. Certain definitions of culture state that it is a "mental" phenomenon, and many definitions of personality start from the same premise. Both personalities and cultures appear to acquire their distinctiveness at least as much from organization as from content (Woodward, 14). More and more personality psychologists and anthropologists have had recourse to such ideas as "themes," and "configurations," "orientations," and "implicit logics" in constructing their conceptual models. As Mandelbaum (16) says: "The shape of a culture, when we probe into its essential nature, begins to look more and more like the structure of a personality."

Benedict's famous parallels were of a slightly different order — between personality *types* and cultural *types*. Yet she seemed to many of her readers to be saying: culture is personality writ large; personality is culture writ small. The equation of culture with the personality of a society (Redfield, 3) or of personality as the subjective side of culture (Faris, 11) repr sents an unfortunate over-simplification. Th former analogy leads to the brink of th "group-mind" fallacy. The latter is false b cause culture is far from being the only con stituent of personality; a unique biologic heredity and idiosyncratic life history als enter in.

The parallels nevertheless remain arrestin Of cultures as well as of personalities one ca properly say: "This culture is in some respec like all other cultures, in other respects lik some other cultures only, in a few respec completely individual." A personality ca participate much more nearly in the whole a culture than in the whole of a society. Th fact that students of personality and studen of culture have more in common than eith have with students of societies as such is a tested by some interesting contrasts in disc plinary affiliations.

Superficially, sociologists and cultural an thropologists appear to be studying much th same things. Yet the record shows mor instances of cooperation and intellectual sym pathy between sociologists and social psy chologists than between anthropologists an sociologists. Anthropologists have more ofte been affiliated with students of personalit (clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, psych analysts) and have had deeper influence upo the thinking of these groups. Probably th fundamental difference is that social psychol gists and contemporary American sociologis are more obsessed with the quantitative an more ready to pull their data out of contex while the other two groups insist upon th relevance of form, of features of order and a rangement which are not (at least as yet measurable. It will, however, be germane t our analysis of the relationships between cu ture and psychology to examine a little furthe the factors that have brought students of pe sonality and students of culture together.

Just as the anthropologist attempts to get picture of the whole of a culture, so the clinica type of psychologist tries to envisage th whole of a personality. In both cases this en tails, for the time being at least, some deficien cy in workmanship as well as loss of rigo The anthropologist cannot have enough spe ialized knowledge to describe music, basetry, and kinship with equal expertness. Nor an the psychologist be equally well trained n mental and projective tests, depth interiewing, and techniques of the personal docunent. Nevertheless holistic, controlled imressionism has certain merits, at any rate for euristic purposes in this particular stage of he development of the human sciences.

One may take as an extreme case the relaonship between psychoanalysis and anthroology. For all of the extravagant dogmatism nd *mystique* of much psychoanalytic writing, ne anthropologist sensed that here at least he as getting what he had long been demanding rom academic psychology: a theory of raw uman nature. The basic assumptions of the neory might turn out to be false in general or detail. The anthropologist was positive that ne theory was culture-bound to an important egree, though the evidence of the past twenty ears indicates that many anthropologists exggerated the extent of the distortion they nought produced by bourgeois Viennese culre and by late nineteenth-century science. t all events, psychoanalysis provided anthroology with a general theory of psychological rocess that was susceptible of cross-cultural sting by empirical means and with clues that ight be investigated as to the psychological uses of cultural phenomena.

Moreover, there were experiential factors at drew the psychoanalysts and the anthroologists together. Psychiatrists of all persuaons were showing that there was meaning the most apparently chaotic and non-adapve acts of the mentally ill. This struck an swering chord with the anthropologist, for was engaged in demonstrating the fact that e seemingly bizarre patterns of non-Western ltures performed the same basic functions did our familiar customs. The same amnesty at the psychoanalyst grants to incestuous eams the anthropologist had learned to acde to strange cultures. That is, both insisted at the queerest behavior had significance in e economy of the individual or of the soety. There was no implication of moral aproval, necessarily, on the part of either psyiatrist or anthropologist. Both merely agreed at behavior could not be legislated out of existence unless psychologically satisfying and socially acceptable substitutes were discovered. The essential scientific task was that of gaining maximal understanding of underlying determinants.

Finally, the dominant experience of cultural anthropologists had been as "unscientific" — in the narrow sense of that term — as that of the psychoanalysts. Most cultural anthropologists are as innocent of statistics as the psychoanalysts; both groups operate with procedures that are essentially "clinical." Ordinarily the anthropologist working under field conditions has as little chance to do controlled experiments as has the psychoanalyst who sees his patient for an hour a day in the consulting room. The skilled of both professions do make predictions of a crude order and test them by subsequent observation. But these observations do not lend themselves to presentation in neat graphs and "t" distributions. Indeed both groups would maintain, without disparaging the indispensable importance of statistics for other purposes, that some of their main problems involve matters of form, position, and arrangement more than of the incidence and clusterings of random variations. Such problems may find an eventual solution in terms of matrix algebra or some other form of topological mathematics but, in the nature of the case, not in an applied mathematic based on probability theory. Probably in all culture, as well as in that aspect known as linguistics, the crucial issue is not that of size or frequency but of what point in what pattern. One may compare the principle of the circle which does not depend upon measurement as such but upon a fixed patterning, even though measurements are necessary to draw any particular circle to specification.

And so the anthropologist, however skeptical he may be of certain psychoanalytic dogmas, tends to feel in some measure at home in psychoanalytic psychology. He recognizes certain similarities which confront him in describing and interpreting a culture with those met by a psychoanalyst in diagnosing a personality; the relationships between forms and meanings, between content and organization, between stability and change.

Culture is not merely a "tissue of externalities" (Marett, 1). It is "built into" the personality and as such is part, though only part, of the personality. From many different private versions of a given aspect of a culture as manifested by so many different unique personalities, the anthropologist constructs the ideal type of that aspect which he, perfectly legitimately, incorporates in his conceptual model of the total culture. This is the "supposedly impersonal aspects of values and definitions" which worries Sapir (8). But almost all anthropologists today are fully aware that as culture influences the concrete act of the individual actor it is not "impersonal" at all. Concretely, culture is internalized. This is the basis of those resemblances between culture and super-ego[13] to which Opler (9) and others have drawn attention. To a considerable degree (though not completely) anthropological culture, psychoanalytic super-ego, and indeed the *conscience collective* of Durkheim are all constructs from the same data and have many overlapping theoretical implications.

There is no genuine problem as to the "inwardness" or "outwardness" of culture. It is "outward" and "impersonal" as an abstraction, a logical construct; it is very much "inward" and affective as internalized in a particular individual. One must merely take care not to confuse these two frames of reference. It is highly convenient to construct an abstract conceptual model of a culture. But this does not mean that culture is a force like Newtonian gravity "acting at a distance." Culture is a precipitate of history but, as internalized in concrete organisms, very much active in the present. One might almost say that a culture is to a society as the memory is to a person. The past is present through memory and through the structuring of the present whic previous events have produced.

Culture is manifested in and through personalities. Personality shapes and changes culture but is in turn shaped by culture. Cultur exists to the extent to which the "privat worlds" of which Sapir (8) and the Beagleholes (20) write overlap. In a complex stratified and segmented society like our own thes "private worlds" overlap for the majority o the total population only upon the broadest o issues. Generalized American culture, as Merton (22) says, has a "differential impact upo diversely situated groups."

The exploration of the mutual interrelation between culture and psychology must continue. However, we may conclude with Ster (1949, 342) that:

> There has been considerable unrewarding controversy . . . around the contrast of culture as thing in itself, and culture as an activity of perso participating in it. Actually both approaches a valid, and are required to supplement each other for rounded understanding of cultural behavior.

Both culture and personality are inferenti constructs that start (but select) from behavio or products of behavior. Symbolization (in very broad sense) seems to be central to bot models, and such symbolization is carried o at various levels of awareness and with varyin degrees of compulsiveness. In the past cultur has tended to emphasize explicitness of bot design and content, personality theory implicitness and "internality." Now cultu theory seems to be working "downward toward the implicit and "internal," personalit theory "upward" to explicit forms. Hence th two bodies of theory converge more and mo but will not, we think, fuse completely.

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[13] A case can also be made for comparing culture at least as closely to another concept of Freud's, that of the ego ideal. However, this would involve us in a highly technical consideration of psychoanalyt terminology.

GROUP *e*: CULTURE AND LANGUAGE

Boas, 1911: 67–68.

It would seem that the obstacles to general-
ed thought inherent in the form of a language
e of minor importance only, and that pre-
mably the language alone would not pre-
ent a people from advancing to more general-
ed forms of thinking if the general state of
eir culture should require expression of such
ought; that under these conditions the lan-
age would be molded rather by the cultural
ate. It does not seem likely, therefore, that
ere is any direct relation between the culture
a tribe and the language they speak, except
so far as the form of the language will be
olded by the state of culture, but not in
far as a certain state of culture is conditioned
morphological traits of the language. . . .

Of greater positive importance is the ques-
on of the relation of the unconscious charac-
r of linguistic phenomena to the more con-
ious ethnological phenomena. It seems to my
ind that this contrast is only apparent, and
at the very fact of the unconsciousness of
guistic processes helps us to gain a clearer
derstanding of the ethnological phenomena,
point the importance of which can not be
derrated. It has been mentioned before that
all languages certain classifications of con-
pts occur. To mention only a few: we find
jects classified according to sex, or as ani-
ate and inanimate, or according to form. We
d actions determined according to time and
ace, etc. The behavior of primitive man
akes it perfectly clear that all these concepts,
though they are in constant use, have never
en into consciousness, and that consequently
eir origin must be sought, not in rational, but
entirely unconscious, we may perhaps say
stinctive, processes of the mind. They must
due to a grouping of sense-impressions and
concepts which is not in any sense of the
rm voluntary, but which develops from quite
fferent psychological causes. It would seem
at the essential difference between linguistic
enomena and other ethnological phenomena
that the linguistic classifications never rise
to consciousness, while in other ethnological
enomena, although the same unconscious
igin prevails, these often rise into consciousness, and thus give rise to secondary reasoning and to re-interpretations. It would, for instance, seem very plausible that the fundamental religious notions — like the idea of the voluntary power of inanimate objects, or of the anthropomorphic character of animals, or of the existence of powers that are superior to the mental and physical powers of man — are in their origin just as little conscious as are the fundamental ideas of language. While, however, the use of language is so automatic that the opportunity never arises for the fundamental notions to emerge into consciouness, this happens very frequently in all phenomena relating to religion. It would seem that there is no tribe in the world in which the religious activities have not come to be a subject of thought. While the religious activities may have been performed before the reason for performing them had become a subject of thought, they attained at an early time such importance that man asked himself the reason why he performed these actions. With this moment speculation in regard to religious activities arose, and the whole series of secondary explanations which form so vast a field of ethnological phenomena came into existence.

2. *Sapir, 1912: 239–41 (1949: 100–02).*

. . . Perhaps the whole problem of the relation between culture and environment generally, on the one hand, and language, on the other, may be furthered somewhat by a consideration simply of the rate of change or development of both. Linguistic features are necessarily less capable of rising into the consciousness of the speakers than traits of culture. Without here attempting to go into an analysis of this psychological difference between the two sets of phenomena, it would seem to follow that changes in culture are the result, to at least a considerable extent, of conscious processes or of processes more easily made conscious, whereas those of language are to be explained, if explained at all, as due to the more minute action of psychological factors beyond the control of will or reflection. If this be true, and there seems every reason to believe that it is, we must conclude that cultural change and linguistic change do not move along parallel lines and hence do not tend to stand in a close causal relation. This point of view makes it quite legitimate to grant, if necessary, the existence at some primitive stage in the past of a more definite association between environment and linguistic form than can now be posited anywhere, for the different character and rate of change in linguistic and cultural phenomena, conditioned by the very nature of those phenomena, would in the long run very materially disturb and ultimately entirely eliminate such an association. . . .

To some extent culture and language may then be conceived of as in a constant state of interaction and definite association for a considerable lapse of time. This state of correlation, however, can not continue indefinitely. With gradual change of group psychology and physical environment more or less profound changes must be effected in the form and content of both language and culture. Language and culture, however, are obviously not the direct expressions of racial psychology and physical environment, but depend for their existence and continuance primarily on the forces of tradition. Hence, despite necessary modifications in either with lapse of time, a conservative tendency will always make itself felt as a check to those tendencies that make for change. And here we come to the crux of the matter. Cultural elements, as more definitely serving the immediate needs of society and entering more clearly into consciousness, will not only change more rapidly than those of language, but the form itself of culture, giving each element its relative significance, will be continually shaping itself anew. Linguistic elements, on the other hand, while they may and do readily change in themselves, do not so easily lend themselves to regroupings, owing to the subconscious character of grammatical classification. A grammatical system as such tends to persist indefinitely. In other words, the conservative tendency makes itself felt more profoundly in the formal groundwork of language than in that of culture. One necessary consequence of this is that the forms of language will in course of time cease to symbolize those of culture, and this is our main thesis. Another consequence is that the forr of language may be thought to more a curately reflect those of a remotely past sta of culture than the present ones of culture self. It is not claimed that a stage is ev reached at which language and culture star in no sort of relation to each other, but simp that the relative rates of change of the two di fer so materially as to make it practically i possible to detect the relationship.

3. *Sapir, 1924b: 152–53 (1949, 155–56).*

. . . If the Eskimo and the Hottentot have r adequate notion of what we mean by caus tion, does it follow that their languages are i capable of expressing the causative relatio Certainly not. In English, in German, and Greek we have certain formal linguistic d vices for passing from the primary act or sta to its causative correspondent, e.g., English *fall, to fell*, "to cause to fall"; *wide, to wide* German *hangen*, "to hang, be suspended *hängen*, "to hang, cause to be suspended Greek *pherō*, "to carry"; *phoreō*, "to cause carry." Now this ability to feel and expre the causative relation is by no manner of mea dependent on an ability to conceive of causali as much. The latter ability is conscious ar intellectual in character; it is laborious, lil most conscious processes, and it is late in d veloping. The former ability is unconscio and nonintellectual in character, exercises i self with great rapidity and with the utmo ease, and develops early in the life of the ra and of the individual. We have therefore r theoretical difficulty in finding that conce tions and relations which primitive folk a quite unable to master on the conscious plar are being unconsciously expressed in their la guages — and, frequently, with the utmo nicety. As a matter of fact, the causative r lation, which is expressed only fragmentaril in our modern European languages, is in mar primitive languages rendered with an abs lutely philosophic relentlessness. In Nootka, Indian language of Vancouver Island, there no verb or verb form which has not its preci causative counterpart.

Needless to say, I have chosen the concep of causality solely for the sake of illustratio not because I attach an especial linguistic in

rtance to it. Every language, we may con-
ude, possesses a complete and psycholo-
cally satisfying formal orientation, but this
ientation is only felt in the unconscious of its
eakers — is not actually, that is, consciously,
own by them.
Our current psychology does not seem al-
gether adequate to explain the formation
d transmission of such submerged formal
stems as are disclosed to us in the languages
the world. . . .

Trubetzkoy (1929), 1949: xxv.

. . . une étude attentive des langues orientée
rs la logique interne de leur évolution nous
prend qu'une telle logique existe et qu'on
ut établir toute une série de lois purement
guistiques indépendantes des facteurs extra-
guistiques, tels que la "civilisation," etc.
ais ces lois ne nous diront rien du tout, ni
le "progrès" ni sur la "régression." . . . Les
ers aspects de la civilisation et de la vie des
uples évoluent aussi suivant leur logique
erne, et leurs propres lois n'ont, elles aussi,
n de commun avec le "progrès" . . . Dans
istoire littéraire, les formalistes se sont enfin
s à étudier les lois immanentes, et cela nous
rmet d'entrevoir le sens et la logique interne
l'évolution littéraire. Toutes les sciences
itant de l'évolution sont tellement négligées
point de vue méthodologique que mainten-
le "problème du jour" consiste à rectifier la
thode de chacune d'elles séparément. Le
nps de la synthèse n'est pas encore venu.
anmoins on ne peut douter qu'il existe un
tain parallélisme dans l'èvolution des dif-
ents aspects de la civilisation; donc il doit
ster certaines lois qui déterminent ce paral-
sme. . . . Une discipline spéciale devra surgir
aura uniquement en vue l'étude synthétique
parallélisme dans l'évolution des divers as-
ts de la vie sociale. Tout cela peut aussi
ppliquer aux problèmes de la langue. . . .
isi, au bout du compte, on a le droit de se
nander, non seulement pourquoi une langue
nnée, ayant choisie une certaine voie, a
lué de telle manière et non d'une autre, mais
si pourquoi une langue donnée, appartenant
n peuple donné, a choisi précisément cette
e d'évolution et non une autre: par example
tchèque: la conservation de la quantité
vocalique, et le polonais: la conservation de la mouillure des consonnes. . . .

5. *Sapir, 1929: 211–14 (1949: 164–66).*

. . . Of all forms of culture, it seems that language is that one which develops its fundamental patterns with relatively the most complete detachment from other types of cultural patterning. Linguistics may thus hope to become something of a guide to the understanding of the "psychological geography" of culture in the large. In ordinary life the basic symbolisms of behavior are densely overlaid by cross-functional patterns of a bewildering variety. It is because every isolated act in human behavior is the meeting point of many distinct configurations that it is so difficult for most of us to arrive at the notion of contextual and non-contextual form in behavior. Linguistics would seem to have a very peculiar value for configurative studies because the patterning of language is to a very appreciable extent self-contained and not significantly at the mercy of intercrossing patterns of a non-linguistic type. . . .

. . . The regularity and typicality of linguistic processes leads to a quasi-romantic feeling of contrast with the apparently free and undetermined behavior of human beings studied from the standpoint of culture. But the regularity of sound change is only superficially analogous to a biological automatism. It is precisely because language is as strictly socialized a type of human behavior as anything else in culture and yet betrays in its outlines and tendencies such regularities as only the natural scientist is in the habit of formulating, that linguistics is of strategic importance for the methodology of social science. Behind the apparent lawlessness of social phenomena there is a regularity of configuration and tendency which is just as real as the regularity of physical processes in a mechanical world, though it is a regularity of infinitely less apparent rigidity and of another mode of apprehension on our part. Language is primarily a cultural or social product and must be understood as such. Its regularity and formal development rest on considerations of a biological and psychological nature, to be sure. But this regularity and our underlying unconsciousness of its typical forms do not make of linguistics a mere adjunct to either biology or psychology. Better than any other social science, linguistics shows by its data and methods, necessarily more easily defined than the data and methods of any other type of discipline dealing with socialized behavior, the possibility of a truly scientific study of society which does not ape the methods nor attempt to adopt unrevised the concepts of the natural sciences. . . .

6. *Bloomfield, 1945: 625.*

Every language serves as the bearer of a culture. If you speak a language you take part, in some degree, in the way of living represented by that language. Each system of culture has its own way of looking at things and people and of dealing with them. To the extent that you have learned to speak and understand a foreign tongue, to that extent you have learned to respond with a different selection and emphasis to the world around you, and for your relations with people you have gained a new system of sensibilities, considerations, conventions, and restraints. All this has come to you in part unnoticed and in part through incidents which you remember, some of them painful and some pleasurable. If the culture is remote from your own, many of its habits differ very widely from those of your community. No exception is to be made here for the peoples whom we are inclined to describe as savage or primitive; for science and mechanical invention, in which we excel them, represent only one phase of culture, and the sensitivity of these peoples, though different, is no less than our own.

7. *Voegelin and Harris, 1945: 456–57.*

Language is part of culture. Everyone acknowledges this theoretically and then tends to treat the two separately in actual work because the techniques of gathering data and making analyses are not the same for both. The result of this practical divorce of linguistic work from cultural investigation often means that the final linguistic statements and the final cultural statements are incomplete; or statements covering the ethno-linguistic situation as a whole are neglected.

8. *Voegelin and Harris, 1947: 588, 590–9*
593.

The data of linguistics and of cultural a
thropology are largely the same.

Human behavior, as well as (or rather, whic
includes) behavior between humans, is neve
purely verbal; nor, in the general case, is
non-verbal. Linguistics characteristically stud
only that part of a situation which we her
call verbal. Cultural anthropologists often seg
regate the non-verbal from the verbal, relega
ing the latter to special chapters or volume
(such as folklore), as contrasted with chapte
devoted to various aspects of material cultur
such as house types; one might infer fro
some ethnographies that houses are built
sullen silence. . . .

The techniques of linguistics and of cultur
anthropology are in general different.

Linguistic techniques enable a worker
state the parts of the whole (for any one la
guage), and to give the distribution of t
parts within the whole. This provides criter
of relevance: it is possible to distinguish shar
ly between what is and what is not linguisti
Such criteria are lacking in ethnographi
where culture traits are none too clearly di
tinguished from culture complexes and whe
a given segment of behavior may be regard
by one worker as an expression of culture,
another as an expression of personality; anoth
segment of behavior, thought to be entire
physiological (as morning sickness in pre
nancy), may later be shown to be stimulat
by cultural expectation. Accordingly, neith
the historian treating of past cultures, nor t
anthropologist dealing with present cultures
ever half as comfortable as is the linguist
excluding any datum as irrelevant. . . .

Cultural anthropology is dependent up
comparative considerations for finding its e
ments; linguistics is not. Linguistic analy
provides an exhaustive list of its elemen
(thus, there are between a dozen and a sco
or two of phonemes for any given languag
cultural analysis does not.

9. *Greenberg, 1948: 140–46.*

The special position of linguistics ari
from its two-fold nature: as a part of the s
ences of culture by virtue of its inclusion

e mass of socially transmitted tradition of
man groups, and as a part of the nascent sub-
ct of semiotics, the science of sign behavior
general. That language should be included
both of these more general sciences is no
ore contradictory than, for example, the
uble status of physical anthropology with
simultaneous affiliation with a physiolo-
cally oriented zoölogy and with anthro-
logy, the general study of man approached
th physically and culturally. Since lin-
istics faces in these two directions, it should
aware of the implications for itself both of
e semiotician's discussions of language and of
e general science of culture. Linguists have,
the whole, been more aware of their affilia-
ns with cultural anthropology than with
miotics, a state of affairs which is under-
ndable in view of the recency of the
miotician's interest in the general features of
guage. . . .

. . . Careful compilation of a lexicon is . . .
ield in which the linguist and ethnologist can
uitfully collaborate. To the ethnologist, the
nantics of the language of the people in
iom he is interested is a subject of considera-
e interest since it presents him with a prac-
ally exhaustive classification of the objects
the cultural universe of the speakers. For
rtain morphemes whose *designata* are not
nsually perceivable events in the space-time
the investigator the linguistic approach is
ucial. That this has been realized in general
ethnologists is evidenced by the liberal use
native terms which characterize magical and
ner ideological components of culture, a
actice which has resulted in the borrowing
the ethnographic literature of such
ords as *mana* and *taboo* into the European
guages.

The lexicon of a language holds as it were
nirror to the rest of culture, and the accu-
cy of this mirror image sets a series of prob-
ns in principle capable of empirical solution.
certain instances, notably that of kinship
rminology, this problem is a familiar one,
d has occasioned a number of specific in-
stigations. On the whole, however, the eth-
graphic problems presented by this aspect
language remain for the future. . . .

The unit of the descriptive linguist is a speech community, taken more or less widely, as indicated by such rough terms as language, dialect, or sub-dialect. The definition of this community is often undertaken in the introductory portion of a linguistic description where the people are named, and population figures and geographical distributions are given. In his choice of a unit of description the linguist resembles the cultural anthropologist who describes cultural norms valid for a circumscribed group of people, a tribe, community, or nation. Such a treatment disregards — and justifiably so for the purpose in hand — relations in two directions, one towards the individual, and the other in the direction of the exact determination of the membership in this community and the relationship of its membership to others whose speech show some degree of similarity to its own. This superorganic approach to linguistics I call cultural, as opposed to individual and social. Thus far . . . our discussion has been of cultural linguistics in the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic phases. . . .

Social linguistics, often called ethnolinguistics, involves in its synchronic aspect, a whole series of significant problems regarding correlations between population groupings as determined by linguistic criteria and those based on biologic, economic, political, geographical, and other non-linguistic factors. . . .

Social diachronic studies or historical ethnolinguistics is the phase of the inter-relationships of ethnology and linguistics of which there has probably been the greatest awareness. The correlations between linguistic groupings of people and those derived on other bases, notably physical and cultural, is a standard problem in historic research. Examples of historical ethnolinguistic approaches are the tracing of former population distributions through linguistic groupings, the estimate of chronologic remoteness or recency of the cultural identity of groups on the basis of degree of linguistic divergence, the reconstruction of a partial cultural inventory of a proto-speech community on the basis of a reconstructed vocabulary, acculturational studies of the influence of one culture on another by the study of loan-words, and diffusionist studies of single elements of culture in which points of primary or secondary diffusion can be traced by a consideration of the form of the words which often point unequivocably to a particular language as the source.

It is perhaps worthwhile to note the extent to which our analysis of language is also applicable to culture traits in general. Obviously the distinction between synchronic and diachronic is relevant and it is possible to study cultures either descriptively or historically. The distinction between the cultural, the social, and the individual approaches is also valid. If we adopt Linton's convenient concept of status, then the behavior patterns themselves are the results of cultural analysis, while the manner of selection of individuals for given statuses, whether achieved or ascribed, together with factors of sex, age, geographical locations, etc., are social as here defined. The study of personality variations in the carrying out of the patterns is part of the individual approach.

10. *Hoijer, 1948: 335.*

Culture, to employ Tylor's well known definition, is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." It is clear that language is a part of culture: it is one of the many "capabilities acquired by man as a member of society."

Despite this obvious inclusion of language in the total fabric of culture, we often find the two contrasted in such a way as to imply that there is little in common between them. Thus, anthropologists frequently make the point that peoples sharing substantially the same culture speak languages belonging to disparate stocks, and, contrariwise, that peoples whose languages are related may have very different cultures. In the American Southwest, for example, the cultures of the several Pueblo groups, from Hopi in the west to Taos in the east, are remarkably alike. Puebloan languages, however, belong to four distinct stocks: Shoshonean, Zunian, Keresan and Tanoan. The reverse situation — people speaking related languages but belonging t different culture areas — is illustrated by th Athapaskan-speaking groups in North America. Here we find languages clearly and unmistakably related, spoken by peoples o the Mackenzie area, the California area, and the area of the Southwest, three very differen cultural regions.

The fact that linguistic and culture areas d not often coincide in no way denies th proposition that language is part and parce of the cultural tradition. Culture areas resul from the fact that some traits of culture ar easily borrowed by one group from neighboring groups. In essence, then, the similaritie in culture which mark societies in the sam culture area result from contact and borrowing, and are limited to those features o culture which are easily transmitted from on group to another.

Language areas, on the other hand, ar regions occupied by peoples speaking cognat languages. The similarities in language between such peoples are due, not to contac and borrowing, but to a common linguisti tradition. Traits of language are not readil borrowed and we should not expect to fin linguistic traits among those cultural feature shared by peoples in the same culture area.

If whole cultures could be grouped genetically as we now group languages into stock and families, the culture areas so forme would be essentially coincident with languag areas. This is difficult to do, since much o culture does not lend itself to the precise comparison necessary to the establishment o genetic relations.

11. *Voegelin, 1949: 36, 45.*

A *culture whole* is to ethnology what single natural language is to linguistics. In th earlier ethnological and sociological theory *culture whole* was merely a point of departure.[14] Nowadays a given *culture whol*

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[14] [Voegelin's footnote] Witness theoretical discussions of the nineteenth century concerned with elementary ideas, independent invention or psychic unity of mankind, and cultural evolution; cyclic history theories of today are partly comparative in the nineteenth century sense, partly sequential (evolution and devolution of one culture in one area) Linguistic theory and method is also concerned wit sequential and comparative problems beside its mor recent concern with exclusively synchronic statements.

ıeld as a constant against which a particular
alysis or theory is tested; in a somewhat
rallel way, the *linguistic structure* of a given
tural language may be said to be what
ıerges after certain operations are followed.
Some writers jump from this parallel way
delimiting a single cultural community or
ingle speech community to either or both
the following conclusions: (1) that lan-
age is a part of culture, which is debatable;
) that the techniques for analysis of lan-
age and culture are the same or closely
nilar — this is surely an error.[15] It is obvious
t one does not find culture in a limbo,
ce all human communities consist of human
mals which talk; but culture can be, and
a matter of fact, is characteristically studied
considerable isolation; so also in even greater
lation, the human animal is studied in
ysical anthropology, and not *what* the
man animal talks about, but rather the
ucture of his talk is studied in linguistics.
hat he talks about is called (by philosophers
l semanticists) *meaning;* but for most an-
opologists *what* he talks about is *culure* . . .
f language were merely a part of culture,
mates should be able to learn parts of human
guage as they actually do learn parts of
nan culture when prodded by primatolo-
ts. No sub-human animal ever learns any
t of human languages — not even parrots.
e fact that *Polly wants a cracker* is not
en by the parrot as part of a language is
wn by the refusal of the bird to use
t of the utterance as a frame (*Polly wants*
. .) with substitutions in the frame. (For
three dots, a speaker of a language would
able to say *cracker* or *nut* or *banana* or
thing else wanted.) As George Herzog
phrased this, imitative utterances of sub-
nan animals are limited to one morpheme;
the parrot, then, *Polly wants a cracker* is
unchangeable unit. From this point of view, we can generalize: an inescapable feature of all natural human languages is that they are capable of multi-morphene utterances.

12. *Silva-Fuenzalida, 1949: 446.*

. . . When we hear the statement that "language is a part of culture," it is in fact meant that utterances are correctly understood only if they are symbols of cultural phenomena. This implies that since experience is communicated by means of language, a person speaking any language participates to some degree in the ways of life represented by that language. These verbal symbols are not loosely joined, but co-ordinated by means of a system that expresses their mutual relations. Language is thus the regular organization of series of symbols, whose meanings have to be learned as any other phenomenon. The implication of this is that as each culture has its own way of looking at things and at people and its own way of dealing with them, the enculturation of an individual to a foreign body of customs will only be possible as he learns to speak and understand the foreign language and to respond with new selection and emphasis to the world around him — a selection and emphasis presented to him by this new culture.

13. *Hockett, 1950: 113.*

Two recent remarks concerning the relation of language to culture call forth this brief protest. C. F. Voegelin (1949) labels "debatable" the usually accepted contention that language is part of culture. Silva-Fuenzalida (1949) does not debate the claim, but certainly misunderstands it; he says language is part of culture because "utterances are correctly understood only if they are symbols of cultural phenomena."

Voegelin's claim is flatly false; Fuenzalida's misunderstanding is unhappily confusing. We

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[5] [Voegelin's footnote] Because culturalists do
, in actual field work [operations, analysis], find
ure traits by asking what are "irreducible ways
acting shared by a social group;" rather, culture
ts found in a whole culture reflect the ethnologists'
nistication of comparative ethnography — of the
ı in which he works, or, more generally, of world
ıography. Besides the explicit argument supporting this in Voegelin and Harris, 1947, see also the Index references to Typology in Kroeber, 1948. Per contra, Gillin and Gillin, 1948, who equate *phonemes* and *culture traits,* without any critical reservations (p. 155): they say a culture trait is identifiable by being irreducible and cite a single digit (1, 2, 3 etc.) as an example of such a trait; what then are fractions and negative numbers?

may state succinctly what it means to say that language is part of culture, and prove in a few words why it is true . . . That our speech habits are thus acquired has been proved time and again: bring an X-baby into a Y-speaking environment and there raise him, and he will grow up speaking Y, not X. Therefore language is part of culture.

Since linguistics is the study of language and cultural anthropology the study of (human) culture, it follows that linguistics is a branch of cultural anthropology. It also follows that every linguist is an anthropologist. But it does not follow, by any means, that every linguist *knows* that he is an anthropologist, or that a linguist necessarily knows something about phases of culture other than language, or, for that matter, that every cultural anthropologist knows that language is culture and that linguistics is a branch of his own field, even if one to which he chooses to pay no particular attention. The historical fact is that there have been two distinct traditions, with differing terminologies, different great names and landmarks, differing levels of achievement, differing chief problems and direction of interest. Only two men (to exclude those now living) have so far achieved reputations in both fields, and of those two, Boas as anthropologist far outshadows Boas as linguist, Sapir as linguist probably somewhat outshadows Sapir as culturalist.

It is probably because of the separateness of the two traditions that we have the unfortunate habit of speaking of "language *and* culture." We ought to speak of "language *in* culture" or of "language and *the rest* of culture." From the fact that language is part of culture does not follow that we have, as yet, anything very significant to say about "language in culture" or the interrelationships between "language and the rest of culture."

14. *Buswell, 1950: 285.*

Surely it is not amiss to consider *a* language, as related to the body of science called linguistics, in the same sense as *a* culture, as related to ethnology. This Voegelin does, with the perfectly logical result that he can now speak analytically of language *and* culture *in terms of this abstract comparison.* That t relationship of language to culture is debatab is then the only reasonable way to state but only in the sense that "the *structure* [man's] talk is studied in linguistics." Ar " . . . for most anthropologists *what* he tal about is culture." (Voegelin, ms. in pre Proceedings, XXIX International Congress Americanists).

15. *Voegelin, 1950: 432.*

Speaking only in terms of scientific usag can it be agreed that linguistics and cultu and physical anthropology are coordinat The content descriptions of general cours in anthropology departments often specif these three main divisions of anthropolog just as the content description of a gener biology course might specify botany an zoology and bacteriology as the three mai divisions of biology. Because bacteria a classified as plants, and other microörganisn as animals, while viruses remain unclassifie in this respect, perhaps a biologist would n object to saying that bacteriology adjoin zoology as well as botany, thus parallelin the position of culture: adjacent to linguistic on the one hand, and to physical anthropolog on the other — assuming, of course, th phenotypic as well as genotypic traits are in cluded in physical anthropology. Whateve the majority opinion may be on the relation ship of language to culture, linguistic analys characteristically proceeds without referenc to the culture of speakers — even when dat on the culture of speakers are available. I most anthropologists really do think tha linguistics is part of culture, then it is a ver dispensable part; it does not keep the majorit from classifying the archaeological remains o particular preliterate peoples as the cultur of the people in question — despite the fac that their culture must, by definition, be pre sented without any linguistic data at all.

It is relatively easy to abstract linguistic from culture and to define linguistics withou reference to culture, as I have done; it i much more difficult to abstract culture an define culture or covert culture withou reference to language.

Olmsted, 1950: 7–8.
There is a good deal in [the 1949] article
Voegelin's that ought to evoke comment.
st, the fact that great apes can learn to
ve a car but not to speak is significant,
it in no way proves that language is not
part of culture. If this be the test of
ether something is a part of culture, then
ely Tylor's or Herskovits' definitions of
ture (to name only a couple of widely
epted ones) will straightway be shot to
ces as we amass a colossal list of things that
s cannot be taught to master.

That linguistic and ethnological techniques
not strictly comparable is one claim; that
ture traits and phonemes are not com-
able is another. Probably few students
uld disagree with the later claim. For the
neme is not a piece of raw data as are
st generally recognized culture traits; a
neme is something inferred from raw
a, a construct shown to have crucial lin-
stic value within the structure of the lan-
ge under study. The linguist, in determin-
the phonemes of a language, applies cer-
standard techniques that enable him to
cover and describe the linguistically im-
tant sound-units. He then may go on to
npare one structure with another, always
ng sure that he knows the relation of any
the phonemic units to the whole. The
ure trait (or anything like it) does not as
have the same status in ethnology. What
f crucial importance in one culture may be
illary in another. It is this lack of a handy
l indicating the structural value of data
lies at the roots of the deficiencies of
a comparative project as the Cross-
ural Survey. As Voegelin (1949) points
the status of phonemes is something in-
ent in the linguistic structure being studied,
, theoretically, a linguist who knew the
niques, even if he had never studied an-
r language, could study any language and
e up with the phonemes in a way that
ld satisfy any other competent linguist.
wever, the anthropologist, lacking any such
dard procedure for determining the rela-
ethnological value of each "culture trait,"
t needs call on his knowledge of other
ures in order to investigate, in a specific
ure, what has been found to be crucial in
r cultures. In this sense the ethnologist
is dependent on comparative techniques for the examination of any given culture, while the linguist is not.

17. *Taylor, 1950: 559–60.*

In all fairness to C. F. Voegelin, it may be questioned whether the phrase "language and culture" is any more vicious than, for example, "culture and society." Certainly, non-human societies without culture exist; whereas language and culture (or the rest of culture) are not found apart. But within the human species, society, language, and culture are concomitant; and it is hard to see how one is any less acquired or learned than the other.

Nevertheless, there is an important difference between language and the other universal aspects of culture: the latter lean heavily on precept — that is to say, on language — for their practice and transmission, whereas the rudiments of the former can be passed on only by example and imitation. Not until the child has gained some control of speech, by a process comparable to that by which a kitten learns to kill mice, can its enculturation progress far in other directions — this time by the instrumentality of language itself, and hence by a process unknown on the sub-human level.

Language has often been called the vehicle of culture; and there would seem to be no particular vice in distinguishing a conveyance from that which it conveys, even when in practice the two may be inseparable.

COMMENT

It is remarkable how fitfully anthropologists and linguists have discussed the relation of culture and language.

We have found no passages explicitly dealing with the subject in Jespersen's, Sapir's, or Bloomfield's books called *Language*.

In 1911 Boas (1) pointed out that linguistic phenomena are unconscious and automatic, but cultural phenomena more conscious. This distinction has become widely accepted. Boas went on, however, to suggest that cultural phenomena, such as fundamental religious notions (animism, supernaturalism, etc.) may in their origin have been equally unconscious, but have secondarily became a subject of thought and been rationalized into consciousness, whereas the use of language remained automatic. This second suggestion seems to have been developed little further, either by Boas or others.[16]

Sapir (2) in 1912 made much the same point as Boas: culture changes result from processes easily made conscious, linguistic changes are due to minute factors beyond the control of will or reflection. Sapir in his turn adds a second suggestion — which also appears not to have been developed — that with time the interaction of culture and language became lessened because their rates of change were different. Cultural elements serve immediate needs, and cultural forms reshape themselves, but linguistic elements do not easily regroup because their classification is subconscious.

A dozen years later, Sapir (3) returned to the issue with the point that consistent grammatical expression of causality may occur in languages whose associated cultures possess no adequate explicit notions of causality. Languages often contain "submerged formal systems" whose psychology is unclear and not closely related to conscious thought. This issue was subsequently revived in an opposite sense by Whorf and by Lee in their metalinguistic papers.

Trubetzkoy (4) in 1929 touched on the theme of the relation — "purely linguistic laws independent of extra-linguistic factors such as civilization." But he also submitted the claim that linguistics ought ultimately be able to give the reasons why particular languages followed one line of development and not others.

Sapir (5) returned to the subject in 1929. Language patterns develop in relative self-containment and detachment from "other types of cultural patterning." Linguistics thus has a peculiar value for configurative studies, including Gestalt psychology. It shows the possibilities open to the social sciences when they do not ape the methods or adopt the unrevised methods of natural science.

It is evident that up to this point there was fundamental consensus that language showed in a somewhat accentuated degree certain features, such as consistency and unconsciousness of patterning, which occurred also i lesser measure in non-linguistic culture.

Then there appears to have been a lull un 1945, when two papers, by Bloomfield (6) ar by Voegelin and Harris (7) reopened t subject: "Every language serves as the bear of a culture" and "Language is part of culture These were followed by interrelated stat ments (8–16) by Voegelin and Harris, Green berg, Hoijer, Voegelin (11, 15), Silva-Fuenz lida, Hockett, Buswell, Olmsted, and Taylo Voegelin partly reversed his former positio with Harris, at least to the extent of speakin of language as not "merely a part of culture (11) and suggesting that they are "coordinate (15); and was bluntly contradicted by Hocke (13). As of early 1951, the discussion is st in progress, and promises to be fruitful of i creased sharpening of concepts. Greenberg appraisal is particularly broad: he specifical considers semiotic aspects, and he recogniz cultural or superorganic, social, and individu approaches or emphases as valid in linguisti as well as in cultural anthropology. His me tion of language and "the rest of culture" typical of the position, with various shading of most of the participants in the discussio It is evident that culture has been used in tw senses, each usually implicit in its context a validated there: culture including languag and culture excluding language. It is al clear that language is the most easily separab part or aspect of total culture, that its pr cesses are the most distinctive, and that t methods of linguistics are also the most d tinctive as well as the best defined in the soc sciences. What the "cultural" equivalent phonemes, or the linguistic equivalent "cultural traits," may be has not yet becom apparent: it may be unanswerable until t question is reformulated. Similar obscurit remain unresolved as to the conceptual re tion or non-relation of cultural and orga concepts (culture trait, culture whole, speci genus, or family, ecological assemblage faunistic area). Underlying the problem, a in a sense constituting it, is the fact, as Voege (15) says, that it is obviously easier to abstra linguistics from the remainder of culture a define it separately than the reverse.

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[16] But see Lévi-Strauss, 1951. This article appeared too late to include in this section. We have referred to it in Part IV. It is one of the most arresting sta ments on language and culture ever published.

GROUP *f*: RELATION OF CULTURE TO SOCIETY, INDIVIDUALS, ENVIRONMENT, AND ARTIFACTS

. *Wissler, 1916: 200–01.*

. . . when we are dealing with phenomena hat belong to original nature, we are quite ight in using psychological and biological nethods; but the moment we step over into ultural phenomena we must recognize its *sic*] historical nature . . . . We often read hat if cultural phenomena can be reduced to erms of association of ideas, motor elements, tc., there remains but to apply psychological rinciples to it [*sic*] to reveal its causes. This is vain hope. All the knowledge of the mechnism of association in the world will not tell s why any particular association is made by particular individual, will not explain the nvention of the bow, the origin of exogamy, r of any other trait of culture except in terms hat are equally applicable to all.

. *Marett, 1920: 11–13* (cf. *d*–1).

It is quite legitimate to regard culture, or ocial tradition, in an abstract way as a tissue f externalities, as a robe of many colors woven n the loom of time . . . . Moreover, for certain purposes, which in their entirety may be alled sociological, it is actually convenient thus o concentrate on the outer garb. In this case, ndeed, the garb may well at first sight seem o count for everything, for certainly a man aked of all culture would be no better than forked radish . . . Human history [nevertheess] is no Madame Tussaud's show of decrated dummies. It is instinct with purposive novement through and through . . . .

According to the needs of the work lying earest to our hand, let us play the sociologist r the psychologist, without prejudice as regards ultimate explanations. On one point nly I would insist, namely that the living nust be studied in its own right and not by neans of methods borrowed from the study f the lifeless. If a purely sociological treatnent contemplates man as if there were no ife in him, there will likewise be no life in it. The nemesis of a deterministic attitude towards istory is a deadly dullness.

3. *Ogburn, 1922: 48.*

Kroeber has recently made an attempt to show that the subject matter of sociology is culture, apparently relatively free from any consideration of the organic factor. His attempt is quite bold considering the agreement existing as to the nature of society and the acceptance of society as the subject matter of sociology, and is also significant because of his logical and consistent analysis which sets forth the importance of culture as a subject of science. Briefly, his thesis flows from his classification of sciences according to planes, the inorganic, the vital organic, the mental organic, and the superorganic.

4. *Case, 1924a: 106.*

Environment and race . . . may be regarded as in a sense original, with culture emerging from [their] interaction . . . . The factor thus derived from the two preceding becomes itself an active member of a triumvirate of forces, whose interaction constitutes the process known as . . . *social evolution* or "civilization."

5. *Kroeber, 1928: 331 (1931: 476).*

The kite, the manner of manipulating the marbles, the cut of a garment, the tipping of the hat, remain as cultural facts after every physiological and psychological consideration of the individuals involved has been exhausted.

6. *Sapir, 1931: 658 (1949: 365).*

The word custom is used to apply to the totality of behavior patterns which are carried by tradition and lodged in the group, as contrasted with the more random personal activities of the individual . . . . Custom is a variable common sense concept which has served as the matrix for the development of the more refined and technical anthropological concept of culture. It is not as purely denotative and objective a term as culture and has a slightly more affective quality indicated by the fact that one uses it more easily to refer to geographically remote, to primitive or to bygone societies than to one's own.

7. *Sapir (1932), 1949: 515–16.*

The so-called culture of a group of human beings, as it is ordinarily treated by the cultural anthropologist, is essentially a systematic list of all the socially inherited patterns of behavior which may be illustrated in the actual behavior of all or most of the individuals of the group. The true locus, however, of these processes which, when abstracted into a totality, constitute culture is not in a theoretical community of human beings known as society, for the term "society" is itself a cultural construct which is employed by individuals who stand in significant relations to each other in order to help them in the interpretation of certain aspects of their behavior. The true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and, on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions. Every individual is, then, in a very real sense, a representative of at least one subculture which may be abstracted from the generalized culture of the group of which he is a member. Frequently, if not typically, he is a representative of more than one subculture, and the degree to which the socialized behavior of any given individual can be identified with or abstracted from the typical or generalized culture of a single group varies enormously from person to person.

It is impossible to think of any cultural pattern or set of cultural patterns which can, in the literal sense of the word, be referred to society as such. There are no facts of political organization or family life or religious belief or magical procedure or technology or aesthetic endeavor which are coterminous with society or with any mechanically or sociologically defined segment of society . . . .

. . . The concept of culture, as it is handled by the cultural anthropologist, is necessarily something of a statistical fiction and it is easy to see that the social psychologist and the psychiatrist must eventually induce him to carefully reconsider his terms. It is not the concept of culture which is subtly misleading but the metaphysical locus to which culture generally assigned.

7a. *Winston, 1933: 5–7.*

Societal life is both social and cultural i nature. The social and the cultural are int mately related; nevertheless they are not th same. Inasmuch as it is necessary for the pu poses of this book to grasp the significance both approaches, separately and together, th distinction between the two may be analyze briefly.

Artificial attempts to distinguish betwee fields on the basis of word-splitting are n unknown phenomena in the realm of th sciences, physical or social. It is not the in tention to add one more literary discussion t the fairly large accumulation along this lin It is, however, necessary for the purposes o the adequate presentation of the cultural ap proach to differentiate, in so far as differentia tion is possible or necessary, between the soci and the cultural. Instances common to every day life afford materials for exemplificatio The social interaction which takes place be tween two individuals comes under the cate gory of the social, in so far as it pertains t their reactions to one another as individual But where their behavior is affected by th patterned ways of behavior existent in th society of which they are a part, their ow *social* behavior is influenced by a *cultura* factor. The introduction, the tipping of th hat and other formalized rules of politenes the methods of courtship and the channele ways of behavior toward each other of ma and wife, are all examples of patterned way of behaving. The interaction is social but i is affected by the cultural; it may largely coin cide or, as in the case of antisocial behavior it may veer away from the patterned ways o behavior laid down by a given society.

Turning to group behavior, we may tak the play groups of children. Children pla the world over. The chemical, the physical the biological, the individual, and the socia components in play may be separately studied But when the play life follows a definit pattern, it has become culturally conditioned The play of children with other children, psychosocial phenomenon, is affected by th turally imposed types of play, whether it in New Guinea or in New Mexico.

The interactions of individuals with others, individuals with groups, or of group upon up are exemplifications of social interac- n. But interaction in society takes place hin a cultural framework. This cultural mework influences human behavior and at same time is to be distinguished sharply m it, in order to analyze completely and re objectively the functions and structure society. . . .

. . Even in the social field there is still valent the error of considering behavior ltogether a matter of social relationships. ere is a cultural milieu within which social tionships always take place. This cultural ieu, while it has been built up as a result societal life, has become, *from the stand- nt of the present*, the framework within ich present social relationships occur and influenced. The relationships between hus- d and wife, between employer and em- yee, among members of a club or members church, are social or psychosocial. These tionships are affected by the particular erns of behavior developed in a given ety. The relationships not only involve al interaction; they also involve patterned s of behaving. Thus it is that, with the e biological processes, the same chemical cesses, the apparently same inherited psy- logical traits, the apparently same type of raction, i.e., that of a man and a woman, courtship and marriage systems, differ in arts of the world, and in differing affect erently the behavior of men and women ay, the United States, Siam, Sweden, and n. There are no laws in the physical nces, there are no explanations in the social nces on the purely social level to explain differing habits of peoples, so far as these ts are wide-spread and not individual liarities. Failure to recognize these facts s to an inadequate explanation of human vior.

Goldenweiser, 1933: 63.

. Man, being part of culture, is also part ociety, the carrier of culture.

9. *Forde, 1934: 466.*

The differences in character and content between particular cultures have, as has been said, often been ascribed to one or more of a number of general factors, and especially to differences of race and physical environment, or to differences in the alleged state of social or even psychological evolution. No one of these general factors can alone explain anything, nor can their significance be analyzed in isolation; for they do not operate singly or in a vacuum. They fail both singly and collectively because they ignore the fact that the culture of every single human community has had a specific history.

10. *Ford, 1937: 226.*

Culture is concerned primarily with the way people act. The actions, then, of manufacture, use, and nature of material objects constitute the data of material culture. In their relation to culture, artifacts and materials are to be classed in the same category as the substances, such as minerals, flora, and fauna, which compose the environment in which people live. Artifacts themselves are not cultural data, although, to be sure, they are often the concrete manifestations of human actions and cultural processes. The cultural actions of a people cannot even be inferred from them without extreme caution, for a number of reasons. Chief among these are the following: (1) instead of being a product of the culture the artifact may have been imported; (2) the process of manufacture is frequently not implicit in the artifact itself; and (3) the use or function of the artifact is not deducible from the object alone.

11. *Murdock, 1937: xi.*

Patterned or cultural behavior does not, however, exhaust the data available to the student of society. Realizing that culture is merely an abstraction from observed likenesses in the behavior of individuals organized in groups, the authors of several of the articles, especially those dealing with aspects of modern society, find themselves interested in the culture-bearing groups, sub-groups, and individuals themselves. To them sociology is not merely the science of culture; it is also the science of society. While it is perfectly legitimate conceptually to exclude all data save cultural patterns, and while this particular procedure has proved extremely fruitful in the hands of anthropologists and others, this does not appear to exhaust all possibilities of social science. In this respect our authors find themselves in disagreement with certain American sociologists who, discouraged by the apparently chaotic situation within their own discipline, have turned in desperation to cultural anthropology and have imported into sociology a whole series of anthropological concepts: diffusion, invention, culture area, etc. Applying these to phenomena in our own culture, they believe they have achieved an objectivity which their colleagues have missed. The followers of Sumner and Keller, who have been "cultural sociologists" for a much longer time — who have, indeed, always been such — do not, however, see any impelling reason why the sociologist should thus arbitrarily limit his field.

12. *Parsons, 1937: 762–63.*

On an analytical basis it is possible to see emerging out of the study as a whole a division into three great classes of theoretical systems. They may be spoken of as the systems of nature, action and culture . . . . The culture systems are distinguished from both the others in that they are *both* non-spatial and a-temporal. They consist, as Professor Whitehead says, of *eternal* objects, in the strict sense of the term eternal, of objects not of indefinite duration but to which the category of time is not applicable. They are not involved in "process."

13. *Plant, 1937: 13, fn. 4.*

The terms environment, milieu, and cultural pattern are used interchangeably in this volume.

14. *Bierstedt, 1938: 211.*

The social group is the culture, artifacts and traits are its attributes.

[This bases on the passage from Wallis cited as III–*a*–5. Bierstedt asks: What is this "more than the sum" of Wallis? And answers: Thi "more," the functioning dynamic unit, is th people who possess a certain complex c traits . . . . The nucleus around which thes traits are grouped is the people who hav them. Then follows the statement above.]

15. *Kardiner, 1939: 7.*

When we have collected, described, an catalogued all its institutions, we have th description of a culture. At this point w find Linton's differentiation between a societ and a culture very useful: a society is a pei manent collection of human beings; the institu tions by which they live together are thei culture.

16. *Rouse, 1939: 16, 18, 19.*

. . . culture cannot be inherent in the arti facts. It must be something in the relationshi between the artifacts and the aborigines wh made and used them. It is a pattern of sig nificance which the artifacts have, not th artifacts themselves.

Culture, then, is merely a single one of group of factors which influence the artisan procedure in making an artifact . . . . Cultur may be the most important of the interplayin factors. Nevertheless, it would not seem justi fiable to consider the artifacts themselves to b equivalent to culture.

The types and modes, then, express th cultural significance possessed by the Fo Liberté artifacts. In effect, they separate th cultural factors which produced the artifac from the non-cultural factors which are ir herent in the artifacts.

17. *Radcliffe-Brown, 1940: 2.*

Let us consider what are the concrete, ol servable facts with which the social anthrc pologist is concerned. If we set out to study for example, the aboriginal inhabitants of part of Australia, we find a certain number c individual human beings in a certain natur environment. We can observe the acts c behaviour of these individuals, including, c course, their acts of speech, and the materi products of past actions. We do not observe "culture," since that word denotes, not an

oncrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it
commonly used a vague abstraction. But
irect observation does reveal to us that these
uman beings are connected by a complex
etwork of social relations. I used the term
social structure" to denote this network of
ctually existing relations. It is this that I
egard it as my business to study if I am
vorking, not as an ethnologist or psychologist,
ut as a social anthropologist. I do not mean
hat the study of social structure is the whole
f social anthropology, but I do regard it as
eing in a very important sense the most
undamental part of the science.

8. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945b: 29.*
. . . human action is framed by four univer-
l dimensions: (1) physical heredity as mani-
ested in the human organism, (2) the external
on-human environment, (3) the social en-
ironment, (4) a precipitate from past events
vhich has partially taken its character at any
iven moment as a consequence of the first
hree dimensions as they existed when those
vents occurred, partially as a consequence of
he selective force of an historical precipitate
culture) that already existed when a given
ast event occurred.

9. *Kluckhohn and Kelly, 1945b: 35.*
. . . to have the maximum usefulness, the
erm [culture] should be applicable to social
nits both larger and smaller than those to
vhich the term "society" is normally applied.
Thus, we need to speak of "Mohammedan
ulture" in spite of the fact that various peoples
vhich share this to greater or lesser extent
nteract with each other much less intensively
han they do with other societies which do not
ossess Mohammedan culture. Also, it is
seful to speak of the culture of cliques and of
elatively impermanent social units such as,
or example, members of summer camps.
Often it may be desirable to refer to these
cultures" by qualified terms such as "sub-
ultures" or "cultural variants." Neverthe-
ess, such abstractions are inescapably "culture"
n the generic sense.

9a. *Kluckhohn, 1945a: 631–33.*
The third abstraction (social) arises out of the fact that human beings must adjust to other human beings as well as to impersonal forces and objects. To some extent these adjustments are implemented and limited only by the presence or absence of other human beings in specified numbers, at particular points, and of specified age, sex, size, and intelligence, relative to the actors whose action is being "explained." Insofar as the human environment of action does not go beyond such inevitables of the interaction of human beings with each other, it may be called "the social environment." It is imperative, however, to isolate a fourth dimension (the cultural) before we can adequately deal with the total environment of human action. This fourth abstraction arises from the observed fact that any given human interaction can take place in a variety of ways so far as the limitations and facilitations of the biological and impersonal environmental conditions are concerned. Some human interactions, indeed, do seem to be subject only to the constraints supplied by the field of biological and physical forces. Such interactions may be designated as "social" without further qualification. However, careful observations of the words and deeds of human beings make it certain that many of their acts are not a consequence simply of physical and biological potentialities and limitations. If the latter were the case, the possible variations within a defined field of biological and physical forces would be random. The variations within different human groups which have some historical continuity tend beyond all possible doubt to cluster around certain norms. These norms are demonstrably different as between groups which have different historical continuities. These observed stylizations of action which are characteristic of human groups are the basis for isolating the fourth, or cultural, dimension to action.

The concrete social (*i.e.*, interactive) behavior observed among human beings must in most cases be assumed to be the combined product of biological and cultural "forces." Often, then, the "social" and the "cultural" are inextricably intermingled in observable acts. However, some social acts are not culturally patterned. This is one reason for including a distinct "social" dimension. Another arises out of one certainly valid aspect of Durkheim's position. If we postulate that all ongoing human behavior must be in some sense adaptive and/or adjustive, we must posit social collectivities as the referents of some behavior systems, for these cannot be "explained" as meeting needs (biological or "psychological") of isolated human organisms. In other words, "society," like "culture," is an "emergent" with properties not altogether derivable from a summation of even the fullest kind of knowledge of the parts. Indeed — to go back to the framework of "determination" — it seems likely that culture itself may be altered by social as well as by biological and natural environmental forces. A plurality of individuals (of such and such numbers, etc.) continuously interacting together, produces something new which is a resultant not merely of previously existing cultural patterns and a given impersonal environmental situation but also of the sheer fact of social interaction. Suppose that two random samples, of, say, 5000 and 500 persons from a society possessing a relatively homogeneous culture are set down on islands of identical ecological environment (but of areas varying proportionately with the sizes of the two groups). After a few generations (or a shorter interval) one could anticipate that two quite distinct cultures would have evolved — partly as a result of "historical accidents" but also as accommodations to the contrasting number of actual and potential face-to-face relationships. Patterns for human adjustment which were suitable to a society of 500 would not work equally well in the society of 5000 and vice versa. Thus we must regard the environment of interaction (abstracted from the cultural patterning which prevails in it) as one of the determiners of alterations in the system of designs for living (culture).

20. *Fortes, 1949a: 57–58.*

The qualitative aspect of social facts is what is commonly called culture. The concept "structure" is, I think, most appropriately applied to those features of social events and organizations which are actually or ideally susceptible of quantitative description and analysis. The constant elements most usuall recognized in any social event by ethnographers are its cultural components; its structura aspect, being variable, is often overlooked. I should be emphasized that I am not suggestin a division of the facts of social life into tw classes; I am referring to the data of observation. "Culture" and "structure" denote complementary ways of analysing the same facts In the present stage of social anthropology al analysis of structure is necessarily hybrid, involving descriptions of culture as well a presentation of structure . . .

21. *Murdock, 1949b: 82–83.*

Since it is mainly through face-to-face relations that a person's behavior is influenced b his fellows — motivated, cued, rewarded, an punished — the community is the primary sea of social control. Here it is that deviation i penalized and conformity rewarded. It is noteworthy that ostracism from the community i widely regarded as the direst of punishment and that its threat serves as the ultimate inducement to cultural conformity. Through the operation of social sanctions, ideas and behavior tend to become relatively stereotype within a community, and a local culture develops. Indeed the community seems to be the most typical social group to support a total culture. This, incidentally, provides the theoretical justification for "community studies," a field in which anthropologists sociologists, and social psychologists alike have shown a marked interest in recent decades.

Under conditions of relative isolation, each community has a culture of its own. The degree to which this is shared by neighborin local groups depends largely upon the mean and extent of inter-communication. Ease of communication and geographical mobility ma produce considerable cultural similarity over wide areas, as, for example, in the United States today, and may even generate important social cleavages which cut across local groupings, as in the case of social classes. For most of the peoples of the earth, however, the community has been both the primary unit of social participation and the distinctive culture-bearing group.

Radcliffe-Brown, 1949: 321, 322.

Malinowski produced a variant, in which
lture is substituted for society, and seven
asic biological needs" are substituted for
e desires, interests and motives of the
rlier writers . . . .

[The] theory of society in terms of struc-
es and process, interconnected by function,
s nothing in common with the theory of
ture as derived from individual biological
eds.

Nadel, 1951: 29, 79–80.

s there any behavior of man which is not
society?" The (somewhat conventional)
aseology we used before, when we spoke
"man in the group," seems to suggest that
re is such behaviour. But since man does
t exist without the group (omitting Robin-
Crusoes, "wolf-children," and other
bious anomalies), this addition would seem
be either misleading or redundant. It is,
wever, not quite that. The qualification
meaning in that it distinguishes between
ms of acting and behaving which are part
the existence of the group and those which,
ugh occurring in the group, are not of it.
e distinction is essentially one between
urrent and unique behaviour. The forms of
aviour, then, with which we are primarily
cerned are recurrent, regular, coherent,
predictable. The subject matter of our
uiry is *standardized behaviour patterns;*
ir integrated totality is *culture.*

n this sense, then, social facts are two-
ensional. Like any two-dimensional entity,
y can be projected on to one or the other
ordinate, and so viewed under one or the
er aspect. If we wish to find names also
the dimensions themselves, they seem
gested by the familiar words *Society* and
ture. Society, as I see it, means the totality
ocial facts projected on to the dimension of
tionships and groupings; culture, the same
lity in the dimension of action. This is not
ely playing with words. In recent an-
pological literature, in fact, the terms
ciety" and "culture" are accepted as re-
ing to somewhat different things, or, more
cisely, to different ways of looking at the
e thing. And indeed, the very existence of these two words would seem to support our two-dimensional schema: categorizing thought, as expressed in language, has been led towards the same twoness-in-oneness.

The consistent distinction between these two concepts entails considerable linguistic difficulties. Mostly, when we speak of "culture" and "society" we mean a totality of facts viewed in both dimensions; the adjective "social" especially, for example, in the familiar phrase "social facts," or in the less familiar one, "things social" (which is my translation of Durkheim's *choses sociales*), has always this double connotation. Nor de we possess a convenient term summarizing this twofold reality as such save the clumsy word socio-cultural. I can, therefore, only hope that the sense in which the terms social and cultural, society and culture, will subsequently be used will become clear from their context.

Now, anthropologists sometimes assign to the two "dimensions" a different degree of concreteness and reality. Radcliffe-Brown, for example, regards only social relations as real and concrete, and culture as a mere abstraction; while Malinowski's whole work seems to imply that culture is the only reality and the only realm of concrete facts. Understood in so absolute a sense, both views are misconceptions. Social relations and the groupings into which they merge are as much of an abstraction as is culture. Both, too, are abstractions evolved from the same observational data —individuals in co-activity; but they are not, I think, abstractions of the same level.

COMMENT

Superficially this seems like a residual group, but it centers on the relation of culture to society and extends from that on the one hand to relation to the individuals who compose society and on the other to the environment that surrounds it.

Culture and Society. The statements on the culture-society relation begin in 1932 with a passage from a famous article by Sapir (7). The definitions in Part II that most consistently deal with this relation of society and culture constitute our group C-1, which see culture as the way of life, or sum of the ways of doing, by a society or group.[17] These way-of-life definitions begin only three years before the statements we have grouped into Section *f*. In the same year of 1929 Bernhard Stern published his important article explicitly distinguishing society from culture and pointing out conceptual deficiencies due to the ambiguity of using "social" to cover phenomena of both society and culture. It is evident that for a decade or more previously there had been half-conscious uneasinesses and stirrings against the conceptual haziness and undifferentiation of social and cultural phenomena;[18] but the explicit partition appears not to have come until 1929. Once it had been effected, it was natural that it should soon be reflected in discursive statements as well as in formal definitions.

Sapir, however, differed from the others here considered in that while he began with an interest in culture (including language) as such, and came to add a powerful interest in individual personality,[19] he was never interested in society, just as he remained cold to non-holistic or non-personality psychology. In our citation (7), he disposes of society as a cultural construct employed by individuals in significant relations to each other in order to help them in the interpretation of certain aspects of their behavior. The true locus of culture he places in the interactions of individuals, and subjectively in the meanings which individuals may abstract from their participation in the interactions. This leaves to the individual the primacy as regards significance; to culture, something; to society, almost nothing. Sapir goes on to say that it is impossible to think of any cultural pattern which can literally be referred to society as such. These drastic statements have had surprisingly little notice taken of them by social scientists.

Winston (7a) was exceptionally clear at an early period in distinguishing between the social and the cultural but seems to have had little influence on later writers, though he w a direct influence on Kluckhohn and Kel (19) and Kluckhohn (19a).

Goldenweiser (8) a year later than Sap speaks of society as the carrier of cultu Murdock (11), 1937, calls culture pattern behavior and has some anthropologists confi ing themselves to it, legitimately enough, distinction from society. He approves less those sociologists who "in desperation" ha applied culture and other anthropological co cepts to our own society. The Sumner-Kel school, however, he maintains have alwa been "cultural sociologists" — which last, least, seems indubitable to the present autho

Bierstedt (14), 1938, a year later misfi completely in saying that the social group is t culture, artifacts and traits its attributes. T comes down to saying that what *has* the c ture therefore *is* the culture. The route which Bierstedt arrives at this position equally hazy. Starting from Wallis's rema about culture (already cited in *a*–5) that c ture is more than the sum of its parts, Bierste confuses this "sum" with "the functioning d namic unit" through which culture comes be, and decides this is society. This is equi lent to saying that the locus of a thing is t thing itself! Beyond which is the question ready raised by Sapir in (7) whether the lo of culture really is in society as such or in dividuals. It is hard to understand th strange lungings of Bierstedt except as mo vated by an anxiety at the spread of the co cept of culture.

Bierstedt bases on Wallis (*a*–5), 1930, a springboard to leap to his startling conclusi that the social group *is* the culture. One cou of course also go on to regard the society *being* individuals, the social organization a social relations constituting merely *their* tributes; then, to assert that individual org isms *are* organized groups of cells with b chemical interactions, with psychosoma behavior as attributes thereof; and so on. T rt of reduction is evidently self-defeating.

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[17] The group, society, community, etc., also appear frequently in the class A or descriptive definitions, but more incidentally. The C–I class really *rests* on the distinction: culture is the way of a society.

[18] As there had to be, once Tylor as far back as 1871 had given a formal definition of culture that concluded with the phrase "of man as a member society."

[19] It is interesting, however, that in 1931 (*f*–6) Sa sees the behavior patterns "lodged" in the group "carried by tradition" — not by the individuals the group.

Another year later we find Kardiner (15) nplicitly equating culture with institutions, hich might pass as an off-hand, by-the-way efinition; but then going on to imply that it as Linton who discovered the distinction etween culture and society! It was perhaps om Linton that Kardiner learned of the disnction.

Still another year, 1940, brings us to Radiffe-Brown (17) and one of his several atmpts not indeed to deny culture but to betle it, to make it unimportant as compared ith social structure. As against observable uman beings and their observable behavior, cluding speech and artifacts as products of st behavior, he says that culture is not obrvable "since that word [culture] denotes, ot any concrete reality, but an abstraction" and "as commonly used a vague abstracon." But "direct observation does reveal" at "human beings are connected by a comex network of social relations" which may called "social structure." The study of this cial structure is "the most fundamental rt" of the science of social anthropology. his conclusion seems indeed to follow from adcliffe-Brown's premises that (1) culture only a vague abstraction and that (2) social thropology is the scientific part of anthroology, ethnology consisting merely of antiuarian non-structured facts or of speculative quences of such facts. The partiality of the cond of these premises is sufficiently evident require no refutation at this date. The first emise does need correction, because while is true that culture must be regarded as an straction in that its recognition involves ore than sense impressions,[20] the same is of urse true of social relations or structure. A nship relation or an incest barrier is no more bservable" than a myth or a property valuaon: social structure is inferred or abstracted om behavior no more and no less than are stoms. Radcliffe-Brown slides over this entical conceptual status, partly by first eling culture as vague, and partly by then mediately saying that the complex network of social relations is "revealed" by "direct observation"; whereas of course it is revealed by direct observation plus inquiry and inference that generalize and abstract, exactly as customs and beliefs are revealed. Certainly no complex network of structure, social or otherwise, is ascertainable by direct sensory observation. Radcliffe-Brown has cajoled himself into the belief that his social structure rests on a legitimate foundation of observable reality that the vague and spuriously abstract thing called culture lacks. Viewed historically even in 1940, and of course more so today, Radcliffe-Brown is conducting a rearguard action against the advance of the concept of culture.

Radcliffe-Brown's 1949 statement (22) is essentially contrastive of his own position with Malinowski's. It is true that the two have little in common but use of function: Malinowski does deal with culture and his explanatory biological or psychosomatic needs reside in individual men, not in society. Radcliffe-Brown deals with society in terms of its structure, process, and function.

Fortes (20), 1949, makes a curious distinction between culture and structure. Culture is the qualitative aspect of "social facts"; structure, those analyzed quantitatively (!). Most often recognized are the constant elements that constitute culture; the structural aspect is "variable and often overlooked." Culture and structure are not classes of social facts but complementary ways of analyzing them. —This is a most puzzling statement. Culture and structure are obviously not complementary concepts. There is no apparent reason why qualities should be permanent and structure variable. The two terms are evidently being used by Fortes with some unusual or private meaning; or at least one of them is. Can it be that he means by culture what it generally means, or at least its forms, norms, and values, and that his "structure" designates the individual and personal variability in social adherence to cultural norms? This would make an intelligible concept; but what has it to do with "structure"?[21]

Nadel (23), 1951, another British social anthropologist, voices a position not far from our own. To paraphrase: society and culture are different abstractions from data of the same order; society emphasizes "the dimension of relationships and groupings"; a culture is a system of patterns of behavior modalities. We would only make explicit two small reservations. First, the patterns *for* such relationships and groupings are cultural. Second, the anthropologist abstracts not only from "action" (including, of course, verbal acts) but also from the products of patterned action (i.e., artifacts).

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[20] Specifically, a selection of aspects of sense imessions that have a common feature. This is, of urse, the differentia of abstraction (etymologically: rawing away from").

[21] As a pupil of Radcliffe-Brown, and as editor of the 1949 volume of studies presented to Radcliffe-Brown, in the pages immediately preceding our citation from his own essay in that book, Fortes ques-

Kluckhohn and Kelly (19), 1945, take for granted the correspondence of societies and cultures and point out that just as there are societies greater and smaller than the customary units of tribes, communities, and nations, so cultures also range in size from that of Mohammedanism down to the sub-cultures of say cliques or summer camps.[22] Murdock, however (21), 1949, is inclined to regard the community as the seat of social control and as therefore the "most typical" social group to support a total culture. By community he seems to mean the group in which interpersonal relations are still largely, or at least potentially, face-to-face. This is true for tribes, is only partly true for peasant-like communities, and mostly does not apply in modern urbanized or semi-urbanized nations. Even in peasant communities the army, the church, taxes, trials, railroads, and posts, at least part of fashions, news, and sentiments, exist on a national and not at all primarily on a face-to-face scale. The church edifice and the pastor may be closely linked into the communal set-up, but dogma, ritual, the forms of marriage, the selection of the priest are at least nationwide and often super-nationwide. Undoubtedly greater intimacy, warmth, and holistic integration attach to the community, in the sense of the Toennies Gemeinschaft, than to any Gesellschaft organization. On the other
hand, cultural totalities of national and supe
national scope can contain a far greater variet
of content and attain to achievements of mo
profundity and intensity. There may we
have existed more cultures limited to tribe
in the history of mankind, than those of n
tional size. Also no doubt most nations ar
historically, confluences of communities, an
communities continue to persist in them. Y
it is also obvious that in societies like our ow
or the Russian, or even in the Roman Empi
or in Egypt of four thousand years ago, th
total culture was of an intricacy, richness, an
effectivenes that could not possibly have bee
supported by any face-to-face community.

Parsons' position (12), 1937, is expresse
so that it might logically be considered eithe
here or in the culture-individual discussio
that follows. Of Parsons' great theoretic
"systems of nature, action, and culture" w
take the middle one to mean "social action
or what others would call society or orga
ized interpersonal relations viewed as an a
tivity which possesses structure. This co
ception of society is Parsons' special contribu
tion to social theory, but, in the framewor
of our present monograph that deals wit
culture, his concept of society, however im
portant, is obviously of only marginal co
cern. More relevant is his assertion that cu
ture systems are distinguished from natur
and action systems in being non-spatial and a
temporal, consisting of "eternal objects" t
which the category of time is not applicabl
and which are not involved in process. W
take it that this means that the essential thing
in culture are its forms and that these *can* b
viewed timelessly. For instance a religion o
an æsthetic product or a language can be ex
amined in terms of itself for its qualities o
values or the integration of these; or severa
religions, arts, or languages can be compare
for their relative development of qualitie

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tions the validity of another distinction made by Radcliffe-Brown in his 1940 article (beyond the distinction just discussed by us), namely between "structure as an actually existing concrete reality" and general or normal "structural form." Fortes, like ourselves, challenges the dictum that structure is immediately visible in concrete reality, pointing out, again like ourselves, that it is discovered by com-
parison, induction, and analysis, in other words, "b
abstraction from concrete reality" (1949, p. 56).
is in going on from this finding that Fortes sets up hi
new differentiation of culture from quantitativel
viewed "structure," as a suggested replacement o
Radcliffe-Brown's.

[22] See also Kroeber, 1951b, p. 282.

is we agree to; but we also hold that it is
t the only or necessary way in which cul-
re can be approached. Particular cultures
occur in particular places and at particular
nes, and their interconnection in space and
ne and content and form can be studied as
ell as their abstracted forms alone. That is
leed what culture history is.

We suspect that the real crux of Parsons'
tement lies in his assertion that culture sys-
ns are not involved in *process*. To this we
ould subscribe: culture is obviously not only
way of behavior but also a product of hu-
n beings. Its cause in the modern sense of
word, equivalent to the Aristotelian ef-
ient cause, is the actions of men — human
havior, in contemporary phraseology. No
ount of analysis or comparison of cultural
ms *per se* will yield understanding of the
ecific *causes* of the particular forms. Aris-
le would have called the forms of cultural
enomena, or at any rate the relationships of
h forms, their formal causes. These are not
oductive of what we call process; though
y are involved in it. Existing culture is un-
ubtedly determinative of subsequent cul-
e in that it normally enters into its consti-
ion to a high degree. It is thus an almost
scapable precondition as well as constituent
any arising culture. In Aristotelian parlance
lier culture could quite properly be called
material cause of subsequent culture. But
t again is not "cause" in the modern scien-
c sense: it is only conditioning material on
ich human activity — itself largely deter-
ned by previous human activity conditioned
culture — impinges and operates as effi-
nt agent. We thus agree with Parsons that
rocess in culture means its continuing con-
te causation, this does not reside in the cul-
e itself but in the actions or behavior of
n.

How far it is proper and useful to designate
behavior as specifically "social" action,
to put it into a "system" contrasted with
t of nature is another matter. Human behavior is rooted in organic structure and function, which can surely not be left out of "nature": human action is by no means all social or concerned wholly with interrelations of persons. And on the other hand, even after we have admitted that culture as such is not concrete cause, we have only to abstract in imagination out from almost any situation of social action all the present and past culture that is actually involved in it, is phenomenally enmeshed with it, to realize how relatively barren of significance the remainder of pure social action would mostly be. Culture can be conceded to be literally a product, and yet the claim be maintained that cultureless social action, like a human nature not steeped in culture, would be phenomenally a fiction and operationally nearly empty.

Parsons' more recent position as evidenced in his 1949 definition (II–B–19) has moved in the anthropological direction. However, a still more recent work[23] shows a strong disposition to restrict culture to values or to "symbol systems." He, together with Edward Shils (also a sociologist), agrees that there is no such thing as either personality or social system without culture. But he maintains that personalities and social systems are "concrete systems," whereas he regards culture as an organization of symbols in abstraction from "the other components of action, specifically the motivational and non-symbolic situational components."

Our own view is that "social system" or "social structure," "personality," and "culture" are all abstractions on about the same level. To a large degree, as we have indicated earlier, they all depart from the same order of data, and the distinction rests primarily in the focus of interest and type of question asked (i.e., "frame of reference"). If one thinks of "a society" (*not* a "social system" or a "social structure") as a specific group of individuals who interact with each other more than with "outsiders,"[24] then, of course, "a

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[3] Parsons, *et al.*, 1951.

[4] This may mean the people of another com-
ity (locality differentiation), another tribe or
on ("political" differentiation), people of an-
r speech (linguistic differentiation), or any com-
tion of these criteria. The size of unit taken as "a society" can properly vary with the problem. But frequency of interaction is always closely correlated with in-group, out-group feeling, though this correlation may have negative as well as positive aspects.

society" is more concrete than "a culture." It is also possible and legitimate to distinguish "the social" from "the cultural" by pointing to facts that are not culturally patterned but which yet influence social (i.e., interactive) life. One may instance such phenomena as population density, the location of a group, and others (cf. III-*f*-19 and III-*f*-19a). Finally, a plurality of individuals in more or less continuous interaction produces something new which is a product of that interaction and not merely a perpetuation of pre-existing cultural patterns. *Cultural* factors influence the greater part of social behavior but *social* factors in their turn modify culture and create new culture.

In Parsons' new book *The Social System* one also sees the tendency, shared by certain other American sociologists and many British social anthropologists, to restrict culture to normative, idea, and symbolic elements. It will be well to quote at some length:[25]

> Culture . . . consists . . . in patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of action, internalized components of the personalities of individualized actors and institutionalized patterns of social systems . . . .
>
> . . . cultural elements are elements of patterned order which mediate and regulate communications and other aspects of the mutuality of orientations in interaction processes. There is, as we have insisted, always a normative aspect in the relation of culture to the motivational components of action; the culture provides *standards* of selective orientation and ordering.
>
> The most fundamental starting point for the classification of cultural elements is that of the three basic "functional" problem-contexts of action-orientation in general, the cognitive, the cathectic and the evaluative. It is fundamental to the very conception of action that there must be pattern-complexes differentiated with respect to each of these major problem contexts. These considerations provide the basis for the initial classification of cultural pattern types, namely belief systems, systems of expressive symbols, and systems of value-orientation. (p. 327)

In some fundamental respects (emphasis upon patterning, symbols, internalization of culture on the part of individuals), we are completely happy with this statement. Earlier
the same work (p. 15) Parsons also says t
culture is transmitted, learned, and shared
that it is "on the one hand the product of,
the other hand a determinant of, systems
human social interaction." These are po
with which anthropologists would ag
We can also accept Parsons' distinction
culture from social system as resting, am
other things, on the fact that culture is tra
missible. It is also clear in this book that P
sons treats the cultural dimension as an in
pendent one in his general theory.

Our incomplete satisfaction with Pars
probably arises from the fact that his sche
is centered so completely upon "action." T
leaves little place for certain traditional to
of anthropological enquiry: archæology,
torical anthropology in general, diffusion, c
tain aspects of culture change, and the l
What anthropologists call "material cultu
he deals with as "cultural objects" and "c
tural possessions," nor, again, does his
proach encompass certain aspects of the stu
of the products of human behavior w
which anthropologists have long been c
cerned. Finally, his version of the theory
action is, in our view, overly complex for
present state of the sciences of man. His
tricate system of categories cuts across a
we feel, dismembers the concept of cultu
In particular, we are resistant to his absorb
into "social systems" abstracted eleme
which we think are better viewed as part
the totality of culture.

Raymond Firth has just published a
markably clear and cogent statement:

> In the description and analysis of the group
> of human beings the most general terms used
> society, culture, and community. Each is commo
> used to express the idea of a totality. As abstracti
> they can give only a selected few of the qualitie
> the subject-matter they are meant to repres
> Naturally, then, the definition of them has ten
> to mark contrasted rather than shared qualities.
> types of contrast made familiar by German soci
> gists have drawn a distinction between the more
> poseful associations serving individual ends and th
> arising from less-well-defined principles of aggre

---

[25] The ensuing definition is not included in Part II because we found it necessary to close our survey of definitions with works published in 1950.

> . This has value as an analytical device, to classify al relationships. But at the broadest level, to er almost the complete range of association, this ual exclusiveness is misplaced. The terms represent erent facets or components in basic human situas. If, for instance, society is taken to be an nized set of individuals with a given way of life, ure is that way of life. If society is taken to be aggregate of social relations, then culture is the tent of those relations. Society emphasizes the an component, the aggregate of the people and relations between them. Culture emphasizes the ponent of accumulated resources, immaterial as as material, which the people inherit, employ, smute, add to, and transmit. Having substance, part only ideational, this component acts as a ilator to action. From the behavioural aspect, ure is all learned behaviour which has been ally acquired. It includes the residual effects of al action. It is necessarily also an incentive to on. The term community emphasizes the space- component, the aspect of living together. It lves a recognition, derived from experience and rvation, that there must be minimum conditions greement on common aims, and inevitably some mon ways of behaving, thinking, and feeling. ety, culture, community, then involve one anr — though when they are conceived as major tes for concrete study their boundaries do not ssarily coincide. (1951, 27–28)

'o sum up: the simple biological analogy 'organism and environment" is inadequate ause man is a culture-bearing animal. Some of three-way paradigm is necessary since have: (a) individuals, (b) the situations which they find themselves, and (c) the les or ways in which they are oriented to e situations. In terms of the intellectual sion of labor which has generally been ered to during this century the study of vidual organisms and their motivations has n the province of psychology and biology. ofar as sociology has had a distinct concep- field, it has been that of investigation of situation. Cultural anthropology has been ling with the modes of orientation to the ation. How the individual is oriented to situation is in the concrete sense "within" actor but not in the analytic sense, for dal orientations cannot, by definition, be ived from observing and questioning a single individual — they are culture. It is clear that these three points of the triangle are statements of foci in a broader frame of reference; they are not independent but each has implications for the other. For example, culture is not motivation but it affects motivation and likewise is part of the individual's "definition of the situation."

Culture and Individuals. This is a briefer[26] group than the preceding.

Wissler (1), 1916, is of importance because he was trained in psychology and was one of the first anthropologists to consider relations with psychology. He makes the simple and definite and incontestable point that no amount of psychology as such will give historical answers such as why inventions and organizations or changes of culture were made when, where, and by whom they were made.

Marett (2), 1920, (cf. also *d*–1), accepts a parallelism of sociology and psychology, but warns against a sociological treatment of man and history done as if there were no life in the subject matter: such treatment is dead and dull. No one will dissent from this. Marett's remark about human history being "instinct with purposive movement through and through" is evidently intended as a reminder that history deals with live men who strove and tried. It is probably not to be construed as a claim that history itself, as an entity, has an immanent or God-implanted purpose.

Ogburn (3), 1922, is commenting on Kroeber's then recent first attempt to distinguish planes of phenomena reducing to each other in one direction only, but also containing each an autonomous component or at least aspect. It so happened that Kroeber at that time did not name a social level, but passed directly from the cultural ("superorganic") to the mental and thence to the organic and inorganic planes of phenomena. In fact, with all endeavor at "splitting" he was not yet conceptually separating cultural and social phenomena, being still caught in the then prevalent ambiguity of meaning of the word "social." Ogburn had been influenced by personal contact with Boas and was sympathetic

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The ensuing discussion should be linked with in the comment on III–*d*.

to the recognition of culture, but considered Kroeber's attempt "bold." It was certainly only half thought through.

The citation from Kroeber himself nearly a decade later (5), 1931, merely affirms the existence of cultural facts over and beyond their physiological and psychological aspects. It is worth remarking that a specifically social aspect is still not mentioned: the social facies was being included either in the psychological or the cultural.

Culture and Environment. Environment as a causative factor has been less in evidence in recent thinking than in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but has of course never been ruled out. We may begin with the latest statement, that of Kluckhohn and Kelly (19), 1945, which recognizes "four universal dimensions" framing human action. They are: organic heredity, non-human environment, social environment, and a historical precipitate which includes the effects of the three foregoing as well as its own selectivity. In more usual but looser terminology, these four dimensions are race, environment, society, and culture.

Case (4), 1924, already recognizes three of these four "dimensions": race and environment interacting to produce culture, and this interacting with them to produce — a tautological anticlimax — "social evolution or civilization." Progress thus gets itself smuggled in. Yet, from a sociologist, the omission of society is remarkable.

Daryll Forde (9), 1934, attributes culture (not human action as in Kluckhohn and Kelly's case) to the four factors of race, physical environment, society, and psychology. However, his point is not so much to distinguish these as to point out the fallacy of using any of them alone as an explanation, because all cultures have had specific, individual histories.

Plant's statement that he is using "environment, milieu, and cultural pattern" interchangeably could hardly have been made in
other than a specifically psychological wor
It is only in the fact of their all being imping
ments on the individual psyche that the
three are alike.

Culture and Artifacts. Clellan Ford (1
1937, and Rouse (16), 1939, both of Yale, o
with a psychological, the other with an arc
æological approach, agree that artifacts a
not culture. This is a position implied in son
of the definitions cited in Part II — tho
which emphasize ideas, ideals, behavio
though contrariwise artifacts are undoubted
implied in many other definitions, and are e
plicitly mentioned in several, such as A-
B-6, D-II-12, E-4, G-5. Ford's position is th
culture is concerned wtih the way people a
How people make and use artifacts is part
culture; the artifacts themselves are cultu
data but not culture. Artifacts stand in t
same category of relationship to culture
does environment. Rouse words it a litt
differently. "Culture cannot be inherent i
artifacts. It is the relationship between ar
fact and user, the pattern of significance
artifacts, that is cultural, not the artifacts
such.

Culture and Custom. Sapir (5), 1931, wh
apparently never gave a full-length form
definition of culture,[27] wrote one of his mar
profoundly illuminating articles in the Enc
clopædia of Social Sciences on "Custom."
is, he says, a common sense concept that h
served as the matrix for the development
the concept of culture, and remains somewh
more connotive, subjective, and affect-lade
The authors feel this to be a pregnant remar
which, if consistently kept in mind by all
us, would have obviated many deviations a
missteps in the understanding of culture.

Sapir does define custom in this article. H
says it is "the totality of behavior patter
which are carried by tradition and lodged
the group, as contrasted with the more ra
dom personal activities of the individual." W
feel that this definition is both common-sen
and precise: it hits the nail on the head.

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[27] His B-2, B-3, G-1 in Part II are brief as well as incidental.

ADDENDA

he two following passages are added to
nd completeness of documentation. They
e received when the manuscript was al-
ly in the hands of the editor and hence the
nments and subsequent tabulations have
been revised to include them. But they
, clearly enough, upon central issues
ched upon many times in the course of this
k.

vans–Pritchard, 1951: 17–18.
mong the older anthropological writers,
rgan, Spencer, and Durkheim conceived
aim of what we now call social anthro-
gy to be the classification and functional
ysis of social structures. This point of
v has persisted among Durkheim's followers
rance. It is also well represented in British
ropology today and in the tradition of
nal sociology in Germany. Tylor, on the
r hand, and others who leant towards
ology, conceived its aim to be the classifi-
on and analysis of cultures, and this has
the dominant viewpoint in American
ropology for a long time, partly, I think,
use the fractionized and disintegrated In-
societies on which their research has been
centrated lend themselves more easily to
ies of culture than of social structure;
ly because the absence of a tradition of
nsive field work through the native lan-
ges and for long periods of time, such as
have in England, also tends towards studies
ustom or culture rather than of social re-
ns; and partly for other reasons.
hen a social anthropologist describes a
itive society the distinction between so-
y and culture is obscured by the fact that
escribes the reality, the raw behaviour, in
ch both are contained. He tells you, for
nple, the precise manner in which a man
vs respect to his ancestors; but when he
es to interpret the behaviour he has to
e abstractions from it in the light of the
icular problems he is investigating. If
e are problems of social structure he pays
ntion to the social relationships of the per-
concerned in the whole procedure rather
than to the details of its cultural expression.

Thus one, or a partial, interpretation of ancestor worship might be to show how it is consistent with family or kinship structure. The cultural, or customary, actions which a man performs when showing respect to his ancestors, the facts, for instance, that he makes a sacrifice and that what he sacrifices is a cow or an ox, require a different kind of interpretation, and this may be partly both psychological and historical.

This methodological distinction is most evident when comparative studies are undertaken, for to attempt both kinds of interpretation at the same time is then almost certain to lead to confusion. In comparative studies what one compares are not things in themselves but certain particular characteristics of them. If one wishes to make a sociological comparison of ancestor cults in a number of different societies, what one compares are sets of structural relations between persons. One necessarily starts, therefore, by abstracting these relations in each society from their particular modes of cultural expression. Otherwise one will not be able to make the comparison. What one is doing is to set apart problems of a certain kind for purposes of research. In doing this, one is not making a distinction between different kinds of thing — society and culture are not entities — but between different kinds of abstraction.

b) *Infield, 1951: 512–13.*

It would seem that the first step in this direction would have to be a sociological definition of culture. Such a definition would have to specify the functional interrelations between the mode of interaction, or as Lewin would call it the "structural configuration of socio-dynamic properties," and both the aggregate of acquired meanings on the one side as well as the needs of individuals on the other. In this sense, it could be possibly formulated as follows: Culture is an acquired aggregate of meanings attached to and implemented in material and non-material objects which decisively influence the manner in which human beings tend to interact so as to satisfy their needs.

By "aggregate of acquired meanings" we understand something equivalent to what constitutes culture in the eyes of anthropology. The "whole of material and non-material values together with the vehicles of their implementation," as anthropology likes to define it, is a somewhat static complex. By substituting for values the term "meanings" we at once open the possibility of relating the cultural element to what interests the sociologist most: the mode of sociation. In this way, a place is also accorded to that factor which the natural science point of view tends to neglect, the active element in human nature. Acquired meanings are both those accumulated and transmitted by former generations, the social heritage, as well as those which the present generation makes actively its own, the cultural activities of the present. In this manner, the nature of the acquired meanings has a direct functional relation to the mode of social interaction. In its turn, the mode of social interaction is functionally related to and oriented toward the satisfaction of needs of the interacting individuals. Actually, like any true functional interrelation, the one pr
sented in our definition can be analyzed
starting from any of its terms. Taking
starting point, for instance, from the acquir
meanings, the analysis can show how, by w
of the mode of social interaction, they affe
the nature of the needs. Or, by starting fro
the needs — taking them generally as bei
of the kind that can be satisfied by acti
mainly for oneself or of the kind that can
satisfied by acting mainly together with othe
— it can be shown how they influence t
mode of social interaction which in turn d
termines the selection, acceptance, and cul
vation of specific meanings attached to m
terial and non-material objects. Finally, t
analysis can set out from the mode of soc
interaction and show how this interacti
forms, so to speak, a relay system betwe
meanings and needs. Wherever we start fro
it is clear that the sociologically relevant cha
acter of a given group's culture can be unde
stood fully only if the analysis is capable
accounting not only for the main terms of t
culture but for the functional interrelation
these terms as well.

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Part IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A: SUMMARY

WORD AND CONCEPT

HE history of the concept of culture as used today in science is the story of the ergence of an idea that was gradually ined out of the several connotations of an sting word. The word culture, in turn, s back to classical or perhaps pre-classical in with the meaning of cultivation or nur- e, as it still persists in terms like agriculture, ticulture, cult, cultus, and in recent forma- ns like bee culture, oyster culture, pearl ture, bacillus cultures. The application of ture to human societies and history was late apparently post-1750 — and for some rea- was characteristic of the German language l at first confined to it.

The Romance languages, and English in ir wake, long used civilization instead of ture to denote social cultivation, improve- nt, refinement, or progress. This term goes k to Latin civis, civilis, civitas, civilitas, ose core of reference is political and urban: citizen in an organized state as against the oesman. The term civilization does not oc- in classical Latin, but seems to be a naissance Romance formation, probably nch and derived from the verb civiliser, aning to achieve or impart refined manners, anization, and improvement. An Italian r-counterpart civiltà is as early as Dante; l Samuel Johnson still preferred civility civilization.

Thus both terms, culture and civilization, gan by definitely containing the idea of bet- ment, of improvement toward perfection. ey still retain this meaning today, in many ges, both popular and intellectual. How- r, in science as of 1952, the word culture acquired also a new and specific sense metimes shared with civilization), which fairly be described as the one scientific de- ation that it possesses. This meaning is that a set of attributes and products of human ieties, and therewith of mankind, which extrasomatic and transmissible by mechan- s other than biological heredity, and are essentially lacking in sub-human species as y are characteristic of the human species as it is aggregated in its societies. This concept of culture (and/or civilization) did not exist anywhere in 1750. By 1850 it was de facto being held in some quarters in Germany, though never quite explicitly, and with considerable persisting wavering between the emerging meaning and the older one of cultivating or improvement. In 1871 the first formal or explicit definition of the new concept which we have been able to find was given by the anthropologist Tylor. This history of the emergence of the concept within its existing terminological matrix is still far from clear in detail, but its main course can be traced.

The Middle Ages looked backward toward perfection as established at the beginning of Time. Truth was already revealed, human wisdom long since added to it; there was no place left for progress. The Renaissance felt itself achieving great things, but could hardly as yet formulate how these achievements differed from those of the past. Toward 1700 the idea began to dawn in western Europe that perhaps "the Moderns" were equalling or surpassing "the Ancients." To this daring idea several factors probably contributed: the channeling, constricting, and polishing of language, manners, and customs under the leadership of France; the positive achievements of science from Copernicus to Newton; the surge of a philosophy finally conscious of new problems; an upswing of population and wealth; and no doubt other influences. By about 1750 not only was the fact of modern progress generally accepted, but the cause of it had become clear to the times: it was the liberation of reason, the prevalence of rational enlightment.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In 1765 Voltaire established the term "the philosophy of history." An earlier and longer work by him on the generalized history of mankind, dating from 1756, was the famous *Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations.* This title pointed the two paths that led out from Voltaire. One emphasized the *spirit* of peoples and led to a sort of philosophical commentary or reflections on human history. In this tradition were the Swiss Iselin's 1768 *History of Humanity*; Condorcet's *Sketch of a Historic Survey of the Progress of the Human Spirit*, posthumous in 1801, and the final if belated culmination of the movement in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, also posthumous in 1837. In all these the effort was to seize the spirit or essence, the ésprit or Geist, of human progressive history. It is history as distilled deductively by principles; documentation is secondary; and the course of thought shears away from comparative recognition of many cultures or civilizations, whose inherent plurality and diversity tend to interfere with formulations that are at once compact and broad.

USE OF CULTURE IN GERMANY

The second path emphasized the "moeurs," *customs*, which are variable, particular, plural, and empirical rather than rational. Custom, as Sapir says,[1] is indeed a common-sense concept that has served as a matrix for the development of the scientific concept of culture. The best-known early exponents of this line of inquiry are Adelung, 1782, Herder, 1784–1791, Jenisch, 1801. The movement was essentially German; and the weighting was definitely historic and even in parts ethnographic rather than philosophical, though aiming to cover the entire human species throughout its duration. The titles of the works of the three authors mentioned all contain the term History and the term Humanity (or Human Race). Adelung uses Culture in his title, Jenisch in a sub-title. Herder puts Philosophy into his title, but speaks constantly of culture, humanity, and tradition as near-equivalents. Culture is defined as a progressive cultivation of faculties by Herder, as an amelioration or refinement by Adelung. But in context of usage, many statements by both authors when they use "culture" have a modern ring — not because Adelung and Herder had really attained to the modern scientifically generalized concept of culture, but because their approach was historical, pluralistic, relativistic, and yet aiming to cover the totality of the know
world of custom and ideology. The first us
of "history of culture" is by Adelung, of "cu
ture history" by Hegewisch, 1788.

The Adelung-Herder movement exper
enced a sort of revival a half-century later
the hands of Klemm, who began publishing
many-volumed General Culture History
1843, and a General Science of Culture
1854. Klemm's ability to generalize, let alon
theorize, was limited. He was interested in i
formation and he was industrious. He h
far less sweep and empathy than Adelung an
Herder. He describes instead of narratin
history begins to dissolve into ethnography
his hands. Yet his use of the term cultu
shows the drift of the times. The sense
"cultivating" has receded. There is a gre
deal about stages of culture. And there a
a number of passages in which the word cu
ture can be without strain construed in
modern scientific meaning — though we pr
bably cannot be completely sure that in an
of these passages Klemm did so construe
because he seems never to have given a defin
tion of the term. He probably had attained
at times at least — to the implicit recogniti
of the scientific concept; he certainly stood
its threshold. After him, beginning wi
Burckhardt, 1860, and going on through
series of historians, philosophers, anthropol
gists, and others — Hellwald, Lippert, Ric
ert, Frobenius, Lamprecht, Vierkandt, a
Simmel — there is no longer any question
wide German recognition of the scientif
concept of culture, whether defined or not

SPREAD OF THE CONCEPT AND RESISTANCES

Even more important, however, is t
spread of the concept from Germany to oth
countries. Danilevsky's "culture-historic
types" of 1869 are major cultures or civiliz
tions as surely as are Spengler's and Toynbee
Tylor explicity acknowledged his use of a
obligation to Klemm. In his 1865 *Research*
he had occasionally ventured on the term cu
ture, though he mostly used civilization. B
in 1871 he boldly called his major book *Prim*

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[1] Part III–*f*–5.

ive Culture and in its opening sentence gave he first, formal, explicit definition of culture. This may be set down as the recordable date f birth of the scientific concept, though the rocreation had been German.

Still, in the retrospect of eighty years, it is emarkable how slowly Tylor's formulation nd term were accepted. Two years before, Matthew Arnold had defined culture as the ursuit of perfection, characterized by sweet-ess and light. A generation or two later, a undred speakers of English would still have ccepted Arnold's definition to one that even new of Tylor's, directly or at second-hand. The Oxford Dictionary referred to Arnold n 1893, to Tylor not until the 1933 Supple-nent.[2] The first though still imperfect pene-ration of the scientific or Tylorian concept f culture into the world of dictionaries was n the Webster of 1929; and its earliest ade-uate recognition we have found in any general English dictionary is of 1947.

All in all, British scientists and intellectuals ave been more resistive than American ones o acceptance of the term culture as long as hey could get by with either society or civili-ation. Thus the phrase social anthropology was coined in England and is still used there when Americans would more often say cul-ural anthropology. Toynbee deals with so-cieties and civilizations, very rarely with cul-ures. The resistance appears to be stylistic, a natter of idiom, of distaste for a word usage first established in another language. Ameri-ans scrupled much less to borrow from the Germans.

France has been even more resistive than England. Civilization, with its implications of advancement and urbanization, is still the pre-ferred French noun used for culture, though the adjective "cultural" has more standing. In many situations the indeterminate word "social" continues to do service in France to-day for the concepts of both the social and the cultural, much as in Durkheim's day. It is not clear to what degree this old-fashioned and ambiguous terminology is a minor symptom or a contributing factor of a certain backwardness in spots of contemporary French theoretical thinking in the social and cultural field.

Outside these two countries acceptance of the term culture is universal and understanding of the concept wide: in Russia, other Slavic lands, Scandinavia, Holland, Latin America much as in Germany and the United States.

CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

Much as Tylor for a time wavered between culture and civilization and perhaps finally chose the former as somewhat less burdened with connotation of high degree of advancement, the two terms have continued to be near-synonyms to many students writing in English, both British and American. The concepts attached to the two words in usage have been close enough to make choice between them to a large extent a matter of preferential taste.

In German, however, three separate attempts have been made to *contrast* culture and civilization. The first of these, whose beginnings are attributed to Wilhelm von Humboldt, and which was carried on by Lippert and Barth, makes culture concerned with the technological-economic activities or the "material" sphere; but civilization, with spiritual ennoblement or enriching. This view found temporary reflection in American sociology in Lester Ward and Albion Small around 1900.

Next, Spengler used civilization to denote the final, petrifying, non-creative phase which was the old age or winter of his unique monadal, fate-charged cultures. This usage had wide temporary repercussions in Germany, but few echoes outside.

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[2] While Tylor long failed to influence the humanists and dictionary makers (Pt. I, 13, 14) with his definition and use of the word culture, he did quickly influence some of the men who were shaping anthropology. General A. Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers in two papers read in 1874 and 1875 uses the term freely, wholly with Tylor's meaning, and without defining it, that is, as if its sense were known to his audiences. See "Principles of Classification," pp. 1, 2, 3, and "On the Evolution of Culture" pp. 21, 23, 24 (3 times), 26 (twice), 31 (twice), 44; these page references being to the 1906 reprint by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, under the title: *The Evolution of Culture and other Essays*, edited by J. L. Myres (in which the places of original publication are cited).

Finally there is the Alfred Weber reaction of 1920 to Spengler, still maintained by Thurnwald as of 1950, identifying civilization with the objective technological and informational activities of society, but culture with subjective religion, philosophy, and art. Civilization is accumulative and irreversible; the cultural component is highly variable, unique, nonadditive. This view has found somewhat modified reflection in MacIver, Odum, and Merton among American sociologists.

The tenacity of these several German efforts to drive through to a distinction between culture and civilization is as marked as their variety of position. It seems almost as if, there being two words close in sense, a compulsion arose to identify them with contrasting aspects of the major meaning which they shared.

CULTURE AS AN EMERGENT OR LEVEL

Once culture had been recognized as a distinctive product of men living in societies, or as a peculiar, coherent, and continuous set of attributes of human behavior, it was probably only a question of time until the claim was advanced that culture constituted a separate "level," "dimension," or "aspect" of phenomena, analogous to the distinctive organization or patterning characteristic of organic phenomena in addition to their physico-chemical basis. C. Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution* of 1923 is perhaps the best-known work developing the principle of emergence, though wholly without reference to culture. Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity* — issued in 1920 — is the first book on the subject by a philosopher and has publication priority over Morgan but was evidently influenced by him. The autonomy of the cultural level was apparently first advanced by Frobenius as early as 1898 in *Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kulturen und Naturwissenschaftliche Kulturlehre*, and restated in *Paideuma*, 1921. It was of course completely assumed and asserted by Spengler in 1918. It is advocated by Kroeber in *The Superorganic* in 1917: even to a diagram showing superposed divergent or emergent levels. More recently, Warden among psychologists, and White[3] among anthropologists, have concerned themselves with culture as an emergent.[3a]

As between all levels, it is the lower ones that set the frame in which phenomena of superior level operate. The "laws" or forces of the lower level do not per se "produce" the upper-level phenomena; at any rate, these cannot be wholly derived from below; there is always a specific residuum, a sum of the parts, a combination or organization, that is of and in the level being considered. Thus organic processes of events conform wholly to physico-chemical process, but cannot be nonresidually resolved into them. Lower-level factors adequately explain certain constants and uniformities in upper-level phenomena, but they do not wholly explain, nor even describe, the distinctive properties specific to phenomena of the upper level.

Culture constitutes the topmost phenomenal level yet recognized — or for that matter, now imaginable — in the realm of nature. This of course does not compel the prediction that emergence into our consciousness of a new and higher level is precluded.

The danger in the construal of culture as an emergent level evidently lies in the consequent tendency to reify or hypostasize culture, to view it as a distinctive substance or actual superorganism, and then to assume that it moves through autonomous, immanent forces. Spengler certainly believed this; so did Frobenius, at least at times; and Kroeber has been flatly charged with the same errors by Boas, Benedict, and Bidney, besides incurring opposition to the concept of the superorganic from Sapir and Goldenweiser. Too few anthropologists have, however, participated in the discussion of this phenomenological set of problems to render it clear whether recognition of a cultural level or aspect necessarily compels the reification of culture as a substance containing its own self-moving forces, or whether is possible to take the first step and refrain rom the second. To put it differently, is the alue of recognition of a cultural level essenally methodological and operational, or is it nisleading because it must lead to substantificaon and stark autonomy? Sociologists have een of little help on this point because their pecific approach being through the social spects of phenomena, they tend to treat the ultural aspects as an extension or secondary, that the problem is marginal to them. hilosophers on the whole have shown no reat interest in the issue. This very fact, owever, suggests that the recognition of vels does not necessarily have ontological nplication, but is essentially an operational ew arising within empirical scientific pracce.[4]

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[3] White's general theory of culture has been discussed at length by one of us a few years ago (Kroeber, 1948b). With minor reservations the other author of the present monograph is in complete agreement with this critique.

[3a] See also Znaniecki, 1952, which appeared while the present monograph was in galley proof.

DEFINITIONS OF CULTURE

In Part II we have cited one hundred sixtyur [4a] definitions of culture. The occurrence these in time is interesting — as indeed the stribution of all cultural phenomena in ther space or time always reveals significance.

Our earliest definition, Tylor's of 1871, ems not to have been followed by any other r thirty-two years. Between 1900 and 1919 ctually 1903 and 1916), we have found only ; but for 1920 to 1950, one hundred fiftyven. In other words, the distribution is: in e first three-fifths of our eighty years, less an four per cent; in the last two-fifths, nety-six per cent. The long wait after ylor is particularly striking. The word culre was by then being bandied about by all nds of German thinkers; and one has only turn the leaves of the 1888–98 Old Series the *American Anthropologist* to find the m penetrating even to titles of articles — 1895, Mason on *Similarities in Culture;* in 96, Fewkes on *Prehistoric Culture of usayan;* in 1898, McGee on *Piratical Aclturation.* The point is that the word culture s being used without definition.

BEFORE AND AFTER 1920

The few twentieth-century definitions earlier than 1920 are also interesting, both with reference to the profession of the authors and to the class to which we have assigned the definitions.

1871	Tylor	Anthropologist	A–1, Ennumerative
1903	Ward	Sociologist	F–II–1, Ideas
1905	Small	Sociologist	D–I–1, Adjustment
1907	Ostwald	Chemist	F–IV–1, Residual
1915	Ostwald	Chemist	F–IV–2, Residual
1916	Wissler	Anthropologist	D–II–1, Learning
1916	Wissler	Anthropologist	F–II–2, Ideas.

For the period 1920–50 we submit a tabular list of definition groups or classes arranged in the chronological order of their earliest post-1920 definition, with mention of the author of this first post-1920 one, and citation of the number of definitions in each group during each of the three decades 1920–50.

It is evident that once a post-1920 definition with a certain new emphasis has been made, others in the same group follow pretty steadily, in fact usually increase in numbers. For the three decades (1940–50 comprising eleven instead of ten years) the total definitions are 22, 35, 100.

In contrast, the time gap between the seven pre-1920 definitions and the first post-1920 ones (within the same emphasis groups) runs from nine to forty-nine years and averages twenty-eight years. The length of this interval inevitably raises the question whether an isolated statement, so far ahead as this of all the rest in its group, can have been actuated by the same motivations as these; that is, whether in spite of formal or verbal resemblance to them, it actually "meant" the same — whether it was aimed at the same sense or was a chance shot.

For instance, when the chemist Ostwald in 1907 and 1915 defined culture as that which man alone among animals possesses, his statement is evidently *not* part of the same *specific* current of thought that led the sociologist

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[4] For a more extended discussion of "levels," see oeber, 1949.

[4a] Actually, if additional definitions in Part III, in tnotes, and in quotations throughout the monoph are counted, there are probably close to three hundred "definitions" in these pages. However, sampling indicates that the main conclusions we draw from the one hundred and sixty-four would not be substantially altered if we had retabulated to include every possible "definition."

DEFINITIONS IN PART II.

Pre-1920 Definition	First post-1920 Definition	By	Definition group, Emphasis on	Number of Definitions 1920–29	1930–39	1940–50	Total*
			A. Beginning 1920–29				
(1871)	1920	Wissler	Enumeration, A	5	5	9	20
—	1921	Park-Burgess, Sapir	Tradition, Heritage, B	6	5	12	23
—	1921	Sapir	Incomplete, G	2	2	3	7
(1916)	1925†	Hart-Pantzer	Learning, D-II	1	—	(13)	(15)
(1903)	1927	Sumner-Keller	Adjustment, D-I	2	5	9	17
—	1927	Willey	Product, F-I	3	6	12	21
—	1929	Wissler	Rule, Way, C-I	1	4	15	20
—	1929	Willey	Patterning, E	1	1	7	9
—	pre-1930	Tozzer	Habit, D-III	1	1	1	4
			B. Beginning after 1930				
—	1934	Roheim	Purely Psychological, D-IV	—	2	1	2
—	1935	Carver	Ideals and Behavior, C-II	—	2	4	6
(1903, 1916)	1937	Schmidt, Blumenthal	Ideas, F-II	—	2	6	10
			C. Beginning after 1940				
(1907, 1915)	1941	Blumenthal	Residual, F-IV	—	—	3	5
(1916)	1941†	Miller-Dollard	Learning, D-II	(1)	—	13	15
—	1942	Bain	Symbols, F-III	—	—	5	5

* Includes all definitions from Tylor's onward.
† Repeated, because of long interval 1925 to 1941.

Blumenthal to say in 1941 that culture is all non-genetically produced means of adjustment (F-IV-1, 2, 3). Ostwald was not thinking of adjustment, nor of its means; and he accepted culture as a property or result, rather than inquiring into the process that produced it.

Again, Small's 1905 statement (D-I-1) centers on attainment or promotion of ends, individual or social; which is characteristic of the psychologizing sociology of his day—vaguely psychologizing it seems in the retrospect of a half-century. But, beginning with Sumner and Keller in 1927, the emphasis comes to rest on a new basis, which instead of being limited to the subjectively psychological, is concerned with adaptation to total environment.

Similarly, in the emphasis-on-ideas group F-II, Ward's 1903 statement refers to ideas, but the central concept is that culture is a social structure or organism; to which there is then appended the supplementary remark "and ideas are its germs"—whatever "germs" may mean in this context. Wissler, thirteen years later, when he says that culture is a definite association complex of ideas, is undoubtedly trying to give a specific psychological definition; especially as his own training was largely psychological. Still, Wissler did not pursue this approach—in fact abandoned it for others. So it is as much as twenty-one years after Wissler that a continuing stream of definitions with idea emphasis (F-II-4 to 9. nine in number including variants) first begins to be produced, from 1937 to 1949. The half-dozen authors involved in this continuity evidently in part influenced one another, in part were responding to the times.

THE PLACE OF TYLOR AND WISSLER

The case of Tylor as a precursor is somewhat special. It was almost a half-century—from 1871 to 1920—before his earliest of all definitions had a successor in the enumeratively descriptive class "A." As usual. Wissler was first, after Tylor; anthropologists predominate among the successors; and Tylor's influence is traceable, sometimes even in turns of wording, to as late as Kroeber, Herskovits. and Thurnwald, 1948–50. The reason for this continuity is not only that Tylor possessed unusual insight and wisdom, but that he was deliberately establishing a science by defining its subject matter. That he made this definition

first sentence of a book shows that he was
nscious of his procedure.

et why Tylor was so long in being fol-
ved even by Wissler remains a problem. The
sons evidently were multiple. First, Tylor
s introducing a new meaning from a foreign
guage for an established English word, and
glish idiom was resistant. Then, concur-
tly, the older English sense of the word
ture was being given an ultra-humanistic
rpening by Matthew Arnold; and as against
literary significance, with its highly
rged connotation in a country where higher
ication was classical, a contrary effort in an
ipient science had little force. In fact, the
nes of Lang and Frazer suggest how
le extricated from belles lettres the new
ence of anthropology remained in Britain
more than a generation after Tylor.
en, the whole orientation of the evolution-
school, whose productivity began just ten
rs before 1871 and of which Tylor him-
formed part, and which led anthropology
of the fringe of philosophy, history,
graphy, biology, and medicine into an
onomous activity with problems of its own
the orientation of this evolutionary school
s toward origins, stages, progress and sur-
als, and spontaneous or rational operations
the human mind. Culture entered consid-
tion chiefly as an assemblage of odd cus-
ns and strange beliefs used to substantiate
broad principles advanced as to origins and
gress. In short, the assumptions as well as
findings of the "evolutionists" were
ematic and, except for Tylor, the men
mselves remained uninterested in culture
concept.

inally, it is probable that the influence of
as was a factor. As we have seen, American
hropologists were using both the concept
the word culture fairly freely in the
hteen-nineties, perhaps already in the
hties beginning with the establishment of
Bureau of Ethnology. Boas, coming from
rmany in the eighties, was certainly familiar
h both idea and word. However, Boas was
erested in dealing with culture, not in
tematically theorizing about it. He gave his
t definition of it at the age of seventy-two,
an encyclopædia article on the scope of
hropology. His first book, issued when he was fifty-three, was called *The Mind of Primitive Man;* his last, a selection from his articles and papers, chosen by himself at the age of eighty-two, he named *Race, Language, and Culture.* So far as there is a central theme in both works, it is that one cannot infer or deduce between environment, race, language, and culture; that spontaneous or inherent developments cannot be proved and must not be assumed, and that so far as they tend to occur they are generic and subject to variation or even suppression; that as regards human groups different influences can produce similar effects, and that causes are multiple and must be independently ascertained in each case with due regard to the specificity of its history. The upshot was a far more critical approach than had been displayed by any predecessor, and results that were positive as regards many particular problems, but as regards generalities were largely methodological or negative. Boas was interested in the complex interactions of culture, language, race, and environment; he was much less interested in the nature and specific properties of culture. As Boas in one way or another influenced almost all his successors in American anthropology, the result was that directly he contributed little to Tylor's attempt to isolate and clarify the concept of culture as such, and that indirectly he hindered its progress by diverting attention to other problems.

This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that Wissler, whose anthropological training stemmed from Boas, but who broke personally with him about 1906, by 1916 had offered two definitions of culture (D–II–1, F–II–2) and was the first to follow with definitions of different emphasis (A–2, C–I–1) in 1920 and 1929. Wissler was lunging rather than consistent in these tries. But it is evident that he was concerned with the problem of what culture was and what characterized it, more than Boas ever was; and the parting of the personal ways of the two men may have freed Wissler for this interest. As in so much of his other work, he was somewhat casual, imprecise, and perhaps unintense in his attack on the problem; but he possessed an exploratory and pioneering mind. Of Wissler's four definitions which we cite, all are the first of their class except for the precedence of one by Tylor.

THE COURSE OF POST-1920 DEFINITIONS

Let us revert to our tabulation. After the Enumerative class (A) of definitions launched by Tylor and revived by Wissler, the next to be initiated was the Historical one which emphasized Tradition or Social Heritage (B). "Tradition" goes back to Herder, who consistently used the term alongside Cultur and Humanitaet, almost as a synonym. Social Heritage of course *is* culture — the matrix in which culture as a technical term of science grew up, according to Sapir. Sapir himself and Park and Burgess lead off the chain in 1921; eight of the first ten definitions, to 1937, are by anthropologists, and seven of the remaining thirteen.

Passing over the Incomplete Definitions (G), and for a moment those that emphasize Learning (D–II), we come to those stressing Adjustment or Problem Solving (D–I). Here Small had pointed the way as early as 1903 with his stress on "ends," and it was the sociologist Keller, editing and continuing Sumner's work in 1927, that established Adjustment (or Adaptation in 1915) as a factor in culture. This is a characteristic sociological type of definition. Only four of the seventeen examples found by us emanate from anthropologists: in 1942, Clellan Ford, who was trained also in sociology and psychology at Yale, and who varied adaptations to problem-solutions; in 1946, Kluckhohn and Leighton; in 1949 Turney-High with maintenance of "equilibrium as a psychological organism" as a variant of adaptation; and in 1950 the British anthropologist, Piddington.

Our group next in time, beginning in 1928, with emphasis on culture as a Product or Artifact (F–I), is again dominantly the result of sociological thinking. Apart from the prehistorian Menghin's statement of 1934 that culture is the objectified, materialized result (Ergebnis) of spiritual activity, there are only four definitions by anthropologists — the la four, from 1948 to 1950.

A year later, in 1929, Wissler initiated t Rule or Way type of conceiving of cultu (C–I). With "way" close to custom, a again to tradition or heritage, one might e pect this formulation to come mainly fro anthropologists. It does: they made or pa ticipated in thirteen of the twenty statemen assembled.[5]

Patterning or Organization as an emph sized factor in culture (E) might be look for as also an anthropological view, in view Benedict's influence; but it is not so in origi Willey, Dollard, and Ogburn and Nimko are the only representatives from 1929 to 194 However, the emphasis is not yet sharp. T word pattern[6] is not used; correlation, inte relation, interdependence, system do occu With 1941 the anthropologists join in. Re field speaks of "organization," Linton of "o ganized" and of "configuration," Kluckhoh and Kelly of a "system of designs for living The word "patterned" appears only since 194 with Gillin and Turney-High. We believe, intimated in our Comment on group E, th the concept is likely to have greater weightin in the future, whatever the terms may be th will be used to designate it.

From 1930 to 1934 no new types of defin tions were launched. In 1935 Carver, an econ mist, made a statement that does not fit any our groups too well but is perhaps nearest o Ideals-plus-Behavior class C–II. Two emine sociologists, Thomas and Sorokin, and t philosopher Bidney, have produced the r maining five statements which we have c lated. "Behavior" is of course a mechani tically-charged term given its wide vogue post-World-War-I psychology. The old anthropologists spoke of activities, reactions, practices. Values or norms, on the other han have probably long been a covert constitue of conceptions of culture, which have on recently begun to be acknowledged.

In 1937 the anthropologist Pater Schmi and the sociologist Blumenthal independent

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[5] An additional definition of this type, discovered too late to include in Part II, is by the classical scholar and student of comparative religion, H. J. Rose. It is only a year later than Wissler: "Throughout, the word 'culture' is used in the sense of German Kultur, which it translates. That is, it signifies any way life distinctively human, however far from civiliz tion or refinement." (Translator's preface to Schmi 1930, p. ix).

[6] It does occur in Winston, 1933 (F–I–4).

vived an interest in ideas as a characteristic
mponent of culture (group F–II) which had
n dormant since the sociologist Ward in
o3 and the anthropologist Wissler in 1916.
l the remaining statements of the class, ex-
pt one by the philosopher Feibleman and one
the sociologist Becker, are from anthro-
logists.

Interest in culture being learned (D–II) has
o roots. One is old, and rests on the recogni-
n that culture is non-instinctive, non-
netic, acquired by social process, whether
it process be called tradition, imitation, or
ucation. This is reflected, as early as 1871,
Tylor's "acquired by man as a member of
ciety." The second interest is much more
cent, and is a reflection of emphasis on
rning theory in modern psychology. While
culture is learned, most cultureless animals
o learn, so that learning alone can never
ffice either to define or to explain culture.
ne mention of learning by anthropologists
e Benedict, Opler, Hoebel, Slotkin, and
uckhohn thus evidences the growing rapport
tween anthropology and psychology.

In the tabulation we have ventured to group
s class as essentially post-1940 and beginning
th Miller and Dollard in 1941. This implies
it we construe the Hart and Pantzer 1925
finition as historically premature to the main
rrent, like the 1916 Wissler one. Actually,
issler says "acquired by learning;" Hart and
ntzer mention imitation, tuition, social ac-
istion, and transmission; but in both cases
e point is the fact of acquisition (as against
nateness), rather than the precise manner of
quisition. On the contrary, Miller and
llard in 1941 dwell on the stimulus-response
d cue-reward underlay of the manner of
quisition and do not even mention learning
such; which first reappears with Kluckhohn
1942.

Our F–III group emphasizing Symbolization
tes only from 1942. We may have missed
me extant statements that belong here. Cer-
nly there is as of 1951 a wide recognition
nong philosophers, linguists, anthropologists,
ychologists, and sociologists that the exist-
ce of culture rests indispensably upon the development in early man of the faculty for symbolizing, generalizing, and imaginative substitution. Another decade ought therefore to see a heavier accentuation of this factor in our thinking about culture.

RANK ORDER OF ELEMENTS ENTERING INTO POST-1930 DEFINITIONS[7]

Let us now consider conceptual elements from the point of view of entrance into definitions in any explicit form rather than from the exclusive point of view of emphasis. We shall include only those elements which occur most frequently or which (as just indicated above) seem to have special importance in more recent developments of the concept. The rank order for the pre-1940 decade is as follows:

Group reference ("social" etc.)	23
Historical product ("heritage," "tradition," etc.)	18
Totality	16
Behavior ("acts," etc.)	12
Non-genetic transmission	11
Patterned ("system," "organized," etc.)	11
Adjustive-adaptive ("gratification," etc.)	10
Ideas	8
Carriers of culture ("individuals," "persons," etc.)	7
Group product	5
Values and ideals	4
Learning	3
Way or mode	3

The same breakdown of elements entering explicitly into definitions of the 1941–50 (inclusive) period gives:

Group reference	43
Behavior	35
Non-genetic	32
Way or mode	26
Patterned	24
Adjustive-adaptive	23
Carriers of Culture	22
Learning	22
Totality	20
Historical product	15
Ideas	13
Group product	13
Values and ideals	12

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[7] Excludes Residual Category and Incomplete
finitions (both those in G and a few in the earlier sections which were obviously not intended by their authors as full definitions).

These counts are only rough[8] because in some cases words or phrases had to be interpreted, perhaps arbitrarily. Nevertheless, a fairly trustworthy picture emerges of constancies and variations during these two decades. Of the one hundred thirteen definitions here considered, thirty-three fall into the first decade and eighty into the second. In both groups the attribution of culture to a group or social group is the single element most often given explicit mention. However, it occurs in about two-thirds of the earlier definitions and in only about half of the more recent ones. The historical dimension drops from second place in the rank order to tenth, appearing in less than a fifth of the definitions of the last decade. Totality drops almost but not quite as sharply proportionately but perhaps here much of the same notion is expressed by "system" (and other words and phrases subsumed under "patterned.") Similarly, perhaps "non-genetic" (which climbs to third place in the second list) conveys part of what was previously designated as "historical" or "traditional." The two most striking shifts are with respect to "learning" and "way or mode." The former is largely to be attributed to a contemporary intellectual fashion. If culture was considered a social heritage and non-genetically transmitted (as it was in a high proportion of the 1931–40 definitions), it clearly had to be learned. The real difference probably rests in the greater emphasis upon learning as a special kind of psychological process and upon individual learning. The trend toward thinking of culture as a distinctive mode of living, on the other hand, is genuinely new.

Making allowance for changes in the favorite words of intellectuals from one decade to the next, we feel that this examination indicates more constancy than variation in the central notions attaching to the concept of culture. There are interesting differences in emphasis and shading, but the conceptual core has altered significantly only in the direction of stressing the "style of life" or "over-a pattern" idea.

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS ENTERIN INTO SINGLE DEFINITIONS

In another conceptual respect, howeve there appears a real trend — namely, towa creating more sophisticated definitions th include a larger number of criteria.

	1931–40	1941–5
Based on one criterion[9]	2	3
Based on two criteria	9	4
Based on three criteria	12	22
Based on four criteria	7	27
Based on five criteria	3	16
Based on six criteria	—	6
Based on more than six criteria	—	2

FINAL COMMENTS ON DEFINITIO

Society being presupposed by culture, it not surprising that reference to the grou appears in so many of our definitions culture. Sometimes the reference is to huma society generally, or "the social;" more ofte to *a* society or group or community or se ment within the human species; sometimes th members of the society or the fact of "sharin are emphasized.

Fairly frequent explicit reference to huma culture — or for that matter the culture of a one society — as constituting a sum or who or total, in distinction from particular custom ways, patterns, ideas, or such, is probably al expectable. It may have been reenforced realization of the variably composite origin the content of most or all cultures.

Custom is most frequently mentioned in t broad type of definition — weighted for i clusiveness rather than sharpness — that ori inated with Tylor and was continued by Bo and Dixon. However, the concept is retaine also in a series of recent definitions by st dents under specific psychological influencin Linton, Dollard, Gillin, Thomas, LaPiere.

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[8] A finer but more complicated analysis can be based upon tabulating the actual words used (as listed in Index B of Part II).

[9] The criteria included here go beyond the thirteen in the two previous lists. They take account of such additional elements as "symbols," "habits," and t like. An enumeration is counted as one element, b in addition, such elements as "ideas" and "value are counted separately.

e use of the word pattern was almost inly furthered by the title of Benedict's us book of 1934. At the same time, rn is conceptually not very far from just as this overlaps with custom. Part e recent drift toward pattern thus ap- ; to be linguistic fashion. However, the otation of selectivity seems to be sharper e term pattern. And the idea of selection mes explicit in various recent definitions. ctivity" and "a distinctive way of life" bviously very close. "A selective orienta- toward experience characteristic of a p" would almost serve as a definition of re.

historically accumulating social heritage smitted from the past by tradition is men- ed in thirty-three cases. None of the p-A definitions, those in the Tylor tradi- , are here included: it is evident that they culture as a momentary dynamic cross- on rather than as something perpetually ing in time. There are also no "product"- itions of class F–1 formally represented he heritage group. Terms like products, tion, formation, precipitate are ambiguous etween preponderance of dynamic or his- connotation.

raditional heritage roots in custom and , but with more or less implication or some- s consciousness of the mechanism of trans- ion and acquistion. When emphasis shifts n the long-range process and from its lt in culture, to a close-up view of the hanism operative in the ultimate participat- individual, the interest has become psycho- cal and new terms appear: acquired, non- etic, learning. These are primarily post- 5, mostly post-1940, and at least in part resent specific influence of psychological king on anthropology and sociology.

he same may be said of the largish group definitions which mention behavior, re- nse, and stimulus. These were probably ched off by Linton's, Mead's, and Thomas' ements of 1936 and 1937. One of the few vious mentions of behavior is by Wallis in o, in his lengthy, piecemeal adumbration a definition, and there it is by no means hasized. Wallis also uses reactions, along h Boas, 1930; and Dixon, 1928, activities. These three seem to antedate formal psychological influencing.

Even Linton, Mead, and Thomas, who certainly were psychology-conscious by 1936–37, qualify behavior, when they mention it, so that its emphasis seems subsidiary and incidental, compared with that of the remainder of the phrase. Their wordings are, respectively, "pattern of habitual behavior;" "complex of traditional behavior;" "values . . . [i.e.] institutions, customs, attitudes, behavior."

Whether behavior is to be included in culture remains a matter of dispute. The behavior in question is of course the concrete behavior of individual human beings, not any collective abstraction. The two present authors incline strongly to exclude behavior as such from culture. This is on two grounds. First, there also is human behavior not determined by culture, so that behavior as such cannot be used as a differentiating criterion of culture. Second, culture being basically a form or pattern or design or way, it is an abstraction from concrete human behavior, but is not itself behavior. Behavior is of course a pre-condition of culture; just as the locus or residence of culture can only be in the human individuals from whose behavior it is inferred or formulated. It seems to us that the inclusion of behavior in culture is due to confusion between what is a pre-condition of culture and what constitutes culture. Since behavior is the first-hand and outright material of the science of psychology, and culture is not — being of concern only secondarily, as an influence on this material — it is natural that psychologists and psychologizing sociologists should see behavior as primary in their own field, and then extend this view farther to apply to the field of culture also. Linton seems to be the only anthropologist who has made culture consist of responses and behavior (C–I–9, 1945a); and this he did in a work written in an explicit context of psychology, whereas in another essay of the same year (C–I–8, 1945b) he sees culture as a way of life, a collection of ideas and habits. As a matter of fact, Linton wavers somewhat even in his psychological book. The core of his briefer statement there is that culture is "organized repetitive responses;" the core of his longer formulation is that culture is "the configuration of learned behavior." Since a configuration is a pattern or form or design or way, the emphasis here is really no longer on the behavior but on a form abstracted from it.[10]

Bidney, whose specialty is the application of philosophical method to anthropology, has culture (C-II-3) consist both of acquired or cultivated behavior and of ideals (or patterns of ideals). This seemingly paradoxical combination rests upon the assumption of a polarity which leaves room for creativity and expression — Bidney is an avowed humanist — and is meant to allow the reconciliation of materialistic and idealistic interpretations of culture. Bidney's argument in reiterated support of this position must be read in the originals to do him justice. We content ourselves with pointing out the uniqueness of his view. No one among anthropologists has shared it; in fact they seem to have sheered off from "ideals" up to date, though "values" are increasingly mentioned.

The degree to which even lip-service to values has been avoided until recently, especially by anthropologists,[11] is striking. Thomas explicitly read values into social study in the *Polish Peasant* thirty years ago. The hesitation of anthropologists can perhaps be laid to the natural history tradition which persists in our science for both better and worse. The present writers are both convinced that the study of culture must include the explicit and systematic study of values and value-systems viewed as observable, describable, and comparable phenomena of nature.

The remaining conceptual elements which we have encountered occur rather scatteringly in the definitions: adjustment; efforts, problems, and purpose; artifacts and material products; even environment. None of these appears to have forged completely into common consensus among scientists as an essential ingredient or property of culture. The same is true of symbols (mediation, understandi communication).

All in all, it is clear that anthropologists h been concrete rather than theoretical min about culture. Their definitions of it h tended either to be descriptively and enu eratively inclusive like Tylor's original one; to hug the original concept of custom or ne derivatives of it like ways or products. though more occupied than sociologists w the past and with changes in time, they h mostly not stressed seriously the influence the past on culture or its accumulative ch acter — formally perhaps less so than sociologists. Heritage and tradition, it is t do involve the past; but their focus is on reception by the present, not on the perdur influence of the past as such. At two import points the sociologists have in general ant pated the anthropologists: recognition values as an essential element, and of crucial role of symbolism. Learning, respon and behavior have come into the considerat of culture through direct or indirect influe ing from psychology. Of these, learni which extends to cultureless animals, obviously too undifferentiated a process serve as a diagnostic criterion for culture; behavior seems rather — as we have already said — to be that within whose m culture exists and from which it is conceptua extricated or abstracted.

The proportion of definitions of culture non-anthropologists in the pre-1930 perio striking. This is partly a reflection of relative lack of interest of anthropologists theory, partly a result of the enormous fluence of Tylor's definition. This is not together remarkable when one considers h much Tylor packed into his definition. Ta for example, the phrase "acquired by man a member of society." This, in effect, li heritage, learning, and society. It also imp that culture is impossible without the b gically inherited potentialities of a particular nd of mammal.

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[10] Harris (1951: 324) has put it well: "What the anthropologist constructs are cultural patterns. What members of the society observe, or impose upon others, are culturally patterned behaviors." Lasswell (1935: 236) hinted at much the same idea in saying: "When an act conforms to culture it is conduct; otherwise it is behavior."

[11] As far back as 1921 the sociologists Park Burgess (II-B-1) emphasized the social meaning c ponent of the social heritage, but anthropolog have been as backward in recognizing mean (other than for traits) as they have been slow to ad values.

We do not propose to add a one hundred d sixty-fifth formal definition. Our monoaph is a critical review of definitions and a neral discussion of culture theory. We nk it is premature to attempt encapsulation a brief abstract statement which would inide or imply all of the elements that seem us to be involved. Enumerative definitions objectionable because never complete. ithout pretending to "define," however, we nk it proper to say at the end of this sumry discussion of definitions that we believe ch of our principal groups of definitions ints to something legitimate and important. other words, we think culture is a product; historical; includes ideas, patterns, and lues; is selective; is learned; is based upon mbols; and is an abstraction from behavior d the products of behavior.

This catalogue does not, of course, exhaust meaningful and valid propositions which 1 be uttered about culture. Lest silence on r part at this point be misinterpreted, it is rhaps as well to restate here some few ntral generalizations already made by us quoted from others.

All cultures are largely made up of overt, tterned ways of behaving, feeling, and acting. But cultures likewise include a aracteristic set of unstated premises and egories ("implicit culture") which vary eatly between societies. Thus one group consciously and habitually assumes that ery chain of actions has a goal and that en this goal is reached tension will be duced or disappear. To another group, nking based upon this assumption is by no ans automatic. They see life not primarily a series of purposive sequences but more as de up of disparate experiences which may satisfying in and of themselves, rather than means to ends.

Culture not only markedly influences how lividuals behave toward other individuals t equally what is expected from them. Any lture is a system of expectancies: what ds of behavior the individual anticipates being rewarded or punished for; what constitute rewards and punishments; what types of activity are held to be inherently gratifying or frustrating. For this and for other reasons (e.g., the strongly affective nature of most cultural learning) the individual is seldom emotionally neutral to those sectors of his culture which touch him directly. Culture patterns are *felt*, emotionally adhered to or rejected.

As Harris has recently remarked, "the 'whole' culture is a composite of varying and overlapping subcultures." [12] Sub-cultures may be regional, economic, status, occupational, clique groups — or varying combinations of these factors. Some sub-cultures seem to be primarily traceable to the temperamental similarities of the participating individuals. Each individual selects from and to greater or lesser degree systematizes what he experiences of the total culture in the course of his formal and informal education throughout life:

> Sapir speaks of "the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions." . . . In some cases, as in social organization or linguistic usage and vocabulary, the individual carries out only a part of the socially observed pattern . . . , and we cannot say that his selection of behavior is the same as the social pattern. In other cases, as in grammatical structure, the individual's behavior is virtually the same as that which is described for the society as a whole . . . Sapir shows how the speaker of a particular language uses the particular pattern of that language no matter what he is saying . . . the social pattern (i.e., the behavior of the other individuals in society) provides experience and a model which is available to each individual when he acts. Just how he will use this model depends on his history and situation: often enough he will simply imitate it, but not always.[13]

STATEMENTS ABOUT CULTURE

Our quoted Statements about culture in Part III are longer but fewer than the Definitions of Part II. We did include every definition we found, including even some incomplete ones. That is why they increased geometrically through recent decades: more were attempted with growing conceptual recognition of culture. Of "statements," however, we included only the more significant or interesting or historically relevant ones. Their number could easily have been doubled or trebled.

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[12] Harris, 1951, p. 323.

[13] Harris, 1951, pp. 316, 320.

On the whole the six groups or classes into which we have divided the statements show about the same incidence in time. Only the relation of culture to language (group *e*) was discussed at these separate periods: 1911–12; 1924–29; 1945–50; but different problems w being argued in these three periods.

When all returns were in, we discov that the three of our cited statements w antedate 1920 were all made by anthropolog who were admitted leaders of the profess Boas, Sapir, Wissler.

Throughout, anthropologists constitute so what over half of those cited.

B: GENERAL FEATURES OF CULTURE

AS THE statements quoted have been discussed in some detail in the Comments n the six groups, it seems unnecessary to re-eview these Comments further here.

It does remain to us, however, to discuss ystematically, if briefly, certain general fea-ires or broad aspects of culture which have ntered to only a limited degree or indirectly nto the Definitions and the Statements we ave assembled. These aspects of culture may e conveniently grouped under the headings ntegration, Historicity, Uniformity, Caus-ity, Significance and Values, and Relativism.

INTEGRATION

As of 1951, there seems to be general agree-ient that every culture possesses a consider-ole degree of integration of both its content nd its forms, more or less parallel to the ten-ency toward solidarity possessed by socie-es; but that the integration is never perfect r complete, Malinowski and the functionalists aving overstated the case, as well as Spengler nd Benedict with their selected examples. nstitutions can certainly clash as well as the nterests of individuals. In any given situation, he proper question is not, Is integration per-ect? but, What integration is there?

It is also plain that while a broad, synthetic nterpretation is almost always more satis-ctory than an endlessly atomistic one, a alidly broad interpretation can be built up nly from a mass of precise knowledge inutely analyzed. Nor does it follow that it as been only unimaginative "museum moles" nd poor stay-at-homes debarred from con-ct with strange living cultures who have done atomistic" work. Very little reliable culture story would ever have been reconstructed ithout the willingness to take the pains to aster detail with precision. This is no fferent from functionally integrative studies: oth approaches have validity in proportion they are substantiated with accurate evi-ence. That some intellects and temperaments nd one approach more congenial than the her, means merely that interests are differ-ntly weighted. A significant historical interpretation is just as synthesizing as a functional interpretation. The principal difference is that the historical interpretation uses one additional dimension of reference, the dynamic dimension of time. Two synchronous, connected activities in one culture, or two successive, altered forms of the same activity in one culture a generation or century apart, both possess interrelation or integration with each other. The particular significance of the relations may be different; but it would be erroneous to suppose that the degree of connection was intrinsically greater in one case than in the other.

HISTORICITY

This brings us to the question of how far anthropology or the study of culture is, should be, or must be historical or non-historical.

There is general agreement that every culture is a precipitate of history. In more than one sense "history is a sieve."

In the early "classical" days of anthropology, beginning with Bachofen, Morgan, Tylor, Maine, and their contemporaries, the question did not arise, because their "evolutionistic" philosophies of developmental stages, essentially deductive and speculative however much buttressed by selected evidence, posed as being historical or at least as surrogate-historical in realms on which documentary historical evidence was lacking.

In the eighteen-eighties and nineties there began two reactions against this school: by Ratzel and by Boas. Ratzel was and remained a geographer sufficiently entangled in environmental determinism that he never got wholly mobilized for systematic historical aims. Boas also began as a geographer (after training in physics) but passed rapidly over into ethnology, becoming an anti-environmentalist, and insisted on full respect being given historical context. In fact, he insisted that his approach was historical. It certainly was anti-speculative; but a certain "bashfulness," as Ackerknecht recently has aptly called it in a paper before the New York

Academy of Sciences, prevented Boas from undertaking historical formulations of serious scope.

A third effort in the direction of historical interpretation of culture occurred around the turn of the century in Germany. It seems to have been first presented in 1898 by Frobenius, who however was unstable as a theoretician and vacillated between historical, organicist, and mystic positions. Graebner, Foy, and Ankermann in 1904 developed Frobenius's suggestions into the Culture-sphere principle; which assumed a half-dozen separate original cultures, each with its characteristic inventory of distinctive traits, and whose persistences, spreads, and minglings might still be unraveled by dissection of surviving cultures. After initial criticism, Father Schmidt adopted this scheme and carried it farther under the name of "the" Culture-historical Method. The method was indeed historical in so far as it reconstructed the past, but it was also schematic, and therewith anti-historical, in that the factors into which the early history of culture was resolved were selected arbitrarily or dogmatically, and received their validation only secondarily during the resolution. By about 1915, repercussions of this German-Austrian movement had reached Britain and resulted in the formulation of a simplified one-factor version by Rivers, Elliott Smith, and Perry: the "Heliolithic" theory of transport by treasure-seeking Phoenicians of higher culture as first developed in Egypt.

The excesses of these currents gave vigor, soon after 1920, to the anti-historical positions of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, which, for a while at least, were almost equally extreme. Actually, the two had little in common, as Radcliffe-Brown subsequently pointed out, besides an anti-historical slant and the attributed name of "functionalism." Malinowski was holistically interested in culture, Radcliffe-Brown in social structure. The latter's approach aimed to be and was comparative; Malinowski compared very little, but tended to proceed directly from the functional exposition of one culture to formulation of the principles of all culture. The result was a Malinowskian theory of culture in many ways parallel to standard "economic theory" — a set of permanent, autonomous principles whose acceptance tended to make observe historical change seem superficial and unin portant in comparison.

It was in reaction partly to this functionali view, and partly to Boas's combination of pr fessed historical method with skepticism specific historical interpretations, that Kroebe about 1930, began to argue that cultur phenomena were on the whole more amenab to historical than to strictly scientific trea ment. This position has also been long mai tained by Radin, and with reference to "soci anthropology" was reaffirmed by Evan Pritchard in 1950.

Kroeber's view rests upon Windelband distinction of science, in the strict sense of t word, as being generalizing or nomotheti but of history as particularizing or idiosy cratic in aim. Rickert, another Neo-Kantia attributed this difference to the kind of ph nomena dealt with, the subject matter science being nature, whereas that of histo was what it had been customary to call "Geis but what really was culture. Nature a culture each had their appropriate intellectu treatment, he argued, respectively in scientif and in historical method. Kroeber modifi the Rickert position by connecting it wi the recognition of "levels" of conceptualiz tion ("emergence") of phenomena, as alrea discussed, and by rejecting an all-or-no dichotomy between science and history. Th gradualist view left to cultural history identity of procedure with the admitted historical sciences that flourish on sub-cultur levels — palæontology and phylogenetic b ology, geology, and astronomy. On the oth hand, the possibility of scientific uniformiti or laws on the sociocultural level was also n precluded. Cultural phenomena simply we more resistive to exact generalizations th were physical ones, but also more charg with individuality and unique values. Physic science "dissolves" its data out of the phenomenality, resolves them into process involving causality which are not tached to particular time or place. A hi torical approach (as distinct from convention "History") preserves not only the time a place of occurrence of its phenomena b also their qualitative reality. It "interpret by putting data into an ever-widening co xt. Such context includes time as an implicit tential, but is not primarily characterized by ing temporal. In the absence of chronogical evidence a historical interpretation can ll develop a context of space, quality, and eaning, and can be descriptively or "synronically historical" — as even a professional storian of human events may pause in his rrative for the depiction of a cross-sectional oment — may indeed succeed in delineating ore clearly the significant structural relaons of his phenomena by now and then abacting from their time relations.

It is an evident implication of this theory at a historical approach tends to find the ned-at context primarily on the level of own phenomena: the context of cultural ta is a wider cultural frame, with all culture its limit. The "scientific" approach on the ntrary, aiming at process, can better hope determine cause, which may be attainle only contingently or implicitly by hisrical method. The "scientific" approach has hieved this end by translevel reduction of enomena — reduction, for instance, of culral facts to causes resident on a social, ychological, or biological level. At any rate, e possibility of exact and valid and repeatle findings of the nature of "laws" in regard culture is not precluded, in this epistemogical theory, but is explicitly admitted. It merely that the processes underlying phemena of the topmost level can be of so many els that their determination might be excted to be difficult and slow — as indeed it s actually been to date.

Accordingly there is no claim in this sition that one approach is the better or ore proper. The historical and the scientific ethods simply are different. They point at ferent ends and achieve them by different eans. It is merely an empirical fact that thus more reasonably adequate and usable toric findings than systematic processual es appear to have been made on cultural ta. It is not at all certain that this condition ll continue. Indeed Murdock's (1950) book social structure and Horton's (1943) monoaph on alcoholism already constitute two impressive attempts at demonstrating correlations that are more functional than historical. It is certainly more desirable to have both approaches actively cultivated than one alone.

It cannot be said that the foregoing point of view has been widely accepted by anthropologists and sociologists. It could hardly be held while the theory of levels remained generally unaccepted, and as long as the method of physics[14] continues to be regarded as the model of method for all science, the only conceded alternative being an outright approach through art toward the "æsthetic component" of the universe.

Students of human life who pride themselves on being "scientific" and upon their rigor[15] still tend, consciously or unconsciously, to hold the view of "science" set forth in Karl Pearson's famous *Grammar*. In other words, they not only take physics as their model but specifically nineteenth-century physics. Here problems of measurable incidence and intensity predominate. Such problems also have their importance in anthropology, but the most difficult and most essential questions about culture cannot be answered in these terms. As W. M. Wheeler is said to have remarked, "Form is the secretion of culture." Form is a matter of ordering, of arrangement, of emphasis. Measurement in and of itself will seldom provide a valid description of distinctive form. Exactly the same measurable entities may be present in precisely the same quantities, but if the sequences or arrangements of these entities differ, the configurations may have vastly different properties. Linguistics, which is, on the whole, the most rigorous and precise of the cultural sciences, has achieved its success much more by configurational analysis than by counting.

Experimental psychology (with the partial exception of the Gestalt variety) and various social sciences have made of statistics a main methodological instrument. A statistic founded upon the logic of probability has been and will continue to be of great use to cultural anthropology. But, again, the main unresolved problems of culture theory will never be resolved by statistical techniques precisely because cultural behavior is patterned and never randomly distributed. Mathematical help may come from matrix algebra or some form of topological mathematics.[16]

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[14] And especially of nineteenth-century physics.

[15] Laboratory or experimental scientists strongly tend to take an attitude of superiority to historical problems — which, incidentally, they can't solve.

None of this argument is intended to deprecate the significance of the mathematical and quantitative dimensions in science generally and in anthropology in particular. Quite the contrary. Our point is two-fold: the specific mathematic applied must be that suited to the nature of the problem; there are places where presently available quantitative measures are essential and places where they are irrelevant and actually misleading.

Ethnographers have been rightly criticized for writing "The Hopi do (or believe) thus and so" without stating whether this generalization is based upon ten observations or a hundred or upon the statement of one informant or of ten informants representing a good range of the status positions in that society. No scientist can evade the problems of sampling, of the representativeness of his materials for the universe he has chosen to study. However, sampling has certain special aspects as far as cultural data are concerned. If an ethnographer asks ten adult middle-class Americans in ten different regions "Do men rise when ladies enter the room on a somewhat formal occasion?" and gets the same reply from all his informants, it is of no earthly use for him — so far as establishment of the normative middle-class pattern is concerned — to pull a random sample of a few thousand from the million American men in this class.

Confusion both on the part of some anthropologists and of certain critics of anthropological work has arisen from lack of explicit clarity as to what is encompassed by culture. Some anthropologists have described cultu as if culture included *only* a group's patte *for* living, their conceptions of how specif sorts of people ought to behave under spe fied conditions. Critics of Ruth Benedict, example, have assumed that she was mak generalizations as to how Zuñis in fact do have whereas, for the most part, she is talk of their "ideals" for behavior (though doesn't make this altogether clear). In opinion, as we have indicated earlier, cult includes *both* modalities[17] of actual behav *and* a group's conscious, partly conscious, unconscious designs for living. More precise there are at least three different classes of da (1) a people's notions of the way things ou to be; (2) their *conceptions* of the way th group actually behaves; (3) what does in f occur, as objectively determined. The anth pologist gets the first class of data by int viewing and by observing manifestations of proval and disapproval. He gets the seco class from interviewing. The third is est lished by observation, including photograp and other mechanical means of recording. three classes of data constitute the mater from which the anthropologist abstracts conceptual model of the culture.[18] Culture not a point but a complex of interrelated thin

UNIFORMITIES

Most anthropologists would agree that constant elemental units like atoms, cells, genes have as yet been satisfactorily establish within culture in general. Many would in that within one aspect of culture, namely l guage, such constant elemental units have be isolated: phonemes,[19] and morphemes. It rguable whether such units are, in principle, iscoverable in sectors of culture less autonatic than speech and less closely tied (in some ways) to biological fact. We shall present oth sides of this argument, for on this one oint we ourselves are not in complete agreenent.[20]

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[16] Perhaps a completely new kind of mathematic is required. This seems to be the implication in Weaver, 1948. But some forms of algebra seem more appropriate to certain anthropological problems than probability statistics or the harmonic analysis used by Zipf and others. (Cf. the appendix by Weil to Part I of Lévi-Strauss, 1949.) Mathematicians have commented orally to one of us that greater development of the mathematics of non-linear partial differential equations might aid materially in dealing with various perplexing questions in the behavioral and cultural sciences. The only contemporary statistical technique which seems to afford any promise of aiding in the determination of implicit culture is Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis (see Chapters and 11 in Stouffer, Guttman, Suchman, Lazarsf et al., *Measurement and Prediction*, Vol. IV *Studies in Social Psychology in World War* Princeton University Press, 1950).

[17] This implies, of course, an abstraction from c crete events — not the behavior itself.

[18] The problem considered in this paragraph essentially that discussed by Ralph Linton under rubric "real culture" and "culture construct." answer, of course, is not exactly the same as Linto

[19] Jakobson (1949, p. 213) remarks, "lingui analysis with its concept of ultimate phonemic enti signally converges with modern physics which revea

One of us feels that it is highly unlikely that ny such constant elemental units will be discovered. Their place is on lower, more basic evels of organization of phenomena. Here nd there suggestions have been ventured that here are such basic elements: the culture rait, for instance, or the small community of ace-to-face relations. But no such hints have een systematically developed by their proponents, let alone accepted by others. Culture raits can obviously be divided and subdivided nd resubdivided at will, according to occaion or need. Or, for that matter, they are ften combined into larger complexes which re still treatable, in *ad hoc* situations, as uniary traits, and are in fact ordinarily spoken f as traits in such situations. The face-to-face ommunity, of course, is not actually a unit f culture but the supposed unit of *social* refrence or frame for what might be called a inimal culture. At that, even such a social nit has in most cases no sharply defined acual limits.

As for the larger groups of phenomena like eligion that make up "the universal pattern" — r even subdivisions of these such as "crisis tes" or "fasting" — these are recurrent ineed, but they are not uniform. Any one can ake a definition that will separate magic from eligion; but no one has yet found a definition at all other students accept: the phenomenal ontents of the concepts of religion and magic mply intergrade too much. This is true even ough almost everyone would agree in differentiating large masses of specific phenomena as respectively religious and magical — supplicating a powerful but unseen deity in the heavens, for instance, as against sticking a pin into an effigy. In short, concepts like religion and magic have an undoubted heuristic utility in given situations. But they are altogether too fluid in conceptual range for use either as strict categories or as units from which larger concepts can be built up. After all, they are in origin common-sense concepts like boy, youth, man, old man, which neither physiologists nor psychologists will wholly discard, but which they will also not attempt to include among the elementary units and basic concepts upon which they rear their sciences.

This conclusion is akin to what Boas said about social-science methodology in 1930: "The analysis of the phenomena is our prime object. Generalizations will be more significant the closer we adhere to definite forms. The attempts to reduce all social phenomena to a closed system of laws applicable to every society and explaining its structure and history do not seem a promising undertaking."[21] Significance of generalizations is proportional to definiteness of the forms and concepts analyzed out of phenomena — in this seems to reside the weakness of the uniformities in culture heretofore suggested; they are *indefinite.*

A case on the other side is put as follows by Julian Steward in his important paper: *Cultural Causality and Law: A Trial Formulation of the Development of Early Civilizations.*[22]

> It is not necessary that any formulation of cultural regularities provide an ultimate explanation of culture change. In the physical and biological sciences, formulations are merely approximations of observed regularities, and they are valid as working hypotheses despite their failure to deal with ultimate realities. So long as a cultural law formulates recurrences of

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e granular structure of matter as composed of ementary particles."

[20] Wiener (1948) and Lévi-Strauss (1951) also esent contrasting views on the possibilities of disovering lawful regularities in anthropological data. iener argues that (a) the obtainable statistical runs e not long enough; and (b) that observers modify e phenomena by their conscious study of them. vi-Strauss replies that linguistics at least can meet ese two objections and suggests that certain aspects social organization can also be studied in ways at obviate the difficulties. It may be added that Wiener has remarked in conversation with one of us that he is convinced of the practicability of devising new mathematical instruments which would permit of satisfactory treatment of social-science facts. Finally, note Murdock's (1949, p. 259) finding: ". . . cultural forms in the field of social organization reveal a degree of regularity and of conformity to scientific law not significantly inferior to that found in the so-called natural sciences."

[21] Reprinted in Boas, 1940, p. 268.

[22] Steward, 1949, pp. 5–7.

similar inter-relationships of phenomena, it expresses cause and effect in the same way that the law of gravity formulates but does not ultimately explain the attraction between masses of matter. Moreover, like the law of gravity, which has been greatly modified by the theory of relativity, any formulation of cultural data may be useful as a working hypothesis, even though further research requires that it be qualified or reformulated.

Cultural regularities may be formulated on different levels, each in its own terms. At present, the greatest possibilities lie in the purely cultural or superorganic level, for anthropology's traditional primary concern with culture has provided far more data of this kind. Moreover, the greater part of culture history is susceptible to treatment only in superorganic terms. Both sequential or diachronic formulations and synchronic formulations are superorganic, and they may be functional to the extent that the data permit. Redfield's tentative formulation that urban culture contrasts with folk culture in being more individualized, secularized, heterogeneous, and disorganized is synchronic, superorganic, and functional. Morgan's evolutionary schemes and White's formulation concerning the relationship of energy to cultural development are sequential and somewhat functional. Neither type, however, is wholly one or the other. A time-dimension is implied in Redfield's formulation, and synchronic, functional relationships are implied in White's . . . .

The present statement of scientific purpose and methodology rests on a conception of culture that needs clarification. *If the more important institutions of culture can be isolated from their unique setting so as to be typed, classified, and related to recurring antecedents or functional correlates, it follows that it is possible to consider the institutions in question as the basic or constant ones, whereas the features that lend uniqueness are the secondary or variable ones.* For example, the American high civilizations had agriculture, social classes, and a priest-temple-idol cult. As types, these institutions are abstractions of what was actually present in each area, and they do not take into account the particular crops grown, the precise patterning of the social classes, or the conceptualization of deities, details of ritual, and other religious features of each culture center.

To amplify and generalize what Steward has said, there are admittedly few, if any absoute uniformities in culture content unless one states the content in extremely general form — e.g., clothing, shelter, incest taboos, and the like. But, after all, the *content* of different
atoms and of different cells is by no mea
identical. These are constant elemental uni
of *form*. The same may be said for linguist
units like the phoneme. One of us suspec
that there are a number, perhaps a considerab
number, of categories and of structural princ
ples found in all cultures. Fortes[23] speaks
kinship as "an irreducible principle of Ta
social organization." It probably is an irreduc
ble principle of all cultures, however muc
its elaboration and emphasis upon it may var
When Fortes[24] also says that "Every soc
system presupposes such basic moral axioms
he is likewise pointing to a constant element
unit of each and every culture. These conside
ations will later be elaborated in our discussio
of Values and Relativism below. It is cle
that such problems are still on the frontier
anthropological inquiry because the anthr
pologists of this century have only begun
face them systematically.

We cannot better close this section then b
quoting an extremely thoughtful passage fro
Fortes:[25]

> What lies behind all this? What makes kinship
> irreducible principle of Tale social organization? . .
> We know from comparative studies that kinship bea
> a similar stress (though its scope is often mo
> limited) in the social organization of peoples with f
> more highly differentiated social systems than th
> of the Tallensi.
>
> The usual solution to this question, explicitly stat
> by Malinowski, Firth, and others, and implicit in t
> descriptive work of most social scientists who wri
> on kinship, puts the emphasis on the facts of se
> procreation, and the rearing of offspring. There
> obvious truth in this view. But like all attempts
> explain one order of organic events by invoking
> simpler order of events necessarily involved in t
> first, it borders on over-simplification. It is like tryi
> to explain human thinking by the anatomy of t
> brain, or modern capitalist economy by the need f
> food and shelter. Such explanations, which indica
> the necessary pre-conditions of phenomena, are a
> to short-circuit the real work of science, which
> the elucidation of the sufficient causal or function
> determinants involved in the observed data of b
> haviour. They are particularly specious in soc
> science. It is easy and tempting to jump from o
> level of organization to another in the continuum
> body, mind, and society when analysis at one lev

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[23] Fortes, 1949b, p. 344.

[24] Fortes, 1949b, p. 346.

[25] Fortes, 1949b, pp. 344–46.

ems to lead no farther. As regards primitive kin- ip institutions, the facts of sex, procreation, and the aring of offspring constitute only the universal w material of kinship systems. Our study has own that economic techniques and religious values ve as close a connexion with the Tale lineage stem, for example, as the reproductive needs of the ciety. Indeed, comparative and historical research aves no doubt that radical changes in the economic ganization or the religious values of a society like at of the Tallensi might rapidly undermine the neage structure; but some form of family organiza- on will persist and take care of the reproductive eeds of the society. The postulate we have cited verlooks the fact that kinship covers a greater field social relations than the family.

The problem we have raised cannot be solved in e context of an analytical study of one society; it quires a great deal of comparative research. We n, however, justifiably suggest an hypothesis on e basis of our limited inquiry. One of the striking ings about Tale kinship institutions is the socially knowledged sanctions behind them. When we ask hy the natives so seldom, on the whole, transgress e norms of conduct attached to kinship ties, we evitably come back either to the ancestor cult or moral axioms regarded as self-evident by the allensi. To study Tale kinship institutions apart om the religious and moral ideas and values of the atives would be as one-sided as to leave out the cts of sex and procreation. On the other hand, our alysis has shown that it is equally impossible to nderstand Tale religious beliefs and moral norms. part from the context of kinship. A very close nctional interdependence exists between these two tegories of social facts. The relevant connecting nk, for our present problem, is the axiom, implicit all Tale kinship institutions, that kinship relations e essentially moral relations, binding in their own ght. Every social system presupposes such basic oral axioms. They are implicit in the categories of alues and of behaviour which we sum up in con- epts such as rights, duties, justice, amity, respect, rong, sin. Such concepts occur in every known human society, though the kind of behaviour and the content of the values covered by them vary enormously. Modern research in psychology and sociology makes it clear that these axioms are rooted in the direct experience of the inevitability of interdependence between men in society. Utter moral isolation for the individual is not only the negation of society but the negation of humanity itself.

CAUSALITY

So far as cultural phenomena are emergents, their causes would originate at depths of different level, and hence would be intricate[25a] and hard to ascertain. This holds true of the forms of civilization as well as of social events — of both culture and history in the ordinary sense. There are first the factors of natural environment, both inorganic and and organic, and persistent as well as catastrophic. Harder to trace are internal organic factors, the genetic or racial heredity of societies. While these causes clearly are far less important than used to be assumed, it would be dogmatic to rule them out altogether. There is also the possibility that the congenitally specific abilities of gifted individuals traceably influence the culture of the societies of which they are members. Then there are strictly social factors: the size, location, and increase rate of societies or populations considered as influences affecting their cultures. And finally there are cultural factors already existent at any given period of time that can be dealt with; that is, in our explanations of any particular cultural situation, the just enumerated non-cultural causes must always necessarily be viewed as impinging on an already existing cultural condition which must also be taken into account, though it is itself in turn the product in part of preceding conditions. Though any culture can variably be construed as being at once adaptive, selective, and accumulative, it never starts from zero, but always has a long history. The antecedent conditions enter in varying degrees, according to their nearness and other circumstances, into the state of culture being examined; but they always enter with strength.

[25a] Cf. Coulborn, 1952, p. 113: "The fantastically mple, monistic view of cause necessary to a thorough- oing reductionism is none other than the cause which erved the physical sciences from the seventeenth entury to the nineteenth and was foisted upon other ciences by reason of the egregious success of the hysical sciences in that period. Difficulties in nuclear hysics and astrophysics have driven the physicists emselves out of that stronghold, and it might be ipposed that the efforts of such a philosopher as Vhitehead would have destroyed it completely. But is is not so: some non-physicists still lurk in it — case of cultural lag! From Durkheim onward social scientists, latterly anthropologists, have argued vigorously against this opinion, some even wishing to establish a new monism contrary to it. But the truth is that cause actually operates in all sorts of ways: it can, as to certain particulars, be entirely on the cultural level, but, as to others, it operates both upwards and downwards, and perhaps round about, between the levels. . . . Aristotle's concept of formal cause is enlightening without being at the same time misleading, but his efficient cause — and this is surely generally agreed — is a harmful conception: any item in a causal structure can be regarded as efficient, for, if any item is missing, the event will be changed."

This variety of factors acting upon culture accounts for its causality being complex and difficult. It is also why, viewed in the totality of its manifestations, culture is so variable, and why it generally impresses us as plastic and changeable. It is true that cultures have also sometimes been described as possessed of inertia. Yet this is mostly in distant perspective, when the constant innumerable minor variations are lost to view and the basic structural patterns consequently emerge more saliently.

Further, it would seem that a full and open-minded examination of what brought about any given cultural condition would regularly reveal some degree of circular causality. This is both because of the degree to which antecedent conditions of culture necessarily enter into it, and because of the relations of culture and persons. It is people that produce or establish culture; but they establish it partly in perpetuation and partly in modification of a form of existing culture which has made them what they are. The more or less altered culture which they produce, in turn largely influences the content of subsequent personalities; and so on. This perpetual circularity or continued interaction was first recognized among students of culture; but in the past two or three decades, psychiatrists and psychologists also became increasingly aware of the influence of culture on personalities.

This awareness of interrelation has constituted an advance, but has also brought about some forced causalities and exaggerations, particularly by those using psychoanalytic explanations. Thus the influence of toilet and other childhood training has quite evidently been overemphasized. That a particular kind of training should have specific consequences is to be expected. But to derive the prevailing cast of whole national civilizations from such minute causes is one-sided and highly improbable. Again, it is legitimate to think that any established culture will tend to be accompanied by a modal personality type. B
there is then a temptation to portray the deve
opment of individuals of this type as if it we
this development that produced the particula
quality of content of the culture; which
equivalent to dogmatically selecting one of tw
circularly interacting sets of factors as the de
terminative one.

Rather contrary is the habit of many anthro
pologists of treating cultural facts in certai
situations without reference to the people pro
ducing these facts. For instance, archæologist
ascertain much of the content and patternin
of cultures, and the interrelations of these cul
tures, without even a chance, ordinarily, o
knowing anything about the people throug
whose actions these cultures existed, let alon
their individual personalities. It is true tha
this deficiency constitutes a limitation of th
scope of archæological interpretation, but i
certainly does not invalidate the soundness o
significance of archæological study within it
scope. In the same way linguists consider thei
prime business to be determination of the con
tent and patterns of languages and the growth
and changes of these, mainly irrespective o
the speakers either as individuals or as person
ality types. Culture history, again, largely
dispenses with the personalities involved in it
processes and events; in part because they ca
no longer be known, for the rest, because a
particular individuals they possess only mino
relevance. Similarly, ethnography can be ade
quately pursued as a study of the classification
interrelations, and history of cultural forms
and culture-wholes as such; what it gains from
the addition of personalities is chiefly fullness
texture, color, and warmth of presentation.

It is clear from these several cases that cul
ture can be historically and scientifically in
vestigated without introduction of personality
factors. In fact, the question may fairly be
raised whether ordinarily its study — as cul
ture — does not tend to be more effective if
it is abstracted from individual or personality
factors, through eliminating these or holding
or assuming them as constant.

It is, of course, equally legitimate to be in
terested in the interrelations of culture and
personality. And there is no question that
there is then an added appeal of "livingness"
of problem; and understanding thus arrived

ought to possess the greatest ultimate depth.
present, however, the well-tried and mainly
personal methods of pure culture studies
l seem more efficiently productive for the
derstanding of culture process than the
wer efforts to penetrate deeper by dealing
nultaneously with the two variables of per-
nality and culture — each so highly variable
itself.

What the joint cultural-psychological ap-
oach can hope to do better than the pure-
ltural one, is to penetrate farther into caus-
y. This follows from the fact of the im-
diate causation of cultural phenomena neces-
ily residing in persons, as stated above.
hat needs to be guarded against, however,
confusion between recognition of the area
which causes must reside and determination
the specific causes of specific phenomena.
cannot be said that as yet the causal explana-
n of cultural phenomena in terms of either
ychoanalysis or personality psychology has
lded very clear results. Some of the efforts
this direction certainly are premature and
ced, and none, to date, seem to have the
ar-cut definiteness of result that have come
be expected as characteristic of good
hæology, culture history, and linguistics.

Finally, the question may be suggested —
ugh the present is not the occasion to pur-
it fully — whether certain personality-
l-culture studies may be actuated less by
ire to penetrate into culture more deeply
n by impulses to get rid of culture by re-
ving or explaining it away. This last would
a perfectly legitimate end if it were
nitted.

Let us return, however, to causality once
re. In a sense we are less optimistic than
Tylor eighty years ago when he wrote:

> udimentary as the science of culture still is, the
> ptoms are becoming very strong that even what
> n its most spontaneous and motiveless phenomena
> , nevertheless, be shown to come within the range of distinct cause and effect as certainly as the facts of mechanics. (1871, 17)

For reasons indicated above and elsewhere in this study, we do not anticipate the discovery of cultural laws that will conform to the type of those of classical mechanics, though "statistical laws" — significant statistical distributions — not only are discoverable in culture and language but have been operated with for some two decades.[26]

Nevertheless, cultural anthropologists, like all scientists, are searching for minimal causal chains in the body of phenomena they investigate. It seems likely at present that these will be reached — or at any rate first reached — by paths and methods quite different from those of the physical sciences of the nineteenth century. The ceaseless feedback between culture and personality and the other complexities that have been discussed also make any route through reductionism seem a very distant one indeed.

The best hope in the foreseeable future for parsimonious description and "explanation" of cultural phenomena seems to rest in the study of cultural forms and processes as such, largely — for these purposes — abstracted from individuals and from personalities. Particularly promising is the search for common denominators or pervasive general principles in cultures of which the culture carriers are often unaware or minimally aware. Various concepts [27] (Opler's "themes"; Herskovits' "focus"; Kroeber's "configurations of culture growth"; and Kluckhohn's "implicit culture") have been developed for this kind of analysis, and a refinement and elaboration of these and similar approaches may make some aspects of the behavior of individuals in a culture reducible to generalizations that can be stated with increased economy. The test of the validity of such "least common denominators" or "highest common factors" [28] will, of course, be the

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[5] As in the correlations of the Culture Element
vey of native western North America directed by
of the present authors, to mention but one
nple.

Cf. Kluckhohn, 1951a.

Although the approach is from a somewhat
erent direction and the terminology used is not
same, the point of view we express in these paragraphs seems thoroughly congruent with that expressed by Lévi-Strauss (1951). Compare: ". . . thus ascertain whether or not different types of communication systems in the same societies — that is, kinship and language — are or are not caused by identical unconscious structures" (p. 161). "We will be in a position to understand basic similarities between forms of social life, such as language, art, law, religion,

extent to which they not only make the phenomena more intelligible but also make possible reasonably accurate predictions of culture change under specified conditions.

One attempts to understand, explain, or predict a system by reference to a relatively few organizing principles of that system. The study of culture is the study of regularities. After field work the anthropologist's first task is the descriptive conceptualization of certain trends toward uniformity in aspects of the behavior of the people making up a certain group (cf. III–a–16). The anthropological picture of the explicit culture is largely as Firth (1939, III–a–11) has suggested "the sum total of *modes* [29] of behavior." Now, however, anthropologists are trying to go deeper, to reduce the wide range of regularities in a culture to a relatively few "premises," "categories," and "thematic principles" of the inferred or implicit culture.[30] So far as fundamental postulates about structure are concerned, this approach resembles what factor analysts are trying to do. The methods, of course, are very different.

A model for the conceptually significant in these methods is suggested in the following excerpts from Jakobson and Lotz:

> Where nature presents nothing but an indefinite number of contingent varieties, the intervention of culture extracts pairs of opposite terms. The gross sound matter knows no oppositions. It is the human thought, conscious or unconscious, which draws from it the binary oppositions. It abstracts them by eliminating the rest . . . As music lays upon sound matter a graduated scale, similarly language lays upon it the dichotomal scale which is simply a corollary of the purely differential role played by phonemic entities . . . a strictly linguistic analysis which must *specify* all the underlying oppositions and their interrelations . . . Only in resolving the phonemes into their constituents and in identifying the ultimate entities obtained, phonemics arrives at its basic concept . . . and thereby definitely breaks with the extrinsic picture of speech vividly summarized by L. Bloomfield: a *continuum* which can be viewed as con-
> sisting of any desired, and, through still finer analy
> infinitely increasing number of successive pa
> (Jakobson, 1949, 210, 211, 212)

> Our basic assumption is that every langu
> operates with a strictly limited number of und
> lying ultimate distinctions which form a set
> binary oppositions. (Jakobson and Lotz, 1949, 1

The fundamental oppositions in cult
generally may turn out to be ternary or q
ternary. Jakobson has indicated that langua
though constructed around simple dichoton
oppositions, involves both an axis of succe
iveness and an axis of simultaneity which c
its hierarchical structure even up to symb
Certainly the analyses of Jakobson and L
involve complex multi-dimensional interre
tionships. The resemblance of their grap
representations of French phonemic struct
to similar drawings of the arrangements
atoms in organic molecules is striking.

The work of Jakobson and Lotz conce
only one aspect of culture, language. At pr
ent only the data of linguistics and of soc
organization are formulated with sufficient p
cision to permit of rigorous dissolution of e
ments into their constituent bundles of d
tinctive features. But there is abundant p
sumptive evidence that cultural categories
not a congeries; that there are principles wh
cut across. Aspects of given events are oft
clearly meaningful in various realms of c
ture: "economic," "social," "religious," a
the like. The difficult thing is to work ou
systematic way of making transformations
tween categories.

This direction is so new — at least in its co
temporary dress — and so basic to the anth
pological attack upon cultural "causation" t
the discussion must be extended a little. T
prime search is, of course, for interrelationsh
between the patterned forms of the expl
and implicit culture.

The problem of pattern is the problem
symmetry, of constancies of form irrespect

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that, on the surface, seem to differ greatly. At the same time, we will have the hope of overcoming the opposition between the collective nature of culture and its manifestations in the individual, since the so-called 'collective consciousness' would, in the final analysis, be no more than the expression, on the plane of individual thought and behavior, of certain time
and space modalities of these universal laws wh
make up the unconscious activity of the mind"
163).

[29] Italics ours.

[30] For one try at this kind of analysis, see Klu
hohn, 1949b.

wide variations in concrete details of ac-
lization. So far as biological and physical
sibilities are concerned, a given act can be
ried out, an idea stated, or a specific artifact
de in a number of different ways. How-
r, in all societies the same mode of disposing
many situations is repeated over and over.
ere is, as it were, an inhibition alike of the
domness of trial and error behavior, of the
lifferentiated character of instinctive be-
rior, and of responses that are merely func-
ial. A determinate organization prevails.

3y patterning in its most general sense we
an the relation of units in a determinate sys-
, interrelation of parts as dominated by the
eral character of wholes. Patterning means
t, given certain points of reference, there
standards of selective awareness, of se-
nce, of emphasis. As the physical anthro-
ogist H. L. Shapiro has remarked:

> is perhaps open to debate whether the variations
> ld be regarded as deviations from a pattern, or
> sequence be reversed and the pattern derived
> the distribution of the variates. But by which-
> end one grasps this apparent duality, the in-
> ble association of a central tendency with the
> ations from it constitutes a fixed attribute of
> nic life. Indeed, in a highly generalized sense,
> exposition of the central tendency and the under-
> ding of individual variation furnish the several
> gical, and possibly all the natural sciences, with
> basic problem. So pervasive is the phenomenon,
> difficult to conjure up any aspect of biological
> rch that cannot ultimately be resolved into these
> lamental terms.

he forms of the explicit culture are them-
es patterned, as Sapir has said, "into a com-
configuration of evaluations, inclusive and
lusive implications, priorities, and potenti-
es of realization" which cannot be under-
d solely from the descriptions given by
the most articulate of culture carriers.
use another analogy from music: the melo-
(i.e., the patterns of the explicit culture) are rather easily heard by any listener, but it takes a more technical analysis to discover the key or mode in which a melody is written.

The forms of the explicit culture may be [30a] compared to the observable plan of a building. As Robert Lynd has said: "The significance of structure for a culture may be suggested by the analogy of a Gothic cathedral, in which each part contributes thrusts and weights relevant not only to itself alone but to the whole." Patterns are the framework, the girders of a culture. The forms of the implicit culture are more nearly analogous to the architect's conception of the total over-all effects he wishes to achieve. Different forms can be made from the same elements. It is as if one looks at a series of chairs which have identical proportions but which are of varying sizes, built of a dozen different kinds of wood, with minor ornamentations of distinct kinds. One sees the differences but recognizes a common element. Similarly, one may find in two individuals almost the same personality traits. Yet each has his own life style which differentiates the constellation of traits. So, also, a culture cannot be fully understood from the most complete description of its explicit surface. The organization of each culture has the same kind of uniqueness one finds in the organization of each personality.

Even a culture trait is an abstraction. A trait is an "ideal type" because no two pots are identical nor are two marriage ceremonies ever held in precisely the same way. But when we turn to those unconscious (i.e., unverbalized) predispositions toward the definition of the situation which members of a certain social tradition characteristically exhibit, we have to deal with second-order or analytical abstractions. The patterns of the implicit culture are not inductive generalizing abstractions but purely inferential constructs. They are *thematic principles* which the investigator introduces to explain connections among a

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For some purposes a better simile is that of a large
ntal rug. Here one can see before one the in-
cy of patterns — the pattern of the whole rug
various patterns within this. The degree of in-
cy of the patterns of the explicit culture tends to
roportional to the total content of that culture,
Kroeber has remarked: "Such a climax is likely
e defined by two characteristics: a larger content of culture; and a more developed or specialized organization of the content of the culture — in other words, more numerous elements and more sharply expressed and interrelated patterns. These two properties are likely to go hand in hand. A greater content calls for more definite organization; more organization makes possible the absorption of more content." (1936, p. 114.)

wide range of culture content and form that are not obvious in the world of direct observation. The forms of the implicit culture start, of course, from a consideration of data and they must be validated by a return to the data, but they unquestionably rest upon systematic extrapolation. When describing implicit culture the anthropologist cannot hope to become a relatively objective, relatively passive instrument. His role is more active; he necessarily puts something into the data. Whereas the trustworthiness of an anthropologist's portrayal of explicit culture depends upon his receptivity, his completeness, and his detachment and upon the skill and care with which he makes his inductive generalizations, the validity of his conceptual model of the implicit culture stands or falls with the balance achieved between sensitivity of scientific imagination and comparative freedom from preconception.

Normative and behavioral patterns are specifically oriented. The forms of the implicit culture have a more generalized application but they are, to use Benedict's phrase, "unconscious canons of choice." The implicit culture consists in those cultural themes of which there is characteristically no sustained and systematic awareness [81] on the part of most members of a group.

The distinction between explicit and implicit culture is that of polar concepts, not of the all-or-none type. Reality, and not least cultural reality, appears to be a continuum rather than a set of neat, water-tight compartments. But we can seldom cope with the continuum as a whole, and the isolation and naming of certain contrastive sections of the continuum is highly useful. It follows, however,
that the theoretical structure does not colla
with the production of doubtful or transitio
cases. In a highly self-conscious culture
the American which makes a business of stu
ing itself, the proportion of the culture wh
is literally implicit in the sense of never hav
been overtly stated by any member of the
ciety may be small. Yet only a trifling p
centage of Americans could state even th
implicit premises of our culture which h
been abstracted out by social scientists. In
case of the less self-conscious societies the
conscious assumptions bulk large. They
what Whorf has called "background pheno
ena." What he says of language applies to ma
other aspects of culture: ". . . our psyc
make-up is somehow adjusted to disreg
whole realms of phenomena that are so
pervasive as to seem irrelevant to our da
lives and needs . . . the phenomena of a l
guage are to its own speakers largely . . . o
side the critical consciousness and control
the speaker. . . ." This same point of view
often expressed by historians and others wh
they say: "The really important thing to kn
about a society is what it takes for grante

These "background phenomena" are of
traordinary importance in human action. H
man behavior cannot be understood in ter
of the organism-environment model un
this be made more complex. No socialized
man being views his experience freshly.
very perceptions are screened and distorted
what he has consciously and unconsciou
absorbed from his culture. Between the stin
lus and the response there is always interpo
an intervening variable, unseen but powerf
This consists in the person's total appercept

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[81] "Awareness" has here the special and narrow sense of "manifested by habitual verbalization." The members of the group are of course aware in the sense that they make choices with these configurations as unconscious but determinative backgrounds. Professor Jerome Bruner comments from the standpoint of a psychologist: "The process by which the implicit culture is 'acquired' by the individual (i.e., the way the person learns to respond in a manner congruent with expectation) is such that awareness and verbal formulation are intrinsically difficult. Even in laboratory situations where we set the subject the task of forming complex concepts, subjects *typically* begin to *respond* consistently in terms of a principle
before they can verbalize (a) that they are operat
on a principle, or (b) that the principle is thus-and
Culture learning, because so much of it takes place
fore very much verbal differentiation has occurre
the carrier and because it is learned along with the
tern of a language and as part of the language, is bou
to result in difficulties of awareness. Thoughtw
inherent in a language are difficult to analyze b
person who speaks that language and no other si
there is no basis for discriminating an implicit thoug
way save by comparing it with a different thoug
way in another language." (Letter to CK, Septem
7, 1951.)

ss which is made up in large part of the more neralized cultural forms.[82]

Let us take an example. If one asks a Navaho lian about witchcraft, experience shows that re than seventy per cent will give almost ntical verbal responses. The replies will y only in this fashion: "Who told you to k to me about witchcraft?" "Who said that knew anything about witchcraft?" "Why you come to me to ask about this — who d you I knew about it?" Here one has a navioral pattern of the explicit culture, for structure consists in a determinate interitation of linguistic symbols as a response a verbal (and situational) stimulus.

Suppose, however, that we juxtapose this and ner behavioral patterns which have no innsic interconnection. Unacculturated Nava- are uniformly careful to hide their faeces l to see to it that no other person obtains ssession of their hair, nails, spit, or any other dily part or product. They are likewise aracteristically secretive about their peral names. All three of these patterns (as ll as many others which might be menned) are manifestations of a *cultural enthyme* (tacit premise) which may be intelleclized as "fear of the malevolent activities other persons." Only most exceptionally uld a Navaho make this abstract generalizan, saying, in effect, "These are all ways of wing our anxiety about the activities of ers." Nevertheless, this principle does or- all sorts of concrete Navaho behavior and, hough implicit, is as much a part of Nava- culture as the explicit acts and verbal sym-s. It is the highest common factor in dise explicit forms and contents. It is a princi- which underlies the structure of the excit culture, which "accounts for" a number distinct factors. It is neither a generalizan *of* aspects of behavior (behavioral pattern) of forms for behavior (normative pattern) t is a generalization *from* behavior. It looks an inner coherence in terms of structuraliz- principles that are taken for granted by ticipants in this culture as prevailing in the world. Patterns are forms — the implicit culture consists in interrelationships between forms, that is, of qualities which can be predicated only of two or more forms taken together.

Just as the forms of the explicit culture are configurated in accord with the unconscious system of meanings abstracted by the anthropologist as cultural enthymemes, so the enthymemes may bear a relation to an over-summative principle. Every culture is a structure — not just a haphazard collection of all the different physically possible and functionally effective patterns of belief and action but an interdependent *system* with its forms segregated and arranged in a manner which is *felt* as appropriate. As Ruth Benedict has said, "Order is due to the circumstance that in these societies a principle has been set up according to which the assembled cultural material is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with certain inner necessities that have developed with the group." This broadest kind of integrating principle in culture has often been referred to as *ethos.* Anthropologists are hardly ready as yet to deal with the ethos of a culture except by means of artistic insight. The work of Benedict and others is suggestive but raises many new problems beside those of rigor and standardized procedures. As Gurvitch[83] has said: "Une des caractéristiques essentielles des symbôles est qu'ils révèlent en voilant, et qu'ils voilent en révèlant."

SIGNIFICANCE AND VALUES[84]

We come now to those properties of culture which seem most distinctive of it and most important: its significance and its values. Perhaps we should have said "significance or values," for the two are difficult to keep separated and perhaps constitute no more than somewhat different aspects of the same thing.

First of all, significance does not mean merely ends. It is not teleological in the traditional sense. Significance and values are of the essence of the organization of culture. It is true that human endeavor is directed toward ends;

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[82] A possible neurological basis of universals and he culturally formed and tinged apperceptive mass only recently been described.

[83] Gurvitch, 1950, p. 77.

[84] For a more extended treatment of values by one of us, see Kluckhohn 1951b.

but those ends are shaped by the values of culture; and the values are felt as intrinsic, not as means. And the values are variable and relative, not predetermined and eternal, though certain universals of human biology and of human social life appear to have brought about a few constants or near-constants that cut across cultural differences. Also the values are part of nature, not outside it. They are the products of men, of men having bodies and living in societies, and are the structural essence of the culture of these societies of men. Finally, values and significances are "intangibles" which are "subjective" in that they can be internally experienced, but are also objective in their expressions, embodiments, or results.

Psychology deals with individual minds, and most values are the products of social living, become part of cultures, and are transmitted along with the rest of culture. It is true that each new or changed value takes its concrete origin (as do all aspects of culture) in the psychological processes of some particular individual. It is also true that each individual holds his own idiosyncratic form of the various cultural values he has internalized. Such matters are proper subjects of investigation for the psychologist, but values in general have a predominantly historical and sociocultural dimension. Psychology deals mainly with processes or mechanisms, and values are mental content. The processes by which individuals acquire, reject, or modify values are questions for psychological enquiry — or for collaboration between psychologists and anthropologists or sociologists. The main trend, however, is evidenced by the fact that social psychology, that bridge between psychology and sociology, recognizes a correspondence between values and attitudes, but has for the most part concerned itself, as social psychology, only with the attitudes and has abstracted from the values; much as individual psychology investigates the process of learning but not knowledge, that which is learned.

Values are primarily social and cultural: social in scope, parts of culture in substance and form. There are individual variants of cultural values and also certain highly perso goals and standards developed in the vici tudes of private experience and reinforced rewards in using them. But these latter not ordinarily called values, and they must any case be discriminated from collect values. Or, the place of a value in the lives some persons may be quite different from t in the cultural scheme. Thus day-dream or autoerotic practices may come to acqu high value for an individual while be ignored, ridiculed, or condemned socioc turally. These statements must not be c strued as implying that values have a subst tive existence outside of individual minds, that a collective mind containing them has a such substantive existence. The locus or pl of residence of values or anything else cultu is in individual persons and nowhere else. I a value becomes a group value, as a habit b comes a custom or individuals a society, o with collective participation.

This collective quality of values accou for their frequent anonymity, their seemi the spontaneous result of mass movement, in morals, fashion responses, speech. Thou the very first inception of any value or n part thereof must take place in an individ mind, nevertheless this attachment is mos lost very quickly as socialization gets und way, and in many values has been long sin forgotten. The strength of the value is, ho ever, not impaired by this forgetting, b rather increased. The collectivization m also tend to decrease overt, explicit awaren of the value itself. It maintains its hold a strength, but covertly, as an implicit a prio as a non-rational folkway, as a "configuratio rather than a "pattern" in Kluckhohn's 19 distinction.[85] This means in turn that fun tioning with relation to the value or standa becomes automatic, as in correct speech; compulsive as in manners and fashion; or e dowed with high-potential emotional char as often in morals and religion; in any eve not fully conscious and not fully rational self-interested.

Values are important in that they provi foci for patterns of organization for the ma l of cultures. They give significance to our derstanding of cultures. In fact values prole the only basis for the fully intelligible nprehension of culture, because the actual ganization of all cultures is primarily in ms of their values. This becomes apparent soon as one attempts to present the picture a culture without reference to its values. e account becomes an unstructured, meanless assemblage of items having relation to e another only through coexistence in localand moment — an assemblage that might profitably be arranged alphabetically as in other order; a mere laundry list.

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[85] Cf. Kluckhohn, 1941; 1943.

qually revealing of the significance of ues is an attempt to present the description one culture through the medium of the ue patterns of another. In such a presentan, the two cultures will of course come out e in structure. But since some of the cont of the culture being described will not fit model of the other culture, it will either e to be omitted from the description, or will stultify this model by not fitting it, or will be distorted in order to make it seem to This is exactly what happened while wly discovered languages were being desbed in terms of Latin grammar.

For the same reason one need not take too iously the criticism sometimes made of ethgraphers that they do not sufficiently disguish the ideal culture from the actual cule of a society: that they should specify at exists only ideally, at all points specify numbers of their witnesses, the personies of their informants, and so on. These es of technical procedure are sound enough, they lose sight of the main issue, which not validation of detail but sound concepn of basic structure. This basic structure, with it the significant functioning, are ch more nearly given by the so-called ideal ture than by the actual one. This actual ture can indeed be so over-documented that values and patterns are buried. It might n be said without undue exaggeration that adequate information being assumed as ilable — the description of the ideal cule has more significance than the actual, if hoice has to be made. If the picture of the l culture is materially unsound or conted, it will automatically raise doubts. But if the picture of the actual culture makes no point or meaning, it may be hard to inject more meaning from the statistical or personalized data available. In short, the "ideal" version of a culture is what gives orientation to the "actual" version.

Another way of saying this is that in the collection of information on a culture, the inquirer must proceed with empathy in order to perceive the cardinal values as points of crystallization. Of course this does not mean that inquiry should begin and end with empathy. Evidence and analysis of evidence are indispensable. But the very selection of evidence that will be significant is dependent on insight exercised during the process of evidence-collecting. What corresponds in whole-culture studies to the "hypothesis tested by evidence" in the experimental sciences is precisely a successful recognition of the value-laden patterns through which the culture is organized.

Values and significances are of course intangibles, viewed subjectively; but they find objective expression in observable forms of culture and their relations — or if one prefer to put it so, in patterned behavior and products of behavior.

It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science. Instead, they were relegated to a special set of intellectual activities called "the humanities," included in the "spiritual science" of the Germans. Values were believed to be eternal because they were God-given, or divinely inspired, or at least discovered by that soul-part of man which partakes somewhat of divinity, as his body and other bodies and the tangibles of the world do not. A new and struggling science, as little advanced beyond physics, astronomy, anatomy, and the rudiments of physiology as Western science still was only two centuries ago, might cheerfully concede this reservation of the remote and unexplored territory of values to the philosophers and theologians and limit itself to what it could treat mechanistically. But a science of total nature cannot permanently cede anything which it can deal with by any of its procedures of analysis of phenomena and interpretation of evidence. The phenomena of culture are "as phenomenal" as those of physical or vital existence. And if it is true that values provide the organizing relations of culture, they must certainly be included in the investigation of culture.

How far values may ultimately prove to be measurable we do not know. It seems to us an idle question, as against the fact that they are, here and now, describable qualitatively, and are comparable, and their developments are traceable in some degree. Values are being dealt with, critically and analytically, not only be every sound social anthropologist, ethnographer, and archæologist, but by the historians of the arts, of thought, of institutions, of civilization.

Anthropologists, up to this point, have probably devoted too little attention to the variability of cultural values and the existence of alternative value systems [36] within the same culture, as well the general relation of cultural values to the individual. This regard for alternatives is necessary even in cultural studies per se because of the palimpsest nature of most cultures. As Spiro [37] has remarked:

> The ideal norms that upper-middle class Americans are violating in their sexual behavior are not their norms, but the norms of their ancestors, or the norms of contemporary lower-middle class Americans.

There is a good case for the view that any complex stratified or segmented culture requires balance, counterpoint, an "antagonistic" equilibrium between values. Florence Kluckhohn [38] has put this argument well:

> There is . . . too much stress — implied when not actually stated — upon the unitary character of value orientations. Variation for the same individual when he is playing different roles and variation between whole groups of persons within a single society are not adequately accounted for. More important still, the emphasis upon the unique of the variable value systems of different societies ignores the fact of the universality of human problems and the correlate fact that human societies have found for some problems approximately the same answers. Yet certainly it is only within a frame of reference which deals with universals that variation can be understood.
> Without this framework it is not possible to
> systematically with either the problem of simila
> and difference as between the value systems
> different societies or the questions of variant va
> within societies . . . .
>
> However important it is to know what is domi
> in a society at a given time, we shall not go far tow
> the understanding of the dynamics of that soc
> without paying careful heed to the variant orie
> tions. That there be individuals and whole gro
> of individuals who live in accordance with patt
> which express variant rather than the domina
> stressed orientations is, it is maintained, essentia
> the maintenance of the society. *Variant values*
> *therefore, not only permitted but actually requi*
> It has been the mistake of many in the social scien
> and of many in the field of practical affairs as v
> to treat all behavior and certain aspects of mot
> tion which do not accord with the dominant value
> deviant. It is urged that we cease to confuse
> deviant who by his behavior calls down the sa
> tions of his group with the variant who is accep
> and frequently required. This is especially true
> a society such as ours, where beneath the surf
> of what has so often been called our compul
> conformity, there lies a wide range of variation.

In sum, we cannot emphasize too stron
the fact that if the essence of cultures be th
patterned selectivity, the essence of this
lectivity inheres in the cultural value syste

VALUES AND RELATIVITY

We know by experience that sincere co
parison of cultures leads quickly to recog
tion of their "relativity." What this means
that cultures are differently weighted in th
values, hence are differently structured, a
differ both in part-functioning and in tot
functioning; and that true understanding
cultures therefore involves recognition of th
particular value systems. Comparisons of c
tures must not be simplistic in terms of
arbitrary or preconceived universal value s
tem, but must be multiple, with each cultu
first understood in terms of its own particu
value system and therefore its own idiosy
cratic structure. After that, comparison
with gradually increasing reliability reveal
what degree values, significances, and qualit

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[36] Cf. F. Kluckhohn, 1950.

[37] Spiro, 1951, p. 33.

[38] F. Kluckhohn, 1951, pp. 101, 108–09.

Cf. also Goldschmidt's recent remark: "The existence of conflicting aims, and the conflict over the
achievement of common aims, both of which are
greater importance to primitive social system t
anthropologists have appreciated, and which have s
far-reaching consequences for the nature of instituti
. . ." (1951, p. 570)

common to the compared cultures, and to at degree distinctive. In proportion as comn structures and qualities are discovered, uniquenesses will mean more. And as the ge of variability of differentiations becomes ter known, it will add to the significance of re universal or common features — someat as knowledge of variability deepens nificance of a statistical mean.

n attaining the recognition of the so-called ativity of culture, we have only begun to what students of biology have achieved. e "natural classification" of animals and nts, which underlies and supplements lutionary development, is basically relatitic. Biologists no longer group together nts by the simple but arbitrary factors of number of their stamens and pistils, nor mals by the external property of living in , air, or land, but by degrees of resemnces in the totality of their structures. The ationship so established then proves usually to correspond with the sequential developnts of forms from one another. It is evident t the comparative study of cultures is aimat something similar, a "natural history of ture"; and however imperfectly as yet, is inning to attain it.

t will also be evident from this parallel why much of culture investigation has been and ains historical in the sense in which we e defined that word. "A culture described erms of its own structure" is in itself idiophic rather than nomothetic. And if a naal classification implicitly contains an evoonary development — that is, a history — he case of life, there is some presupposition t the same will more or less hold for cule. We should not let the customary differe in appelations disturb us. Just as we are culture de facto trying to work out a naal classification and a developmental history hout usually calling them that, we may ly say that the results attained in historical logy rest upon recognition of the "relaty" of organic structures.

Ve have already dwelt on the difficulties slow progress made in determining the ses of cultural phenomena. An added reafor this condition will now be apparent. at is the fact that the comparison of strucal patterns is in its nature directed toward what is significant in form rather than what is efficient in mechanism. This is of course even more true for cultural material, in which values are so conspicuously important, than for biological phenomena. And yet there is no reason why causation should not also be determinable in culture data, even if against greater difficulties — much as physiology flourishes successfully alongside comparative and evolutionary biology.

It is evident that as cultures are relativistically compared, both unique and common values appear, or, to speak less in extremes, values of lesser and greater frequency. Here an intellectual hazard may be predicted: an inclination to favor the commoner values as more nearly universal and therefore more "normal" or otherwise superior. This procedure may be anticipated because of the security sense promoted by refuge into absolutes or even majorities. Some attempts to escape from relativism are therefore expectable. The hazard lies in a premature plumping upon the commoner and nearer values and the forcing of these into false absolutes — a process of intellectual short-circuiting. The longer the quest for new absolute values can be postponed and the longer the analytic comparison of relative values can be prosecuted, the closer shall we come to reemerging with at least near-absolutes. There will be talk in those days, as we are beginning to hear it already, that the principle of relativism is breaking down, that its own negativism is defeating it. There have been, admittedly, extravagances and unsound vulgarizations of cultural relativity. Actually, objective relativistic differences between cultures are not breaking down but being fortified. And relativism is not a negative principle except to those who feel that the whole world has lost its values when comparison makes their own private values lose their false absoluteness. Relativism may seem to turn the world fluid; but so did the concepts of evolution and of relativity in physics seem to turn the world fluid when they were new. Like them, cultural and value relativism is a potent instrument of progress in deeper understanding — and not only of the world but of man in the world.

On the other hand, the inescapable fact of cultural relativism does not justify the conclusion that cultures are in all respects utterly disparate monads and hence strictly noncomparable entities.[39] If this were literally true, a comparative science of culture would be *ex hypothesi* impossible. It is, unfortunately the case that up to this point anthropology has not solved very satisfactorily the problem of describing cultures in such a way that objective comparison is possible. Most cultural monographs organize the data in terms of the categories of our own contemporary Western culture: economics, technology, social organization, and the like. Such an ordering, of course, tears many of the facts from their own actual context and loads the analysis. The implicit assumption is that our categories are "given" by nature — an assumption contradicted most emphatically by these very investigations of different cultures. A smaller number of studies have attempted to present the information consistently in terms of the category system and whole way of thought of the culture being described. This approach obviously excludes the immediate possibility of a complete set of common terms of reference for comparison. Such a system of comparable concepts and terms remains to be worked out, and will probably be established only gradually.

In principle, however, there is a generalized framework that underlies the more apparent and striking facts of cultural relativity. All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct answers to essentially the same questions posed by human biology and by the generalities of the human situation. These are the considerations explored by Wissler under the heading of "the universal culture pattern" a by Murdock under the rubric of "the le common denominators of cultures." Eve society's patterns for living must provi approved and sanctioned ways for deali with such universal circumstances as the exis ence of two sexes; the helplessness of infan the need for satisfaction of the elementa biological requirements such as food, warmt and sex; the presence of individuals of diffe ent ages and of differing physical and oth capacities. The basic similarities in hum biology the world over are vastly more ma sive than the variations. Equally, there a certain necessities in social life for this kind animal regardless of where that life is carri on or in what culture. Cooperation to obta subsistence and for other ends requires a ce tain minimum of reciprocal behavior, of standard system of communication, and indee of mutually accepted values. The facts human biology and of human group livin supply, therefore, certain invariant points reference from which cross-cultural compar son can start without begging questions th are themselves at issue. As Wissler pointe out, the broad outlines of the ground plan all cultures is and has to be about the san because men always and everywhere are face with certain unavoidable problems whic arise out of the situation "given" by natur Since most of the patterns of all cultures cry talize around the same foci,[40] there are signi cant respects in which each culture is n wholly isolated, self-contained, disparate b rather related to and comparable with other cultures.[41]

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[39] As a matter of fact, cultures may share a large body of their content through historical connection and provable derivation and yet have arrived at pretty diverse value systems. If we could recover enough ancient and lost evidence, it is expectable that we would be driven to the admission that every culture shares some of its content, through derivation, with every other on earth. This historic interconnection leaves any monadal view or talk of the noncomparability of cultures without basis. Possessing coancestry, they must be comparable. All that the most confirmed relativists can properly claim is that to achieve the fullest understanding of any culture, we should not begin by applying to it the patterns and values of another culture. This eminently modest and reasonable principle of autonomy of comprehension, or reciprocity in understanding, do not assert that all the structure and all the values any two cultures are utterly disparate — which wou make them noncomparable and would be a mar festly extreme and improbable view. It affirms th there is comparability but that the structure-val system of one culture must not be imposed on a other if sound understanding is the aim. Biologis have long taken this for granted about classes organisms and yet have never stopped comparin them fruitfully. Only, their comparison means di covering likenesses *and* differences, not lookin merely for likenesses or merely for differences.

[40] Cf. Aberle, et al., 1950.

[41] This paragraph summarizes the argument f similarity and comparability of culture on gener

Nor is the similarity between cultures,
hich in some ways transcends the fact of
lativity, limited to the sheer forms of the
iversal culture pattern. There are at least
me broad resemblances in content and spe-
fically in value content. Considering the
huberant variation of cultures in most
spects, the circumstance that in some partic-
ars almost identical values prevail through-
t mankind is most arresting. No culture
lerates indiscriminate lying, stealing, or viol-
ce within the in-group. The essential uni-
rsality of the incest taboo is well-known.
o culture places a value upon suffering as an
d in itself; as a means to the ends of the
ciety (punishment, discipline, etc.), yes; as
means to the ends of the individual (pur-
cation, mystical exaltation, etc.), yes; but of
d for itself, never. We know of no culture
either space or time, including the Soviet
ıssian, where the official idology denies an
ter-life, where the fact of death is not cere-
onialized. Yet the more superficial concep-
on of cultural relativity would suggest that
least one culture would have adopted the
nple expedient of disposing of corpses in the
me way most cultures do dispose of dead
imals — i.e., just throwing the body out far
ough from habitations so that the odor is
t troubling. When one first looks rather
refully at the astonishing variety of cultural
tail over the world one is tempted to con-
ıde: human individuals have tried almost
erything that is physically possible and
arly every individual habit has somewhere
some time been institutionalized in at least
e culture. To a considerable degree this is
valid generalization — but not completely.
spite of loose talk (based upon an uncritical
ceptance of an immature theory of cultural
lativity) to the effect that the symptoms of
ental disorder are completely relative to cul-
re, the fact of the matter is that all cultures
fine as abnormal individuals who are permanently inaccessible to communication or who fail to maintain some degree of control over their impulse life. Social life is impossible without communication, without some measure of order: the behavior of any "normal" individual must be predictable — within a certain range — by his fellows and interpretable by them.

To look freshly at values of the order just discussed is very difficult because they are commonplaces. And yet it is precisely because they are *common*places that they are interesting and important. Their vast theoretical significance rests in the fact that despite all the influences that predispose toward cultural variation (biological variation, difference in physical environments, and the processes of history) all of the very many different cultures known to us have converged upon these universals. It is perfectly true (and for certain types of enquiry important) that the value "thou shalt not kill thy fellow tribesman" is not concretely identical either in its cognitive or in its affective aspects for a Navaho, an Ashanti, and a Chukchee. Nevertheless the central conception is the same, and there is understanding between representatives of different cultures as to the general intent of the prohibition. A Navaho would be profoundly shocked if he were to discover that there were no sanctions against in-group murder among the Ashanti.

There is nothing supernatural or even mysterious about the existences of these universalities in culture content. Human life is — and has to be — a moral life (up to a point) because it is a social life. It may safely be presumed that human groups which failed to incorporate certain values into their nascent cultures or which abrogated these values from their older tradition dissolved as societies or perished without record. Similarly, the biological sameness of the human animal (needs and potentialities) has also contributed to convergences.

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ounds of logic and common observation. The argu-
ent of course becomes much stronger still as soon as
e historic connections or interrelations of cultures
e considered, as outlined in the preceding footnote,
. Really, comparability is not even questionable,
d it has not been denied in practice except by
casional extreme dogmatists like Spengler. Indeed,
is precisely analytic comparison that first leads to recognition of differences of structure and values instead of naïve assumption of essential uniformity, and therewith to relativism. But relativistically colored comparison does not aim merely at ever-accentuated differentiating, which would become sterile and self-defeating. We must repeat that true comparison deals impartially with likenesses and divergences as analysis reveals them.

The fact that a value is a universal does not, of course, make it an absolute. It is possible that changed circumstances in the human situation may lead to the gradual disappearance of some of the present universals. However, the mere existence of universals after so many millennia of culture history and in such diverse environments suggests that they correspond to something extremely deep in man's nature and/or are necessary conditions to social life.

When one moves from the universals or virtual universals to values which merely are quite widespread, one would be on most shaky ground to infer "rightness" or "wrongness," "better" or "worse" from relative incidence. A value may have a very wide distribution in the world at a particular time just because of historical accidents such as the political and economic power of one nation at that time. Nations diffuse their culture into the areas their power reaches. Nevertheless this does not mean one must take all cultural values except universals as of necessarily equal validity. Slavery or cannibalism may have a place in certain cultures that is not evident to the ethnocentric Christian. Yet even if these culture patterns play an important part in the smooth functioning of these societies, they are still subject to a judgment which is alike moral and scientific. This judgment is not just a projection of values, local in time and space, that are associated with Western culture. Rather, it rests upon a *consensus gentium* and the best scientific evidence as to the nature of raw human nature — i.e., that human nature which all cultures mold and channel but never entirely remake. To say that certain aspects of Naziism were morally wrong [42] — is not parochial arrogance. It is — or can be — an assertion based both upon cross-cultural evidence as to the universalities in human needs, potentialities, and fulfillments and upon natural science knowledge with which the basic assumptions of any philosophy must be congruent.

Any science must be adequate to explain both the similarities and the differences in the phenomena with which it deals. Recent anthropology has focussed its attention preponderantly upon the differences. They ar there; they are very real and very importan Cultural relativism has been completely established and there must be no attempt to explai it away or to deprecate its importance becaus it is inconvenient, hard to take, hard to liv with. Some values are almost purely cultura and draw their significance only from th matrix of that culture. Even the universa values have their special phrasings and empha ses in accord with each distinct culture. An when a culture pattern, such as slavery, i derogated on the ground that it transgresse one of the more universal norms which i some sense and to some degree transcend cultural differences, one must still examine it no within a putatively absolutistic frame but i the light of cultural relativism.

At the same time one must never forget tha cultural differences, real and important thoug they are, are still so many variations on theme supplied by raw human nature and by th limits and conditions of social life. In som ways culturally altered human nature is comparatively superficial veneer. The common understandings between men of differen cultures are very broad, very general, ver easily obscured by language and many othe observable symbols. True universals or nea universals are apparently few in number. Bu they seem to be as deep-going as they are rare. Relativity exists only within a universal framework. Anthropology's facts attest that the phrase "a common humanity" is in no sense meaningless. This is also important.

Rapoport [43] has recently argued that objective relativism can lead to the development of truly explicit and truly universal standards in science and in values:

> So it is incorrect to say that the scientific outlook is simply a by-product of a particular culture. It is rather the essence of a culture which has not yet been established — a *culture-studying* culture. Ironically, the anthropologists, who often are most emphatic in stating that no noncultural standards of evaluation exist, are among the most active builders of this new culture-studying culture, whose standards transcend those of the cultures which anthropologists study

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[42] At very least, integratively and historically destructive.

[43] Rapoport, 1950, pp. 232–33.

> d thus give them an opportunity to emancipate emselves from the limitations of the local standards. ne anthropologist can remain the anthropologist th in New Guinea and in Middletown, in spite of e fact that he may have been born in Middletown in New Guinea.
>
> The moral attitudes contained in the scientific tlook have a different genesis from those con-ned in ordinary "unconscious" cultures. They are result of a "freer choice," because they involve a eper insight into the consequences of the choice.

In sum, cultures are distinct yet similar and mparable. As Steward has pointed out, the atures that lend uniqueness are the second-y or variable ones. Two or more cultures n have a great deal of content — and even patterning — in common and still there is distinctness; there are universals, but relativistic autonomy remains a valid principle. Both perspectives are true and important, and no false either-or antinomy must be posed between them. Once again there is a proper analogy between cultures and personalities. Each human being is unique in his concrete totality, and yet he resembles all other human beings in certain respects and some particular human beings a great deal. It is no more correct to limit each culture to its distinctive features and organization, abstracting out as "precultural" or as "conditions of culture" the likenesses that are universal, than to deny to each personality those aspects that derive from its cultural heritage and from participation in common humanity.

C. CONCLUSION

A FINAL REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

Anthropologists, like biologists somewhat earlier, were presented with a great array of structures and forms to describe. As the concept of culture was expanded, more and more things came to be described as their possible significance was grasped. The overwhelming bulk of published cultural anthropology consists in description. Slowly, this harvest of a rich diversity of examples has been conceptualized in a more refined manner. Starting with the premise that these descriptive materials were all relevant to a broad and previously neglected realm of phenomena, the concept of culture has been developed not so much through the introduction of strictly new ideas but through creating a new configuration of familiar notions: custom-tradition-organization-etc. In divorcing customs from the individuals who carried them out and in making customs the focus of their attention, anthropologists took an important step — a step that is perhaps still underestimated. When a time backbone was added to the notion of group variability in ways of doing things, not only group differences, but the notion of the historical derivation and development of these differences entered the picture. When the concept of "way" was made part of the configuration, this conceptualized the fact that not only discrete customs but also *organized* bodies of custom persisted and changed in time.

Various social theorists (Hegel, Weber, Comte, Marx, Huntington, and others) have tried to make particular forms the main dynamic in the historical process: ideas; religious beliefs and practices; forms of social organization; forms of technological control of the environment. One modern group would place forms of intra-family relationship in a central position. There has, of course, been some of this partisanship in anthropology: White and Childe who stress modes of technology; Laura Thompson and others who stress idea systems; British and American social anthropologists who make forms of social organization central; a few who have recently stressed the role of linguistic morphology. But if there be any single central tendency in the attempts to conceptualize culture over eighty years, it has been that of denying in principle a search for "*the*" factor. In the attempt to avoid simple determinisms, anthropologists have fairly consistently groped for a concept that would avoid commitment to any single dynamism for interpreting sociocultural life and would yet be broad and flexible enough to encompass all of the significant aspects in the "superorganic" life of human groups.

While in single definitions one can point to the splitters, the lumpers, the plumpers for one special feature, the over-all trend is certainly that indicated above. The majority emphasis, the steady emphasis has been upon working out a generalizing idea, a generative idea of the sort that Suzanne Langer[44] talks about:

> The limits of thought are not so much set from outside, by the fullness or poverty of experiences that meet the mind, as from within, by the power of conception, the wealth of formulative notions with which the mind meets experiences. Most new discoveries are suddenly-seen things that were always there. A new idea is a light that illuminates presences which simply had no form for us before the light fell on them. We turn the light here, there, and everywhere, and the limits of thought recede before it. A new science, a new art, or a young and vigorous system of philosophy, is generated by such a basic innovation. Such ideas as identity of matter and change of form, or as value, validity, virtue, or as outer world and inner consciousness, are not theories; they are the terms in which theories are conceived; they give rise to specific questions, and are articulated only in the form of these questions. Therefore one may call them generative ideas in the history of thought . . .

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[44] Langer, 1948, p. 5.

Again avoiding a new formal definition, we ay say — extending a little what has already een stated in III–e–15 — that this central idea now formulated by most social scientists pproximately as follows:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, f and for behavior acquired and transmitted by mbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of ıman groups, including their embodiments in arti-cts; the essential core of culture consists of tra-tional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas d especially their attached values; culture systems ay, on the one hand, be considered as products of tion, on the other as conditioning elements of rther action.

he main respects in which, we suspect, this rmula[45] will be modified and enlarged in e future are as regards (1) the interrelations cultural forms: and (2) variability and the dividual.

Perhaps a better way of putting the problem ould be to say that as yet we have no full eory of culture. We have a fairly well-lineated concept, and it is possible to enum-ate conceptual elements embraced within at master concept. But a concept, even an portant one, does not constitute a theory. here is a theory of gravitation in which ravity" is merely one term. Concepts have way of coming to a dead end unless they are und together in a testable theory. In thropology at present we have plenty of finitions but too little theory.

The existence of a concept of culture apart om a general theory is with little doubt one ctor which has influenced a few professional thropologists toward shying away from the e of the concept. The position of Radcliffe-own and other British social anthropologists s been discussed. In this country Chapple, rensberg, and their followers have attempted create a theory with biological and mathe-atical underpinnings, by-passing culture. We feel that their work, based upon careful measurements of interaction, has been limited by the fact that it is more readily productive to study culture in abstraction from concrete agents than to study social interaction segregated off from culture. But our point here is that they seem to have avoided the concept because it was not tied to other terms in generalized conceptual schemes such as have been constructed in biology and mathematics.

We suspect that a dynamic and generalized conceptual model in the area of culture will develop largely as a result of further investigation of cultural forms and of individual variability.

The study of cultural structures, as opposed to content, has progressed markedly during the last generation. Sapir, drawing upon linguistics where sheer structure is often crucial, showed what a fertile field for analysis this was and how much that was not immediately apparent could be discovered. "Forms and significances which seem obvious to an outsider will be denied outright by those who carry out the patterns; outlines and implications that are perfectly clear to these may be absent to the eye of the onlooker." Benedict, building upon the clues offered by Sapir and others, demonstrated the dependence of concrete and manifest cultural forms upon deeper-lying, pervasive principles. Bateson explored the interrelationships of institutional, cognitive, and affective cultural structures. Kroeber attempted to trace the "behavior" of cultural configurations in time. Morris Opler indicated how masses of content data might be subsumed as expressive of a relatively small number of themes characteristic of each culture.

Examples could be multiplied. We now have, as already pointed out, adumbrations of a theory of cultural structure. This needs to be pulled together, pointed up, and deepened by both diachronic and synchronic studies.

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[45] The word "formula" may well be objected to. ack is probably right when he writes: "Scientific ethod" . . . is a term of such controversial applica-n that a definition universally acceptable can be pected to be platitudinous. A useful definition will a controversial one, determined by a choice made, ore or less wisely, in the hope of codifying and luencing scientific procedures. . . . The search for an immutable and determinate essence underlying the plenitude of historical process can result only in epigrammatic paradox . . . . The type of definition appropriate takes the form of a description of the constitutive factors, together with an indication of their relative weight or importance and their mutual relationships. (1949, 94)

Steward has attempted to set up typological sequences of cultural forms recurring, putatively, because of environmental, demographic, and other constants. But we are still far from being able to state "the laws of cultural development." Analogies are dangerous, but it is tempting to suggest that the development of anthropology lags about a generation behind that of biology. Comparative morphology and evolutionary biology retain their importance in contemporary biology, but biochemistry and genetics are the most actively innovating fields.[46] We are still some distance from "cultural genetics."

The culture and personality approach can help bring us closer to a "cultural genetics." We think that those who have looked to the psychological level for explanations, whether following the lead of Boas or with subsequent importations from psychoanalysis and learning theory, are in a position to make significant contributions, provided they do not, in effect, try to "reduce" or "abolish" culture in the process.

There must be concurrent emphasis upon the variability of cultural forms as well as upon the variability of personalities within the group. In part, what seems to give structure to personality is the incorporation of cultural forms; underlying and expressing these are the basic meanings laid down beginning in early childhood. The formed cultural element must become as integral a part of the formulation of the concept "personality" as the idea of defense systems resulting from pressure on basic needs is part of it today. Investigators should make cross-cultural personality studies because thus they can compare individuals who have not only been exposed to different forms but to some of the same forms in different sequence.

Culture is an abstract description of *trends toward* uniformity in the words, acts, and artifacts of human groups. Like personality, culture might be conceived dynamically as the working out of the implications of certain genetic foci. Just as a personality syster acquires early its characteristic bents so doe a cultural one. There would appear to be suggestive analogy between the weighting o themas on a projective test and the recurrenc of the thematic principles of the implicit cul ture. The basic themes of a personality may b more unconscious, have a more dynamic rol The implicit configurations of a culture ma be closer to conscious imagery and expresse in less disguised form through observabl forms of behavior and expression.

However, the naïve individual is unawar of the extent to which what he regards as hi own personal habits are patterned (positivel or negatively) along cultural lines.[47] Th patterning is primarily that of the implic culture. These underlying cultural form often have extraordinary persistence eve when shifts in culture content are major an rapid. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la mêm chose." This has been repeatedly pointed ou and documented by Boas, Kroeber, and Sapi (among others). Boas, for example, in hi introduction to Benedict's *Patterns of Cultur* remarks, "In comparison to changes of con tent of culture the configuration has ofte remarkable permanency." Kroeber in his 192 discussion of the cultures of the America Southwest pointed out that "the container of various distinctive cultures altered muc less through time than the items, traits, an complexes that were "contained." Sapir ha made a generalization with respect to th dynamism involved:

> Whenever the human mind has worked collectivel and unconsciously, it has striven for and often a tained unique form. The important point is that th evolution of form has a drift in one direction, that seeks poise, and that it rests, relatively speaking, whe it has found this poise.

Since the unique cultural forms in accor with which individuals unconsciously patter much of their behavior have, as it were, logic of their own,[48] no psychological la

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[46] Certain outstanding biologists like Julian Huxley integrate the historical and experimental branches.

[47] Cf. Sapir, 1949 (originally 1927), p. 549 ff.

[48] This is the conclusion reached by Richardson and Kroeber (1940) as a result of their empirical and quantitative examination of women's dress fashions during three centuries:

"We are now in position better to weigh the sever possible causes of changes in variability. The pr mary factor would seem to be adherence to or d parture from an ideal though unconscious patte for formal clothing of women. The consistent co nd no investigation of the culture-personality ontinuum which attempts to reduce culture o psychology will ever explain all of the road principles of culture change.

Maquet (1949, pp. 246–7) remarks:

> Il est exact que les prémisses de culture ne sont pas es facteurs non-immanents. Cependent elles sont des icteurs sociaux, ou plus exactement socioculturels au ens où toute idée exprimée est un phénomène im-ossible sans societé. Par ailleurs — et ceci est plus nportant — ces prémisses culturelles, quoique de ature idéale, sont cependant des facteurs exterieurs ar rapport aux divers domaines de la pensée.

As Sapir showed for language,[49] there are configurational pressures" which bring about oth parallel and differentiating changes. very particular cultural structure through its mphases, its tendencies toward disequilibrium 1 certain sectors, its lack of development in articular areas, favors evolution in some direc-ons and not in others. And, as Sapir further ointed out, "it is more than doubtful if the radual unfolding of social patterns tends indef-itely to be controlled by function." [50]

Harris has well generalized Sapir's views as ey relate to planned change:

> Changes which are attempted at any one time will erefore be intimately connected with the cultural atterns existing at that time, and will lead to patterns hich differ in certain directions rather than in thers, and which are not entirely different and un-lated to the previous patterns. A more or less ontinuous and directional shift, with observable regularities, is therefore often discernible in the history of cultural patterns taken by themselves, even though the *agency* of change is the reaction of the individual. (1951, 328; italics ours).

The polar case is, of course, that of fashion[51] or style. Here there seems to be an element of irreversibility or near irreversibility which few aspects of culture seem to possess. But there appears to be a degree of stylistic individuation or particularization in all forms of culture; sometimes this is deflected by external pressures or by strains in the total cultural system. In general, though, drift almost comes down to the matter of style, and each style has its fluctuations, its periodicities, or arrives at its inherent terminus ("pattern saturation").

The older biology also paid but little focussed, systematic attention to individual variability. Darwin's *Origin of Species* is as full of reference to variations as it is to adaptations and heredity. But either it is particular, isolated variations that are cited and described, or the general fact of variability is assumed. To Darwin, variations go somewhere in making selective adaptation possible, but they come from nowhere, out of the blue. It was Mendel who first posed the question whether there was an order or form in which variations *came*. Darwin had focussed on change in heredity and on selection-survival as its agency; but while his work reeks of the fact of variation, how variation operates remains

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ormity of variability to certain magnitudes of pro-ortion — mostly a conformity of low variabilities to igh magnitudes — leaves little room for any other onclusion. . . . Social and political unsettlement as ich might produce stylistic unsettlement and varia-ility as such; but there is nothing to show that it ould per se produce thick waists, ultra high or low nes, short and tight skirts. If there is a connection ere, it seems that it must be through alteration of ie basic semi-conscious pattern, through an urge to nsettle or disrupt this; and that when increased ishion variability occurs, it is as a direct function f pattern stress, and only indirectly, and less cer-inly, of sociopolitical instability. In short, generic istorical causes tending toward social and cultural istability may produce instability in dress styles lso; but their effect on style is expressed in stress pon the existent long-range basic pattern of dress, nd the changes effected have meaning only in terms f the pattern." (1940, 147–48)

The "unconscious" or "semi-conscious" patterns referred to would be aspects of what in the present monograph is designated as "implicit culture."

[49] Murdock (1949b, pp. 198–99) notes:

"The phenomenon of linguistic drift exhibits numerous close parallels to the evolution of social organization, e.g., limitation in the possibilities of change, a strain toward consistency, shifts from one to another relatively stable equilibrium, compensatory internal readjustments, resistance to any influence from diffusion that is not in accord with the drift . . . The present study has led to the conclusion that social organization is a semi-independent system comparable in many respects to language, and similarly characterized by an internal dynamics of its own. It is not, however, quite such a closed system, for it demonstrably does change in response to external events, and in identifiable ways. Nevertheless, its own structure appears to act as a filter for the influences which affect it."

[50] Sapir, 1949, p. 341.

[51] Cf. Richardson and Kroeber, 1940.

out of the focus of the inquiry — which is why he could passively accept Lamarckianism. Similarly, in anthropology the notion of variability within the group is coming to be emphasized more and more, but is not yet sharply focussed, at least not from the angle of culture — see Part III*d*, Comment. Linguistics, which is often a delicate indicator of cultural theory, is now stressing the phoneme — a range of variation of a pattern focus. The older anthropological approach, useful and sufficient in its day, has tended to obscure important issues that hinge upon the empirical fact of formal variability. Fulfilling cultural forms in individual behavior is not the easy achievement that is often tacitly assumed in anthropological literature. The individual's notions of "correct form" are often fuzzy. Even when they are more clear-cut, personal needs and drives frequently prevent more than a crude approximation. It is also probably difficult for both participant and investigator to project similarity into the behavior of others; the investigator misses the nuances.

The trend toward emphasizing variability is closely related to the growing emphasis on the individual in cultural studies. Not only is every individual different, but, concretely, the cultural forms differ too with the individuals who color them with their own needs and presses. Concretely, again, even the cultural heritage of each individual is unique, even though abstractly the total cultural heritage is available to all. Conversely, the same cultural forms are used as vehicles for very different sorts of personality projection. The same form can be used for an almost endless variety of purposes and for expressing an almost infinite shading of meanings. Certain socially accepted culture patterns receive their affective charg largely because they are circuitous outlets fo feelings that cannot be more directly expressed Such forms as witchcraft, for example, are o about the same kind of significance in gettin down to basic meanings as are significant re sponses on projective tests. Finally, a recen trend (as in the work of Morris[52]) has been t emphasize not just discrete cultural forms bu formal types as models for personality devel opment.

All of this is said not in the framework o the reductionism that pervades much of th culture and personality movement but becaus the study of culture itself would seem t require explicit provision in its central con cept for the implications which cultural form have for the individual and the variability o individuals. This point will be amplified i the next section.

We agree with L. L. Bernard[53] that:

> . . . definition ranges all the way from the low leve of accuracy of indicating (pointing out) an object o process through naming and describing it in a literar manner, to the various stages of symbolic condensation and functional conditioning, and ending in th formulation of an ideal hypothetical norm which i a sort of compromise between the generalization o inadequate experiental reality and a projected realit which is yet to be attained in its entirety.

"Culture" has now reached the stage that Bernard calls that of "condensed representativ abstract definition."[54] It remains for futur work to produce a further symbolic condensation that will make adequate provision fo the systemic nature of cultures ("interrelation of forms") and for individuals and their variabilities.

REVIEW OF ASPECTS OF OUR OWN POSITION

We do not propose to attempt a summary of our "Summary," let alone of our many criticisms and appraisals of the discussions of others in the main body of this work, plus our own, we hope, constructive points scattered through the body of the text. Yet, in the interests of clarity, it seems proper at thi point to restate briefly our position on certair issues that are controversial at the moment some of them perhaps needlessly so. The ensuing paragraphs are, therefore, highly selective and do not constitute a complete gest of our theory of culture but only of ir stand on certain topics of special con- mporary interest.

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[52] Morris, 1948.

[53] Bernard, 1941a, p. 510.

[54] Bernard, 1941a, p. 501.

Culture is a general category of nature, and pressly of human nature. As such it is com- rable to categories like energy, mass, evolu- on. As a general category it is both sub- antive (or classificatory) and explanatory. hat is, it may be asked: to what main natural tegory is this or that phenomenon — or are ese selected aspects of phenomena — to be cribed? If the phenomenon is, for example, e religious system of the Haida, the answer clearly "cultural," just as in the case of the productive cycle of the hamster the answer ould be "biological." Or, the query may be: *hy* do the Chinese avoid milk and milk pro- icts. The only possible shorthand answer is: cause of their culture — which reply implic- y rejects an explanation in terms of heredity present situation.

Substantively and descriptively, the totality human culture includes the cultural phe- mena of all peoples, times, and places inso- r as these phenomena are known or know- le. Culture as a generalized explanatory tegory applies to all of these, though the tality constitutes an aggregation which does ve in common the six general features just viewed in B of Part IV. Cultural phenom- a in general are also, of course, character- ed by the fact that specific elements of each lture bear some relation both to the broad ound plan of all cultures *and* to the distinc- ve design of the specific culture to which e element belonged or belongs.

Literally, it might be contended that the tality of human culture is patterned only in e sense of a broad similarity at all times and aces of some of its grand categories like ansmissibility, and in the possession of the ore or less universal values that have been scussed. Future work will show the extent which the definition of these categories and lues can be sharpened or to which they will shrink on comparison. But there is undoubtedly an element of patterning in the totality of human culture, whether this totality be regarded as the historical summation of individuated cultures, or as a context and implied standard of reference for particular cultural phenomena, or as a body of data useful in psychologically delimiting "raw human nature."

However, total culture is a generalization like "living matter" or total life on earth; and it is of the nature of generalizations that as such they cannot show the sharp patterning characteristic of particular phenomena, such as particular cultures constitute. In another sense, however, total culture can be seen as strongly patterned because, much like total life, it is not diffusely or amorphously uniform in its occurrence, but is expressed only through a great variety of highly patterned forms. This "culture in the partitive sense," [55] or particular cultures, as they are usually called, are, like particular forms of life, markedly idiosyncratic, and patterning is one of their most significant properties. It is patterning that gives to each culture — or species — its selective and distinctive life-way; to each culture its "selective orientation toward experience broadly characteristic of a group." [55a]

It is proper, then, to speak both of culture in general — whether in a descriptive or explanatory way — and of particular cultures. Moreover, the lines of demarcation of any cultural unit chosen for description and analysis are in large part a matter of level of abstraction and of convenience for the problem at hand. Occidental culture, Graeco-Roman culture, nineteenth-century European culture, German culture, Swabian culture, the peasant culture of the Black Forest in 1900 — these are all equally legitimate abstractions if carefully defined. At one level "Mayan culture" is a useful concept; more microscopically, this entity dissolves into a series of rather differentiated, separate cultures.

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[55] On "culture" and "a culture" and on explanatory d descriptive dimensions, see Kluckhohn and Kelly, 45a and 1945b. The term "partitive" comes from ylor, 1948.

[55a] In correspondence with us Walter Taylor has de an interesting case for the view that holistic lture is "psychological" and only partitive culture is anthropological. He suggests that only particular cultures have structure — i.e. specific structures. Total human culture is additive or summative of many varieties — like the total class, Mammals. There is a Mammalian pattern, but of course there can't be a mammalian structure.

The same may be said of New Guinea Melanesian culture or cultures.

Culture is produced and changed, concretely, by individuals and each distinctive life-way is also the product of a group. Yet a culture is not necessarily tied throughout time to a particular society. Mohammedan culture, as we know it today, cuts across communities, societies, and nations. Roman society ceased to exist as such more than a millenium ago, but Roman culture was a vital force throughout the Middle Ages and, in certain aspects, is still "alive" today.

This is one of many reasons why culture must be regarded as an autonomous system or category and indeed—at least for certain purposes—can be treated quite frankly in relative abstraction from both personalities and societies. Culture is not a mystical "force" acting at a distance. *Concretely*, it is created by individual organisms and by organisms operating as a group. It is internalized in individuals and also becomes part of their environment through the medium of other individuals and of cultural products. Acts take place: (a) in time between persons, (b) in space in an environment partly made up of other persons. But because acts take place in time the past continues to influence the present. The history of each group leaves its precipitate—conveniently and, by now, traditionally called "culture"—which is present in persons, shaping their perceptions of events, other persons, and the environing situation in ways not wholly determined by biology and by environmental press. Culture is an intervening variable between human "organism" and "environment."

As a matter of general theory, it must never be forgotten that there is a ceaseless interaction between personality (or individual variability) and culture; that only persons and not cultures interact in the concrete, directly observable world; and the like. All of this is manifestly true at the level of concrete events. Yet in science, abstractions at different levels are both permissible and desirable, so long as there remains awareness of the level of abstraction at which the investigator is operating. At the cultural level
abstraction it is perfectly proper to speak
relations between cultures, the mutual infl
encing of cultures, in the same way that, mo
concretely, we speak of relations between pe
sons. Even fairly concretely, this is som
times a better description. Take, as a simp
example, the case of the modern scholar w
learns about mediæval North African cultu
from Ibn Khaldun. He does not interact wi
the person, Ibn Khaldun, nor the latte
Muslim contemporaries. The modern scho
really encounters, through a book, a differe
way of life which (as filtered through his pe
sonality and culture) he then reacts to a
tends to diffuse into his own culture.

Those who still deny the autonomy (
some respects) of the cultural level are eith
stubborn reductionists who reject the validi
of all emergent systems or such as find it i
possible to deal satisfactorily with their ow
particular interests by a purely cultural a
proach. Dollard,[56] for example, in a we
known paper remarks:

> . . . a very peculiar conception of the human ani
> emerges from the cultural way of viewing behavi
> He appears as a bearer of culture, much as facto
> workers look like "hands" to their employer. W
> one sees from the cultural angle is a drama of
> much like a puppet show in which "culture"
> pulling the strings from behind the scenes. Men
> not emerge in their full personal reality, but they
> pear as actors of parts, as role-players, and the att
> tion is never centered on them but only on their o
> line of behavior.

All of this is valid enough. But anthropologi
do not claim that culture provides a compl
explanation of human behavior, merely th
there is a cultural element in most human b
havior, and that certain things in behavi
make most sense when seen through cultu
We would add that just as behavior in all
concreteness is a proper object of scienti
enquiry, so culture and cultural process a
even when abstracted from behavior. Cultu
as an emergent and a culture as a system wi
its own properties are indeed more effective
studied in abstraction from personality a
concrete individual variability, just as biolo

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[56] Dollard, 1939, p. 52.

de notable progress without waiting for emistry to solve all the problems of the derlying processes. To be sure, there is w biochemistry, and we have no doubt that ere will eventually be a genuine cultural ychology or even cultural physiology: but feel that the study of culture as such must t be abandoned for a perhaps premature nthesis or a disguised reductionism.

n general, approach from an underlying el may hope to explain the uniformities in enomena of an upper level, but does not en attack the problem of their diversities. anted that we know a great deal about the l biochemistry of the sex drive, we still ow nothing of why a thousand human pop- tions are likely to practice five hundred tinguishable kinds of marriage besides in- merable varieties of extra-marital sex be- vior. Our experience to date makes it likely t there will always be irreducible residues ich do make sense and do have meaning in ms of relations within their own level. It is fact conceivable that as the body of reduced trans-level understandings grows, our cor- s of unreduced intra-level understandings l also continue to grow. Its simplicity is at renders reductionism attractive as a con- otual system. To believe that essential re- ction has been accomplished is an illusion;[57] t it is about to be, is a wish fulfillment. Our lest understanding of the world may well ntinue to be in pluralistic terms.

The realization of the pragmatic utility and cessity of recognition of distinctive levels is a risk of being pushed to a point of ex- s. In that event the aspects or properties of h level are exaggerated and transcendental- d into entities or kinds of realities in the stantive sense: life, mind, society, culture. metimes the motivation of such hypostasiz- ; or reification is the ardor of a new attitude. metimes it is a hangover from old pre-scien- c concepts like soul. The result is that radical innovators and die-hard reactionaries of the intellect may find themselves fellow-partisans against an orthodox bourgeoisie of reductionists and that the latter do not discriminate between their opponents.

Grace de Laguna has presented a balanced view which recognizes alike the existence of distinct realms of phenomena (the psychological and the cultural) and their interdependence:

> It is as if the basic pattern of the culture must be reflected in the internal structure of each individual person; as if the individual were in some sense a microcosm and the culture to which he belongs a macrocosm. Each individual, like a Leibnizian monad, "reflects" the culture of his world from his own point of view and with varying degrees of clearness and confusion. The experienced ethnologist is now able to reconstruct a considerable part of the cultural system from any good informant, using not merely what the informant "knows," or can verbalize, but what he unwittingly reflects in his attitudes and modes of expressive response . . . observable differences are equally important and even more significant. The basic structure is rather to be found in the common ground of both their similarities and their differences, the trunk from which divergent personalities branch and by which they are all supported. (1949, 387–88)

From a mere insistence on the importance of recognizing culture as a distinct domain of phenomena, there has been considerable spilling-over to the further but hasty and usually hazy attitude which sees culture as a special kind of entity or substance. Malinowski in the same essay credited culture with being "a reality sui generis" and yet saved his monism by deriving the manifestations of this same culture from physiological needs and psychological imperatives. Culture may be primarily intelligible in terms of itself, but it is never unresidually intelligible in terms of itself.

The efficient causes[58] of cultural phenomena unquestionably are men: individual personalities who are in interpersonal and social relations. This cannot be denied, and there is neither use nor honesty in trying to whittle any of it away. But the manifestations of culture come characteristically in certain forms, patterns, or configurations, many of which are large, ramifying, and enduring. Now while persons undoubtedly make and produce these cultural forms, our knowledge of persons — and very largely also our knowledge of societies of persons — has failed conspicuously to explain the cultural *forms*: to derive specific cultural effects from specific psychic or social causes. In fact, psychological and social concepts or mechanisms are not even much good at *describing* cultural forms.[59] Such descriptions or characterizations begin to mean something only when they are made on the cultural level — in terms of intercultural relations and of cultural values.

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[57] On the difficulties and "illusion" of reduction in natural sciences, cf. Nagel, 1949.

[58] We use this terminology here and elsewhere because we suscribe whole-heartedly to the istotelian theory of causation but because those o attack culture as a "cause" or "explanation" are whether they realize it or not — thinking in these highly similar terms. We are aware that contemporary thought rejects the notion that a cause is connected with its effect as if by a sort of hidden string. We ourselves think of causality as interdependence or co-variance — if a, then b (under defined circumstances). Even this relationship, alike in most aspects of physical and social science, is not more than a statement of high probability: certain events or abstracted parts of events tend strongly to

Every anthropologist or historian concerned with culture realizes that cultural situations make more sense, reveal more meaning, in proportion as we know more of their cultural antecedents, or, generically, more total cultural context. In other words, cultural forms or patterns gain in intelligibility as they are set in relation to other cultural patterns.

We are convinced that the primacy of patterns and pattern relation must be accepted in our intellectual operations with cultural data, possibly not for ever, but at any rate in the present development of our learning and science. It is easy to cry for dynamic mechanisms, but they have been very hard to find. What the mechanisms or efficient causes residing in persons have explained in culture is on the one hand, certain kinds of cultural innovations; on the other hand, perhaps the broader recurrences, its rather hazily defined common denominators. All the characterized qualities of culture, all its variations and specificities, remain essentially unexplained by dynamic psychic mechanisms.[60]

The clearest case is furnished again
linguistics. Speech is a wholly human a
wholly social phenomenon, but linguisti
thrives by being completely anonymous a
impersonal, with a minimum of reference
its carriers and their psychology, and
dealing with the relations of specific forn
without serious concern for their speci
productive causes. The relation of *d*, *t*, *ts*
deux, *two*, *zwei* is a "law" in the sense
being a regularity of form, of consistent re
tion of pattern. But the linguist does n
generally ask what made English have
where French has *d*. He could not give t
answer and he knows he could not; and —
he has even thought about it — he probab
suspects that no reductionist could give
either. The linguist may also be quite ready
concede that in his way the physicist is right
he claims that actually language *is* varying
vibrations made by the larynges and mout
of individuals of *Homo sapiens*. On t
physicist's level language is that and remai
that. The linguist gets something more signi
cant than air waves out of his material becau
he does not try to explain it either throu
airwaves or through efficient causes residing
persons, but by taking such causality f
granted and concerning himself with t
interrelations of linguistic *forms*.

Culture as a whole is more manifold a
less channeled than its part, language. Th
perhaps is why students of culture have be
less courageous or decisive in realizing that o
of their most fertile procedures is essential
the same. Like language, culture exists on
in and through human individuals and the
psychosomatic properties; and like langua
it acquires a certain larger intelligibility a
systematic significance in the degree that
takes these persons for granted and procee
to investigate the interrelations of supe
personal forms of culture. Culture may w
yet reveal "laws" similar to the "laws" whic
the linguist calls sound shifts; only they w

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recur together. This is essentially Hume's interpretation of causality in terms of generality (cf. Reichenbach, 1951, esp. pp. 157–59).

[59] As shown by the fact that we have now in America a dozen or two of systematic books on social psychology which all deal with psycho-social mechanism and nearly all carefully refrain fro
dealing with the cultures produced by the mechanis

[60] The problem may be that of Langmuir's "co
vergent and divergent phenomena." Cf. Langmu
1943.

sumably be, like these, primarily relations orms (synchronic or sequential), not laws fficient causality. So far as these latter are erminable for culture, the prospect seems e that they will continue to reside largely ot wholly in the psychic or psychosomatic l.

ntil now anthropology has gone much her in building up a theory for structures, onality theory farther in building up a ry of functions. In the past culture theory tended to emphasize explicitness. In recent rs culture theory has been working "downds," personality theory "upwards." It may hat a single conceptual model, based not n summary reductionism but upon gradual escence, may be created which is usable for that portion of psychology that deals the individual interacting with his fellows with that part of anthropology which s with the approximations of individuals ultural forms and with the growth and ge of cultures insofar as these arise from vidual variation.

e recur, however, to our point that some cts of cultural process not only can but better be studied in abstraction from cul- l agents. Cultures are systems (that is, organized) because the variables are inter- endent.[61] All systems appear to acquire ain properties that characterize the system system rather than the sum of isolable ele- ts. Among these properties is that of ctionality or "drift." There is a momentum ity to cultural systems.[62] The perform- of a culturally patterned activity appears carry with it implications for its own ge which is by no means altogether ran- . Forms in general, as D'Arcy Thompson shown, have momentum qualities. The ence of "drift" in one aspect of culture guistics) has been fairly well established. re is probably "cultural drift" in general. re may even be in some sense "cultural orthogenesis" within particular limited scopes; that is, the direction of at least some culture change is more predetermined by earlier forms of the culture than caused by environmental press and individual variability.

This is not to minimize the role of "accident" — the inability of our conceptual models to predict the entry of significant new factors that influence the body of phenomena under consideration. Just as mutations bring to the gene pool of a population previously non-operative elements, so invention, natural catastrophes or optima, perhaps gene mutations toward unusually endowed or specialized individuals, alter the course of cultures.[63] Nevertheless, in spite of all these "accidents," it is an empirical fact that there are significant freezings in the cultural process. It is these which anthropologists can most easily study. Anthropology, like Darwin's work, has been largely a matter of looking at acts in terms of their consequences rather than in terms of their "causes" — in the meaning of classical mechanics.

The logical construct, culture, is based upon the study of behavior and behavioral products. It returns to behavior and behavioral products in that the concept of culture makes more behavior intelligible and, to an appreciable extent, makes possible predictions about behavior in particular areas. But culture is not behavior[64] nor the investigation of behavior in all its concrete completeness. Part of culture consists in norms for or standards of behavior. Still another part consists in ideologies justifying or rationalizing certain selected ways of behavior. Finally, every culture includes broad general principles of selectivity[65] and ordering ("highest common factors") in terms of which patterns of and for and about behavior in very varied areas of culture content are reducible to parsimonious generalization.

Herewith we hope our basic theoretical

As L. J. Henderson used to say: "The interde- ence of variables in a system is one of the widest ctions from experience that we possess; or, we alternatively regard it as the definition of a m."

Cf. Kroeber, 1944.

Cf. Kluckhohn, 1945b, pp. 161–64.

[64] Cf. Gide, "la rivalité du monde réel et de la représentation que nous nous en faisons."

[65] Mauss, 1935, remains one of the most impressive examinations of selectivity. This study is not nearly as well known in the English-speaking world as it should be.

position has been made clear. We are not too sure that we can properly classify ourselves as cultural realists, idealists, or nominalists.[66] We have been trying to make new wine: it may or may not decant usefully into eight-hundred-year old bottles. With all respect for the philosophical approach, we naturally cannot but hope that our views have a content broader than can be wholly subsumed by these categories. If we are asked: "How can a logical construct like culture explain anything?" we would reply that other logical constructs and abstractions like "electromag netic field" or "gene" — which no one h ever seen — have been found serviceable i scientific understanding. Analytic abstractio summarize an order of relationship betwee natural phenomena, and relations are as re as things. Whatever one or the other o us may have said in haste or error in the past, in this monograph we have at any rate trie to honor the philosophical precept of n confusing substance with reality.

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[66] Cf. Bidney, 1942, 1946, 1947; Spiro, 1951.

[67] Herskovits, 1951a, 1951b; Spiro, 1951.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: HISTORICAL NOTES ON IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

By

Alfred G. Meyer

One reason why the German term "Kultur" could acquire a connotation different from that given it by contemporary American anthropology is the very trivial fact that the German language has another word which has often been used to denote "culture" in the anthropological sense. That word is "Volk," together with its derivatives, "Volkstum," "volkstuemlich," "voelkisch," and others. More often it is the plural, "Voelker," which has the meaning that "culture" has acquired in anthropology. "Volk," when used n the singular, often connotates the *German* people;[1] indeed, the adjective "voelkisch" acquired a distinctly jingoist character around he turn of the century, stressing the indigenous racial and cultural heritage rather han political allegiance.[2] But the plural, "Voelker" — often used in the combination "Voelker der Erde" — can often be translated s "cultures." "Voelkerkunde" and ethnography are, as a rule, synonymous.[3] In both the German and the Russian tradition, anthropology more often than not is physical anhropology, whereas social and cultural aspects re stressed by ethnography; hence "Voelkerkunde" is roughly equivalent to "cultural nthropology." As early as 1785 Meiners held hat his comparative description of cultures might just at well be called "Voelkerkunde" or, more specifically, "Fruehvoelkerkunde."[4]

In this connection, it should be pointed out hat the word "Voelker" is used more often to enote primitive cultures than advanced cultures. The plural of "Volk" thus came to denote cultures other than our own, specifically, non-European or non-Western cultures.[5]

Kultur theories can be explained to a considerable extent as an ideological expression of, or reaction to, Germany's political, social and economic backwardness in comparison with France and England. But the ideological reaction to this backwardness went into different and mutually hostile directions. For Kant and other representatives of eighteenth-century enlightenment in Germany, the enlightenment itself, the growth of rationalist and utilitarian philosophy, the flourishing of political and economic institutions, represented *Kultur*, and to emulate the achievements of *Kultur* was the task they set for Germany. *Kultur* thus had a universal, patently international flavor. Nonetheless individual nations or states could be regarded as the principal carriers of *Kultur*, and those nations were acclaimed as pathfinders and models for backward Germany. In this spirit, German radicals during the last decade of the eighteenth century supported revolutionary France and hailed Napoleon as the spreader of *Kultur* over all of Europe.

The other ideological strand tended to regard *Kultur* as a complex of qualities, achievements, and behavior patterns which were local or national in origin and significance, unique, non-transferable, non-repetitive, and therefore irrelevant for the outsider. Herder's relativism did much to pave the way for this conception of *Kultur*. The stress on such unique culture patterns as against the economic, political, scientific, or philosophical achievements of Western civilization can be regarded as an attempt to compensate for a deep-seated feeling of inferiority on the part of German intellectuals once they had come in contact with the advanced nations. Similarly, Russian cultural nationalism can easily be traced to such a feeling of inferiority; quite fittingly, Russian cultural nationalism developed in the measure as Russian contacts with the West intensified. These *Kultur* theories, then, are a typical ideological expression — though by no means the only one — of the rise of backward societies against the encroachments of the West on their traditional culture. *They consist in asserting the reality of something which is just about to be destroyed.*

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[1] Toennies uses "Volkstum" almost synonymously with "Kultur," whereas "Zivilisation" is defined as "Staatstum"; all these terms are used universally, without being restricted to German culture.

[2] Usually, it was nothing else than a euphemistic ynonym of "antisemitic."

[3] They are, of course, also literal translations of each other.

[4] Stoltenberg, 1937, pt. 1, p. 200.

[5] Note the similar connotation of "the others" which the Hebrew word "goyim" and the Latin "gentes" — both originally meaning "peoples" — have acquired. Luther consistently translated both words as "Heiden."

This ideological reaction against the dynamics of westernization and industrialization need not, of course, be international only; it can be a purely domestic phenomenon. The tradition of enlightenment calls for support of those social strata in one's own country which are likely to further the spread of *Kultur;* conversely, Germans, in the name of *Kultur*, opposed the encroachments of *Zivilisation*, just as certain Americans, in the name of traditional American community ways, bewail urbanization, industrialization, and the curse of bigness. And in this fight for the preservation of the cultural heritage at home, the ideologist is often tempted to seek support for his denunciations of civilization in a glowing description of primitive but unspoiled cultures. Tacitus held up to his degenerate contemporaries the simple but upright life of the primitive cultures in Germany's forests; Rousseau similarly used the noble savage of the North American plains; Herder draws on an almost encyclopædic knowledge of primitive cultures for the same reason; and one might even point out that Margaret Mead's studies of Samoan culture were undertaken in part in order to hold up a didactic mirror to modern man.

This is not, however, the original "domestic" significance of *Kultur* theories of this sort. Like theories of contact and popular sovereignty, *Kultur* theories were directed against the *ancien régime* and its absolutism; for they held, explicitly, that history was not made by states and dynasties, but by peoples. The difference between the two types of revolutionary ideologies is that the one conceives of "the people" as a political association; the other, as a natural community of culture. Both are liberal in their intent; but the one is rational, the other, romantic or even sentimental liberalism. One wants to go "forward" — if the word make any sense — to political democracy; the other, "back" to nature.[6]

Romantic liberalism and those *Kultur* theories which are within its tradition are therefore not only directed against absolutism, but also against the entire rational-utilitarian tradition of the Age of Enlightenment. It is therefore not at all astonishing that after the French Revolution, when rationalism, utilitarianism, and related theories were associated with Jacobinism, just as dialectical materialism is today associated with the Kremlin, the Romantic struggle against this tradition turned against the Revolution. The *Sturm und Drang* movement, of which Herder's preoccupation with primitive cultures is an intrinsic part,[7] had been a rebel ideology; Romanticism was clearly counter-revolutionary. Yet, *Kultur* theories of both the Kant and the Herder tradition were sufficiently identified with the idea of dissent or revolt that this identification alone might explain why the concept of *Kultur* was altogether eliminated from the dictionary of German social thought until after 1848, by which time its radical connotation had probably been forgotten entirely.[8]

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[6] Rousseau straddles both these types of revolutionary ideology and could therefore become a precursor of both the rational and the irrational tradition of nineteenth-century thought. Herder's concept of *Cultur* also contains seeds of both the political-rational and the irrational-cultural strands.

[7] Herder's preoccupation with primitive cultures is manifested not only in his philosophy of history, but also in his extensive labors to translate the poetic heritage of primitive or extinct cultures.

[8] It is true that Schiller, taking the Kantian concept as a point of departure, attempted to give it a completely unpolitical, or rather antipolitical, twist. Recoiling from the sight of the terror that had been unleashed by the French Revolution, Schiller in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (first published in 1795) denounced the idea that material culture could advance mankind. Look at the developments in France — he said in effect — and you will see the disastrous results of this kind of culture. In

t the same time, it is quite possible to argue hat the *Kultur* idea of Herder and his con-emporaries too was directed against the rench Revolution even before that revolution ook place. Herder's history expressed dis-atisfaction with the course of our own ivilization. There is implicit in it a theory f the decline of the West and the ascendancy f unspoiled cultures like those of the Slavs. here is at times a mood of pessimism, a menting over the opportunities which the Vest has missed, and a warning of evil things come. Thoughts like these were eagerly icked up by cultural nationalists in Russia.[9]

Russian social thought, one might right-lly claim, centered around problems of ulture. Throughout the nineteenth century, e "problem of Russian history," i.e., the uestion concerning Russia's cultural char-cteristics, destiny, and mission, was one of e central themes with which all social ought, from Chaadaev to Stalin and Berdiaev, d to deal. Posing the problem of "Russia d the West," which was germane to this er recurrent theme, gave a relativistic char-cter to all Russian ideologies from the start. imilar to the divergent strands in German *ultur* ideas, moreover, two schools of ought forked out in Russia as well, the Vesterners — rationalists, utilitarian in orien-tion, mechanistic in method, who regarded ussia as an integral part (however back-ard) of Western civilization — and the avophiles, cultural nationalists, who asserted e distinctness and superiority of Russian or avic culture, the irrelevancy of European perience for Russia, and the inapplicability historical laws of the West to Russian soil.

The ideological similarity or even identity Russian cultural nationalism with German ltural nationalism is obscured by the fact at nineteenth-century Russian thought itially took its method and terminology gely from Hegel who spoke in terms of *Geist*, not of *Kultur*. It should not be forgotten, however, that Hegel's *Weltgeist* is supposed to manifest itself at different times and in different places within groups referred to as nations. *Weltgeist* thus institutionalized becomes *Volksgeist*, and the concrete investigation of any given *Volksgeist* is nothing else than the Hegelian version of the comparative study of cultures of Herder and the historiography he represents. In spite of the idealistic phraseology which Hegel has carried *ad absurdum*, Hegel's concrete analyses of his own and other cultures are no less rich in material and insight than, for instance, Spengler's descriptions of those institutions, ideologies, and behavior patterns in which a culture's "soul" supposedly manifests itself.

Yet, the reemergence of the *Kultur* concept both in Germany and in Russia attests to the limitations of the Hegelian method and terminology. *Geist*, it appeared, was excessively laden with unstated methodological premises; culture served far better as a concept through which to view the social structure and institutions, behavior patterns, ideologies, and ethos of a given society in their totality and interdependence. Consequently, in the latter part of the century, when Klemm, Rickert, and others revived the *Kultur* concept in Germany, the concept of *kul'tura* enters the writings of Russian social scientists. Danilevskii's book, in which the term seems to have been used for the first time in Russia, is perhaps the most systematic statement of ideas latent in the entire Slavophile tradition. Marking the transition from cultural Slavophilism to political Pan-Slavism, it is the most significant statement of the secularization of Slavophile cultural and religious ideologies, and has fittingly been dubbed the "text book of Pan-Slavism."

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when Russian social thought flowered in unprecedented intensity and produced the most

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e place of the Kantian idea he then posited the mand for a culture of the beautiful, i.e., for an sentially aesthetic orientation of human endeavor. While these Letters were an all-important har- ger of the Romantic movement in Germany, the ncept of "aesthetic culture" developed in them did t, apparently, come into general usage.

[9] Cf. Konrad Bittner, "J. G. Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," in: *Germanoslavica*, vol. II (1932–33), no. 4, pp. 453–80; also: Karl Staehlin, "Die Entstehung des Panslavismus," in: *Germanoslavica*, vol. IV (1936), p. 1–25 and 237–62.

diverse schools, the term *kul'tura* was used in the most diverse meanings.

Leontiev (1831–91) was greatly influenced by Danilevskii, though he insisted on identifying *kul'tura* with nations, similarly as Hegel had made nations the carriers of *Volksgeist*. Each nation thus has a culture of its own; and for Leontiev culture had primarily æsthetic significance.

Lavrov and Iuzhakov, both in the positivist tradition, spoke of culture in the sense of the statically given aspects of each society on which human intelligence and human labor works for progress or, in Lavrov's terminology, for civilization. For civilization, according to Lavrov, is "culture vitalized by the work of thought."[10] Attempting to define culture, Lavrov writes that each generation of mankind "receives from nature and history a totality of needs and appetites which are to a considerable extent conditioned by cultural habits and traditions. It satisfies these needs and appetites by the customs of life and the inherited social institutions, by its craft art [art is here used in the sense of know-how] and its routine technology. All that constitutes its culture, or the zoological element in the life of mankind."[11]

> The culture of a society is the milieu given by history for the work of thought, and which conditions the *limits of possibilities* for that work in a given epoch with the same inevitability to which at all times the unchangeable law of nature sets limits to that work. Thought is the sole agent which communicates some *human* quality to social culture. The history of thought, conditioned by culture, in connection with the history of culture which changes under the influence of thought,—there you have the entire history of civilization. Into an intelligent history of mankind can go only such events as explain the history of culture and thought in their interaction.[12]

At another place he makes even clearer tha progress is man's movement *away from* culture, to civilization. In a critical review o Mikhailovsky's theory of progress, Lavrov maintained that where there is no criticism, a in that theory, there can be no progress at all "History would stop. The way I understand the word 'civilization' it would be inapplicabl to such a society, *which would be leading purely cultural life, the life of the highes vertebrates.*"[13]

Paul Miliukov appears to have taken th concept of culture in its broadest anthropological sense. His three-volume work *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury* (Outlin of a history of Russian culture),[14] deals wit population, economic, political, and social institutions, religious life, education, nationalism and public opinion.

As early as 1860, in an article entitle "Chto takoe antropologia?" (What is anthropology?), Lavrov had declared that anthropology should be the roof science integratin all our knowledge of man and society. Bu the conventional use of the word "anthropology" in late nineteenth-century Russi tended to restrict its meaning to physical anthropology. It was at the suggestion of a professor of zoology, Anatol' Petrovich Bogdanov, that an anthropological section was adde to the Society of Lovers of Natural Scienc (Obshchestvo liubitelei estestvoznaiia) at th University of Moscow in 1864. And it was natural scientist and geographer, Dmitr Nikolaevich Anuchin, who was the first t occupy the chair in anthropology establishe at Moscow University in 1876. He too regarded anthropology as a branch of th natural sciences and relegated social or cultur aspects to ethnography, which, for him, wa a branch of historical science.[15]

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[10] "Istoricheskie pis'ma," (Historical letters) no. VI: "Kul'tura i mysl'," (Culture and thought) in: P. L. Lavrov, *Izbrannye sochineniia na sotsial'no-politicheskie temy v vos'mi tomakh* (Selected works on socio-political topics, in 8 volumes). Moscow, 1934, vol. I, p. 243.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 244. This and the following translations are those of the author.

[13] "Formula progressa g. Mikhailovskogo," (Mr. Mikhailovski's formula of progress), *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 404 (italics mine). For some remarks on the theories of both Lavrov and Iuzhakov in English, cf. Julius F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology*, New York, 191 Columbia University Press, pp. 107 and 161–62.

[14] 2nd ed., Sankt Peterburg, 1896–1903.

[15] Cf. his statement that "ethnographic groups not coincide with anthropological ones due to the fa that they are products, not of biological developmen but of cultural-historical influences," from an artic entitled "Rossiia v antropologicheskom otnoshenii (Russia in the anthropological sense) quoted by M. Levin, "Dmitrii Nikolaevich Anuchin," in *Tru Instituta Etnografii imeni N. N. Miklukh-Makla* new series, vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1947, p. 12.

Twentieth-century Russian thought has een a curious revival of Danilevskiis ideas, ot within the Soviet Union, to be sure, but nong an emigré group calling itself the urasian movement.[16]

The beginning of the movement is marked y the publication of "*Evropa i chelovehestvo*" (Europe and mankind) by Prince I. S. Trubetskoi (Sofia, 1920). Trubetskoi ejects the "cultural fallacy" of European ocial science, both in its chauvinistic and its osmopolitan form,[17] and asserts the inviolable utonomy of culture. Westernization is seen s the evil of our age; the "blessings of civilizaon" are denounced, and all cultures are called o become conscious of themselves, assert iemselves, and resist the encroachment of ivilization. Unlike Danilevskii, Trubetskoi consistent in his view that culture is exlusive and non-transferable; for, whereas anilevskii had tended to attribute a world iission to the Slavs, a mission to make Slavic ulture dominant in the entire world, Truetskoi does not substitute such a pan-Slavic or the rejected pan-European ideal.

A curious development in Eurasian thought as that the representatives of this movement rifted toward a reconciliation of old Slavic alues with Communism. The Russian revoluon was hailed as a revolt of the Eurasian ulture against the West. The former "has een smothered by two hundred years of a ionarchy kowtowing to Europe; and . . . the Revolution, though in its conscious will it was a particularly vigorous affirmation of the European-made ideal of godless Communism, was in its subconscious essence the revolt of the Russian masses against the domination of a Europeanized and renegade upper class."[18]

In keeping with the reversal of Russia's Western expansion after the First World War, the Eurasians redefined the area of the Russian-Eurasian *Kultur*, and tried to establish this Eurasian community in terms of geographical, linguistic, ethnical, social, and historical unity.[19]

Thus the concept of culture survived in modern Russian thought (outside the Soviet Union) not only in the strictest anthropological-ethnological sense, but also in its more intuitive meanings reminiscent of Spengler's historical scheme. In addition, it has been used in the sense of culturation by that group of Russian neo-mediævalists of which Berdiaev is the best known representative. In his "*Khristianstvo i kul'tura*," E. Spektorskii asserts that culture is man's ability to master nature, society, and himself. His thesis is that our unprecedentedly high achievements of material and social culture are threatened by the destruction of spiritual culture, and he calls for a spiritual revival, for a preoccupation with spiritual culture, which in his opinion must be based squarely on the New Testament.[20]

Finally, some elements of Russian nationalism during the first World War similar to their German counterpart, took refuge with the myth of culture by making the spread of Russia's superior culture one of the chief war aims. The word *kul'tura*, especially with the adjective "national" preceding it, turned into a thinly veiled ideology of national domination and national expansion, not only to justify pan-Slavist ambitions, but also to rationalize the tsarist policy of forced russification.[21]

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[16] For a brief characterization of the Eurasian iovement, cf. D. S. Mirsky, "The Eurasian Moveient," *Slavonic Review*, vol. VI, no. 17 (December, 927), pp. 312 ff.; cf. also Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik er Panideen*, Berlin, 1931, p. 17–26.

[17] Trubetskoi maintains that the terms "mankind," iuman civilization," "world order," and such, are uite unreal, and betray as much Western egoentricity as the classical ideas that Hellas or the oman *orbis terrarum* constituted the whole civilized orld. Thus cosmopolitanism and chauvinism are ifferent only in degree, not in principle — an idea hich has recently been incorporated in the Comiunist Party line by Zhdanov. Cosmopolitanism and hauvinism, according to this line, are bourgeois leologies; the contrasting proletarian virtues are iternationalism and Soviet patriotism.

[18] D. S. Mirsky, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

[19] George V. Vernadskii attempted to write a urasian history in his *Opyt istorii Evrazii s poloviny bestogo veka do nastoiashchego vremeni* (Attempt at a history of Eurasia from the middle of the sixth century up to the present time), Berlin, 1934.

Roman Iakobson tried to establish and define a group of Eurasian languages to show their close relation: *K kharakteristike evraziiskogo iazykovogo soiuza* (Toward a characterization of the Eurasian language union), Paris, 1931.

Pëtr N. Savitskii saw Eurasia as a separate world in geographical terms. His concept of Space-Development-Types (tipy mestorazvitiia) is, expressly, a geopolitical modification of Danilevskii's "cultural-historical types": "The concept of space-development has to be joined with Danilevskii's concept of cultural-historical type . . . For every one of these types there is a corresponding 'space-development.'" — *Rossiia — osobyi mir* (Russia, a world by itself), Paris, 1929, p. 65. Cf. also his *Geograficheskie osobennosti Rossii* (The geographical peculiarities of Russia), Prague, 1927.

[20] E. Spektorskii, *Khristianstvo i kul'tura*, (Christianity and culture), Prague, 1925.

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[21] Spektorskii refers to this use of the concept in *op. cit.*, p. 10. Cf. also Lenin's criticism of this use of the term referred to in Appendix B, *infra.*

APPENDIX B: THE USE OF THE TERM CULTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION

By

Alfred G. Meyer

When Stalin, in his first letter on linguistics,[1] asserted that language was not part of the superstructure of any given society, he took a decisive step in the direction of recognizing the existence of certain cultural features which are older and have a more lasting stability than social structures organized in a common effort to produce the means of life and its reproduction. For the last twenty years or so, Soviet ideology has come to give explicit recognition to a *national culture* which transcends the scheme of historical development outlined by Marx and Engels. The length to which it has gone in this may be illustrated by a section on "Russian culture and the culture of the nationalities of Russia" in the special volume on the Soviet Union of the new Great Soviet Encyclopædia: [2]

> The rich and progressive Russian culture exerted, during the nineteenth century, quite a great and fruitful influence on the development of spiritual culture among the numerous nationalities of Russia. Tsarism, with its reactionary national-colonial policy, strove to sow disunity among the nationalities of Russia and set them against each other. The progressive Russian culture brought the nationalities of Russia together and united them in one brotherly and friendly family whose members were interested in overthrowing tsarism, in abolishing serfdom and its lasting consequences, and who from the very beginning of the nineteenth century became involved in an all-Russian revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the proletariat.

This increasing emphasis which Soviet ideology has been paying to the national traditions of Russia and its many nationalities must be seen as the natural outgrowth of Stalin's theory of "Socialism in one country." [3] At the same time it must be realized that it is directly opposed to all that Marx and Lenin had to say about national culture.

In Marxism, the concepts devised to express the totality of all social phenomena in their interrelation is not culture, but the mode of production, with its two important subconcepts, the forces of production and the social relations of production. The term "culture" enters into the conceptual framework of Marxism only on the level of the superstructure. But on this level it has much the same content as the current anthropological concept of culture, with the proviso that the economic substructure and the corresponding class relationships are on a more fundamental level; moreover, there is a tendency in Marxist usage to endow the term "culture" with a meaning of achievement or culturation reminiscent of the use which the Enlightenment made of it. Two Soviet dictionary definitions will illustrate these points; the first is from the *Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka* (Reference dictionary of the Russian language) of Professor D. N. Ushakov,[4] the second from the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopædia) vol. xxxv.[5]

> *Kul'tura* — 1. The totality of human achievements in the subjection of nature, in technology, education, and social organization. . .
>
> *Kul'tura* — 5. The material activity of labor of men which conditions the evolution of social man with all the multiplicity of his spiritual interests and

---

[1] I. V. Stalin, "Otnositel'no marksizma v iazykoznanii," (Concerning Marxism in linguistics), *Pravda*, June 20, 1950.

[2] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopædia), special volume, "Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Moscow, 1948, p. 565.

[3] For a survey of this ideological development in its various ramifications, cf. F. Barghoorn, "Stalin and the Russian Cultural Heritage," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 178–203, April 1952. I am obliged to Jindrich Kucera and Paul Friedrich who, independently and simultaneously, called my attention to this article.

[4] Moscow, 1935.

[5] Moscow, 1937.

> needs, constitutes the basis of all human culture and provides the guiding framework for the explanation of the various forms and the development of culture . . . Culture expresses the historically determined stage and the means of man's mastery over the forces of nature; it manifests itself in the level of technology, organization and habits of labor, organization of social life, in manners, customs, and in morality; its expressions are also the stage and forms of men's ideological development, i.e., language, science, art, literature, philosophy, and the *Weltanschauung* of an age.

Lenin contrasted culture with barbarism, in a passage in which he claimed that the imperialist war was threatening to destroy all the previous achievements of culture:

> It seems that the countries [now at war] are once more turning from civilization and culture to primitive barbarism and are once more undergoing a situation in which behavior becomes unrestrained, and men turn into beasts in the struggle for a piece of bread.[6]

True to the internationalist tradition of his movement, which denied that the nation had any significance as a cultural or social unit, he bitterly scored the use which was made of the concept of culture by nationalists everywhere:

> The class-conscious workers know that the slogan of "national culture" is clerical or bourgeois bluff, no matter whether they talk about Great-Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Polish, Georgian, or any other culture. 125 years ago, when nations were not yet divided into bourgeoisie and proletariat, the slogan of national culture could be a unifying and total call to battle against feudalism and clericalism. But since then the class struggle of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has broken out everywhere. The split of the "united" nation into exploiters and the exploited has become an accomplished fact.
>
> Only clericals or bourgeois can talk about national culture at all. The working masses can talk only about the international culture of the world movement of workers.[7]

Thus it is misleading, in Lenin's opinion, to speak about national culture. And yet, in another sense, there is such a thing; but this national culture is even more clearly bourgeois in content than the myth for which the term is used by nationalists. This is how Lenin saw it:

> Within *each* national culture *elements*—however undeveloped—of democratic and socialist culture exist, for in *each* nation exist a mass of working and exploited people whose conditions of life inevitably generate a democratic and socialist ideology. But in *each* nation also a bourgeois . . . culture exists—moreover not just as "elements," but as the *ruling* culture. Hence "national culture" in general *is* the culture of landlords, priests, and the bourgeoisie.[8]

These polemics against the concept of national culture, it must be noted, were directed not only against nationalists, and pan-Slavists from the camp of the bourgeois or pre-capitalist classes, but, even more sharply perhaps, against such socialists who, like the Austrian school (Karl Renner and Otto Bauer), the Marxist movement in Georgia, or the Jewish "Bund," advocated a vigorous struggle for national or cultural-national autonomy.[9]

For culture, according to Lenin, is the superstructure of class relationships and has therefore little or nothing to do with nations, except in the measure as nations themselves are part of that superstructure. Let us once more adduce part of a Soviet dictionary definition of culture which illustrates this point:

---

[6] "Doklad o tekushchem momente 27 iiunia 1918 g." (Report on the current moment of 27 June 1918), in: V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* (Works), 2nd ed., vol. XXIII, p. 77. Cf. also an earlier statement: "The imperialist war . . . is placing mankind before the dilemma either to sacrifice all culture or else to throw off the capitalist yoke by way of a revolution, remove the rule of the bourgeoisie, and to conquer a socialist society and a firm peace," "Za khleb i mir" (For bread and peace), *op. cit.*, vol. XXII, p. 145.

[7] "Kak episkop Nikon zashchishchaet ukraintsev?" (How bishop Nikon defends the Ukrainians), *op. cit.*, vol. XVI, p. 618. For similar polemics, cf. also the following articles: "Kriticheskie zametki po natsional'nomu voprosu" (Critical remarks concerning the national problem), *op. cit.*, vol. XVII, pp. 136–39; "Liberaly i demokraty v voprose o iazykakh" (Liberals and democrats in the problem of languages), vol. XVI, pp. 595–97; and "Nuzhen li obiazatel'nyi gosudarstvennyi iazyk?" (Is a compulsory state language necessary?), *op. cit.*, vol. XVII, pp. 179–81. All of these articles were written in 1913 or early 1914, a period when Lenin and socialists everywhere became more than ever aware of the force of nationalism throughout Europe.

[8] "Kriticheskie zametki po natsional'nomu voprosu," *op. cit.*, vol. XVII, pp. 137 and 143.

[9] Cf. "O 'kul'turno-natsional'noi' avtonomii" (On "cultural-national" autonomy) (1913), *op. cit.*, vol. XVII, pp. 92–95.

> In a class society culture too is class culture: each uling class endeavors to create such culture as vould strengthen its power. In the period of the ighest flowering of capitalism, bourgeois culture ave the world great savants, inventors, philosophers, nd writers. The bourgeoisie made use of the fruits f this culture for the purpose of increasing its vealth and intensifying the exploitation of those who vork. At the present time, in the period of imperial-m, bourgeois culture is decaying and approaches its nd, and the cultural level of the population goes own. The working class is creating its own socialist ulture, by appropriating and critically re-working all ositive achievements of the past. On that basis social-t culture creates a science, technology, and art which re higher than under capitalism. It uncovers in-xhaustible riches of popular creativity in all the eoples of the USSR. In distinction from bourgeois ulture, socialist culture is directed toward the tisfaction of the needs of the broadest popular asses. Hence it is all-human culture. Simultaneously, n account of differences in language, customs, and ther national peculiarities in the different peoples of e Soviet Union, socialist culture takes on a different ational form. "Proletarian in content, national in rm, that is the all-human culture toward which cialism is striding." (Stalin).[10]

Similarly, the article on *kul'tura* in the reat Soviet Encyclopædia maintains that in ass society, culture is the culture of the iling class. Conversely, only classes that are iling have a chance to develop culture. lence, in order that the proletariat may ac-iire culture, it must first seize power and ecome the ruling class. "Only the victorious roletarian revolution creates the conditions r . . . the cultural revolution," i.e., for the ppropriation of culture by the proletariat. r the same reason it must be expected — the ncyclopædia continues — that the proletariat still *uncultured* at the time it makes the volution. It can catch up culturally with the urgeoisie only after the revolution. "Social-n — to use the words of Lenin — begins here culture spreads among the millions."

This "cultural revolution" at which the encyclopædia hints became one of Lenin's chief preoccupations after the October revolution. He wrote about it repeatedly from the middle of 1918 until the end of 1923. Abstractly, he had spoken about the problem even before the war, though in much more optimistic terms than after the revolution:

> The international culture which is already being created systematically by the proletariat of all countries takes up and incorporates not the "national culture" (of any one national collective) as a whole, but takes out of *each and every* national culture *exclusively* its consistently democratic and socialist elements.[11]

More concretely, the problem was defined only later. Thus he wrote in 1922:

> The task is to bring the victorious proletarian revolution together with bourgeois culture, bourgeois science and technology, which have so far been the attainment of few; this is, I repeat, a difficult task. Everything here depends on organization, on the discipline of the advanced section of the working masses.[12]

Nor did he have any more illusions then about the ease and speed with which the cultural revolution might be accomplished; and yet he did not think that the low cultural level of the Russian masses should have argued against the seizure of power by the bolshevik party.

> Our enemies (he wrote in 1923 in one of his last articles) have often said to us that we have undertaken the foolhardy job of planting socialism in an insufficiently cultured country . . . in our country the political and social revolution has [indeed] turned out to precede that cultural transformation and cultural revolution, which we are nonetheless facing at the present.
>
> . . . for us that cultural revolution presents unbelievable difficulties both of purely cultural nature (for we are illiterate) and of material nature (for in order to be cultured a certain development of the material means of production, a certain material base, is needed.)[13]

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[10] From the definition of *kul'tura* in Aleksandrov, al., *Politicheskii Slovar*, (Political dictionary), oscow, 1940.

[11] "Tezisy po natsional'nomu voprosu" (Theses on e national problem), *op. cit.*, vol. XVI, p. 510. Cf. o "Proekt platformy k IV. s" ezdu sotsial-demo-atii latyshskogo kraia" (Draft platform for the fourth congress of social-democrats of the Lettish region), *op. cit.*, vol. XVII, p. 66.

[12] "Uspekhi i trudnosti sovetskoi vlasti" (The successes and difficulties of the Soviet régime), *op. cit.*, vol. XXIV, p. 68.

[13] "O kooperatsii" (On coperation), *op. cit.*, vol. XXVII, p. 397. Cf. also "O nashei revoliutsii" (About

The "culture" Lenin had in mind when he preached the cultural revolution entailed technological skills, political maturity, and other aspects of *westernization*. His use of the term is thus a return to the eighteenth-century use of the word in the tradition of the Enlightenment. The adjective "uncultured" was, in addition, used very often to characterize the rough-shod methods of Soviet and party bureaucracy, its authoritarian degeneration and its corrupt abuses. Culture, then, was by implication the achievement of a smoothly and democratically functioning administrative apparatus. A lengthy passage from his political report at the XIth party congress in March 1922, the last of these congresses he attended, will illustrate this. He was speaking here of dangers threatening the revolution from within, in spite of the fact that the régime had all the political and economic power it wanted. But one thing was lacking:

> It is *kul'turnost'* which those communists who are in the leading positions are lacking. Let us take Moscow, with its 4700 responsible communists, and take that weighty bureaucratic machine — who is running it? I greatly doubt whether one can say that communists are running that heavy thing. If I must tell the truth, then it is not they who are running it, but it runs them. Something has happened here that is similar to what they used to tell us about history in our childhood. This is what they taught us: Sometimes it happens that one people conquers another people, and then the people who conquered are the conquerors, and the conquered one are the defeated. That is very simple, and everyone can understand it. But what happens with the culture of these peoples? Here matters are not so simple. If the people who did the conquering are more cultured than the defeated people, then the former will impose their culture on the latter, but if it is the other way around, then what happens is that the defeated will impose their culture on the conqueror. Has not something similar happened in the capital of the RSFSR; is it not true here that 4700 communists (almost an entire division, and all of them the very élite) turn out to have been subjected by an alien culture? Indeed, we might even get the impression here that the defeated have a high culture. Nothing of the sort: Their culture is miserable and insignificant, and yet it is greater than ours. Howeve
> pitiful, however miserable, it is nevertheless greate
> than that of our responsible communist functionaries
> because they do not have sufficient skill in governing.'

This use of the word *kul'tura* (and th
virtually synonymous *kul'turnost'*) to denot
culturation has survived in the Soviet Unio
up to the present and is applied to embrac
all and any aspects of culturation. The Sovie
press and other Soviet literature is filled wit
admonitions to raise the level of culture i
tractor maintenance, in the fight agains
workers' absenteeism, in daily etiquette, bot
public and private, in cutting administrativ
red tape, and virtually all other activities.

In the mid-thirties, greater stress was lai
in Soviet society on the education of leadership cadres. Therefore we read in the Grea
Encyclopædia that culture entails the education of leaders and specialists in technology
science, the arts, and also in party work; i
includes the struggle against illiteracy, superstitions, and un-bolshevik ideologies, henc
positively, it means ideological rearmamen
And the highest achievement of culture, it i
implied, lies in making all men into fully clas
conscious citizens and proletarians.

Used far less strictly, the term has bee
applied in the U.S.S.R. also to denote th
highest levels of the superstructure; ideolog
art, and philosophy. And in a term lik
"Parks of culture and rest" it signifies nothin
else perhaps than leisure-time activities an
enjoyments in the broadest sense, though i
may specifically refer to the "cultural" enjoyments offered in such parks, as open-air concerts, dancing instruction, or the sight o
statues, monuments, and flower beds.

In addition, the concept of culture has bee
used by Soviet anthropologists — or, as the
would call themselves, ethnographers — i
the general anthropological sense. One of th
definitions of *kul'tura* given by Ushakov[15] i
"A specific way of social, economic, and/o
intellectual life during a given era, of a give

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our revolution), *op. cit.*, vol. XXVII, pp. 400–01. Concerning the great length of time which the cultural revolution will require, cf. Lenin's speech at the second all-Union congress of political propagandists (II. vserossiiskii s"ezd politprosvetov), 1921, *op. cit.*, vol. XXVII, pp. 51–52.

[14] V. I. Lenin, *Sobranie Sochinenii* (Collecte
Works), (ed. 1), vol. XVIII, part II, p. 43, Mosco
and Petrograd, 1923.

[15] *Op. cit.*

eople or class," and for examples the diction-ry adduces "neolithic culture; the culture of ncient Egypt; and proletarian culture."

This is not the place to discuss the method-logy of cultural anthropology in the Soviet Jnion. It is a matter of course that the study f culture and cultures must fit into the frame-vork of Marxist-Leninist historical material-sm. Yet culture study is considered important nough for the establishment, in the 1920's, f an Institute for the History of Material ulture within the Academy of Sciences of he U.S.S.R. The institute was, until recently, amed after Professor Marr, who was its first resident. It appears to be preoccupied with esearch and publications on the history of ulture within the territory of the Soviet Jnion; and the present emphasis is on attempts demonstrate the high level and independence f mediæval, ancient, and prehistoric culture f Russia.[16]

To show the range of topics included under the heading of culture as used by Soviet ethnographers, archæologists, and cultural anthropologists, it might be useful to list the chapter headings in two of the works just cited. Likhachëv treats Russian culture in the fifteenth century under the following headings: Political theory; enlightenment; chronicles; epic; literature; architecture; painting; new developments in customs and mores; and the art of war. Grekov and Artamanov include the following topics in their book on the culture of ancient Russia; Agriculture and trades; crafts; settlement; housing; clothing; food ways and means of communication; trade and trade routes; money and money circulation; military affairs (strategy and tactics); armament; fortifications. They make clear, however, that they have purposely restricted themselves to a treatment of material culture, and a second volume is to deal with "spiritual culture."

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[16] Cf. B. D. Grekov, *Kul’tura Kievskoi Rusi* (The ulture of Kievan Russia), Moscow-Leningrad, 1944; lso D. S. Likhachëv, *Kul’tura Rusi epokha obrazo-aniia russkogo natsional’nogo gosudarstva* (Russia's ulture during the era of the formation of the Russian national state), Leningrad, 1946; also: B. D. Grekov and M. I. Artamanov (ed.), *Istoria Kul’tury drevnei Rusi* (Culture history of ancient Russia), Moscow-Leningrad, 1948.

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